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Executive Summary 
Motivation 
Over the past 30 years, within the field of infrastructure management, as infrastructure systems have 
grown more complex, the level of managerial and financial oversight has increased, and the 
computation power has become less expensive and more readily available, infrastructure managers 
have increasingly turned to computerized infrastructure management systems to aid in the 
management of the built infrastructure. An infrastructure management system acts as an 
infrastructure manager’s 1) inspection database detailing the current state of the built infrastructure, 
2) infrastructure performance simulation platform modeling the potential future infrastructure 
performance, 3) infrastructure deterioration and provided service estimator evaluating the 
equivalent financial loss associated with infrastructure deterioration and decreased provided levels 
of service, and 4) infrastructure maintenance action development engine formulating and scheduling 
technically and financially optimal infrastructure maintenance solutions. 
Historically, the performance simulation module of infrastructure management systems has focused 
primarily upon modeling gradual infrastructure deterioration processes, such as corrosion, and the 
infrastructure provided service estimator has employed nominal values for quantifying the public’s 
evaluation of the provided infrastructure performance. These approaches have caused infrastructure 
managers to focus their attention and funding towards combating gradual infrastructure 
deterioration while giving priority maintenance status to infrastructure objects that place the largest 
nominally evaluated total performance impact on society.  
While this approach has helped infrastructure managers to more efficiently manage the built 
infrastructure, such an approach is only efficient if it is unfailingly implemented over multiple 
decades. Unfortunately, the current limited infrastructure management system scope has exposed 
infrastructure managers to two potentially disruptive forces – potential unforeseen natural hazard 
induced technical failures and potential political and/or financial funding support failures due to 
incongruent evaluation of the provided level of performance between the infrastructure manager’s 
nominal evaluation measures and the experiencing society. While these two disruptive forces 
originate in two very different elements of an infrastructure management system, they both can 
induce the same result – undermining of the intended technically and financially optimal 
infrastructure management solution. 
Objective and originality 
To work towards rectifying both of these limitations, the current work has developed methodologies 
for both quantifying the long-term infrastructure natural hazard risk exposure and estimating an 
individual’s experience-based evaluation of the provided level of infrastructure performance. 
The methodology for assessing natural hazard induced technical infrastructure failures has focused 
around developing an infrastructure component potential failure assessment procedure which 
employs data within existing infrastructure and transportation management systems and currently 
under development natural hazard identification maps. This failure assessment procedure is 
designed to identify the locations and estimate the associated consequences of potential natural 
hazard induced failures. This failure probability and failure consequence information is then 
employed to quantify an annualized and a multi-year infrastructure link risk exposure.  
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The methodology for estimating an individual’s experience-based evaluation of the provided level of 
infrastructure performance has been developed by employing research findings from the fields of 
psychology and behavioral economics to develop the affective assessment approach, a variance-
based evaluation tool. This evaluation tool employs an individual’s range and quality of experienced 
infrastructure performance in time to predict the individual’s current induced affect and future 
sensitivity to the provided levels of infrastructure performance. As this is a constructed evaluation 
approach, employing the affective assessment approach directly in the third infrastructure 
management module, evaluating equivalent financial loss associated with decreased provided levels 
of service, can be computationally prohibitive as each potential sequence would need to be 
modeled. It is, therefore, proposed to use the affective assessment approach as a reality check 
against which the developed technically and financially optimal management solution can be 
assessed and solutions which provide too low or inconsistent levels of infrastructure performance 
can be identified, reevaluated or discarded.  
Results and benefits 
With this additional technical information and perspectives, infrastructure managers are able to 
actively consider an object’s natural hazard risk exposure in modeling the infrastructure 
deterioration and in developing optimal maintenance actions. Furthermore, infrastructure managers 
are able to determine the annual funding that should be invested and made available to respond to 
current and future natural hazard induced object failures. By, calibrating and implanting the affective 
assessment approach, infrastructure managers can also study how proposed technically optimal 
solutions may be socially received and can select solutions which best maintain social support 
throughout the duration of the maintenance solution. 
Within the field of infrastructure management, the past 30 years has been invested in developing 
standardized and computerized infrastructure management systems. With these systems 
implemented, infrastructure managers are starting to observe their strengths but also their 
limitations. This work has focused on formulating quantitative methods to develop solutions for two 
of these limitations. It is hoped that these methods might be further developed, calibrated and 
implemented to improve existing infrastructure management systems and the infrastructure and 
society they manage. 
Key Words: 
Infrastructure management, component failure assessment, natural hazard risk management, 
experience-based evaluation, affective assessment approach 
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Résumé 
Motivation 
Les 30 dernières années ont vu, le domaine des systèmes de gestion d’infrastructures se 
complexifier, le niveau de veille financière et de gestion augmenter, la puissance de calcul devenir 
plus accessible et moins coûteuse, et les gestionnaires d’infrastructure se tourner vers une utilisation 
croissante des systèmes de gestion d’infrastructures assistés par ordinateur. Un système de gestion 
d'infrastructure fonctionne comme un gestionnaire d’infrastructures en ayant recours à : 1) une base 
de donnée répertoriant l’état des structures 2) des simulations modélisant les performances de 
potentielles infrastructures 3) l’estimation des pertes financières équivalentes, dues à la 
détérioration de l’infrastructure ainsi qu’à la baisse des niveaux de service, et 4) à un moteur de 
développement d’actions de maintenance d’infrastructures, formulant et planifiant les solutions 
financières et techniques optimales de maintenance. 
Historiquement, les modules de simulation de performance des systèmes de gestion 
d’infrastructures se sont concentrés dans un premier temps, sur la modélisation des processus de 
dégradation progressive de l’infrastructure, comme la corrosion, et des valeurs statistiques étaient 
utilisées par les estimateurs de service d’infrastructure pour quantifier l’évaluation publique des 
performances de l’infrastructure. Ces approches ont dirigé l’attention et le financement des 
gestionnaires d’infrastructures à combattre contre la détérioration progressive de l’infrastructure, ce 
en rendant prioritaires les statuts de maintenance des  composants d’infrastructures ayant l’impact 
nominal le plus important lors de leur l’évaluation au cours de l’étude de l’impact sociétal de 
l’infrastructure.  
Cependant, malgré l’augmentation d’efficacité pourvue aux gestionnaires d’infrastructure, cette 
approche ne peut être efficace que si elle est implémentée de manière continue au cours de 
plusieurs dizaines d’années. Malheureusement l’étendue actuellement limitée des systèmes de 
gestion d’infrastructures, expose les gestionnaires d’infrastructures à deux forces potentiellement 
disruptives - l’induction  potentielle de défaillances techniques par d'imprévisibles catastrophes 
naturelles et des baisses potentielles de support politique et/ou financier, dues à des évaluations 
incongrues des niveaux de performance entre les évaluations statiques du gestionnaire 
d’infrastructures et ceux rencontrés par la société. Malgré les origines très différentes de ces forces 
disruptives, elles peuvent toutes deux conduire au même résultat - la sape financière et technique de 
la solution intentée de gestion de l’infrastructure. 
Objectifs et originalité de la démarche 
Dans une optique de rectification de ces limites, ce travail a développé des méthodologies de 
quantifications de l’exposition à long terme aux risques naturels et à l’estimation du niveau de 
performance de l’infrastructure basé sur l'expérience personnelle d’un individu. 
La méthode d’assertion de risques induits par des catastrophes naturelles causant des défaillances 
techniques c’est concentré autour du développement d’une procédure d’évaluation de potentielle 
défaillance de composants de l’infrastructure, utilisant des données provenant des systèmes de 
gestion des infrastructures et de transport ainsi que des cartes de risque naturels en cours de 
développement. Ces procédures d’identification de risque de défaillance se proposent d’identifier les 
zones et d’estimer les conséquences corollaires de potentielles défaillances induites par les risques 
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naturels. Les informations provenant des probabilités de défaillance et leurs conséquences sont alors 
utilisées pour quantifier un lien d’exposition aux risques annuel et pluriannuel.  
La méthodologie utilisée pour l’estimation des l’évaluation des performances de structures, basée 
sur l’expérience d’un individu, ont été développées en utilisant des résultats expérimentaux 
provenant des domaines de la psychologie et de l’économie comportementale afin de développer un 
modèle d’évaluation de l’affectif, basé sur un outil d’analyse de la variance. Cet outil d’évaluation 
utilise un classement des individus selon le nombre et la qualité des expériences sur les 
performances d’infrastructures rencontrées au cours du temps. Ceci pour prédire les influences 
actuelles et futures de l’affectif dans l’analyse des niveaux de performance de l’infrastructure. Cette 
approche évaluative construite, utilisant directement l’approche d’évaluation affective dans le 
troisième module de gestion d’infrastructures, servant à évaluer la perte financière équivalente 
associée en fonction de la baisse des niveaux de service, peut-être limitant du point de vue 
calculatoire sachant que chaque séquence potentielle devrait être modélisée. Il est, cependant, 
proposé d’utiliser l’approche d’évaluation affective comme un vérificateur de réalité grâce auquel les 
solutions de gestion technique et financière optimales pourront être évaluées, ainsi les solutions 
proposant des niveau de performance d’infrastructure trop bas ou inconsistants pourront être  
réévaluées ou retirées. 
Résultats et bénéfices  
Avec ces perspectives et ces informations techniques additionnelles, les gestionnaires 
d’infrastructures sont capables de considérer activement l’exposition aux risques naturels d’un 
composant en modélisant la détérioration de l’infrastructure et en développant des actions de 
maintenance optimales. En outre, les gestionnaires d’infrastructure sont capables de déterminer la 
somme annuelle devant être mise à disposition et investie afin de répondre aux défaillances induites 
les risques naturels présents et futurs. En calibrant et implantant l’approche par évaluation affective, 
les gestionnaires d’infrastructure peuvent alors étudier quelles seront les solutions techniques 
acceptées socialement et ainsi choisir les solutions socialement optimales durant toute la durée de 
l’intervention de maintenance. 
Dans le domaine de la gestion de structure, les 30 dernières années ont été investies à développer 
des systèmes de gestion d’infrastructure informatisés et standardisés. Une fois ces systèmes 
implémentés, les gestionnaires d’infrastructures pourront alors observer leurs avantages mais aussi 
leurs limites. Ce travail c’est concentré sur la  formulation de méthodes quantitatives afin de fournir 
des solutions sur deux limites de ces systèmes. Il est à espérer qu’un développement, une 
calibration, et une implémentation ultérieure de ces systèmes de gestion seront effectués avec 
comme objectif l'amélioration de la gestion des infrastructures et des sociétés. 
Mots-clés : 
Gestion d’infrastructure, évaluation de rupture de composants, gestion de risque naturel, évaluation 
basée sur l'expérience, approche d’évaluation affective  
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Zusammenfassung 
Motivation 
Während in den vergangenen 30 Jahren Verkehrsinfrastruktursysteme immer komplexer geworden 
sind, das Mass an betriebswirtschaftlicher und finanzieller Übersicht gewachsen und Rechenleistung 
erschwinglicher und leichter verfügbar geworden ist, haben sich Infrastrukturmanager mehr und 
mehr computergestützten Infrastrukturmanagementsystemen zugewandt, um die Verwaltung der 
gebauten Infrastruktur zu bewältigen. Infrastrukturmanagementsysteme fungieren 1) als 
Inspektionsdatenbanken, die den aktuellen Zustand der gebauten Infrastruktur erfassen, 2) als 
Plattform zur Simulation der zukünftigen Leistungsfähigkeit von Infrastruktursystemen, 3) als 
Hilfsmittel zur Abschätzung des Schädigungsausmasses und der Nutzbarkeit der Infrastruktur, das 
den äquivalenten finanziellen Verlust, der mit der Infrastrukturschädigung und der reduzierten 
Nutzbarkeit verbunden ist auswertet und 4) als technische und finanzielle Planungshilfe für optimale 
Unterhaltsarbeiten. 
Früher zielten die Module von Infrastrukturmanagementsysteme zur Modellierung der 
Leistungsfähigkeit vornehmlich auf  die Vorhersage der fortschreitenden Infrastrukturschädigung 
durch beispielsweise Korrosion ab. Die Nutzbarkeitsabschätzung verwendete statische Werte für die 
Quantifizierung der öffentlichen Bewertung der verfügbaren Leistungsfähigkeit der Infrastruktur. 
Diese Ansätze bewirkten, dass Infrastrukturmanager ihre Aufmerksamkeit und Mittel auf die 
Bekämpfung der fortschreitenden Infrastrukturschädigung richteten, wobei Priorität der Unterhalt 
von den Infrastrukturkomponenten bevorzugt wurde, die die grössten nominell bewerteten 
Gesamtauswirkungen auf die Leistungsfähigkeit der Gesellschaft haben. 
Während dieser Ansatz Infrastrukturmanagern geholfen hat die gebaute Infrastruktur effizienter zu 
bewirtschaften, ist ein solcher Ansatz nur dann effizient, wenn er über mehrere Jahrzehnte 
konsequent angewendet wird. Leider hat der aktuell begrenzte Funktionsumfang der 
Infrastrukturmanagementsysteme Infrastrukturmanager zwei möglicherweise zerstörerischen 
Kräften ausgesetzt –  dem potentiellen durch unvorhergesehene Naturgefahren hervorgerufenen 
technischen Versagen und dem potentiellen Verlust politischer und/oder finanzieller Unterstützung 
aufgrund einer inkongruenten Beurteilung des verfügbaren Leistungsfähigkeitsniveaus durch die 
statischen Bewertungsmethoden des Infrastrukturmanagers einerseits und der wahrnehmenden 
Öffentlichkeit andererseits. Während diese beiden zerstörerischen Kräfte ihren Ursprung in zwei sehr 
verschiedenen Elementen eines Infrastrukturmanagementsystems haben, können beide das gleiche 
Ergebnis bewirken – die Unterwanderung der vorgesehenen technisch und finanziell optimalen 
Infrastrukturmanagementlösung. 
Zielstellung und Originalität 
Zur Aufhebung dieser beiden Einschränkungen, wurden in der vorliegenden Arbeit Methoden 
entwickelt, um die langfristige Risikoexposition der Infrastruktur gegenüber Naturgefahren zu 
quantifizieren und um die individuelle, erfahrungsbasierte Beurteilung der verfügbaren 
Infrastrukturleistungsfähigkeit abzuschätzen.  
Die Methodik um technische Ausfälle der Infrastruktur durch Naturgefahren abzuschätzen, richtet 
sich auf die Entwicklung eines Beurteilungsverfahrens für das mögliche Versagen von 
Infrastrukturkomponenten, das Daten aus bestehenden Infrastruktur- und 
Transportmanagementsystemen und gegenwärtig im Entstehen begriffene Karten zur Identifizierung 
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von Naturgefahren verwendet. Dieses Verfahren zur Versagensabschätzung erlaubt es den Ort zu 
lokalisieren und die mit einem möglichen Schadensfall durch Naturgefahren verbundenen 
Konsequenzen zu bewerten. Die Versagenswahrscheinlichkeit und die Information über die 
Schadensfolgen wird dann angewendet, um die Risikoexposition der Infrastruktur im Jahresmittel 
und Mehrjahreszeitraum zu quantifizieren. 
Die Methodik um die individuelle, erfahrungsbasierte Bewertung der verfügbaren 
Infrastrukturleistungsfähigkeit einzuschätzen, wurde unter Verwendung von Forschungsergebnissen 
aus dem Gebiet der Psychologie und der Verhaltensökonomie entwickelt, um den affektiven 
Bewertungsansatz, ein varianzbasiertes Beurteilungswerkzeug, aufzustellen. Dieses 
Beurteilungswerkzeug berücksichtigt frühzeitig den Erfahrungsbereich und die Erfahrungsqualität des 
Einzelnen bezüglich der Infrastrukturleistungsfähigkeit, um den gegenwärtigen Affekt und die 
zukünftige Sensibilität des Einzelnen in Bezug auf die Infrastrukturleistungsfähigkeit vorherzusagen. 
Da dies ein konstruierter Beurteilungsansatz ist, der den affektiven Bewertungsansatz direkt im 
dritten Infrastrukturmanagementmodul ansiedelt, ist die Auswertung der äquivalenten finanziellen 
Verluste, die mit einem gesunkenen Nutzbarkeitsniveau verbunden sind, berechnungsseitig nahezu 
unmöglich, da jede potentielle Sequenz modelliert werden müsste. Daher wird vorgeschlagen, den 
affektiven Bewertungsansatz als einen Realitätscheck anzuwenden dem die erarbeitete technisch 
und finanziell optimale Managementlösung gegenübergestellt werden kann. Lösungen, die zu 
niedrige oder inkonsistente Niveaus der Infrastrukturleistungsfähigkeit liefern, können damit 
identifiziert, neu beurteilt oder verworfen werden. 
Ergebnisse und Nutzen  
Mit diesen zusätzlichen technischen Informationen und Perspektiven sind Infrastrukturmanager in 
der Lage die Risikoexposition einer Komponente durch Naturgefahren in der Modellierung der 
Infrastrukturschädigung aktiv zu  berücksichtigen und optimale Erhaltungsmassnahmen zu ergreifen. 
Darüber hinaus sind sie in der Lage, die jährliche Finanzierung festzulegen, die aufgewendet und zur 
Verfügung gestellt werden sollte, um auf den aktuellen und zukünftigen Ausfall von 
Infrastrukturkomponenten durch Naturgefahren zu reagieren. 
Durch Kalibrierung und Implementierung des affektiven Bewertungsansatzes können 
Infrastrukturmanager ebenso untersuchen, wie vorgeschlagene technisch optimale Lösungen 
gesellschaftlich aufgenommen werden und können somit Lösungen auswählen, die die grösste 
gesellschaftliche Unterstützung während der Dauer der Erhaltungsmassnahmen erfahren. 
Auf dem Gebiet des Infrastrukturmangements wurden die vergangenen 30 Jahre in die Entwicklung 
standardisierter und computergestützter Infrastrukturmanagementsysteme investiert. Mit der 
fortlaufenden Anwendung dieser Systeme beginnen Infrastrukturmanager die Systemstärken und -
grenzen zu ermitteln. Die vorliegende Arbeit zielt darauf ab, quantitative Methoden für die Behebung 
zwei dieser Einschränkungen zu formulieren. Es besteht die Hoffnung, dass diese Methoden 
weiterentwickelt, kalibriert und implementiert werden, um bestehende 
Infrastrukturmanagementsysteme und die Infrastruktur und Gesellschaft, denen sie dienen, zu 
verbessern. 
Schlüsselwörter: 
Infrastrukturmanagement, Bauteilversagensbeurteilung, Rsikiomanagement von Naturgefahren, 
Erfahrungsbasierte Bewertung, Affektiver Beurteilungsansatz 
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Foreword 
 
The field of infrastructure management has made significant progress over the last 20 years. 
Infrastructure management systems have been developed focusing primarily on modelling of 
deterioration processes. While this approach certainly helped infrastructure managers to manage 
more efficiently the built infrastructure, it lacks considering the more and more relevant questions of 
1) hazard situations due to natural hazards and 2) insufficient support for funding of infrastructure 
maintenance (which might be due to inadequate consideration of the user’s evaluation of 
infrastructure performance).  
In his thesis, Mr Birdsall provides engineering methods and approaches for 1) quantifying the 
exposure to natural hazards and 2) considering the user’s evaluation of the performance of the 
infrastructure system, which are validated by means of case studies. This research covers a broad 
range of disciplines ranging from failure behaviour of structures to topics from psychology and 
economics while dealing with computational aspects of infrastructure management tools. Bringing all 
these disciplines together in a research work devoted to one topic, i.e. infrastructure management, 
was a real challenge. The result is very satisfying since this thesis provides methods useful for the 
infrastructure manager and for implementation into infrastructure management tools. 
Mr Birdsall provides the proof of his capabilities to conduct a scientific study and to solve complex 
problems. In the name of the whole team of MCS, I thank him for his thorough and constant 
investment to the thesis topic as well as for his professional skills and personal qualities. 
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Failure scenario the process by which a hazard can cause structural 
or functional damage to an infrastructure object 
FEMA United States Federal Emergency Management 
Agency 
Functional performance the functional state of the infrastructure object
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Geographic information 
systems 
GIS an geographically-based approach to presenting 
data and conducting analyses 
HCP habitat conservation plans
Hazard H a potentially damaging phenomenon 
Hazard parameter h a variable quantifying a hazard (e.g. flood depth)
Hazard parameter intensity x the magnitude of a hazard parameter 
HAZards United States HAZUS-MH a geographic information systems based 
computerized natural hazard risk assessment tool 
distributed by FEMA 
hedonic psychology the study of what makes interactions pleasant or 
unpleasant 
Indirect consequences the financial valuation of the losses and additional 
expenditures incurred from transport and societal 
related impacts of an infrastructure object’s 
reduced functional performance 
Induced affect the induced emotion of a given interaction 
Interaction the direct personal usage of a public 
transportation system 
LSGIs local self-governing institutions 
National Bridge Inventory 
Database 
NBI an inventory of all bridges within the United 
States with a span longer than 6 meters 
NYDOT New York State Department of Transportation
Return period RP an estimate of the average time interval between 
equivalent intensity events [years] 
Risk of failure H
iR  the probabilistic quantification of the 
consequences a potentially damaging 
phenomenon, a hazard (H), can cause failure of an 
infrastructure object (i) 
SilvaProtect a natural hazard indication mapping resource for 
determining the largest possible extent of gravity-
induced natural hazards 
StorMe a nationally supported, cantonally administrated 
natural hazard event documentation database 
Structural performance the structural state of the infrastructure object
Service interruption duration the time required to return a failed infrastructure 
object to a fully functional state 
Swiss highway structures 
database 
KUBA an infrastructure management system developed 
to manage the swiss highway structures 
Swiss transportation model STM a subset of over 51,000 transportation links which 
are a minimum of 2.8m wide and have the 
capacity to carry a reasonable amount of traffic 
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SwissTopo Swiss national office for geographic information 
systems 
Vector25 an object type-based geographic vectorization of 
the Swiss transportation systems at a scale of 
1:25000 
Vulnerability the consequences a hazard parameter of a given 
intensity can cause failure of an infrastructure 
object 
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Table of Symbols 
Latin Upper Case 
Symbol  Definition 
A the number of non-depreciated interactions [  ] 
ABSE area of bridge superstructure exposed to the hazard [m
2] 
AGW the hazard induced axial wall forces [kN] 
As the area of the tensile reinforcement within the width b [mm
2] 
As’ the area of the compression reinforcement within the width b [mm
2] 
AsBD  tensile reinforcement area within the width bBD of the bridge deck [mm
2] 
As’BD  compression reinforcement area within the width bBD of the bridge deck 
[mm2] 
AsBP the bridge pier tensile reinforcement [mm
2] 
AsBP’ the bridge pier compression reinforcement [mm
2] 
AsBS tensile reinforcement area within the bridge deck width bBD [mm
2] 
As’BS compression reinforcement area within the bridge deck width bBD [mm
2] 
AsGR the gallery roof tensile reinforcement area within the width bGRM [mm
2] 
As’GR the gallery roof compression reinforcement area within the width bGRM 
[mm2] 
AsGRM the gallery roof structural member tensile reinforcement area within the 
width bGRM [mm
2] 
As’GRM the gallery roof structural member compression reinforcement area within 
the width bGRM [mm
2] 
AsGW the gallery wall tensile reinforcement area within the width bGWM [mm
2] 
As’GW the gallery wall compression reinforcement area within the width bGWM 
[mm2] 
AsGWM the gallery wall structural member tensile reinforcement area within the 
width bGWM [mm
2] 
As’GWM the gallery wall structural member compression reinforcement area within 
the width bGWM [mm
2] 
AB Bernoulli’s initial value of goods 
AC, AD, AD, AF Bernoulli’s future potential value of goods (sequentially increasing) 
AF the affective assessment factor  
ASi the potential induced affect for interaction i given the interaction intensity, 
the perceived mean and the perceived standard deviation of experience of 
all previous interactions. 
AV the NYSDOT bridge safety assurance program bridge abutment vulnerability  
[   ] 
B width of the concrete compression face [mm] 
BBH total bridge bearing horizontal capacity [kN] 
BBV the bridge bearing vertical capacity [kN] 
bGR   the gallery roof concrete compression face width [mm]     
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BF the NYSDOT bridge safety assurance program bridge structural assessment of 
the bridge foundation [   ] 
BP Bernoulli’s value of the potential action 
CA,B  the correlation factor between the greater magnitude hazard risk A and the 
lesser magnitude hazard risk B [   ] 
CB  bridge clearance measured between the bottom of the superstructure and 
the average water level or surrounding earth [m] 
Cost HAZUS estimated replacement cost of the given bridge class detailed in Table 
2-3 [USD] 
CS the NYSDOT bridge safety assurance program bridge classification score [   ] 
D50 median diameter of bed material [m] 
D84 diameter of 84% bed material is smaller [m] 
DBA  abutment or pier depth measured from the ground surface at the downhill 
side of the abutment[m] 
DBP bridge pier depth [m] 
DH hazard rupture surface depth at the retaining wall location [m] 
Dj the memory depreciation factor for the considered interaction j [  ] 
DL  landslide rupture surface depth measured from the ground surface at the 
downhill side of the abutment [m] 
DRWF retaining wall foundation depth [m] 
Damage  the HAZUS total anticipated direct financial loss resulting from a bridge 
failure due to scour [USD] 
DCi,mn
x the financial valuation of the repair activities required to return object i’s 
failure in mode mn with respect to the hazard parameter intensity x to object 
i’s original state [CHF] 
DCmn
HI0, DCmn
HI1, DCmn
HI2 estimated direct consequences for the given component class and failure  
               DCmn
HI3  mode as a function of the hazard parameter intensity [CHF/100m] 
DCmn(x) the direct consequence function fitted to the estimated direct consequences 
[CHF] 
DDA avalanche deposited depth [m] 
DDH hazard deposited depth [m] 
DDL landslide deposited depth [m] 
DDR rockfall deposited depth [m] 
DDT torrent deposited depth [m] 
E(n, X ≤ x ,t) the number of events less than or equal to a given threshold event x 
occurring within time t 
EBD  the bridge deck modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
EBP the bridge pier modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
EGRC the gallery roof cushioning material modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
EGWM the gallery wall member modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
ER rockfall kinetic energy [kJ] 
ERW the retaining wall modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
EDF flood induced bank erosion depth [m] 
ELi(x) the exposed object section i length as a function of the hazard parameter 
intensity [m] 
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F  estimated direct consequence extrapolation factor (typically 0.333) [   ] 
Fi,mn
x the structural state of object i failing in mode mn to the hazard parameter 
intensity x  
FXn(X) the cumulative distribution function for the annual maximum hazard 
parameter intensity 
FXN(X) the cumulative distribution function for the largest hazard parameter 
intensity during the time perspective N 
FC the NYSDOT bridge safety assurance program bridge potential failure 
consequences [   ] 
FK1 footing nose shape correction factor [  ] 
FK2 angle of flow attack correction factor [  ] 
FK3 bed condition scour depth correction factor [  ] 
FK4 footing armoring scour depth correction factor [  ] 
G  estimated service interruption duration extrapolation factor (typically 0.333) 
[  ] 
Hb  clearance between the lowest superstructure point and the non-scoured 
stream bed [m] 
HBD bridge deck height [m] 
HC height of the culvert inlet [m] 
HF flood height [m] 
HG the gallery height [m] 
HG’ the uphill gallery wall height measured from the surrounding earth [m] 
HGRC the height of the gallery roof cushioning material [mm] 
HRWB the height of the retaining wall brace [m] 
HT  torrent height [m] 
HTU the height of the lowest tunnel electrical, communication or ventilation 
utilities [m] 
HA the NYSDOT bridge safety assurance program bridge vulnerability to the 
given hazard [   ] 
HI0, HI1, HI2, HI3 reference hazard parameter intensities employed in the consequence 
estimation [   ] 
I infrastructure link reference variable [   ] 
ICi,mn
x the financial valuation of the incurred transport and societal losses and 
additional expenditures due to infrastructure object i’s reduced functional 
performance by failing in mode mn [CHF] 
ICI,daily the daily financial valuation of the losses and additional expenditures 
incurred from transport and societal related impacts of infrastructure link I’s 
reduced functional performance [CHF] 
J  the applicable object length natural hazard specific attenuation factor [  ] 
K  exposed object section length extrapolation factor (typically 0.333) [  ] 
Kw wide pier in shallow flow correction factor [  ] 
k hazard reference variable 
Ku hydraulic constant (19.63) [  ] 
L redefined LQI considering work-leisure tradeoffs  
LB bridge span length between two adjacent supports [m] 
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LBT total bridge length measured from end to end or expansion joint to 
expansion joint [m] 
LG the spacing distance between the gallery structural frames [mm] 
Li
hi0, L i
hi1, L i
hi2, L i
hi3  object section exposed lengths determined from the geographic coincident 
analysis [m] 
Lmax  the total length of the object section [m] 
L0 the original life quality index [$/person] 
Lx total number of years lived in age interval [years] 
Lx1 modified total number of years lived in age interval [years] 
LCA,B  the correlation factor specifying the correlation between the initial hazard A 
and the secondary hazard B, both within the same inferior hierarchical level 
Link_Risk the financial equivalent link risk exposure considering direct and indirect 
consequences [CHF] 
Link _RiskDC  the link direct consequence risk due to all hazard specific continuous risks 
[CHF] 
Link_RiskSI  link risk level service interruption duration risk with respect to all five 
hazards [days] 
LS the NYSDOT bridge safety assurance program bridge vulnerability to the 
given hazard [   ] 
MABS maximum bridge superstructure avalanche induced moment [Nmm] 
MAGWM the gallery structural wall member maximum avalanche induced moment 
[Nmm] 
MGW the hazard induced moment wall forces [kNm] 
MHBD  the maximum hazard induced moment force within the bridge deck [Nmm] 
MHGR the gallery roof maximum hazard induced moment [Nmm] 
MHGRM the gallery structural roof member maximum hazard induced moment 
[Nmm] 
MHGW the gallery wall maximum hazard induced moment [Nmm] 
MHHPH hazard induced horizontal moment [kNm] 
MHHBS hazard induced horizontal moment [kNm] 
MHRW the retaining wall maximum hazard induced moment [kNm] 
MHRWF the retaining wall foundation maximum hazard induced moment [kNm] 
MLGWM the gallery structural wall member maximum landslide induced moment 
[Nmm] 
MRBD the bridge deck maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
MRGR the gallery roof maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
MRHBP the bridge pier maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
MRBS the bridge superstructure maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
MRGW the gallery wall maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
MRGWM the gallery roof member maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
MRHBS the bridge superstructure maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
Mu the ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
MuBD  the ultimate moment resistance of the bridge deck [Nmm] 
MUBPH bridge pier ultimate horizontal moment capacity [kNm] 
MuBS bridge superstructure ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
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MUBSH bridge superstructure ultimate horizontal moment capacity [kNm] 
MuGR the gallery roof ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
MuGRM the gallery roof structural member ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
MuGW the gallery wall ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
MuGWM the gallery wall structural member ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
MURW the retaining wall ultimate moment capacity [kNm] 
MURWF the retaining wall foundation ultimate moment capacity [kNm] 
Mx observed death rate [years
-1] 
Mx1 modified death rate [years
-1] 
N the considered time perspective [years] 
NBP  the number of bridge piers within the considered bridge or bridge section [  ] 
P hazard reference variable 
P(n,t)  the probability of n events in period t 
P(n, X ≤ x, t) the probability of n events in period t that are less in intensity than or equal 
to a threshold intensity x  [  ] 
PAH avalanche horizontal pressure [kN/m
2] 
PBBHi horizontal capacity of bridge bearing or load path i [kN] 
PBBVi vertical capacity of bridge bearing i [kN] 
PfA
B  the failure probability of object A with respect to hazard B [   ] 
Pfi,mn
x the failure probability of object i failing in mode mn with respect to the 
hazard parameter intensity x [  ] 
Pfailure  the HAZUS probability of failure detailed in Table 2-2 [   ] 
PHH total horizontal applied force [kN] 
PRGRM the rockfall force applied on the gallery roof member [kN] 
PRGWM the rockfall force applied on the gallery roof member [kN] 
PRHBP the rockfall horizontal force applied to the bridge pier [kN] 
PRRW the rockfall force applied on the retaining wall [kN] 
PRVBD  the rockfall vertical force applied to the bridge deck [kN] 
PTV the torrent vertical pressure [N/mm
2] 
PK1  pier nose shape correction factor [  ] 
PK2  angle of flow attack correction factor [  ] 
PK3  bed condition scour depth correction factor [  ] 
PK4  pier armoring scour depth correction factor [  ] 
PV the NYSDOT bridge safety assurance program bridge pier vulnerability [   ] 
QC culvert design discharge [m
3/s] 
R rockfall hazard reference variable [   ] 
RDH hazard running depth [m] 
RHRW the retaining wall brace maximum hazard induced force assessed parallel to 
the slope [kN] 
RI
H1  the continuous object I’s risk to avalanche hazards [CHF] 
RI
Hi, RI
Hj, RI
Hk, RI
Kl  the continuous object I’s risk to the four hazards (flood, landslide rockfall, 
torrent) are called in decreasing risk magnitude [CHF]  
RI,SI
1  superior hierarchical level service interruption duration risk with respect to 
avalanche hazard [days] 
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RI,SI
k  superior hierarchical level service interruption duration risk with respect to 
hazard k [days] 
Ri,mn
x  object i’s structural capacity with respect to the failure mode mn and the 
hazard parameter intensity x 
RI
Hz  the individual hazard continuous object risks [CHF] 
Ri,SI
,1  inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section service 
interruption duration risk with respect to the avalanche hazard [days] 
Rj,SI
,1  maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section 
service interruption duration risk with respect to the avalanche hazard [days] 
Rq,SI
,k  maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section 
service interruption duration risk with respect to hazard k [days] 
RURW the retaining wall brace ultimate capacity assessed parallel to the slope [kN] 
RDA  avalanche running depth [m] 
RDH hazard running depth [m] 
RDHB hazard running depth on top of the bridge superstructure [m] 
RDL landslide running depth [m] 
RDR rockfall running depth [m] 
RES  reconstruction economies of scale [   ] 
Rh hydraulic radius [m] 
RiskA
B  the risk of failure of object A with respect to hazard B [CHF] 
RiskDC,T
H  the object direct consequence risk for a given hazard H over a time 
perspective of T years  [CHF] 
RiskDC,T,N
H  the object direct consequence risk for a given hazard H over a time 
perspective of T years considering the maximum hazard parameter intensity 
in N years [CHF] 
Riski
H  the risk of object section i with respect to hazard H [CHF] 
RiskI  the multi-hazard continuous object risk [CHF] 
RiskI,DC
h  the annual continuous object I direct consequence risk with respect to the 
hazard parameter h [CHF] 
RiskI,DC
H  continuous object I’s direct consequence risk exposure to hazard H [CHF] 
RiskI,SI
h the annual continuous object I service interruption duration risk with respect 
to the hazard parameter h [days] 
RiskSI,T
H  the object service interruption duration risk for a given hazard H over a 
temporal horizon of T years [days] 
RiskSI,T,N
H  the object service interruption duration risk for a given hazard H over a time 
perspective of T years considering the maximum hazard parameter intensity 
in N years [days] 
SC culvert slope [m/m] 
Si  the Gumbel Type I standard extreme variate for the given return period i [   ] 
Si  the measured intensity of the current interaction i 
SIi,mn
x the time required to return infrastructure object i having failed in mode mn 
to the hazard parameter intensity x to a fully functional state [days] 
SImn
HI0, SImn
HI1, SImn
HI2,  estimated service interruption durations for the given component class and  
             SImn
HI3 failure mode as a function of the hazard parameter intensity [days/100m] 
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SImn(x) the service interruption duration function fitted to the estimated service 
interruption durations [days] 
T  footing thickness [m] 
T  the risk assessment temporal horizon [years] 
TD thickness of a torrent [m] 
Tx total number of years lived beyond age x [years] 
Tx1 modified total number of years lived beyond age x [years]  
V1  average flow velocity immediate upstream of the pier [m/s] 
V2 adjusted flow velocity for spread footing induced scour calculations [m/s] 
V50 critical velocity of D50 sized material [m/s] 
Va average flow velocity of D50 bed material before scour [m/s] 
VABS maximum bridge superstructure avalanche induced direct shear [N] 
VAGWM the gallery structural wall member maximum avalanche induced shear force 
[N] 
Vd the ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
VD flow velocity of a torrent [m/s] 
VdBD  the ultimate direct shear capacity of the concrete deck [N] 
VdBS bridge superstructure ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
VdGR the gallery roof ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
VdGRM the gallery roof structural member ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
VdGW the gallery wall ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
VdGWM the gallery wall structural member ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
VF average flow velocity below top of footing [m/s] 
VGW the hazard induced gallery shear wall forces [kN] 
VHBD  the maximum hazard induced shear force within the bridge deck [N] 
VHGR the gallery roof maximum hazard induced direct shear [N] 
VHGRM the gallery structural roof member maximum hazard induced shear [N] 
VHGW the gallery wall maximum hazard induced direct shear [N] 
VHHBP hazard induced horizontal shear force [kN] 
VHHBS hazard induced horizontal shear force [kN] 
VHRW the retaining wall maximum hazard induced shear [kN] 
VLGWM the gallery structural wall member maximum landslide induced shear [N] 
VRBD the bridge deck maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
VRBS the bridge superstructure maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
VRGR the gallery roof maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
VRGRM the gallery roof member maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
VRGW the gallery wall maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
VRGWM the gallery wall member maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
VRHBP the bridge pier maximum rockfall induced horizontal direct shear [N] 
VRHBS the bridge superstructure maximum rockfall induced horizontal direct shear 
[N] 
VUBPH bridge pier ultimate direct horizontal shear capacity [kN] 
VUBSH bridge superstructure ultimate direct horizontal shear capacity [kN] 
VURW the retaining wall ultimate shear capacity [kN] 
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VS the NYSDOT bridge safety assurance program bridge vulnerability rating 
score [   ] 
Vulnerabilityi
H(x) the vulnerability function of object i with respect to hazard H [CHF] 
Vulnerabilityi,mn
x the vulnerability of object i failing in mode mn with respect to a hazard 
parameter intensity x [CHF] 
VulnerabilityI,DC,mn
h  the continuous object I direct consequence vulnerability with respect to the 
hazard parameter h assuming each object section responds in the identical 
failure mode mn [CHF] 
VulnerabilityI,SI,mn
h  the continuous object I service interruption duration vulnerability with 
respect to the hazard parameter h assuming each object section responds in 
the identical failure mode mn [CHF] 
WBS weight of the bridge superstructure [kN]  
WBP bridge pier width [m] 
WDH weight of the displaced hazard volume [kN] 
WG the gallery width [m] 
WH the hazard width [m] 
WRW the retaining wall width [m] 
Xn the maximum annual hazard parameter intensity [   ] 
XN the maximum hazard parameter intensity during the considered time 
perspective N [   ] 
Latin Lower Case 
Symbol  Definition 
a  pier width [m] 
aBD the horizontal position of the rockfall impact point measured from the 
closest bridge superstructure beam [mm] 
aBS the lateral position of the rockfall impact point measured from the uphill 
gallery wall [m] 
aBS the longitudinal position of the rockfall impact point measured from the 
closest support or expansion joint [mm] 
aC culvert cross-sectional area [m
2] 
af spread footing width [m] 
aGRM the horizontal position of the rockfall impact point measured from the 
closest gallery roof structural frame [mm] 
aGWM the horizontal position of the rockfall impact point measured from the 
closest gallery structural frame [mm] 
ax death rate factor [years
-1] 
aELi(x)  the effective exposed length of object section i as a function of the hazard 
parameter intensity x [m] 
aELI(x)  the effective exposed length of continuous object I as a function of the 
hazard parameter intensity [m] 
bBD  width of the concrete compression face of the concrete deck [mm] 
bBD  the horizontal spacing of the bridge superstructure beams [mm] 
bBS bridge superstructure concrete compression face width [mm] 
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bGR the lateral position of the rockfall impact point measured from the uphill 
gallery wall [m] 
bGRM the gallery roof structural member concrete compression face width [mm] 
bGW the gallery wall concrete compression face width [mm] 
bGWM the gallery wall structural member concrete compression face width [mm] 
consequencesA
B  the consequences of object A failing due to hazard B [CHF] 
consequencesi,mn
x the consequences of object i failing in mode mn to the hazard parameter 
intensity x [CHF] 
d  the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the 
tensile reinforcement [mm] 
d’ the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the 
compression reinforcement [mm] 
dBD  the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the 
tensile reinforcement of the bridge deck [mm] 
d’BD  the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the compression 
reinforcement centroid of the bridge deck [mm] 
dBS distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the tensile 
reinforcement within the bridge superstructure [mm] 
d’BS distance from the extreme compression fiber to the compression 
reinforcement centroid of the bridge superstructure [mm] 
dcGRM the distance between the centroids of the compression and tensile 
reinforcement within the gallery roof member [mm] 
dGR the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the tensile 
reinforcement centroid within the gallery roof [mm] 
d’GR the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the compression 
reinforcement centroid within the gallery roof [mm] 
dGRM the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the 
tensile reinforcement within the gallery roof structural member [mm] 
d’GRM the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the 
compression reinforcement within the gallery roof structural member [mm] 
dGW the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the tensile 
reinforcement centroid within the gallery wall [mm] 
d’GW the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the compression 
centroid reinforcement within the gallery wall [mm] 
dcGWM the distance between the centroids of the compression and tensile 
reinforcement within the gallery wall member [mm] 
dcRW the distance between the retaining wall compression and tensile 
reinforcement centroids [mm] 
dGWM the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the 
tensile reinforcement within the gallery wall structural member [mm] 
dGWM the distance between the extreme compression fiber and the centroid of the 
tensile reinforcement within the gallery wall member [mm] 
d’GWM the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the 
compression reinforcement within the gallery wall structural member [mm] 
dT the deposited torrent debris density [N/m
3] 
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de the new safety regulation impact on the life expectancy at birth 
dg the financial investment required to implement this new safety regulation 
per exposed individual 
dL the change of the LQI as a function of a new safety regulation 
dRW the distance between the retaining wall extreme compression fiber and 
tensile reinforcement centroid [mm] 
dx number of deaths 
e the life expectancy at birth [years] 
ex life expectancy [years] 
ex1 modified life expectancy [years] 
f  lateral footing extension measured from edge of pier [m] 
f’dc  the dynamic ultimate compressive strength of concrete [N/mm
2] 
f’dcBD  the dynamic ultimate compressive strength of concrete in the bridge deck 
[N/mm2] 
f’dcBD the bridge deck dynamic ultimate compressive concrete strength [N/mm
2] 
f’dcBP the bridge pier ultimate compressive concrete strength [N/mm
2] 
f’dcBS  the dynamic ultimate compressive strength of the bridge structural deck 
[N/mm2] 
f’dcGR the gallery roof dynamic ultimate concrete compressive strength [N/mm
2] 
f’dcGRM the gallery roof structural member dynamic ultimate concrete compressive 
strength [N/mm2] 
f’dcGW the gallery wall dynamic ultimate concrete compressive strength [N/mm
2] 
f’dcGWM the gallery wall structural member dynamic ultimate concrete compressive 
strength [N/mm2] 
fds  dynamic design stress for reinforcement [N/mm
2] 
fdsBD  dynamic design stress for reinforcement of the bridge deck [N/mm
2] 
fdsBS bridge superstructure reinforcement dynamic design stress [N/mm
2] 
fdsGR the gallery roof reinforcement dynamic design stress [N/mm
2] 
fdsGRM the gallery roof structural member reinforcement dynamic design stress 
[N/mm2] 
fdsGW the gallery wall reinforcement dynamic design stress [N/mm
2] 
fdsGWM the gallery wall structural member reinforcement dynamic design stress 
[N/mm2] 
fXn(X) the probability density function for the annual maximum hazard parameter 
intensity 
fXn,i(X) the probability density function for the largest annual hazard parameter 
intensity at the considered object section i 
fXN(X)  the probability density function for the largest hazard parameter intensity 
during the time perspective N 
g  9.807 gravitation acceleration [m/s2] 
g the real gross domestic product per capita [$/person/year] 
h hazard parameter reference variable [   ] 
h0 elevation of bottom of footing measured from stream bed [m] 
hi0, hi1, hi2, hi3  reference hazard parameter intensities employed within the geographic 
coincident analysis [   ] 
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i infrastructure object section reference variable [   ] 
j maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section 
service interruption duration risk reference variable with respect to a given 
hazard 
j the number of interactions between the considered interaction and the 
current interaction [  ] 
l hazard reference variable 
lx number of survivors 
m  hazard reference variable 
m  the number of ways the respective action can be achieved in Bernoulli’s 
measurement of risk 
mn failure mode reference variable [   ] 
n  the total number of object sections located within the continuous object [  ] 
n failure mode reference variable [   ] 
n  the number of continuous objects and object sections in the inferior 
hierarchical level 
n  the number of events [   ] 
n  the number of ways the respective action can be achieved in Bernoulli’s 
measurement of risk 
n the memory depreciation rate [  ] 
n steel reinforcement to concrete modulus of elasticity ration [  ] 
nC Manning’s roughness coefficient for the given culvert [  ] 
nx interval duration [years] 
p the number of ways the respective action can be achieved in Bernoulli’s 
measurement of risk 
pAV the avalanche vertical pressure [N/mm
2] 
pHH hazard horizontal pressure [kN/mm
2] 
pHV  the hazard vertical pressure [N/mm
2] 
pLV the landslide vertical pressure [N/mm
2] 
pμi-1 the perceived mean experience for all previous interactions (1 to i-1) 
pσi-1 the perceived standard deviation of experience for the previous interactions 
(1 to i-1) 
pσmin  the minimum perceived standard deviation of experience [  ] 
q maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section 
service interruption duration risk reference variable with respect to a given 
hazard 
q the number of ways the respective action can be achieved in Bernoulli’s 
measurement of risk 
qF flood specific discharge [m
2/s] 
qx probability of death [   ] 
qx1 modified probability of death [   ] 
r maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section 
service interruption duration risk reference variable with respect to a given 
hazard 
rR  the radius of the boulder at the contact point [mm] 
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rateDC  the direct consequence discount rate [   ] 
rateSI  the service interruption discount rate [  ] 
rpi  the return period for hazard parameter intensity event i [   ] 
s maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section 
service interruption duration risk reference variable with respect to each 
hazard [   ] 
t  maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section 
service interruption duration risk reference variable with respect to a given 
hazard [   ] 
t the considered time period [years] 
un the characteristic largest value of the initial variate Xn [   ] 
uN  the Gumbel Type I characteristic largest value of the initial variate XN [  ] 
vc  the punching shear stress capacity [N/mm
2] 
vcBD  the punching shear stress capacity of the bridge deck [N/mm
2] 
vcBS  the punching shear stress capacity of the bridge structural deck [N/mm
2] 
vcGR the gallery roof punching shear stress capacity [N/mm
2] 
vcGRM the gallery roof structural member punching shear stress capacity [N/mm
2] 
vcGWM the gallery wall structural member punching shear stress capacity [N/mm
2] 
νcRW retaining wall punching shear stress capacity [N/mm2] 
vRBD the bridge deck ultimate rockfall induced punching shear [N/mm
2] 
vRGRM the gallery roof member ultimate rockfall induced punching shear [N/mm
2] 
vRGWM the gallery wall member ultimate rockfall induced punching shear [N/mm
2] 
νRRW rockfall induced punching shear stress [N/mm2] 
w the average amount of an individual’s lifetime invested in working [  ] 
wBS bridge superstructure weight per square meter [kN/m
2] 
wDH distributed buoyancy force per square meter [kN/m
2] 
x hazard parameter intensity [   ] 
x  a threshold or reference intensity [   ] 
x age interval [years] 
y distance between the neutral axis and the extreme compression fiber [mm] 
y1  average upstream main channel depth prior to contraction scour [m] 
y2 adjusted flow depth for spread footing induced scour calculations [m] 
yf elevation bottom of footing measured from stream bed [m] 
ysfooting local scour depth induced by the footing geometry [m] 
yspier  local scour depth induced by the pier geometry [m] 
yspressure  depth of vertical contraction scour measured from the non-scoured stream 
bed [m] 
ystotal  total scour depth adjacent to the pier measured from the non-scoured 
stream bed [m] 
Greek Letter 
Symbol  Definition 
αB the bridge uphill slope [rad] 
αG the gallery uphill slope [rad] 
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αn  an inverse measure of the dispersion of the maximum annual hazard 
parameter intensity Xn [   ] 
αN  the Gumbel Type I inverse measure of the dispersion of XN [  ] 
αR  the rockfall angle of attack measured from the vertical 
αRH the rockfall angle of attack measured from the horizontal [rad] 
αRRW the rockfall angle of attack measured from a line perpendicular to the 
retaining wall surface [rad] 
φGRC the gallery roof cushioning material internal friction angle [rad] 
γH the hazard’s specific gravity [kN/m3] 
ν  the event occurrence rate [years]-1 
νix  the probability of the hazard parameter intensity x affecting object i [  ] 
ρH hazard density [kN/m3] 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Management of transportation infrastructure systems 
Transportation infrastructure systems are composed of links connecting geographically dispersed 
communities, towns and cities. When these systems operate as designed, they form the foundation 
upon which commerce, trade and the serviced communities’ well-being can flourish (Gramlich, 
1994). But when the availability of these systems is jeopardized by gradual deterioration (e.g. 
corrosion induced deterioration) or by sudden failure (e.g. avalanche induced link failure), the 
communities they service can likewise suffer. The dependent relationship between the systems and 
the communities they services is so extensive that the threat of transportation system service 
interruptions can induce the serviced populations to publicly protest or even relocate (Omar, 2001). 
Thus, it is important to maintain the functionality and performance of these transportation 
infrastructure systems in the eyes of engineers and the serviced populations.  
Historically, this maintenance has taken the form of local community leaders and engineers 
personally maintaining limited areas of the transportation infrastructure system. But, as the systems 
have become more extensive, the sheer scale of the systems has required a rethinking of the 
management approach of transportation infrastructure systems. For example, the federal, state and 
local roadway systems in the United States of America are comprised of over 6.3 million km of roads 
and the paved Swiss roadway system is comprised of 83,000 km of roads (US Department of 
Transportation - Federal Highway Administration, 2008) (National Office of Topography Swisstopo, 
2008).1   
 
Figure 1-1:  General framework of an infrastructure management system. 
To meet these changing needs, over the past thirty years, civil engineers have developed 
infrastructure management systems (IMS), as shown in Figure 1-1, to collate inspection data 
specifying the current state of infrastructure objects (e.g. roads, bridges, tunnels), to simulate future 
deterioration processes, to evaluate the consequences of this deterioration and to develop optimal 
infrastructure management approaches. Infrastructure management systems use detailed criterion-
based inspection and evaluation approaches, such as the approach employed by the United States 
Federal Highway Administration in conducting bi-annual bridge inspections, to identify and quantify 
the signs and indications of these deterioration processes (Hartle, Ryan, Mann, Danovich, Sosko, & 
Bouscher, 2002). Example infrastructure management systems include PONTIS, developed in 
conjunction with the United States Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for managing the United 
States highway bridges, and KUBA, developed by the Swiss National Roads Office to manage road 
                                                          
1 While these total roadway lengths do appear to be considerably different, the road length to citizen 
ratio is almost identical with 21 and 10.9 m/citizen respectively for the United States of America and 
Switzerland. 
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structures within the Swiss National Highway System (Thompson, Small, Johnson, & Marshal, 
1998)(Hajdin, 2001).  
Through implementing infrastructure management systems, one can develop optimized 
management approaches for various foreseeable funding levels and predict the resulting 
performance. With this funding-performance linked information, engineers can approach political 
decision makers and infrastructure owners with hard, transparent evidence documenting the 
implications of different levels of funding. Such transparent management approaches can help to 
induce more optimal investment in transportation infrastructure. But unfortunately the hidden signs 
of deterioration combined with semi-rigid taxation and budgetary structures can undermine the 
political motivation for changing infrastructure funding. This commonly results in the out-right denial 
of such funding requests. Unfortunately, it is common for such funding requests to only be 
completely fulfilled in the aftermath of a significant deterioration related infrastructure object 
failures as were the cases in the British railroad management policies following deregulation-linked 
deterioration and the Minnesota highway system management following the recent Minnesota I-35 
bridge collapse (Vickerman, 2004)(The Economist, 2007). 
1.2 Limitations of current infrastructure management systems 
Infrastructure management systems are not without areas for improvement. These structural 
problems appear on two levels: 1) as a product of the complexities of managing such large 
infrastructure systems and 2) within the approaches used to analyze such systems. Concerning the 
complexities of managing such systems, infrastructure management systems sometimes: a) struggle 
to avoid being an administrative requirement rather than an active analysis tool, b) result in 
additional bureaucratic complexity than rather improved transparency in managing such systems, 
and c) overlook local issues affecting the transportation infrastructure objects, which are not 
perceivable from the more general approach taken by infrastructure management systems.  
Concerning the approaches employed to analyze infrastructure management systems, while the 
infrastructure management approach has helped infrastructure managers to more efficiently 
manage the built infrastructure; such approaches are only efficient if they are unfailingly 
implemented over the management duration which can extend from multiple years to multiple 
decades. Unfortunately, the current infrastructure management system limited scope has exposed 
infrastructure managers to two potentially disruptive forces: 1) potential unforeseen natural hazard 
induced technical failures and 2) potential political and/or financial funding support failures due to 
incongruent evaluation of the provided level of performance between the infrastructure manager’s 
nominal evaluation measures and the experiencing society. While these two disruptive forces 
originate in two very different elements of an infrastructure management system, they both can 
induce the same result – undermining of the intended analytically and financially optimal 
infrastructure management solution. 
As the first three limitations mentioned are structural problems associated with the context in which 
infrastructure management systems are implemented, this work will focus on the analytical 
limitations concerning natural hazard assessment and social experience-based evaluation. 
To work towards rectifying both of these limitations, as presented in Figure 1-2, the current work has 
employed a two part approach – first by developing a methodology for quantifying the long-term 
natural hazard risks to the built infrastructure and secondly by formulating an approach for 
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simulating an individual’s experience-based evaluation of the provided level of infrastructure 
performance. As each part has its own detailed introduction, the remaining portion of this general 
introduction provides an overview of both parts and identifies the key challenges to and extensions 
of the current state of knowledge in infrastructure management and civil engineering made within 
this work. 
 
Figure 1-2: Rectifying infrastructure management limitations – natural hazard risk exposure assessment 
methodology and experience-based evaluation simulation approach. 
1.3 A comprehensive risk assessment methodology 
While gradual deterioration induced failure modes have been studied extensively and incorporated 
into infrastructure management systems, potential natural hazard induced failure modes have not 
been studied in detail or incorporated into infrastructure management systems. The most common 
natural hazard management approach employed is to conduct localized or regional transportation 
natural hazard risk assessment and mitigation projects, commonly following natural hazard events 
(Eyer, 2007a). Unfortunately the limited geographic, political and temporal scope of these local 
assessment projects significantly decreases the investment efficiency of the mitigation funds and 
resources as only potential failures within the considered scope are analyzed. It also means the 
natural hazard risk assessments have remained on a local level. 
As presented in detail in Chapter 2, there are a number of large-scale transportation infrastructure 
systematic risk assessment initiatives actively employed or under development including HAZUS-MH, 
the New York State Bridge Safety Assurance Program, Risk Map Germany, and RiskScape New 
Zealand. In order to conduct large-scale assessments, these approaches have either employed 
significant simplifications in their quantitative analysis or have shifted completely to a purely 
qualitative assessment. Unfortunately both of these simplifications produce risk assessment 
approaches which have insufficient accuracy to be directly integrated into an existing infrastructure 
management system. Thus to rectify the limitations of the deterioration process simulation module 
inherent in existing infrastructure management systems, a comprehensive risk assessment 
methodology must be developed.  
A comprehensive risk assessment methodology must include the following aspects: 
? A hazard module which assesses the hazard occurrence and intensity potential within a given 
location. 
? An infrastructure module which quantifies the structural capacities of the analyzed infrastructure 
objects. 
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? A failure assessment procedure which determines if a given potential hazard intensity can induce 
the failure of an infrastructure object. 
? A consequence assessment framework which assesses the consequences of the potential 
infrastructure object failures. 
? A risk quantification procedure which details the equations employed to assess the object risk 
given the hazard, infrastructure object, failure assessment framework, and consequence data 
sources. 
From the existing risk assessment resources within Switzerland, presented in Chapter 2, there are 
already well established practices and procedures developed within the natural hazard assessment 
and infrastructure management fields for respectively collecting hazard and infrastructure object 
data. Where this work extends the current state of knowledge is by developing failure assessment 
procedures for each transportation infrastructure component (i.e. bridge, gallery, retaining wall, 
roadway and tunnel), Section 3.3 and Appendix A. These failure assessment procedures are then 
employed to identify the additional required hazard and infrastructure object data. These failure 
assessment procedures are then employed to assess the potential modes in which an infrastructure 
object can fail given the potential hazard intensity. Additionally, a framework is developed for 
employing expert opinion to estimate the direct consequences and service interruption durations 
resulting from an infrastructure object’s failure, Section 3.4. Lastly, a procedure for a) assembling the 
hazard, infrastructure object, failure assessment framework and consequence assessment data 
sources and b) calculating the resulting transportation infrastructure object and link vulnerability and 
risk is clearly identified, Sections 3.5 to 3.9. This comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessment 
approach is then employed in Chapter 4 to assess the vulnerability and risk of selected infrastructure 
objects located along the Jaun Pass and the A2 highway as it transverses the towns of Zofingen and 
Brittnau. 
This methodology forms a foundation for conducting a system wide natural hazard risk assessment. 
When applied across an entire transportation infrastructure system, the infrastructure manager can 
actively consider an infrastructure object’s potential natural hazard failure risk exposure in modeling 
the infrastructure deterioration and in developing optimal maintenance solutions. He can also 
determine the annual funding which should be invested and made available for natural hazard 
prevention and failure response. This is important because, currently, natural hazard induced failure 
responses are not directly funded or considered by infrastructure management systems. The 
expected end result is reduced infrastructure object failure potential, improved natural hazard 
protection systems, and a more stable funding and infrastructure management, barring funding 
failures due to incongruent evaluation of the level of infrastructure performance between the 
infrastructure manager’s nominal evaluation and the experiencing society. These dynamics are 
introduced in the next section. 
1.4 An experience-based evaluation assessment approach 
Operating and maintaining an infrastructure system is a union of two dichotomous entities: the 
analytical civil engineer and the experiencing public. In a perfect society, the concerns of the former 
would be actively and completely supported by the latter, but in practice, this support is commonly 
incomplete. This support gap is a direct product of the respective assessment approaches the 
engineering community and the general society employs to evaluate the performance of an 
infrastructure system. 
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To assess the performance of an infrastructure system, civil engineers employ codes and guidelines 
developed from empirical experiments, laws, jurisprudence and industry practices to maintain the 
built infrastructure systems. To arrive at this level of expertise, a person must conduct extensive 
training over a number of years to learn how to quantify forces, stress, strains, deflections and 
eventually failure probabilities. Thus when a civil engineer views a bridge, he does not see an 
elevated roadway connecting two separate landmasses, he instead sees stresses and moments, 
cracks and corrosion. The engineering community has employed this analytically based perspective 
to develop the observation-based inspection and systematic assessment methods that form the 
foundation of current infrastructure management systems (Hartle, Ryan, Mann, Danovich, Sosko, & 
Bouscher, 2002). 
Like a civil engineer, each person in society has also conducted extensive training, but rather than 
studying structural problems and analytical assessments, this training relies on the individual’s 
personal interactions and experiences. This training starts soon after birth and continually develops 
and evolves as the individual increases his wealth of knowledge with each additional interaction 
within the bounds of the individual’s mental and physical capacities (Simon, 1957). Following each 
interaction, the individual evaluates the observed interaction’s result and ramifications against his 
previous range and depth of experience. The individual then employs this evolving and refining range 
of experience to evaluate subsequence interactions (Kahneman & Miller, 2002). The end result is an 
individualized evaluation tool that is a product of the individual’s frequency, range, sequence and 
intensity of interactions (von Glasersfeld, 1996). Thus when an individual views a bridge he does not 
see an elevated roadway connecting two separate landmasses, he sees the traffic and roadway 
conditions on the bridge within the context of his previous experiences with the bridge and similar 
infrastructure objects. 
When it comes to evaluating the consequences of an infrastructure object’s deteriorated 
performance, it is not surprising that the engineering community recommends analytically analyzing 
the situation, assigning the potential consequences into quantifiable groups and employing nominal 
values to evaluate each potential consequence group – be it the loss of a life or additional travel time 
and distance (Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 1997) (Vrtic, et al., 2005). When individuals from society 
personally interact with this deteriorating performance, they do not employ the engineer’s selected 
nominal value, but instead they employ their recent experiences as a base against which this 
additional interaction is evaluated. If the deterioration is gradual, the individual is unable to discern 
this change, but if this deterioration deviates significantly from the individual’s previous experience, 
the individual consciously discerns this change. Thus the societal evaluation of the consequences 
resulting from deteriorating performance are as much influenced by the given deterioration 
consequence as it is influenced by the context in which this deterioration consequence is 
experienced.  
Thus to rectify this limitation of the deterioration consequence evaluation module within existing 
infrastructure management systems, an experience-based evaluation simulation approach must be 
developed. 
In developing this experience-based evaluation simulation approach, one must: 
? Identify the infrastructure object parameters the public personally interacts with. 
? Specify a process for modeling how the performance difference between subsequent 
interactions can be evaluated. 
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? Formulate an approach for incorporating additional experiences into the individual’s evaluative 
norms. 
? Examine the implications an experience-base evaluation perspective has for individuals with 
different experience histories and within environments with different deterioration rates. 
This work extends the current state of knowledge by first analyzing the logic used to develop one of 
the consequence evaluation approaches employed by civil engineers – the Life Quality Index, an 
approach used to assess of the value of a life, Appendix B. The Life Quality Index proposes that a 
unified rationale should be developed for taking action in society’s interest and once this rationale is 
known and accepted, the day-to-day risk decisions should be removed from the political arena 
where, in the Life Quality Index developers’ opinion, they do not belong (Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 
1997). While this and other foundational tenets employed in developing the Life Quality Index are 
good intentioned, they are in fact incorrect for by removing the day-to-day risk decisions from 
society, a risk manager is actively exposing himself and his decisions to potential differences between 
the analytically-based performance evaluation and societal experience-based performance 
evaluations. 
To establish a better understanding of the dynamic nature of an individual’s experience-based 
evaluation approach, a pair of case studies studying how an individual’s experience-based 
assessments evolve in time as they interact with a changing infrastructure systems are then analyzed 
in Chapter 5. From these cases, infrastructure parameters are identified that can be influenced by an 
infrastructure manager’s policies and that an individual personally interacts with when using the 
given infrastructure object.  
With these additional perspectives, in Chapter 6 an experience-based evaluation approach – the 
affective assessment approach – is developed from findings within the behavioral economics and 
psychology fields. The affective assessment approach is then employed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 to 
analyze two cases to better understand the implications an experience-based evaluation approach 
can have on the evaluations of a set of interactions. The feasibility of applying such an experience-
based evaluation approach is assessed in Chapter 7 by conducting a pilot study. In this study, it was 
determined that pursuing a calibration study was not feasible within this work, but should be 
pursued in the immediate future. 
This approach offers infrastructure managers a tool to assess how individuals using infrastructure 
objects would evaluate the future provided infrastructure performance (functionality). This is 
important because it assists infrastructure managers in selecting an analytically optimal solution that 
insures the provided performance does not undermine or dilute society’s level of expected 
performance. This assists in keeping society’s evaluation of future performance sufficiently high to 
ensure technically optimal maintenance solutions are fully implemented and funded. The funding 
link has not yet been calibrated but the link is strongly suspected to exist especially in direct 
democracy funding situations as are found in Switzerland. 
1.5 Conclusion 
As can be seen in Figure 1-3, the improvements proposed within this work addresses the analytical 
limitations of current infrastructure management systems enabling infrastructure managers to: a) 
improve performance simulation of potential natural hazard risks, thus actively considering an 
infrastructure object’s natural hazard risk in modeling the infrastructure deterioration and in 
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developing optimal maintenance solutions, b) improve annual funding determinations, c) study how 
proposed technically optimal solutions may be socially received and can select solutions which best 
maintain their social support throughout the duration of the maintenance solution. These tools form 
a technically optimal, socially sustainable infrastructure management model. 
 
Figure 1-3: A technically optimal, socially sustainable management system. 
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2 Existing vulnerability assessment approaches 
The management of potential natural hazard induced infrastructure failures has not enjoyed a 
comprehensive or system-wide management perspective as has the management of gradual 
deterioration induced failure modes. The most common approach is to conduct localized or regional 
transportation natural hazard risk assessment and mitigation projects, commonly following natural 
hazard events, resulting in localized management and mitigation approaches. Currently there are 
also a number of large-scale systematic risk assessment initiatives actively employed or under 
development. These assessment initiatives include HAZUS-MH, the New York State Bridge Safety 
Assurance Program, Risk Map Germany and RiskScape New Zealand. Through analyzing these existing 
risk assessment methods, one can gain a better understanding of the current state of practice and 
identify needed improvements. 
2.1 HAZUS-MH 
HAZUS, HAZards United States, is a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) based computerized 
natural hazard risk assessment tool developed in conjunction with the National Institute of Building 
Sciences and freely distributed by the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
for estimating building and infrastructure losses from natural hazards – specifically earthquake, wind 
and flood hazards. HAZUS-MH encompasses the risk assessment tasks of natural hazard intensity 
modeling, natural hazard-infrastructure object coincident analysis, and infrastructure loss estimation 
all in one platform (FEMA, 2004).  
On the natural hazard assessment side, the HAZUS software is distributed with geographically based 
earthquake, wind and flood hazard intensities for each state in the United States of America. From 
the infrastructure side, HAZUS employs census data and national infrastructure databases such as 
the National Bridge Inventory Database (NBI) to define the location and general vulnerability 
parameters of private housing and public infrastructure. A geographic coincident analysis is then 
employed to determine which infrastructure elements (or statistically abstracted infrastructure 
representations) are affected by the given hazard intensities (FEMA, 2007).  
The HAZUS methodology encourages end users to employ a three stage level of analysis. The first 
stage employs hazard and infrastructure data provided with the HAZUS software to establish a 
perspective of the general scope and scale of potential natural hazard losses. In the second stage, the 
end user moves the analysis from a general perspective to a specific analysis by personally specifying 
additional infrastructure vulnerability data such as specifying detailed vulnerability data for specific 
infrastructure elements. The third stage of analysis graduates this specific analysis to a validated 
state by remodeling the potential losses by analyzing the same objects and hazards within a different 
analysis platform. The specific analysis is validated, or disproved, by comparing and contrasting the 
specific HAZUS analysis and the external analysis. This three stage process helps end users develop a 
general understanding of their risk level and tailor the risk assessment process to their specific 
regions and infrastructure objects (FEMA, 2002). 
To better understand HAZUS’s level of detail and analysis capabilities consider how this risk analysis 
platform assesses road transportation network exposure to natural hazards. While HAZUS does 
provide the hazard intensities for three different hazards, only the effects of flood hazards are 
considered in analyzing the road transportation network. This analysis qualitatively considers which 
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roadway objects can become submerged and which bridges may fail due to scour during a flooding 
event.  
The first failure mode – roadway objects submerged by water – is assessed by conducting a purely 
visual coincident analysis between the flood hazard geographic extent and the geographic location of 
the roadway objects. Unfortunately these visual observations cannot be quantitatively captured, 
such as by formulating a list of which roads may become inundated during a flood event. This 
limitation hampers emergency management planners from quantitatively determining if all road 
transportation links to a location, or even a region, have been severed by rising flood waters (FEMA, 
2007).  
The second failure mode – bridge failure due to scour – is assessed by conducting a coincident 
analysis between the geographic extent of the flood waters and the location of the bridges specified 
within the National Bridge Inventory (NBI), an inventory of all bridges with a span longer than 6 
meters. Bridges within reach of the flood waters are then considered for potential failure due to 
scour by employing NBI’s “scour critical bridges” data field. The NBI identifies scour critical bridges 
during normal biannual bridge inspections with the framework detailed in Table 2-1. HAZUS then 
employs this scour classification to identify the bridges that have been identified as scour critical (0 < 
scour code ≤ 3) (FEMA, 2007). Unfortunately, this assessment does not consider bridges which have 
not been assessed for scour or bridges with unknown foundational conditions, scour codes = U and 6 
respectively. HAZUS then estimates the probability of failure of a given bridge (Pfailure) as a function of 
the bridge’s structural configuration, the bridge’s scour rating and the flood event return period 
using the fixed values presented in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-1: National Bridge Inventory scour critical coding descriptions (FHWA, 1995, pp. 56-57). 
Scour Code Code Description 
N Bridge not over water 
U 
Bridge with ‘unknown’ foundation that has not been evaluated for scour. Since risk cannot be 
determine, flag for monitoring during flood events and, if appropriate, closure. 
T 
Bridge over ‘tidal’ waters that has not been evaluated for scour, but considered low risk. Bridge 
will be monitored with regular inspection cycle and with appropriate underwater inspections. 
9 Bridge foundations (including piles) on dry land well above flood water elevations. 
8 
Bridge foundations determined to be stable for assessed or calculated scour conditions: 
calculated scour is above top of footing. 
7 
Countermeasures have been installed to correct a previously existing problem with scour. 
Bridge is no longer scour critical. 
6 
Scour calculation/evaluation has not been made. (bridges that have not been assessed for 
scour). 
5 
Bridge foundations determined to be stable for calculated scour conditions: scour within limits 
of footing or piles. 
4 
Bridge foundations determined to be stable for calculated scour conditions: field review 
indicates action is required to protect exposed foundations from effects of additional erosion 
and corrosion 
3 
Bridge is scour critical; bridge foundations determined to be unstable for calculated scour 
conditions; scour within limits of footing or piles, scour below spread-footing base or pile tips. 
2 
Bridge is scour critical: field review indicates that extensive scour has occurred at bridge 
foundations. Immediate action is required to provide scour countermeasures. 
1 
Bridge is scour critical; field review indicates that failure of piers/abutments is imminent. Bridge 
is closed to traffic. 
0 Bridge is scour critical. Bridge has failed and is closed to traffic. 
Chapter 2: Existing vulnerability assessment approaches 
 
  11 
Likewise, HAZUS quantifies the value of the given bridge class (Cost) by evaluating the bridge type 
with the fixed values presented in Table 2-3.  
Table 2-2: HAZUS single and continuous estimated bridge failure percentage per each NBI scour code value 
(FEMA, 2007, pp. 7-9). 
 Single-Span Bridge Scour Code Continuous-Span Bridge Scour Code 
Return Period 1 2 3 4-8 9 1 2 3 4-8 9 
100 5 2 1 0 N/A 1.25 0.5 0.25 0 N/A 
500 10 4 2 0 N/A 2.50 1.0 0.50 0 N/A 
1000 15 6 3 0 N/A 3.75 1.5 0.75 0 N/A 
The potential financial loss of each identified scour critical bridge is then computed with Equation 
(2.1). 
 ( )(0.25)( )failureDamage P Cost=  (2.1) 
Where: 
Damage = the total anticipated direct financial loss resulting from a bridge failure due to 
scour. 
Pfailure = the probability of failure detailed in Table 2-2. 
Cost = the estimated replacement cost of the given bridge class detailed in Table 2-3. 
0.25 = the scour failure cost reduction factor as HAZUS makes the assumption that scour 
failures will only result in 25% of the bridge’s total replacement cost. 
Table 2-3: HAZUS bridge replacement cost estimations as a function of the bridge type 
(FEMA, 2007, pp. 3-34). 
Bridge Type HAZUS Valuation (USD) 
Major Bridge 20,000,000 
Other Bridge (including all wood) 1,000,000 
Other Concrete Bridge 1,000,000 
Continuous Concrete Bridge 5,000,000 
Other Steel Bridge 1,000,000 
Continuous Steel Bridge 5,000,000 
Example 2-1: Apply the HAZUS-MH risk assessment methodology to quantify the scour risk of 84 
bridges presented in Table 2-4. 
Table 2-4: Example assessment of 84 different bridges with the HAZUS methodology. 
  # per Scour Class Damage per Return Period (USD) 
Bridge Type Total # 3 2 1 100 500 1000 
Major 3 1 0 0 12,500 25,000 37,500 
Other Concrete 34 5 3 1 40,000 80,000 120,000 
Continuous Concrete 17 3 1 0 15,625 31,250 46,875 
Other Steel 24 4 3 1 37,500 75,000 112,500 
Continuous Steel 6 2 1 0 25,000 50,000 75,000 
  Total Cost 130,625 261,250 391,875 
  # Bridges Failed 0.0863 0.1725 0.2588 
Applying the HAZUS methodology to assess the direct failure cost and determine the number of 
bridges expected to fail due to 100, 500 and 1000 return period floods, is shown in Table 2-4. In this 
example, 29 of the 84 bridges are rated as scour critical with these 29 bridges representing a total 
HAZUS reconstruction valuation cost of 92 million dollars. Even considering a 1000 year return 
The responsive approach: An integrated socially-sustainable technically-optimal decision model 
12   
period, the HAZUS methodology estimates that the direct costs will accumulate to almost 400,000 
USD, 0.43% of this subset’s reconstruction value. Additionally, as the HAZUS methodology is 
statistically based, for a 1000 year flood, it estimates that 0.2588 bridges out of the total 84 bridges 
will fail. Therefore, it is nearly impossible, without further analysis, to identify which bridge is most 
prone to fail and what mitigation actions to implement except for attempting to mitigate all 29 scour 
critical bridges. Furthermore, HAZUS does not provide any estimation of indirect costs including 
additional travel time and loss of connectivity costs, thus it is difficult to identify which of the 29 
scour critical bridges should be addressed first.  
In evaluating the capabilities of the HAZUS methodology, it is essential to remember that HAZUS 
identifies vulnerable bridges as bridges that are within the reaches of the flood waters. As the water 
level within this zone can extend from a 1000 year flood level to a 1 year flood level, the range of 
potential hazard forces on the vulnerable structures also varies. With this said, one can start to 
understand why only 0.2588 out of 29 scour critical bridges are expected to fail under a 1000 year 
return period flood. Unfortunately, such allowances cannot be extended to include the fact that the 
only infrastructure component considered by HAZUS is the bridge component, the only bridge failure 
mode considered is failure due to scour, and only statistical replacement costs are considered. As 
seen within the recent Katrina Hurricane damage, there are a number of additional roadway objects 
vulnerable to flooding including roadways, culverts and tunnels, there are a number of additional 
ways that bridges can fail due to flooding including bearing failure and complete submersion, and 
indirect costs resulting from additional travel time and, most significantly, the severing of all 
transportation connectivity can exceed all direct transportation infrastructure damage. With these 
perspectives, one can observe that while HAZUS does provide for the first time on a region and 
nationwide scale the ability to geographically analyze the potential coincidence between natural 
hazard events and infrastructure objects, the methodology behind this analysis needs to be 
expanded and further developed (Okeil & Cai, 2008). 
2.2 New York State bridge vulnerability assessment 
2.2.1 Program overview 
Starting in 1991, the New York State Department of Transportation (NYDOT) began developing an 
inspection based bridge vulnerability assessment program entitled the Bridge Safety Assurance 
Program. Within the Bridge Safety Assurance Program, vulnerability is defined as an assessment of 
the likelihood of sudden failure and a relative quantification of the resulting consequences. This 
vulnerability assessment program was initially developed to assess the potential occurrences and 
consequences of hydraulic induced failures (predominately flooding) but has since been broaden to 
include steel fatigue, live force overload, motor and maritime vehicle collision, concrete detail and 
seismic associated infrastructure vulnerabilities. Each assessment phase employs a two-pronged 
approach of first reviewing available hazard, object and infrastructure system documents and 
secondly conducting an onsite inspection by qualified personnel. The primary aim of this program is 
to identify vulnerability prone objects so funding for additional technical analysis and mitigative 
actions can be allocated to address the most pressing needs (Bridge Safety Assurance, 2008). In 
recent proposed revision of the PONTIS bridge management system, it was recommended to employ 
the Bridge Safety Assurance Program vulnerability assessment and prioritization methods to quantify 
a bridge’s vulnerability to hydraulic hazards (Patidar, Labi, Sinha, & Thompson, 2007). 
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2.2.2 Hydraulic vulnerability assessment program 
Turning to the hydraulic vulnerability assessment program, the most applicable program to the 
current project, one can observe that this program first starts with an initial screening of the existing 
bridges to determine which bridges are susceptible to hydraulic induced failures. Then the 
vulnerability of the susceptible bridges is assessed with a two-stage assessment process in which 1) 
the bridge vulnerability to the given hazard (LS) and 2) the potential failure consequences (FC) are 
assessed. The bridge vulnerability and failure consequence assessments are then summed, Equation 
(2.2), to produce a vulnerability rating score (VS) which is used to delegate bridges into urgency-
based vulnerability mitigation programs (i.e. safety priority, capital program, no action).  
 VS LS FC= +  (2.2) 
Bridge vulnerability – hydraulic assessment 
A bridge’s vulnerability to hydraulic hazards is composed of a hydraulic assessment of the bridge’s 
location and a structural assessment of the bridge’s foundation (Bridge Safety Assurance, 2008). 
Hydraulic assessment of the bridge site (HA) 
The hydraulic assessment (HA) rates the object hydraulic vulnerability as a function of the following 
ten categories: 
? river slope/flow velocity (0-3)  ?   channel floor material quality (0-4) 
? channel configuration (0-2)    ?   debris/ice accumulation potential (0-4) 
? near a water body junction (0-1)  ?   within a backwater zone (0-1) 
? existing evidence of scour (0-5)  ?   historical maximum flood depths (1-2) 
? object opening capacity (0-2)  ?   object hydraulic overflow potential (0-1) 
Each assessment category is separated into subcategories and delegated numerically increasing 
values as a function of their contribution to the overall object vulnerability. For example the river 
slope/velocity is separated into three subcategories – flat (slope (s) ≤ 0.004 ft/ft), medium (0.0004 < s 
< 0.0015 ft/ft) and steep (s ≥ 0.0015 ft/ft) with the respective numerical rating values of 1, 2 and 3. 
The hydraulic assessment ratings for the ten categories are then totaled – resulting in a hydraulic 
vulnerability rating ranging from a maximum of 25 to a minimum of 1.  
Structural assessment of the bridge foundation (BF) 
With the hydraulic assessment completed, the focus then shifts to assessing the vulnerability of the 
bridge foundation (BF). As with the hydraulic assessment, the bridge foundation vulnerability 
assessment is a category ranking system. This process separately assesses the vulnerability of each 
abutment and pier – with the most vulnerable element controlling the bridge’s vulnerability.  
The bridge abutment vulnerability (AV) is quantified with the following five categories: 
? existing scour countermeasures (0-5) ?   abutment foundation (0-10) 
? abutment location on river bend (0-1) ?   angle of inclination (0-4) 
? embankment encroachment (0-4) 
And the bridge pier vulnerability (PV) is quantified with the following seven categories: 
? existing scour countermeasures (0-5) ?   pier foundation (0-10) 
? angle of attack (0-4)   ?   footing/pile bottom below streambed (0-1) 
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? pier width (0-5)    ?   simple spans (0-1) 
? multiple piers in floodplain (0-2) 
As with the hydraulic vulnerability assessment, each of these twelve categories are subdivided into 
subcategories with each subcategory being delegated a numerical rating value as a function of the 
subcategory’s contribution to the overall element vulnerability. Thus the abutment vulnerability 
rating can range from a high of 24 to a low of 0 and the pier vulnerability rating can range from a high 
of 32 to a low of 1. The structural assessment of the bridge foundation (BF), Equation (2.3), is then 
the maximum abutment and pier vulnerability rating. 
 ( , )BF MAX AV PV=  (2.3) 
With the hydraulic and the bridge vulnerability assessments completed, the individual vulnerability 
scores are summed resulting in a bridge classification score (CS), Equation (2.4).  
 CS HA BF= +  (2.4) 
This classification score is then employed to assign the various objects to one of three vulnerability 
classes which are in turn assigned object event likelihood scores (LS): 
? CS > 35 = high vulnerability → LS = 10 ?   CS < 25 = low vulnerability → LS = 2  
? 40 > CS > 20 = medium vulnerability → LS = 6  
Failure consequence assessment 
The potential failure consequences (FC) are then assessed by assigning rating values as a function of 
the following three categories: 
? potential failure type (1-5)   ? the exposed traffic volume (0-2) 
? the object contribution to the transportation network (0-3) 
The failure type and exposure categories are then summed producing a failure consequence score 
ranging from a maximum of 10 to a minimum of 1. 
Vulnerability rating score 
The vulnerability rating score (VS) is then computed as shown in Equation (2.5) by summing the 
object likelihood and failure consequence scores.  
 VS LS FC= +  (2.5) 
This vulnerability score, ranging from a maximum of 20 to a minimum of 1, is used to separate the 
various bridges into urgency-based vulnerability mitigation programs with the following thresholds: 
? safety priority (VS > 15)   ? safety program (13 < VS < 16) 
? capital program (9 < VS < 14)   ? inspection program (VS < 15) 
? no action (VS < 9)     ? not applicable (VS = 0) 
Within the New York State Department of Transportation system, bridges identified as safety 
priorities are failure prone structures whose potential failure modes should be mitigated 
immediately or as part of the 5-year capital program. Bridges assigned to the safety program are 
potentially failure prone bridges for which vulnerability reduction interventions, enhanced 
inspections or addition to the long-term capital program may be considered in the future. Bridges 
within the capital program are bridges prone to failure under only extreme events and thus the risk 
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level can be tolerated until the implementation of a normally schedule capital improvement project. 
Bridges included within the inspection program are non-failure prone bridges given the current 
conditions remain constant. Thus the bridge and environmental conditions should be reassessed 
during normally scheduled bridge inspections. Bridges identified as no action and not applicable are 
respectively bridges with an extremely remote probability of failure and bridges not exposed to the 
given risk source respectively. 
Thus with such an approach, an infrastructure manager can prioritize a group of bridges into urgency 
based vulnerability mitigation programs. 
Example 2-2: Employ the New York State Department of Transportation Bridge Safety Assurance 
Program to analyze three bridges in the Canton of Aargau. 
To help evaluate the strengths and limitations of the bridge safety vulnerability assessment 
approach, consider the case study of three bridges (designated herein as bridges 1, 2, and 3) located 
in the Canton of Aargau in north-central Switzerland. These three bridges span the Wigger River and 
link the city of Zofingen to the adjacent towns of Strengelbach and Brittnau as shown in Figure 2-1. 
Bridges 1 and 2, built in 1977, are three-span continuous bridges with respective lengths of 69.3m 
and 73.6m and cross not only the Wigger River but also the A2 national highway located just adjacent 
to the Wigger River. Bridge 3 is a 20.0m simply-supported bridge located just east of Brittnau where 
it spans the Wigger River. At the time of the case study, this structure was being replaced as the 
existing structure was in a severely deteriorated state thus the Wigger River was placed into bypass 
conduits. 
Figure 2-1: Elevation and plan images of Bridges 1, 2 and 3 spanning the Wigger River. 
 
The vulnerability of the three bridges to potential flood induced damage was evaluated, as shown in 
Table 2-5, using the hydraulic vulnerability assessment during an onsite inspection. The hydraulic 
environment of all three bridges received ratings of 8 out of a potential score of 25. Additionally, the 
foundations of the three bridges received ratings of 6, 6, and 1 respectively out of potential ratings of 
32, 32 and 24. When summed to determine the classification score, it was found that bridges 1 and 2 
had classification scores of 14 and bridge 3 had a classification score of 9. Thus all of these three 
structures were determined to have a “low vulnerability.” On the consequence side, all three bridges 
are designed with horizontal shear keys and drilled piles at all support locations. Thus potential 
1 2
3
Wigger River
A2 Highway
1 2 3
N
Zofingen
Strengelbach Brittnau
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structural failure consequences due to flooding are purely local structural damage. Within the 
network, bridges 1 and 3 are local roadways and bridge 2 is a collector roadway. Additionally bridges 
1 and 2 carry between 4 and 25 thousand vehicles per day and bridge 3 carries less than 4 thousand 
vehicles per day. Therefore, the three bridges respectively received vulnerability ratings of 4, 5 and 3 
out of a potential scour of 20. Thus, the Hydraulic Vulnerability Assessment manual would 
recommend that no action should be taken apart from continuation of biannual onsite hydraulic 
inspections. 
Table 2-5: Example application of the Hydraulic Vulnerability Assessment. 
Assessment Topic Bridge 1 Bridge 2 Bridge 3 
H
yd
ra
ul
ic
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
Streambed material Cobbles - Cobbles - Cobbles - 
River slope Medium 1 Medium 1 Medium 1 
Channel bottom Stable 1 Stable 1 Stable 1 
Channel configuration Straight 0 Straight 0 Straight 0 
Debris/ice problems None 0 None 0 None 0 
Near river confluence No 0 No 0 No 0 
Affected by backwater No 1 No 1 No 1 
History of scour Small 1 Small 1 Small 1 
Historical max flood > 3.3m 2 > 3.3m 2 > 3.3m 2 
Adequate opening No 2 No 2 No 2 
Overflow relief available Yes 0 Yes 0 Yes 0 
Hydraulic assess. total (HA) - - - - 8 - - - - 8 - - - - 8 
A
bu
tm
en
t  
Scour countermeasures Sheet pile wall 0 Sheet pile wall 0 Sheet pile wall 0 
Abutment foundation Long piles > 6m 0 Long piles > 6m 0 Long piles > 6m 0 
Location on river bed Straight 0 Straight 0 Straight 0 
Angle of inclination 20-45 degs. 1 20-45 degs. 1 20-45 degs. 1 
Embankment encroachment Small 0 Small 0 Small 0 
Abutment assess. total (AV) - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - - 1 
Pi
er
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
Scour countermeasures Sheet pile wall 0 Sheet pile wall 0 - - - - - 
Pier foundations Concrete piles 0 Concrete piles 0 - - - - - 
Footing/pile below stream bed 5-6m 1 5-6m 1 - - - - - 
Angle of attack 0-20 degs 2 0-20 degs 2 - - - - - 
Pier width 1-1.5m 2 1-1.5m 2 - - - - - 
Simple spans Yes 1 Yes 1 - - - - - 
Multiple piers in floodplain No 0 No 0 - - - - - 
Pier assessment total (PV) - - - - 6 - - - - 6 - - - - - 
 Likelihood scour total (LS) CS = 6+8 = 14 2 CS = 6+8 = 14 2 CS = 1+8 = 9 2 
Co
ns
eq
. Failure type Structural Dmg. 1 Structural Dmg. 1 Structural Dmg. 1 
Exposure 4-25,000 ADT 1 4-25,000 ADT 1 < 4,000 ADT 0 
Functional class Local road 0 Collector 1 Local Road 0 
Consequence score total - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 1 
 Vulnerability rating (VS) - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 3 
 
A vulnerable transportation infrastructure object is defined as an infrastructure object that can 
perform inadequately due to a set of potential natural hazard events. Considering the most common 
source of hydraulic risks, the existing rivers and streams, the bridge component is the component 
exposed to the highest hazard parameter intensities (i.e. flooding depth). Furthermore, a bridge is 
the infrastructure object with the largest potential post-failure interruption duration and 
reconstruction costs as the replacement of a single 45m bridge can take multiple weeks and cost 
hundreds of thousands of Swiss Francs. But bridges commonly only comprise less than 2 percent of a 
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given transportation system and while the other objects of a transportation infrastructure network 
(the roadways, culverts, retaining walls, galleries and tunnels) are less prone to hydraulic hazards 
than bridges, their structural resistance to hydraulic hazards is far less. These potential additional 
vulnerability sources become even more apparent when the scope of the potential hazards is 
broadened from purely hydraulic hazards to include rockfall, torrent, landslide and avalanche 
hazards, all common events in mountainous regions. Therefore, while the New York State 
Department of Transportation Bridge Assurance Program has developed a qualitative risk assessment 
approach which does address the infrastructure component most exposed to flood hazards, the 
bridge component, it does not consider any additional components or hazards, nor is it able to 
quantify the relative risk exposure. Thus, beyond serving as a tool to highlight potentially vulnerable 
bridges, the Bridge Safety Assurance Program is not detailed enough to be directly integrated into an 
infrastructure management platform. 
2.3 Lifeline vulnerability assessment approach 
The lifeline vulnerability assessment approach, originally developed within the earthquake 
engineering field, employs a multi-systems perspective to analyzing the vulnerability of the 
infrastructure systems upon which present-day life is dependent. Lifeline systems commonly include 
– communication lifelines (e.g. fiber optic cables, radio transmission, cellular towers), electrical 
lifelines (e.g. transition systems, power generation stations), fuel storage and distribution lifelines 
(e.g. natural gas and petroleum pipelines), and transportation lifelines (e.g. interstate highways, state 
highways, railroads). In conducting a lifeline vulnerability assessment, the response of each object 
contained within a given lifeline and each connection between separate lifelines to a defined hazard 
scenario or set of hazard scenarios is analyzed in detail. Through such an analysis, locations where a 
lifeline is directly vulnerable to a given hazard scenario or indirectly vulnerable through vulnerability 
of the required supporting systems can be identified. Once a given vulnerability is identified, the cost 
efficiency and effectiveness of potential strengthening or additional redundancy mitigation actions 
can be developed (Lowe, Scheffey, & Lam, 1991). 
For example, to assess the direct vulnerability of an interstate highway lifeline and a fiber optic cable 
lifeline, which both cross the same bridge, one would first determine how the bridge structurally 
responds to the given hazard scenario (e.g. flooding of the bridge’s substructure during the 100 year 
flood) and then assess what implications the bridge’s structural response has for the interstate 
highway and fiber optic cable lifelines. This analysis is then expanded to include indirect vulnerability 
sources of the interstate highway and the fiber optic cable lifeline. This requires one to conduct a 
vulnerability assessment of all the systems required to ensure each lifeline remains functioning (e.g. 
the electrical power generation and distribution system). Thus, the given lifeline’s vulnerability is not 
only a function of the direct vulnerability but also the indirect vulnerability introduced by 
vulnerabilities in the required supporting systems (e.g. vulnerability of a fiber optic cable lifeline 
resulting from a general electrical power outage). 
Historically, lifeline vulnerability assessments have been conduced to analyze specific lifeline 
corridors or similarly limited scope infrastructure systems. These assessments do have the potential 
to identify previously unknown vulnerability sources and vulnerable objects. With such information, 
an infrastructure manager can implement strengthening or redundancy related mitigative actions to 
reduce the overall vulnerability of the specific lifeline. But the identification of potential vulnerability 
reduction measures only extends as a far as the geographic scope of the vulnerability assessment 
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which is commonly limited by geo-political boundaries, financial limitations and temporal limitations. 
Lastly, the quality of a lifeline vulnerability assessment is only as good as the methodology employed. 
2.4 Currently under development risk assessment projects 
Internationally, there are two major national comprehensive risk assessment platforms currently 
under development – Risk Map Germany and RiskScape New Zealand. 
2.4.1 Risk Map Germany 
Risk Map Germany is a multidisciplinary research and development project managed by Karlsruhe 
University. The primary objective of the Risk Map project is to conduct large scale quantification of 
natural and man-made risks. Towards this end, the Risk Map project has more than 41 professors, 
research scientists and doctoral students developing methods and procedures for quantifying hazard 
intensities including wind, earthquake, flood and man-made hazards, identifying approaches for 
estimating the vulnerability of infrastructure systems, developing estimations for private and 
business infrastructure assets, formulating methods for cross-comparing risks induced by different 
hazards, and establishing a GIS-based data management framework. The bulk of the Risk Map 
program focuses on assessing risks to private and business infrastructure, elements which are 
commonly the infrastructure objects directly insured by public or private insurance entities.  
With respect to the public infrastructure, the roadways and railways, this risk research effort focuses 
on identifying critical transportation links by estimating the potential consequences that can result 
from the failure of a given infrastructure link. Critical transportation links are identified by assessing 
the link traffic load, the link demand and the post-failure link demand redistribution costs. Through 
comparing these values for each link, the most critical transportation links can be identified. 
With the high consequence public infrastructure links identified, it is anticipated that the risk 
assessment process can be limited to this subset of the infrastructure network. While this approach 
will help to focus the risk assessment process to the majority of the high consequence links, it may 
overlook equivalent or even more at risk transportation links such as extremely hazard prone links 
with moderate or even low failure consequences (Risk Map, 2007). As the Risk Map Germany 
program is still a work in progress, it will be interesting to see if and how these issues are addressed. 
2.4.2 RiskScape New Zealand 
RiskScape is a New Zealand research program working to develop a loss-modeling software package 
for analyzing the potential impacts of natural hazards (flooding, earthquake, volcano, tsunami and 
wind) to improve natural hazard management. RiskScape is intended to include the following natural 
hazard risk assessment steps: natural hazard intensity assessment, identification of exposed 
infrastructure objects, evaluation of infrastructure vulnerability, assessment of damaged states, 
quantification of direct and indirect consequences, and evaluation of the resulting risk.  
The RiskScape assessment methodology is build upon three primary modules: infrastructure 
databases, hazard modeling, and loss assessment. As no extensive infrastructure database exists in 
New Zealand, focused infrastructure field surveys and advanced data collection methods including 
satellite imagery and laser-scanning are being used to formulate the core of a pilot infrastructure 
database. The hazard modeling module is being formulated from previous recorded events and 
Chapter 2: Existing vulnerability assessment approaches 
 
  19 
computer simulation of potential future storms and events. To assess the potential hazard induced 
infrastructure damage, the RiskScape model is intending to employ vulnerability curves (Resse, King, 
Bell, & Schmidt, 2007). As this research program is under development, neither the extent (including 
the types of infrastructure objects considered) nor the depth (including the level of vulnerability 
analysis) is currently unknown.  
2.5 Activities within Switzerland 
2.5.1 Swiss federal railway (SBB) 
The SBB is an extensive organization with over 28,000 employees charged with operating 9,000 trains 
daily and maintaining 3,000 km of railway lines (SBB, 2008). This infrastructure by definition is 
extremely geographically dispersed making it extremely exposed to potential natural hazards. 
Furthermore, the trains, electrical lines and communication lines are extremely vulnerable to natural 
hazard events. To combat the risks posed by natural hazards, the SBB employs a three pronged 
approach of documenting natural hazard events, implementing risk mitigation actions and repairing 
natural hazard induced infrastructure failures.  
When natural hazard events occur, the SBB employee responsible for inspecting and maintaining the 
given rail section is primed to document the location and intensity of the given natural hazard event. 
The SBB is working to collate these numerous hazard event data points within a GIS platform and 
create natural hazard identification maps. When active natural hazard zones are identified or when 
infrastructure objects fail due to natural hazard events, risk mitigation and reconstruction efforts are 
immediately initiated. The SBB annually receives the financial equivalent of 1% of the current value 
of the built railway infrastructure from the Swiss national government to maintain the railway 
infrastructure. These maintenance funds are allocated by each of the four geographically based 
regions using semi-quantitative approaches. The primary pitfall that SBB is currently facing is that it 
does not have a complete inventory of its built infrastructure and thus is receiving a less than 
appropriate maintenance funding support (Meier, 2008).  
2.5.2 Swiss federal roads authority (ASTRA) 
Within the Swiss federal roads authority, the bridge research group is current working to prepare the 
decision foundation and methods to help guide financial resource allocation to maintain the required 
safety standards across the entire road transportation system. This decision foundation includes 
methods for evaluating and comparing risks from different sources (e.g. traffic, natural hazards, 
dangerous goods transport) and for formulating effective risk reduction interventions. The studied 
infrastructure system includes the road infrastructure structures and the vehicular traffic on the road 
infrastructure. The phases considered are construction, maintenance and system operation phases. 
Within ASTRA there is an increasing trend to use risk-based analysis in the planning and management 
of the built infrastructure. This trend extends far beyond the purely technical realm of analysis and 
into areas such as legal and code interpretation and revision aspects. The final goal of this program is 
to develop an actionable methodology which can serve as the foundation for the construction of a 
risk management system at ASTRA (Frey, Gerber, Kost, & Schneeberger, 2005). 
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2.5.3 Cantonal insurance companies 
In Switzerland, 19 of the 26 Swiss Cantons each administers a cantonal fire insurance company which 
is charged with providing insurance for all public, corporate and private buildings against fire and 
natural hazards (i.e. avalanche, flood, landslide, mudslide and rockfall). While this insurance is 
mandatory, the individual premiums are not prorated on individual risk exposure and thus the total 
risk exposure is uniformly carried by all policy holders. 
To aid current and future building owners in assessing their individual risk exposure and in 
determining if risk mitigation actions should be implemented to reduce the risk exposure of their 
respective buildings, the Cantonal Fire Insurance Companies have jointly formulated an application 
oriented manual for conducting building risk assessment with respect to natural hazards (Egli, 2005). 
For each of the considered hazards (avalanche, flood, landslide, mudslide and rockfall) the manual 
systematically presents, within a failure scenario format, the applicable hazard parameter intensities, 
the equations for assessing the forces applied to the buildings, quantification of the resulting 
consequences and identification of different mitigation actions which can be implemented by the 
building owner to reduce the building’s risk exposure.  
 
Figure 2-2: Cantonal Fire Insurance considered hazard-building interactions for the avalanche hazard. 
A key aspect of this building risk assessment with respect to natural hazards is the considered hazard-
building interactions. The hazard-building interactions for the avalanche hazard are presented in 
Figure 2-2 and from these images, one can observe how much influence the building geometry and 
configuration has on the resulting hazard-building interaction. Furthermore, such diagrams serve as 
the foundation for the building risk assessment with respect to natural hazards. 
While neither the Cantonal Fire Insurance Companies nor the developed risk assessment manual 
addresses public transportation infrastructure risk with respect to natural hazards, as public 
transportation is beyond the Cantonal Fire Insurance Companies’ charter, the general systematic risk 
assessment approach and employed hazard and infrastructure parameters have potential to be 
transferred, in spirit, to assessing transportation infrastructure risk with respect to natural hazards. 
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2.6 Hazard data sources in Switzerland 
In reviewing the various vulnerability and risk assessment approaches presented in Sections 2.1 to 
2.5, one can observe that each approach incorporates three different elements in quantifying 
vulnerability and risk – the hazard, the infrastructure object and the failure consequences. This 
section reviews a number of existing and under development resources for quantifying the natural 
hazard parameters and intensities within Switzerland – specifically SilvaProtect, StorMe, hazard 
identification maps and infrastructure specific hazard identification maps.  
2.6.1 SilvaProtect 
SilvaProtect is a natural hazard indication mapping resource for determining the largest possible 
geographic extent of gravity-induced natural hazards – specifically avalanche, landslide, rockfall and 
torrent hazards (Giamboni, 2007). Figure 2-3 presents the SilvaProtect hazard indication map for the 
center of Burgholz located in the Berne Canton. Within Figure 2-3, one can observe the key roadway 
and railway lines crossing Burgholz, shown orange and purple, transposed over a composite image of 
SilvaProtect avalanche, landslide, rockfall and torrent data.  
 
Figure 2-3: SilvaProtect hazard indication map – Burgholz. 
The SilvaProtect data was developed by segmenting Switzerland into 20m x 20m parcels and 
assessing the gravitational stability of each parcel under conditions characteristic of each hazard 
given the local topography. Where instability is identified, the resultant kinetic energy driven path is 
computed and identified with a line. For example, individual potential landslide paths are well 
presented in the lower-right hand corner of Figure 2-3. As the path of a given hazard is influenced by 
the region’s geographic contours, the path of some hazards – torrent and avalanche hazards in 
particular – can be channeled by the local topography. This potential channeling phenomenon can be 
observed in the torrent hazard at the bottom center of Figure 2-3.  
To determine the maximum geographic reach of the various hazards, SilvaProtect employs a 
maximum possible event perspective (greater than 1000 years) and assumes that all slope stability 
and physical hazard prevention infrastructure is non-functional. Unfortunately, this maximum event 
perspective limits the potential application of the SilvaProtect data and thus it can only be employed 
to identify infrastructure objects which are or are not exposed to gravitationally induced hazards. 
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2.6.2 StorMe 
StorMe is a nationally supported, cantonally administrated natural hazard event documentation 
database specifying the date, location and key aspects of previous natural hazard events. With over 
17,500 entries, it is a testament to the detail required for accurately documenting previous natural 
hazard events (Eyer, 2007). Figure 2-4 presents over 100 natural hazard events in the region 
surrounding Spiez, located in the Berne Canton. Unfortunately, the level of participation and detail of 
information varies among the cantons, limiting the applicability of such a database for Swiss wide 
applications. Thus, the StorMe database can only be systematically employed as a tool for identifying 
potential object-hazard combinations and for assisting in developing hazard identification maps. 
 
Figure 2-4: Geographical presentation of StorMe data in the Spiez region. 
2.6.3 Swiss National hazard mapping initiative 
A nationally mandated, cantonally implemented hazard indication map development initiative is 
currently underway within Switzerland. This initiative looks to develop, for all inhabited regions of  
  
Figure 2-5: Hazard identification map example - Flood height intensity, 1000 yr return period. 
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Switzerland, avalanche, flood, landslide, rockfall and torrent hazard identification maps at a 1:5000 
scale for 30, 100, 300 and 1000 year return periods for key hazard parameters presented in Table 2-6 
(Loat, 2007). The project’s specified completion date is December 2011. The hazard identification 
maps will specify the expected geographic scope and expected hazard parameter intensity for each 
of the four return periods. An example of the geographic and hazard parameter intensity detail of 
this information is presented in Figure 2-5. 
To facilitate the Swiss National hazard mapping initiative, predefined hazard parameter intensity 
thresholds have been defined for each considered hazard parameter. As shown in Table 2-6, the 
Swiss National hazard mapping initiative has identified eight key hazard parameters for five different 
hazards (avalanche, flood, landslide, rockfall and torrent). Furthermore, the initiative has also 
identified threshold hazard intensities for each hazard parameter. For example, for the hazard 
parameter flood height, low, medium and high intensity thresholds of HF < 0.5m, 0.5m < HF < 2m, and 
2m < HF respectively have been identified. Where applicable, these hazard parameter intensity 
threshold values can be directly employed to assess the vulnerability and risk of infrastructure 
objects. Currently, the mapping progress achieved by the various cantons does vary and thus already 
completed hazard intensity maps from the Cantons of Aargau and Fribourg are employed in Chapter 
4 to demonstrate the developed vulnerability and risk assessment methodology. 
Table 2-6: Hazard parameter intensity thresholds for the Swiss hazard identification maps (Loat, 2007). 
Hazard Hazard Parameter Low Intensity Medium Intensity High Intensity 
Avalanche Horizontal Pressure PAH < 3 kN/m
2 3 < PAH < 30 kN/m
2 PAH > 30 kN/m
2 
Flood 
Bank Erosion Depth EDF < 0.5 m 0.5 < EDF < 2 m EDF > 2 m 
Flood Height HF < 0.5 m 0.5 < HF < 2 m HF > 2 m 
Specific discharge qF < 0.5m
2/s 0.5 < qF < 2 m
2/s qF > 2 m
2/s 
Landslide Annual velocity VL < 2 cm/year VL: dm/year 
VL > dm/day or 
> 1 m/event 
Rockfall Kinetic energy ER < 30 kJ 30 kJ < ER < 300 kJ ER > 300 kJ 
Torrent Thickness and 
flow velocity 
- TD < 1 m & VD < 1 m/s TD > 1 m & VD > 1 m/s 
2.6.4 Infrastructure specific hazard maps 
As the feasibility of developing hazard identification maps for extensive areas and the utility of these 
maps becomes more apparent, additional public entities are becoming interested in developing 
similar resources for their respective infrastructure systems. The key limitation of the Swiss National 
hazard mapping initiative, detailed in Section 2.6.3, is that it is focused on developing hazard 
identification maps for only the inhabited regions of Switzerland. Some infrastructure systems, 
transportation infrastructure systems in particular, extend beyond the limits of the inhabited regions 
of Switzerland. Therefore, to develop an exhaustive hazard identification map for a transportation 
infrastructure system, additional hazard parameter data must be collated and hazard parameters in 
previously undocumented regions must be assessed.  
The Berne Cantonal Roads Authority, the agency charged at the time with operating and maintaining 
the Swiss highway system within the Canton of Berne, developed hazard parameter intensity maps 
for the National highways within the Berne Canton. Examples of the hazard identification maps for 
avalanche horizontal pressure and flood height intensities affecting the A8 national highway as it 
passes to the south of Erschwanden, just east of Interlaken, are presented in Figure 2-6 (Frick & 
Aeberhard, 2008). 
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Figure 2-6: Geographical presentation of Berne Cantonal highway hazard parameter intensity maps for:  
a) avalanche horizontal pressure and b) flood height. 
2.7 Infrastructure data resources in Switzerland 
To assess the vulnerability and risk of an infrastructure object requires knowledge of three key 
elements – the hazard, the infrastructure object and the failure consequences. In Section 2.6, 
potential hazard data sources within Switzerland were reviewed. This section focuses on the second 
element required to quantify the vulnerability and risk of an infrastructure object – data specifying 
the location and key parameters of the objects contained within the considered infrastructure 
system. Currently, within Switzerland there are two key infrastructure object data sources – 
specifically the Vector25 and the KUBA databases. The details, strengths and limitations of these two 
databases are respectively discussed in Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2. 
2.7.1 Transportation Link Vectorization – Vector25 & STM 
SwissTopo, the Swiss National Office for Geographic Information Systems (GIS), has compiled an 
object type-based geographic vectorization of the Swiss transportation systems at a scale of 1:25000 
entitled Vector25 (National Office of Topography Swisstopo, 2008). For the private transport system, 
the scope of this vectorization extends from Switzerland’s major highways down to the smallest 
marked alpine walking paths and is comprised over 1.3 million links. A graphical presentation of this 
        
Figure 2-7: Geographic presentation of: a) Vector25 private transport data around Bern, b) the Swiss 
Transport Model Data tranposed over the Vector 25 Data. 
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Table 2-7: Considered Swiss Transportation Model functionality classes. 
Class Object Functionality Description % of STM 
Class 1 Principle roads, width > 6m, truck passing possible, slope < 10% 32.60% 
Class 2 Secondary roads, width > 4m, car passing possible, slope < 15% 27.69% 
Class 3 
Tertiary roads, width > 2.8m, passing only in designated zones, 
services countryside 
2.47% 
Separated 
Highways 
Limited access, high-speed roadway, each direction separated 
with a central median, no mixed traffic 
12.34% 
Non-Separated 
Highways 
Limited access, high-speed roadway, not separated with a central 
median, no mixed traffic 
3.94% 
Connector 
Highways 
Connector limited access, high-speed roadway, not separated 
with a central median, no mixed traffic 
4.09% 
Quarter Roads Non-through traffic important roadways, width > 4m 2.09% 
Vector25 data around the center of Bern is presented in Figure 2-7a. As this current work focuses 
developing a methodology to assess the Swiss Road Infrastructure System’s vulnerability to natural 
hazards, a subset of over 51,000 transportation links which are a minimum of 2.8m wide and have 
the capacity to carry a reasonable amount of traffic are included in this analysis. Hereafter, this 
subset is referred to as the Swiss Transport Model (STM). A geographic presentation of the links 
included in the Swiss Transport Model with respect to the base Vector25 data (in gray) is shown in 
Figure 2-7b. 
The links within the Swiss Transport Model (STM) are subcategorized by two different parameters –
the given object’s hierarchical functionality within the transportation network (e.g. Highway, Class 1 
roadway, Class 2 roadway) and the link component type (i.e. bridge, gallery, roadway, tunnel).  
The Swiss Transportation Model considers 35 different functionality classes, but only 7 classes, 
presented in Table 2-7, are located predominately within the borders of Switzerland and constitute 
at least one percent of the Swiss Transportation Model. 
The links within these different functionality groups have then been identified with their respective 
component type. Analyzed as a whole, the four different components considered by the system and 
their representative percentages are presented in Table 2-8. 
Table 2-8: Swiss Transportation Model component types. 
Component % of STM 
Bridge 17.34 
Gallery 0.78 
Roadway 79.08 
Tunnel 2.79 
These functionality and component types presented within this section are useful resources for 
identifying properties and hazard parameter intensity based consequences to a given infrastructure 
class.  
2.7.2 The Swiss highway structures database – KUBA 
Over the past 19 years, the Swiss National Roads Office has developed and continues to expand an 
infrastructure database (KUBA) specifying the location, configuration, general dimensions and 
condition state of the various structures that comprise the Swiss National Highway System. This 
database is used to support the National Road’s Authority in their decision making. KUBA’s predictive 
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capabilities are currently oriented towards formulating optimal intervention strategies with respect 
to gradual deterioration.  
In collecting and entering the data for KUBA, the various objects are first separated by component 
type (i.e. bridges, galleries, retaining walls, tunnels and water retention facilities) and then assigned 
to the one of more than 40 different structural configurations. Once assigned to a given structural 
configuration, the given practitioner is then primed to separate the given object into key elements. 
For the example of a two span continuous bridge, a practitioner is primed to separate the object into 
five key elements – left abutment, right abutment, central pier, superstructure and roadway deck. 
The practitioner then employs KUBA’s semi-structured format of fifty-five different data fields to 
document the different elements within each object. In studying these fifty-five data fields, eleven 
data fields, detailed in Table 2-9, are directly applicable to quantifying an infrastructure object’s 
resistance with respect to a hazard. 
Table 2-9: Risk quantification applicable KUBA datafields. 
Ref Data Field Ref Data Field 
1 Object type 7 Maximum clearance 
2 Location 8 Load charge test 
3 Total length 9 Discharge capacity 
4 Total width 10 Pile type 
5 Total surface 11 Distributed linear weight 
6 Number of spans   
The initial three data fields, detailed in Table 2-9, can be obtained from the Vector25 data, but the 
additional eight data fields included within KUBA can help to further estimate an infrastructure 
object’s resistance.  
2.8 Failure consequence data resources in Switzerland 
With the hazard and infrastructure object data sources within Switzerland detailed in Sections 2.6 
and 2.7, the last element required to quantify the vulnerability and risk of an infrastructure object is 
information identifying the range of the potential consequences resulting from the potential failure 
of an infrastructure object. Within Switzerland, there are five primary sources of failure consequence 
data: local historical archives, public natural hazard event and infrastructure databases (StorMe and 
KUBA), private insurance databases, transportation system models and practitioner professional 
experience. Each source is herein detailed and its applicability to a comprehensive infrastructure 
object vulnerability and risk assessment methodology is assessed.  
2.8.1 Local historical archives 
Natural hazard events impact towns and communities in a number of ways including by damaging 
homes and severing local transportation links. These events commonly become defining points in a 
community’s oral and written history. This history is informally contained within memories of the 
local residents who were present for each event and formally documented within the local historical 
archives and newspapers. While both of these resources contain extremely detailed information 
commonly documenting the event dates, natural hazard parameter intensity levels, direct 
consequences and indirect consequences, the time required to collect, compile and analyze this data 
from the vast number of resources undermines the potential of using these data resources for 
regional or national vulnerability and risk assessments. 
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2.8.2 Public natural hazard event and infrastructure databases 
The StorMe natural hazard event and KUBA infrastructure databases contain venues for identifying 
the structural damage and indirect consequences resulting from natural hazards. Within StorMe this 
damage data is compiled quantitatively by noting if the natural hazard event resulted in any human 
fatalities, human injuries, animal fatalities, forest damage, or damage to protection structures. 
Additional data can be qualitatively included by adding a note to a given StorMe event entry. 
Unfortunately there is no standardized procedure or process for constructing a descriptive note and, 
other than noting the associated hazard (e.g. avalanche), there is no additional information provided 
concerning the hazard parameter intensity.  
When infrastructure objects detailed within the KUBA database are damaged by a natural hazard, the 
practitioners are encouraged to note this damage in the KUBA database along with the gradual 
deterioration related damage. While KUBA has a venue for documenting structural damage, the 
instigator of this structural damage, the natural hazard parameter intensity, is not systematically 
recorded. 
While both of the StorMe and KUBA databases do have venues for quantitatively and qualitatively 
recording the direct and/or indirect consequences of natural hazards, the fact that the hazard 
parameter intensity is not noted prevents one from relating a hazard parameter intensity to an 
infrastructure object’s direct and indirect consequences. 
2.8.3 Private insurance databases 
Another potential source for quantifying the consequences of natural hazards is private and semi-
private insurance company databases. Such databases are developed by an insurance company to 
document previous insurance claims and to predict the potential for future insurance claims. 
Therefore such databases are commonly central to the operation and financial stability of a given 
insurance company. Unfortunately, to the knowledge of the author, the current insurance companies 
focus predominately on private, corporate and governmental buildings which have different 
potential natural hazard induced failure modes as compared to transportation infrastructure objects. 
Furthermore, as these databases do directly or indirectly contain client information and as they are 
central to the financial profitability and stability of the given insurance firm, insurance companies are 
commonly reluctant to provide access to natural hazard insurance claim data. Thus the scope, 
privacy and general accessibility issues related to private and semi-private insurance databases limits 
their applicability to quantifying the potential consequences of a transportation infrastructure object 
failing due to a given hazard parameter intensity. 
2.8.4 Transportation network models 
An approach to quantify the indirect consequences due to the failure of an infrastructure object is to 
develop a model of the given system and to assess what implications the failure of the given object 
has on the system. Such a model specifying the traffic distribution aspects of the primary and 
secondary roadway systems in Switzerland is the Swiss Transportation Model (STM) (Vrtic, et al., 
2005). This system, which has been derived from the Vector25 transportation link vectorization data, 
details the location, transportation capacity (e.g. number of vehicles at a given volume can cross a 
given link) and inter-link connectivity of over 51,000 transportation links. This system can be thus 
used to study how private transportation (e.g. cars, trucks and buses) deviate around a closed 
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transportation link and what implications this deviated traffic has for the general transportation 
system congestion, the total additional travel distance and the total additional travel time. Therefore, 
even though, the Swiss Transportation Model can only provide the unit daily transportation related 
impacts of a link closure (i.e. the total additional travel distance and travel time) when combined 
with the expected service interruption duration of a given infrastructure object failure, one can 
quantify the transportation related indirect consequences.  
2.8.5 Practitioner professional experience 
In the aftermath of natural hazards, the incurred private and public structural damage must be 
inspected, evaluated, and repaired. Within the private market, the responsibility of assessing and 
evaluating damaged homes and industrial buildings falls to general contractors. Within public 
market, the task of assessing the financial and service interruption duration implications of damaged 
roadways and railways falls to the local, cantonal and national road and rail infrastructure officials. It 
is these officials who, over numerous years, amass a wealth of professional experience assessing, 
evaluating and overseeing the repair of natural hazard induced structural damage. Unfortunately, 
this knowledge remains stored within the minds of these individuals, only to be applied when they 
are personally primed with pertinent questions and problems. Therefore, if a method for providing a 
context within which these experienced practitioners can formulate their direct damage and service 
interruption duration estimations and if a method for applying these consequence estimations in the 
vulnerability and risk assessment process were formulated, quantifying direct and indirect 
consequences from expert estimates can be a feasible method. 
2.9 Critique of existing vulnerability and risk assessment approaches 
As infrastructure systems have grown larger and the required level of oversight has increased, 
infrastructure managers have increasing turned to infrastructure management systems to 
transparently develop optimal management solutions to mitigate the gradual deterioration of the 
built infrastructure. The management of potential natural hazard induced infrastructure failures has 
not enjoyed such a comprehensive or system-wide management perspective. Rather, local or 
regional transportation natural hazard risk assessment and mitigation projects, commonly following 
natural hazard events, have been arbitrarily employed when a given infrastructure manager has 
deemed it appropriate.  
To assess the risk of infrastructure systems to natural hazards, risk analysis platforms including 
HAZUS-MH and NYSDOT’s Bridge Safety Assurance Program have been implemented. Unfortunately 
HAZUS-MH does not systematically consider the relative resistance of a specific transportation 
infrastructure object, other than scour, when conducting a risk assessment and the Bridge Safety 
Assurance Program provides only a qualitative risk assessment and inherently circumvents the ability 
to quantify in an equivalent monetary terms the relative annual risk exposure of an infrastructure 
object. Internationally, there are a number of national initiatives to develop comprehensive risk 
assessment platforms including Risk Map Germany and RiskScape New Zealand. Unfortunately, both 
of these initiatives are too early in development to adequately determine the intended analysis 
depth and scale.  
Turning to risk assessment activities currently underway in Switzerland, one can observe that the 
cantonal insurance companies have developed and implemented a comprehensive assessment 
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approach to quantify the natural hazard risks to the existing building stock. Unfortunately, the 
cantonal insurance company charter prevents these governmental organizations from extending 
their scope of analysis and conducting comprehensive risk assessments of the built transportation 
infrastructure. Furthermore, the failure scenarios developed by the cantonal insurance company to 
analyze a building’s response to a natural hazard are not directly applicable to assessing the potential 
failure of the built transportation infrastructure.  
Looking closer at activities underway in Switzerland within the three domains required to quantify 
the risk of an infrastructure object – hazard, infrastructure and consequence assessment – it can be 
seen that a number of these elements have already been or are in the process of being developed. 
Within the hazard assessment domain, maximum scope of gravitational hazards can be determined 
with the SilvaProtect database and the local intensities of a set of hazard parameters within the 
habituated regions of Switzerland are currently being developed within the Swiss National hazard 
mapping initiative. Within the infrastructure assessment domain, a GIS vectorization of the Swiss 
transportation networks, component type identification and object class identification of each 
infrastructure object is publicly available within the Vector25 and STM data sets. Additionally, the 
Swiss highway infrastructure database – KUBA – details the location, configuration, general 
dimensions and condition state of the structures that comprise the Swiss National Highway System. 
Lastly within the consequence assessment domains, there are a number of potential sources of 
failure consequence data within Switzerland but the only sources which show potential for being 
applied on a nation-wide scale are practitioner professional experience to estimate the direct 
consequences and service interruption durations resulting from the failure of an infrastructure object 
and transportation network models to estimate the daily indirect traffic related consequences 
resulting from the failure of a transportation link. 
In reviewing these available resources, one can observe that two key aspects required to assess the 
vulnerability and risk of an infrastructure network which still need to be developed are procedures to 
assess the potential failure of transportation infrastructure components to potential natural hazards 
and an overarching comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessment approach. These two limitations 
are addressed in Chapter 3 by developing failure assessment procedures for each private 
transportation infrastructure component and by proposing a comprehensive vulnerability and risk 
assessment approach. Additional, as each step of the vulnerability and risk assessment approach is 
introduced, an example is provided to demonstrate the intricacies, strengths and limitations of the 
proposed methodology. Lastly, the developed comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessment 
approach is employed in Chapter 4 to analyze the vulnerability and risk of selected objects within two 
different roadway links.  
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3 Comprehensively assessing vulnerability and risk of 
transportation infrastructure  
3.1 Laying the foundation for a comprehensive vulnerability and risk 
assessment approach 
In Chapter 2, a number natural hazard data sources, infrastructure data sources, consequence 
assessment methods, and risk assessment methods are presented. Each of these sources and 
methods have their own applications but, separately or combined, none of the information 
presented can provide a comprehensive assessment of a transportation infrastructure network’s 
vulnerability and risk to natural hazards. Without such a comprehensive assessment methodology, 
infrastructure managers are unable to identify high risk infrastructure objects and links and quantify 
the risk of the various links within their infrastructure network. 
The driving motivation of this chapter is, thus, to develop a transportation infrastructure vulnerability 
and risk assessment methodology from existing or shortly available hazard, infrastructure and 
transportation network data resources. The final product is intended to be fully actionable within a 
maximum time horizon of five years. This chapter lays the methodology’s foundation by first 
defining, from a general perspective, risk, vulnerability and the associated supportive terms, in 
Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3. To assist in the explanation of risk and vulnerability, Section 3.1.1 applies 
these fundamentals to the vulnerability and risk assessment of an infrastructure object (i.e. a 
roadway). With these terms defined from a general perspective, in Section 3.1.3, the sequential steps 
of the methodology are presented in Sections 3.2 to 3.9. 
3.1.1 Analytically quantifying risk – a general perspective 
The failure of an infrastructure object (e.g. a roadway becoming buried in rockfall debris) is the state 
of reduced structural and/or functional performance of the infrastructure object. The risk of failure is 
the probabilistic quantification of the consequences a hazard, can cause on a part of the built 
infrastructure. Herein, a hazard is described as a function of its respective attributes, the hazard 
parameters. Furthermore the magnitude of a given hazard and hazard parameter are respectively 
referred to as the hazard intensity and hazard parameter intensity. The consequences of failure 
include direct consequences and indirect consequences. Direct consequences are the financial 
valuation of the repair activities required to return the infrastructure object’s structural performance 
to its original state (e.g. the financial valuation of removing the rockfall debris and repairing the 
roadway damage). Indirect consequences are the financial valuation of the losses and additional 
expenditures incurred from transport and societal related impacts of the infrastructure object’s 
reduced functional performance (e.g. the financial valuation of detouring around the closed 
roadway).  
The risk of failure of object A with respect to hazard B is the product of the failure probability of a 
object A with respect to hazard B multiplied by the consequences of object A failing due to hazard B, 
Equation (3.1). 
 B B BA fA ARisk P consequences= ⋅  (3.1) 
Where: 
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RiskA
B = the risk of failure of object A with respect to hazard B [CHF] 
PfA
B = the failure probability of object A with respect to hazard B [   ] 
consequencesA
B = the consequences of object A failing due to hazard B [CHF] 
A hazard (e.g. a flood) is quantified in terms of its respective hazard parameters (e.g. flood depth, 
discharge, velocity) and the value of a given hazard parameter is the hazard parameter intensity (e.g. 
the discharge rate). The risk of failure of a given infrastructure object, i, with respect to hazard 
parameter, h, (e.g. flood depth) is equal to the integral of the risk of failure of object i over all 
potential hazard parameter intensities (e.g. flood depth of 0.5m, 1m, 2m). As shown in Equation 
(3.2), this is in turn equal to the product of the failure probability of object i with respect to the 
hazard parameter intensity x, multiplied by the failure consequences of object i with respect to each 
respective hazard parameter intensity x, integrated across all potential hazard parameter intensities. 
 ( ) ( )
0 0
h x x x
i i fi iRisk Risk dx P consequences dx
∞ ∞
= = ⋅∫ ∫  (3.2) 
Where: 
Riski
h = the risk of failure of object i with respect to the hazard parameter h [CHF] 
Riski
x = the risk of failure of object i with respect to hazard parameter intensity x [CHF] 
Pfi
x = the failure probability of object i with respect to the occurrence of the hazard 
parameter intensity x [  ] 
consequencesi
x = the consequences of the failure of object i with respect to hazard parameter 
intensity x [CHF] 
As hazard events seldom affect a given infrastructure object and as infrastructure objects can fail in 
numerous different failure modes, Equation (3.2) is further refined to Equation (3.3) by assuming the 
different failure modes are mutually exclusive. Thus, the resulting total risk with respect to the given 
hazard parameter is a summation of the risk of failure of object i with respect to the hazard 
parameter intensity x within each failure mode mn. 
 ( )
, ,
0 0
x
fi m i mn n
N
h x x
i i
n
Risk v P consequences dx
∞
=
⎡ ⎤
= ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∫  (3.3) 
Where: 
νix = the probability of the hazard parameter intensity x affecting object i [  ] 
Pfi,mn
x = the failure probability of object i failing in mode mn with respect to the hazard 
parameter intensity x [  ] 
consequencesi,mn
x = the consequences of object i failing in mode mn to the hazard parameter 
intensity x [CHF] 
3.1.2 Analytically quantifying vulnerability – a general perspective 
Turning to analytically quantifying vulnerability, the vulnerability of a transportation infrastructure 
object with respect to a hazard parameter is herein defined as the consequences a hazard parameter 
of a given intensity can cause due to the failure of the infrastructure object.  
The vulnerability of object i failing in mode mn to a hazard parameter intensity x, Equation (3.4), is 
the probability of object i  failing in mode mn with respect to a given hazard parameter intensity x 
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multiplied by the sum of the direct and indirect consequences of object i failing in mode mn with 
respect to the hazard parameter intensity x. 
 
, , , ,
( )
n n n n
x x x x
i m fi m i m i mVulnerability P DC IC= +  (3.4) 
Where: 
Vulnerabilityi,mn
x = the vulnerability of object i failing in mode mn with respect to a hazard 
parameter intensity x [CHF] 
DCi,mn
x = the financial valuation of the repair activities required to return object i’s failure in 
mode mn with respect to the hazard parameter intensity x to object i’s original state [CHF] 
ICi,mn
x = the financial valuation of the incurred transport and societal losses and additional 
expenditures due to infrastructure object i’s reduced functional performance by failing in 
mode mn [CHF] 
The direct consequences of object i failing in mode mn for a given hazard h and its parameter 
intensity x, Equation (3.5), are in turn dependent on object i’s structural capacity in the failure mode 
mn and the financial valuation of the activities required to repair this level of structural damage. 
 ( ), , ,n n nx x xi m i m i mif x R F DC> → →  (3.5) 
Where: 
Ri,mn
x = object i’s structural capacity with respect to the failure mode mn and the hazard 
parameter intensity x 
Fi,mn
x = the structural state of object i failing in mode mn to the hazard parameter intensity x  
The indirect consequences of object i failing in mode mn due to the hazard parameter intensity x, 
Equation (3.6), is herein defined as a product of the time required to return infrastructure object i 
having failed in mode mn to the original state (hereafter referred to as the service interruption 
duration) and the daily financial valuation of the transport and societal losses and additional 
expenditures due to infrastructure object i’s reduced functional performance by failing in mode mn.  
 
, , ,n n
x x
i m i m I dailyIC SI IC= ⋅  (3.6) 
Where: 
SIi,mn
x = the time required to return infrastructure object i having failed in mode mn to the 
hazard parameter intensity x to a fully functional state [days] 
ICI,daily = the daily financial valuation of the losses and additional expenditures incurred from 
transport and societal related impacts of infrastructure link I’s reduced functional 
performance [CHF] 2 
Therefore using the definition of Equation (3.6), the risk of failure and vulnerability of object i to 
hazard parameter h, Equations (3.3) and (3.4), can be refined as Equations (3.7) and (3.8). 
 ( )( ), , , ,
0 0
n n n
N
h x x x x
i i fi m i m i m I daily
n
Risk P DC SI IC dxν
∞
=
⎡ ⎤
= ⋅ + ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∫  (3.7) 
 
, , , , ,
( )
n n n n
x x x x
i m fi m i m i m I dailyVulnerability P DC SI IC= + ⋅  (3.8) 
                                                          
2 While it is realized that natural hazard events can seriously or fatally injure individuals, these indirect 
consequences are not considered by this work. Please refer to ASTRA’s “Safety of the road transportation 
system and its structures” series for additional information concerning the assessment of these indirect 
consequences (ASTRA, 2008). 
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One can observe from Equations (3.7) and (3.8), that to quantify the risk and the vulnerability curve 
of a given object i due to a hazard parameter h, one must evaluate five different terms – the 
probability of each hazard intensity x acting on the object i, the probability of object i experiencing 
failure in mode mn, the direct consequences of object i failing in mode mn, the service interruption 
duration of object i failing in mode mn and the daily indirect consequences of object i’s reduced 
functional performance. 
The remaining part of this chapter presents methodologies for assessing the probability of each 
hazard parameter intensity x acting on object i, the probability object i failing in mode mn, the direct 
consequences of object i failing in mode mn and the service interruption duration related to object i 
failing in mode mn. Methodologies for determining the financial valuation of the losses and additional 
expenditures incurred from transport and societal impacts of a given infrastructure object’s reduced 
functional performance can be found within (Hajdin, Axhausen, Bell, Birdsall, & Erath, 2008). 
For clarity purposes, these general definitions of vulnerability and risk are applied in Example 3-1 to 
assess the vulnerability and risk of failure of a roadway object to a rockfall hazard.  
Example 3-1: Evaluate the annual risk of failure of a roadway object exposed to a rockfall hazard. 
Take a rockfall hazard R which is assessed to act on a roadway object i once every 30 years. It is 
further estimated that if the rockfall occurs, it will result in 3m of rock uniformly covering a 100m 
length of roadway. Removing this quantity of rock and repairing the roadway is estimated to take 3.5 
days at a cost of 75,000 CHF. The daily transport and societal losses and additional expenditures due 
to the roadway’s functional failure are estimated at 20,000 CHF. 
 
The roadway object has negligible resistance to a rockfall hazard and thus in case of a rockfall event, 
the roadway object is buried in rockfall debris (the failure mode). The key rockfall hazard parameter 
for a roadway failing in this mode is the depth of deposited debris. The hazard parameter intensity is 
a uniform deposited rockfall debris depth of 3m.  
 
From the data provided above, one can extrapolate the following information: 
νix = 1/30 years = 0.03333 per year            (rate of a rockfall intersecting the roadway) 
x = 3 meters of rock                   (rockfall parameter intensity) 
Ri,m0
x = 0 meters of rock      (roadway structural capacity with respect the given failure mode) 
Pfi,m0
x = 1.00                    (roadway failure probability) 
DCi,m0
x = 75,000 CHF                    (direct consequences, i.e. repair cost) 
SIi,m0
x = 3.5 days                 (service interruption duration) 
ICI,daily =  20,000 CHF                   (daily indirect consequences) 
Thus, the direct consequences of the roadway object i’s structural failure is: 
0,
x
i mDC = 75,000 CHF 
The indirect consequences of the roadway object i’s functional failure is: 
0 0, , ,
x x
i m i m I dailyIC SI IC= ⋅  
0,
x
i mIC = (3.5 days)(20,000 CHF/day) 
 
0,
x
i mIC = 70,000 CHF 
Thus the roadway object i’s vulnerability with respect to the rockfall deposited depth of 3m, 
following Equation (3.4), is: 
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0 0 0 0, , , ,
( )x x x xi m fi m i m i mVulnerability P DC IC= +  
0,
x
i mVulnerability = (1.00)(75,000 CHF+70,000 CHF) 
0,
x
i mVulnerability = 145,000 CHF 
The annual risk of failure of the roadway object i to this rockfall hazard parameter intensity, following 
Equation (3.3), is: 
( )
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fi m i mn n
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R x x
i i
n
Risk P consequences dxν
∞
=
⎡ ⎤
= ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∫  
R
iRisk =(0.0333 1/yr)(1.00)( 75,000 CHF+70,000 CHF) 
R
iRisk =4,829 CHF/year 
 
3.1.3 General framework 
To quantify the vulnerability and risk of infrastructure objects and the risk of infrastructure links 
contained within a transportation network, it is necessary to assess each of the terms in Equation 
(3.3), as follows: 
? the probability of the hazard parameter intensity x affecting object i (νix) 
? the failure probability of object i failing in mode mn with respect to the hazard parameter 
intensity x (Pfi,mn
x) 
? the consequences of object i failing in mode mn to the hazard parameter intensity x 
(consequencesi,mn
x)  
To formulate this information, it is necessary to answer the following five questions:  
1) Is object i exposed to the hazard and what are the expected local hazard parameter 
intensities? 
2) Is object i affected by the possible hazard parameter intensities? 
3) What expected levels of damage does the possible hazard parameter intensities cause upon 
the object i? 
4) What are the expected direct and indirect consequences for each expected level of damage? 
5) For a link comprised of multiple objects, what are the resulting object vulnerabilities and 
object and link risks? (Sections 3.6 to 3.8) 
The first question is answered by using existing practices and data that is under development from 
the geographic information system (GIS) based natural hazard assessment and infrastructure 
documentation data sources, presented in Sections 2.6 to 2.7, to conduct a geographic coincident 
analysis between the various hazards and infrastructure objects. The products of this coincident 
analysis are an assessment object length over which the given hazard acts (the object exposure 
length) and the local hazard parameter intensities for each hazard taken at discrete return periods as 
shown schematically in Example 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1: Schematic of a geographic coincident analysis between the hazard and infrastructure link data. 
The second question is answered by assessing if an object is affected by a given hazard parameter 
intensity. This is accomplished by developing component specific failure assessment processes, 
Section 3.3 and Appendix A, which are employed to identify potential failure modes of each 
infrastructure object. The third and fourth questions are answered by using expert opinion and 
analyzes, Section 3.4, within the context of the possible hazard parameter intensity and the assessed 
failure mode, to estimate the levels of damage, the direct consequences (the structural repair costs), 
and the service interruption durations. 
Lastly, the fifth and final question is answered by developing a comprehensive methodology for 
quantifying the failure vulnerability and risk of an object and the failure risk of a link with respect to a 
hazard or set of hazards. In Section 3.4, the discrete data collected and estimated in Sections 3.2 to 
3.4 is extended to continuous functions by fitting a probability density function to the hazard 
parameter intensity data and by linearly interpolating and extrapolating functions to the exposed 
object length, the direct consequences and the service interruption durations. The vulnerability and 
risk of an object section is then quantified, Section 3.5.5 and 3.6, by considering an object responding 
in a single failure mode with respect to a hazard parameter and an object responding in multiple 
failure modes with respect to the same hazard parameter, schematically shown in Figure 3-2.  
 
Figure 3-2: Schematic of the comprehensive object vulnerability and risk assessment methodology. 
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The analysis scope is then widened from an object section to a continuous object composed of a 
number of object sections. As a given hazard (e.g. a flood) has the potential to structurally and/or 
functionally damage numerous object sections within a given continuous object, and considering that 
as additional object sections are added the resulting direct consequences and service interruption 
times grow with at a less than purely linear rate. These structural repair and service interruption 
scale effects are considered by assessing an effective exposed object length – reduced total lengths 
which are a function of the considered hazard, Section 3.7. This effective exposed object length is 
then employed to assess the continuous object vulnerability and risk with respect to a single hazard 
and to multiple hazards. 
The analysis scope is then widened further from the continuous object to a link composed of a 
number of continuous objects. The individual continuous object risks of failure with respect to 
specific hazards are then combined by considering the geographic-based correlation between the 
various hazards. The end result is an assessment of the risk of failure of a given infrastructure link 
with respect to multiple natural hazards. The influence of the employed temporal risk of failure 
assessment period (e.g. risk of failure over 5 years versus 50 years) is then assessed in Section 3.9. 
This comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessment methodology is then applied, in Chapter 4, to 
analyze two different case studies – selected infrastructure objects within the Jaun Pass and within 
the Commune of Zofingen. The strengths, limitations and potential further applications of this 
comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessment method are then qualitatively assessed. 
3.2 Identifying and quantifying object exposure to natural hazards 
3.2.1 General Overview 
The first step of the comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessment methodology is comprised of 
two stages. The first stage assesses if a given infrastructure object is exposed to the considered 
hazards and the second stage quantifies the expected local hazard parameter intensities at different 
event return periods.  
During this first stage, a general geographic coincident analysis is conducted between the hazard 
parameter maximum event return period data and the infrastructure object data to determine if the 
given infrastructure objects are exposed to the considered hazards. Within Switzerland, the 
SilvaProtect hazard indication database and the maximum return period flood hazard identification 
map are respectively employed to document the maximum geographic reach of gravitational hazards 
(i.e. avalanche, landslide, rockfall and torrent) and the maximum geographic reach of the flood 
hazard. On the infrastructure object side, the Swiss Transportation Model (STM) and the KUBA 
infrastructure databases are used to geographically document the location of the various 
infrastructure objects. Objects not exposed to a given hazard are excluded from further analysis with 
respect to the given hazard.  
The second stage, a detailed geographic coincident analysis is used to quantify the expected local 
hazard parameter intensities at different event return periods. To conduct this analysis, hazard 
parameter identification maps are employed to document the local hazard parameter intensities and 
the STM and KUBA infrastructure databases are used to determine the geographic location of the 
infrastructure objects. The end product of this second stage is a quantification of the local hazard 
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parameter intensities at discrete event return periods and the length of each object exposed to the 
various hazard parameter intensities. 
An example geographic coincident analysis between a hazard and an infrastructure object is 
conducted within Section 3.2.2 to demonstrate the specific analysis stages and to assess the 
strengths, weaknesses and limitations of the current hazard and the infrastructure databases with 
respect to the evaluation of vulnerability and risk. 
3.2.2 Example geographic coincident analysis 
To demonstrate the stages of a geographic coincident analysis between a hazard and an 
infrastructure object, an example coincident analysis is conducted between the flood hazard data 
and the infrastructure object data for the transportation network connecting Brittnau to Zofingen, 
presented earlier in Section 0. Figure 3-3 presents the maximum possible flood hazard (EHQ), the 
STM infrastructure and the KUBA infrastructure data for the Brittnau-Zofingen roadway network.  
  
Figure 3-3: Flood hazard maximum return period and infrastructure data. 
In Figure 3-3, one can observe the flood depth intensity ranges with the EHQ flood database, the 
roadways and bridges included in the Swiss Transportation Model and the national infrastructure 
objects specified within KUBA. From Figure 3-3, one can also observe what is not included, most 
strikingly, the limited number of infrastructure objects included in the KUBA data. This limited 
number of objects is a direct product of the limited scope employed by KUBA. Thus for given the 
region shown, KUBA can only provide information on infrastructure objects within the national 
highway system. 
A geographic coincident analysis is then conducted between the flood hazard maximum return 
period and the infrastructure data to determine which infrastructure objects are and which 
infrastructure objects are not exposed to the flood hazard, Figure 3-4. From the coincident analysis 
presented in Figure 3-4, one can observe that a large number of the infrastructure objects are 
exposed to the maximum flood event. 
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Figure 3-4: Coincident analysis: the maximum return period flood hazard data and the infrastructure data. 3 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Coincident analysis between flood depth intensities for the 300 year return period event and the 
intrastructure objects. 
                                                          
3 Every coincident analysis presented herein was conducted within the ArcMap user interface of ESRI’s ArcInfo 
GIS program (ESRI, 2006). 
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In the second stage of the geographic coincident analysis, the objects exposed to the given hazard, in 
this case a flood hazard, are then further analyzed to determine the location specific hazard 
parameter intensities for specific return period events. Figure 3-5 presents such a coincident analysis 
between the 300 year return period flood event data developed by the Canton of Aargau in 
conjunction with the National Hazard Mapping Initiative and the STM and KUBA infrastructure data 
(Aargau, 2007). 
From Figure 3-5, one can observe that the geographic coincident analysis yields not only the local 
hazard parameter intensity, in this case the local flood depth, but also the infrastructure object 
length over which these hazard parameter intensities are imposed. The detail of this geographic 
coincidence analysis can be presented in a map and in a table.  
As this coincident analysis is conducted digitally within a GIS platform from individual hazard and 
infrastructure databases, the results visually presented above can also be quantitatively presented. 
Four specific infrastructure objects are identified in Figure 3-6 – 1) a portion of the A2 highway, 2) 
the most direct local road between Brittnau and Zofingen, 3) the bridge identified in Detail A, and 4) 
a retaining wall presented in Detail A. 
 
Figure 3-6: Detail presentation of specific infrastructure objects within the Zofingen roadway network. 
The data included within the STM and KUBA databases for the selected objects is presented in Table 
3-1. In reviewing this data, one can observe that the STM database focuses on transportation links 
providing information for infrastructure objects 1, 2 and 3 while KUBA focuses on structures and thus 
can provide information on the bridge and the retaining wall objects. Delving further into this data, 
the STM data specifies the infrastructure type, roadway class and length. The KUBA data details the 
infrastructure type, structural configuration, construction year, and key object properties and 
dimensions.  
For each object contained within the STM database, the length of each object exposed to a specific 
event flood depth intensity range can be quantified and directly assigned. For example, 874 m of the 
2246 m long Zofingenstrasse, connecting Brittnau to Zofingen, is exposed to flood depth of 0.5m or 
less during a 100 year flood event. As the objects in the KUBA are currently geographically 
represented as only single data points, one can only quantify if the object reference point is exposed 
to a given event flood depth intensity. Thus from the flood depth-KUBA coincident analysis, one can 
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determine that the bridge over the A2 has an expected flood depth intensity of 2m or deeper during 
a 300 year flood – a result consistent with the STM-flood depth coincident analysis. 
Table 3-1: Quantitative results from the Zofingen detailed geographic coincident analysis. 
Reference 1 2 3 4 
Name A2 Highway Zofingenstrasse 307 Bridge over A2 N2/108 Wall 
STM Yes Yes Yes No 
STM-Infra. Type Road Road Bridge - 
STM-Class Separated Highway Class 2 Class 2 - 
STM-Length(m) 2646 2246 32.6 - 
ST
M
-R
es
ul
ts
 Exp Length (m) H M L H M L H M L H M L 
30 year Flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - 
100 year Flood 0 0 127 0 0 874 0 0 1.8 - - - 
300 year Flood 244 1465 938 0 73 1275 28.5 0 4 - - - 
EHQ year Flood 244 148 922 20 24 1532 28.5 0 4 - - - 
KUBA No No Yes Yes 
Infrastructure Type - - Continuous Bridge Retaining Wall 
Construction Year - - 1976 1976 
Number of Spans - - 2 - 
Length (m) - - 29.9 128.8 
Maximum Span (m) - - 14.4 - 
Width (m) - - 11.6 - 
Deck Surface (m2) - - 347 - 
Supports - - Abutments - 
Height (m) - - - 2m – 8m – 4m 
KU
BA
 30 year Flood - - Not Exposed Not Exposed 
100 year Flood - - Not Exposed Not Exposed 
300 year Flood - - High Intensity High Intensity 
EHQ year Flood - - High Intensity High Intensity 
3.2.3 Critique of coincident analysis  
From the example hazard-infrastructure object geographic coincident analysis presented above, one 
can observe that during the first stage the non-exposed objects are quickly identified and removed 
from further analysis. In the second stage, the detailed hazard parameter return period – 
infrastructure object geographic coincident analysis, the exposure length of each infrastructure 
object and the associated local hazard parameter intensities are quantified. 
In studying the results from the detailed coincident analysis in a tabular format, it can be observed 
that the currently geographic representation of the KUBA data as single data points rather than as 
linear elements reduces the resulting analysis accuracy. On the hazard side, one can observe that the 
hazard parameter intensities (the flood depth) are represented as intensity ranges (x < 0.5m, 0.5 < x 
< 2m and 2m < x). While such an abstraction is useful for limiting the overall database size, it 
significantly reduces the accuracy of the provided hazard parameter intensity information.  
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3.3 Component failure assessment process 
3.3.1 General overview 
With the exposed object lengths and local hazard parameter intensities identified, one must 
determine if the given objects are affected by the given hazard parameter intensities. To conduct this 
analysis, a failure assessment process has been developed for each considered infrastructure 
component (i.e. bridge, culvert, gallery, retaining wall, roadway and tunnel) and is designed to be 
applied to analyze the infrastructure objects within the given component. Each component failure 
assessment process employs key hazard parameter and infrastructure object data to systematically 
analyze the given object and identify the potential failure modes. 
The component failure assessment process development is derived from the hazard-component 
failure scenarios. The most general set of failure scenarios has been developed by first identifying 
numerous situations in which a given hazard can cause the partial or complete failure of a given 
component. Common failure modes are identified for different failure scenarios. These individual 
failure modes have then been embedded into a structured assessment process and representative 
simple structural models have been formulated using the pertinent hazard and object data. These 
simple models are then employed to assess the potential of failure within each assessment step. 
These representative simple structural modes for each component are presented in Appendix A. 
Throughout this development, specific attention has been paid to directly using pre-existing hazard 
and component data when possible. A summary identifying the required hazard and component 
data, their respective availability and associated failure assessment steps is presented at the close of 
this section.  
3.3.2 Hazard-component failure scenarios 
To develop the component failure assessment process, the scenarios through which each hazard can 
impact each component are outlined. In identifying potential hazard-component failure scenarios, 
five different natural hazards (i.e. avalanche, flood, landslide, rockfall and torrent) and six different 
components (i.e. bridge, culvert, gallery, retaining wall, roadway tunnels) were considered. For 
example, in considering the scenarios in which an avalanche can cause partial or complete failure of a 
bridge, five unique failure scenarios can be identified – specifically: 
1) An avalanche can come in contact with the bridge superstructure vertically overloading the 
bridge superstructure in shear or flexure. 
2) An avalanche can come in contact with the bridge superstructure horizontally overloading 
the bearing connection between the superstructure and substructure causing the bridge to 
slide off its supports. 
3) An avalanche can come in contact with the bridge superstructure horizontally overloading 
the bridge superstructure causing it to fail horizontally in shear or flexure. 
4) An avalanche can come in contact with the bridge substructure overloading a pier in shear or 
flexure. 
5) An avalanche can come in contact with the bridge superstructure and if the superstructure, 
the superstructure-substructure connection and the substructure ultimate strengths are not 
exceeded, the avalanche can bury the bridge running surface. 
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Table 3-2: Hazard-component failure scenarios. 
  Hazard   
  Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent Total # # Modes 
Co
m
po
ne
nt
 
Bridge 5 4 5 5 4 23 6 
Culvert 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 
Gallery 5 2 6 5 3 21 7 
Retaining wall 3 4 4 4 3 18 5 
Roadway 1 2 2 1 1 7 2 
Tunnel 0 2 0 0 2 4 2 
 Total # 15 15 18 16 14 78 24 
Therefore, as presented in Table 3-2, there are 5 different failure scenarios for the avalanche-bridge 
hazard-component combination.  
In briefly looking through Table 3-2, one can observe that there are five or fewer different failure 
scenarios for the culvert and tunnel components while there are at least 18 different failure 
scenarios for the bridge, gallery and retaining wall components. The source of this difference is 
twofold. First, some of the components with a low number of failure scenarios are not exposed to all 
five hazards (i.e. a tunnel is assumed to not be exposed to avalanche, landslide or rockfall hazards). 
Secondly, in the cases where these components are exposed to a given hazard, the component 
resistance to the given hazard is limited or neglected (i.e. a culvert has limited resistance to being 
buried by an avalanche). Turning to the components with a high number of failure scenarios, bridge, 
gallery and retaining wall, this status is a direct result of the multiple levels of the given component’s 
resistance as seen in formulating the Avalanche-Bridge failure scenarios presented above.  
The remaining component, roadway, has an elevated number of failure scenarios, not only because it 
is exposed to all five hazards but also because a roadway object performance can be influenced by 
secondary supportive objects – specifically culvert and retaining wall objects. Thus a landslide can 
cause a roadway failure indirectly by damming a culvert passing underneath a roadway resulting in a 
localized flood which inundates the roadway. 
In Section 3.3.3, the failure assessment process for the bridge component is presented. The detailed 
analysis procedures for the bridge and the failure assessment process and detailed analysis 
procedures for the five additional components have been included in Appendix A. 
The included detailed analysis procedures are not intended to be exhaustive but are rather intended 
to show the analysis process and required data for an example component configuration.  
3.3.3 The bridge failure assessment process 
Bridges are elevated objects commonly constructed to carry the given transportation link over bodies 
of water, established transportation routes or locally uneven ground. Within this work, and as shown 
in Figure 3-7, a bridge is assumed to be composed of four key elements – foundation, piers and 
abutments, bearings and superstructure. 
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Figure 3-7: A typical bridge configuration. 
In Table 3-3, one can observe that 23 different potential failure scenarios are considered in assessing 
the capacity of a bridge. When these failure scenarios are analyzed as a group, six failure modes are 
identified and arranged into the structured assessment process presented in Figure 3-8. 
In Figure 3-8, one can observe that the first step, step A, requires a geographic coincident analysis be 
conducted between the given hazard and bridge object. If the bridge is found to be outside the 
geographic reach of the hazard, it is assumed the bridge is not affected by the given hazard and thus 
survives. But if the bridge is coincident with the hazard, one must assess if the bridge clearance is 
greater than the hazard running height, step B. If the hazard running height exceeds the bridge’s 
clearance, the hazard will come in contact with the bridge superstructure, applying forces to the 
superstructure, the superstructure-substructure bearing connection, the pier and the material 
passing underneath the bridge superstructure. If the hazard does not exceed the bridge clearance, 
the hazard only comes in contact with the bridge foundation and piers. 
The next step, step C, assesses if the hazard can undermine the pier foundation. In Table 3-3, one can 
observe that it has been assumed that only the flood and landslide hazards can undermine a bridge 
foundation, respectively through local induced scour or local rupture surface depth. Returning to 
Figure 3-8, one can observe that whether or not the hazard has come in contact with the bridge 
superstructure has an influence on the resulting flow (i.e. either non-pressurized flow or pressurized 
flow). In either situation, the resulting failure mode is identical, B1 – foundation is undermined. 
Table 3-3: Bridge failure modes and associated hazards. 
 Potential Hazards 
Failure mode Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Foundation is undermined - x x - - 
Superstructure is overloaded vertically in 
shear or flexure 
x - - x - 
Superstructure is overloaded horizontally in 
shear or flexure 
x x x x x 
Bearings are overloaded horizontally or 
vertically 
x x x x x 
Bridge pier is overloaded horizontally in shear 
or flexure 
x - x x x 
Bridge surface submerged in liquid or debris x x x x x 
Bridge Superstructure
Pier
Abutment
Bearings
Foundation
Bearings
Abutment
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Figure 3-8: Bridge failure assessment process. 
As mentioned earlier, the next analysis step, step D, is reached when the hazard has exceeded the 
bridge clearance. Taking the case where the hazard has exceeded the bridge clearance, analysis step 
D determines if the bridge superstructure vertical shear and flexural resistance is sufficient to 
withstand the applied hazard forces. In Table 3-3, one can observe that it has been assumed that 
only avalanche and rockfall hazards can cause a bridge superstructure to vertically fail. If the bridge 
superstructure has sufficient vertical capacity, one must then assess whether the bridge bearing 
system has sufficient horizontal and vertical capacity. In consulting the bridge detailed assessment 
procedures, Appendix A.2, one can observe that it has been assumed that only the flood and torrent 
hazard can cause a bridge bearing system to fail in vertical uplift, and any of the five hazards have the 
potential to horizontally overload the bridge bearing system. If the bridge bearings are overloaded, 
the bridge is assumed to fail in mode B3. If the bearing system does have sufficient capacity, one 
must continue the analysis process on to step F, assessing the horizontal shear and flexural capacity 
of the of the bridge superstructure. If the applied hazard force exceeds the bridge superstructure 
horizontal capacity, the bridge is assumed to fail in mode B4. If the bridge superstructure does have 
sufficient capacity, the analysis process then shifts to the pier resistance. 
The hazard running height and whether the hazard exceeds the bridge clearance both have influence 
on the applied horizontal forces but in every case one must still assess if the pier(s) can withstand the 
applied horizontal pier(s) forces, step G. If the pier resistance is exceeded, it is assumed that the 
bridge will fail in mode B5. But if the pier does have sufficient capacity, the provided result is 
depended on whether or not the hazard running height exceeded the bridge clearance. If the hazard 
does not come in contact with the bridge superstructure, it is assumed that the bridge survives the 
event with this hazard intensity but if the hazard height has exceeded the bridge clearance, one must 
assess if the hazard height also exceeds the combined height of the bridge clearance and the bridge 
superstructure height, step H. If the hazard height does exceed this combined height, it is assumed 
that the bridge fails in mode B6 – bridge surface submerged in liquid or debris. If the hazard height 
does not exceed the combined bridge clearance and superstructure height, it is assumed the bridge 
survives exposure to this hazard intensity. Thus through applying the structured failure assessment  
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Figure 3-9: Example bridge multiple failure mode response. 
process presented herein and within Appendix A.2, one can systematically qualitatively and 
quantitatively determine if a bridge is vulnerable to a given hazard intensity and if so, which failure 
mode controls for the given hazard intensity. 
In consulting the failure assessment process for the culvert, gallery, retaining wall, roadway and 
tunnel components, respectively contained with Appendices A.3 to A.7, one can observe that while 
each component failure assessment process has been adapted to suit the structural configuration of 
each component, the assessment process is similar to the bridge assessment process presented 
above.  
3.3.4 Intricacies of applying a component failure assessment process  
As an object does have the potential to fail in multiple failure modes depending on the hazard 
intensity, Figure 3-9, the component failure assessment process must be applied not just at a single 
hazard parameter intensity but at multiple hazard parameter intensities, thereby identifying the 
range of each failure mode. 
Additionally, if there are uncertainties of the hazard parameter intensities and/or the object 
parameter intensities (e.g. rockfall impact location or concrete compressive strength) one must 
iteratively conduct the failure assessment analysis with each analysis sampling the hazard and object 
parameter intensities as a function of their respective probability distributions. The end result of 
such an iterative analysis are not deterministic failure mode ranges as presented in Figure 3-9, but 
rather probability based failure mode ranges. 
Lastly, in Figure 3-8, one can observe that the failure assessment process requires that multiple 
different parameter intensities must be obtained for a given hazard. Unfortunately, the reporting 
practice of hazard parameter intensities is to collect data for each parameter separately and not to 
correlate the individual parameters. Thus, without conducting a detailed onsite analysis, given the 
current practice, correlating individual hazard parameters is not considered herein. 
3.3.5 Status of component and hazard data 
In Section 3.3.3 and Appendix A, numerous hazard and component parameters were mentioned but, 
as presented in Sections 2.6 and 2.7, only a small number of these parameters are currently 
systematically collected and included within the natural hazard and infrastructure databases.  
 
Bridge resistance
Bridge clearance Structural depth
Applied hazard parameter intensity
Flood depth
Bridge failure modes
Mode B6 Mode B3
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Table 3-4: Hazard parameter availability and applicable component failure modes (with x denoting required 
hazard parameter data and – denoting non-required hazard parameter data). 
   Component Failure Mode 
   Bridge Culv Gallery Retain Wall R T
 Hazard Parameter Available? B C D E F G H B C B C D E F G H I B C D E F D B
A
va
la
nc
he
 
Running depth No x - x x x x x - - - x x x x x x - - - x x x - -
Horizontal pressure Yes - - x x x x - - - - x x - x x x - - - x x - - -
Angle of attack No - - x x - x - - - - - - - x x x - - - - - - - -
Deposited depth No - - - - - - x x - - - - - x x x - - - - - - x -
Fl
oo
d 
Running depth Yes x - - x x - x - - - - - - - - - x - - x x x x x
Local scour depth Partial - x - - - - - - - x - - - - - - - x - - - - - -
Discharge No - - - - - - - - x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Velocity No - - - x x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
La
nd
sl
id
e 
Running depth No x - x x x x x - - - x x x x x x - - x x x x - -
Rupture surface depth No - x - - - - - - - x - - - - - - - x - - - - - -
Horizontal pressure No - - x x x x - - - - x x - x x x - - x x x - - -
Angle of attack No - - x x x x - - - - - - - x x x - - x x x - - -
Deposited depth No - - x - - - x x - - - - - x x x - - - - - - x -
Ro
ck
fa
ll 
Running depth No x - x x x x x - - - x x x x x x - - x x x x - -
Rockfall energy Yes - - x x x x - - - - x x - x x x - - x x x - - -
Angle of attack No - - x x x x - - - - x x - x x x - - x x x - - -
Rockfall radius No - - x x x x - - - - x x - x x x - - x x x - - -
Deposited depth No - - x - - - x x - - - - - x x x - - - - - - - -
To
rr
en
t Running depth Yes x - - x x x x - - - - - x - - - x - - x x x - -
Velocity Yes - - - x x x - - - - - - - - - - - - - x x - - -
Deposited depth No - - - - - - x x - - - - - x x - - - - - - - x x
Detailed summaries of both the cited hazard and component parameters are included below in Table 
3-4 and Table 3-5. 
In these tables, one can observe the current data availability and how these parameters are 
employed within each component assessment process. With such information it is hoped that 
practitioners and infrastructure managers might understand the importance of this data and include 
this required data set in future modeling and collection programs. To improve the data collection 
efficiency, it is important to remember that hazard and object parameters only need to be collected 
for objects which can fail in a mode which requires the given parameter data.  
Good examples of this as needed basis and the implications it poses for the data collection process 
are the culvert height and the bridge superstructure width parameters. The culvert height parameter 
only needs to be collected for culverts located in regions exposed to gravitationally induced hazards 
(avalanche, landslide, rockfall and torrent). Likewise the bridge superstructure width parameter only 
needs to be collected for bridges exposed to avalanche and rockfall hazards. By employing similar 
data collection logic, the process of compiling this data can be significantly simplified. 
3.3.6 Component failure assessment conclusion and critique 
In this section, a comprehensive failure assessment process has been presented for one of the six 
considered infrastructure components – bridge, culvert, gallery, retaining wall, roadway and tunnel. 
For demonstrative purposes, the failure assessment process for the bridge component has been 
directly presented within this section and the failure assessment process for the additional five  
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Table 3-5: Component parameter availability and applicable hazards. 
 Component Parameter Available? Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Br
id
ge
 
Clearance Yes x x x x x 
Pier foundational depth No - x x - - 
Span length Yes x x x x x 
Superstructure width Yes x - - x - 
Superstructure vertical shear and 
flexural resistance 
No x - - x - 
Superstructure buoyancy No - x - - x 
Bearing horizontal & vert. capacity No x x x x x 
Superstructure height No x x x x x 
Superstructure project vertical area No x x x x x 
Superstructure horizontal shear and 
flexural resistance 
No x x x x x 
Pier resistance No x - x x x 
Cl
vt
 Culvert height No x - x x x 
Designed discharge Yes - x - - - 
G
al
le
ry
 
Foundational depth No - x x - - 
Wall height No x - x x - 
Wall shear and flexural resistance No x - x x - 
Wall support shear and flexural 
resistance 
No x - x x - 
Wall support spacing No x - x x - 
Roof width No x - x x x 
Roof shear and flexural resistance No x - x x x 
Roof support shear and flexural 
resistance 
No x - x x x 
Roof support spacing No x - x x x 
Gallery frame lateral resistance No x - x x - 
Re
ta
in
in
g 
w
al
l 
Foundational depth No - x x - x 
Wall height Yes x x x x x 
Wall local shear resistance No - - - x - 
Wall global shear and flexural 
resistance 
No x x x x x 
Wall support spacing No x x x x x 
Foundational moment resistance No x x x x x 
R Supporting objects intact No x x x x x 
Tu
n Tunnel entrance location Yes - x - - x 
Tunnel utility elevation No - x - - x 
components and the detailed quantitative assessment process for all six components are both 
included in Appendix A.  
The component failure assessment process is intended to be employed not only at a single hazard 
intensity but rather at a number of potential hazard intensities. Through such an application process, 
one can identify not only the failure mode at each specific hazard intensity, but also the overall range 
of each failure mode. Additionally, if there are uncertainties concerning the hazard parameter and/or 
object parameter intensities, the component failure assessment process should be applied, with each 
analysis employing sampled probability based parameter data. 
Chapter 3: Comprehensively assessing vulnerability and risk of transportation infrastructure 
 
  49 
Lastly, the current natural hazard and infrastructure component parameter collection practices 
within Switzerland place two significant limitations on applying these component failure assessment 
processes.  
First, current hazard and infrastructure data collection procedures are respectively the product of 
existing natural hazard assessment and the infrastructure management requirements. To apply these 
component failure assessment processes, a number of additional hazard and infrastructure 
parameter data need to be collected, but approaches exist for minimizing and streamlining the data 
collection process.  
Secondly, the failure assessment process for the bridge, gallery and retaining wall components 
requires that multiple hazard parameter intensities be determined for a given hazard intensity. 
Currently, within Switzerland, the natural hazard parameter intensity data is reported separately for 
each individual hazard parameter. This hinders the process of interrelating different parameters for 
the same hazard. Thus it is strongly suggested that all hazard parameters for a given hazard be 
directly correlated or even integrated into a single overarching data set for the given hazard. 
3.4 Estimating component failure mode direct consequences and service 
interruption durations 
3.4.1 General Overview 
In Section 3.3, a failure assessment process was developed for each infrastructure component. By 
employing this assessment process, one can identify the failure modes through which specific hazard 
parameter intensity ranges can cause the given infrastructure object to fail. With the hazard 
parameter intensity range and the failure mode identified, the next questions are – ‘What expected 
levels of damage does the given hazard parameter intensities cause upon the object?` and ‘What are 
the expected direct and indirect consequences for each expected level of damage?`  
This section develops a structured process through which experienced practitioners can employ the 
component class, failure mode and hazard intensity information provided by applying the failure 
assessment process to estimate the incurred object direct consequences (i.e. the repair costs) and 
the service interruption durations, a key aspect to assessing the indirect consequences. 
3.4.2 Developing a structured consequence estimation framework 
In Section 2.8, a number of potential sources for quantifying an object’s direct and indirect 
consequences resulting from an object failing due to a given hazard were presented. Some of the 
presented sources included local historical archives, public natural hazard event and infrastructure 
databases such as StorMe and KUBA, private and semi-private insurance databases such as Swiss-Re 
and the Swiss Cantonal Insurance Companies, and expert opinions. The source which shows the most 
promise for estimating direct consequences and service interruption durations of a failed 
transportation infrastructure object is expert opinion. 
The structured estimation framework developed herein has been cut into five stages – the context, 
the input data, the consequence estimation, the visual presentation of the estimated consequences 
and the ancillary assumptions. In the first stage, the context stage, the component, hazard and the 
associated failure mode are all clearly stated. In the input data stage, the required natural hazard and 
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infrastructure object parameter data required to evaluate the given failure mode are clearly 
presented.  
The third stage, the consequence estimation stage, is the core of this structured estimation 
framework and has been separated into three parts. In the first part, the infrastructure component is 
further specified by component classes based on infrastructure size and the unit present value 
original construction cost is quantified for each component class. The bridge, gallery, roadway and 
tunnel components, are segmented using the Vector25 component classes presented in Table 2-7, as 
the infrastructure object value and repair time is assumed to be a function of the object width and 
level of service. The culvert and retaining walls, whose dimensions are respectively a function of the 
designed discharge and design absorbable kinetic energy, are segmented discretely along these two 
design parameters. Thus the culvert component has been segmented into seven classes with the 
respective arbitrary threshold discharge values of 2.5, 10, 40, 160, 640 and 2560 m3/s. The retaining 
wall component has been segmented into six classes by using the retaining wall height threshold 
value of 2 meters and the design kinetic energy threshold values of 30 and 300 KJ. With each 
component segmented into classes, the total original installation cost represented in 2008 values is 
calculated for a unit quantity of each component class. For the bridge, gallery, retaining wall, 
roadway and tunnel objects, a unit value of 100m length, or the maximum object length if it is less 
than 100m, and a unit value has been used for the culvert component. 
In the second part of the consequence estimation stage, specific reference intensities are identified 
for each hazard parameter and will be employed to estimate the direct consequences and the service 
interruption durations. If reference intensities have already been identified for the given hazard 
parameter (i.e. flood depth intensities of 0.5 and 2 meters) they are employed, but if for hazard 
parameters not previously segmented, avalanche deposited depth, benchmark values are actively 
identified (i.e. avalanche deposited depth intensities of 2, 3 and 5 meters).  
In the third part, experienced practitioners employ the defined failure mode context, infrastructure 
component class, and the benchmark hazard parameter intensities to estimate the resulting object 
direct consequences as a percentage of the total component class value and service interruption 
durations. These direct consequence and service interruption values are then visually presented in 
the fourth stage to aid the experienced practitioner in confirming that the provided estimations 
agree both in magnitude and in trend with their respective experience.  
In the last stage of the structured estimation framework, all ancillary and supporting assumptions are 
definitively stated so that a future practitioner can fully understand any additional information and 
considerations made by the original experienced practitioner. 
Example 3-2: Employ the structured consequence estimation framework to estimate the direct 
consequences and service interruption durations for a 100 meter length of a highway roadway object 
exposed to a flood hazard and fails in mode R2 – roadway buried in liquid or debris. 
Context: 
A highway class roadway object is exposed to a flood hazard and fails in mode R2 – roadway buried 
in liquid or debris. 
Input data: 
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The natural hazard and infrastructure object data required to estimate the consequences of a 
highway roadway object failing in mode R2 to a flood hazard are respectively the local flood depth 
intensity and the geographic position of the roadway object. These two data sets can be respectively 
obtained from the Swiss Flood hazard identification maps, Section 2.6.3 and the Vector25 data, 
Section 2.7.1. 
Consequence estimation: 
Part one: The roadway object has already been identified as a highway component class. The total 
original construction cost of a 100 meter long highway roadway object is estimated at 300,000 CHF.  
Part two: The Swiss National Hazard Mapping initiative has designated two threshold values for static 
flooding – 0.5 and 2 meters. These threshold values are herein employed as the reference hazard 
parameter intensities for the flood depth hazard parameter.  
Part three: Employing the estimated infrastructure object class original construction cost and the 
reference hazard parameter intensity values, the hazard parameter intensity specific direct 
consequences (repair costs) and service interruption durations can be estimated. Such estimated 
values are presented in Table 3-6. 
Table 3-6: Estimated direct consequences and service interruption durations for a highway class roadway 
object failing in mode R2 to a flood hazard. 
Component 
Class 
Intensity 
(m) 
Unit Service Interruption Time
(days/100m) 
Original Construction Cost 
(CHF/100m) 
% Loss Unit Loss 
(CHF/100m)
Highway 0.5 4.00 300,000 5% 15,000 
Highway 2 8.00 300,000 15% 45,000 
Visual presentation of estimated consequences: 
The estimated direct consequences and service interruption durations presented in Table 3-6 are 
then visually presented in Figure 3-10 to aid the expert practitioner in confirming both the magnitude 
and trend of the estimations. 
 
Figure 3-10: Estimated direct consequences and service interruption durations for a highway class roadway 
object failing in mode R2 to a flood hazard. 
Ancillary assumptions: 
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The developed service interruption durations include the flood initiation, receding of water, debris 
collection and service restoration times. 
3.4.3 Conclusions and critique 
By specifying the component class, given hazard parameter intensities, and associated failure mode, 
experience practitioners have a defined context within which one can formulate general direct 
consequence and service interruption durations, as shown in Example 3-2. As shown in Sections 3.5.4 
and 3.6, these discrete consequence estimations will be, transferred into continuous functions and 
subsequently employed to assess the vulnerability and risk of an infrastructure object section, 
continuous object and link. 
3.5 Extrapolating from discrete data to continuous functions 
3.5.1 General overview and motivation 
In Sections 3.2 and 3.4 discrete values have been compiled identifying the local hazard parameter 
intensity as a function of event return period. Additionally, the exposed object lengths, the direct 
consequences and the service interruption durations have all been defined as a function of the 
hazard parameter intensity. To improve the vulnerability and risk calculation accuracy and to ensure 
that the local hazard parameter intensities directly match the exposed object length, direct 
consequence and service interruption duration values, continuous functions will be developed from 
each data set.  
Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 present methodologies for defining a probability density function based on 
the maximum hazard parameter intensity, respectively within a year and a specified time period, 
from the given discrete hazard parameter intensity data obtained from the geographic hazard 
parameter-infrastructure object analysis. Section 3.5.4 presents a methodology for employing linear 
interpolation and extrapolation to develop continuous functions from the discrete exposed object 
length, direct consequences and service interruption durations. As each methodology is presented, a 
descriptive example is included to physically demonstrate the proposed methodology. 
3.5.2 Maximum hazard parameter intensity probability density function for 
infrequent events 
The first step in transitioning from the discrete data to continuous functions is to represent the 
return period based hazard parameter intensities affecting the given object with a continuous 
function, thereby defining the distribution of the maximum annual intensity of hazard parameter h. 
One way to accomplish this is by fitting a probability density function to the return period based 
hazard data as shown in Example 3-3 (Ang & Tang, 1984). 
Example 3-3: Develop the probability density of the maximum annual intensity of hazard parameter h 
by fitting a Gumbel Type I distribution to return period based hazard parameter intensity data. 
One way to develop the probability density function specifying the maximum hazard parameter 
intensity in a given year is to fit a Gumbel Type I distribution to the return period based hazard 
parameter intensity data obtained from a hazard-object geographic coincident analysis. With such an 
approach, it is assumed that the hazard occurs infrequently enough that one can consider only the 
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maximum annual hazard intensity. Additionally, it is assumed that the object is immediately repaired 
to its current state following the hazard event, thereby conservatively removing changes in object 
resistance and temporally overlapping hazard events from consideration. 
To fit a Gumbel Type I distribution to the return period based hazard parameter intensity data, these 
data points are first graphed on Gumbel Type I paper, Figure 3-11a. This horizontal logarithmic scale 
is then transferred from a logarithmic scale to a linear scale by calculating the Gumbel Type I 
standard extreme variate for each hazard parameter intensity return period, Equation (3.9) (Ang & 
Tang, 1984). 
 
1ln ln ii
i
rpS
rp
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
−
= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (3.9) 
Where: 
Si = the Gumbel Type I standard extreme variate for the given return period i [   ] 
rpi = the return period for hazard parameter intensity event i [   ] 
   
Figure 3-11: Fitting a Gumbel Type I distribution a) Hazard parameter intensity as a function of return period 
and b) hazard parameter intensity as a function of the standard extremal variate. 
With both the axes arranged in a linear scale, Figure 3-11b, establishing a linear regression through 
the least-squares method, for example, becomes a relatively simple task. The linear equation, written 
in the format detailed in Equation (3.10), is then directly used to define the Gumbel Type I probability 
density function of the maximum annual hazard parameter intensity within a given year, following 
Equations (3.11) and (3.12) (Ang & Tang, 1984, p. 211). 
 ( )f S a S b= ⋅ +  (3.10) 
 
1
n
a
α =  (3.11) 
 nu b=  (3.12) 
Where: 
Xn = the maximum annual hazard parameter intensity [   ] 
αn = an inverse measure of the dispersion of Xn 
un = the characteristic largest value of the initial variate Xn 
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Thus the annual probability density and cumulative distribution functions for the largest hazard 
parameter intensity in a single year, Equations (3.13) and (3.14), are thus presented in Figure 3-12 
(Ang & Tang, 1984, p. 207). 
 
( )( )( ) x un nn n
n
x u e
X nf x e e
ααα
− −
− − −
=  (3.13) 
 
( )( ) x un n
n
e
XF x e
α− −
−
=  (3.14) 
Where: 
fXn(X) = the probability density function for the annual maximum hazard parameter intensity 
FXn(X) = the cumulative distribution function for the annual maximum hazard parameter 
intensity 
  
Figure 3-12: Probability density and cumulative distribution functions for the annual maximum hazard 
parameter intensity. 
In Example 3-3, one can observe that the fitted probability density function details the probability of 
the various potential annual maximum hazard parameter intensities and a significant portion of 
these hazard parameter intensities have a negative magnitude. Within this work, negative hazard 
parameter intensities are treated as hazard events which do not occur. Thus it is only the portion of 
the probability density function to the right of the vertical axis which details the potential hazard 
parameter intensities. 
It should be noted that other functions other than a Gumbel Type I distribution may fit the hazard 
parameter intensity data better, such as a Gumbel Type III distribution. In such cases, the more 
applicable function should be employed.  
3.5.3 Maximum hazard parameter intensity probability density function for 
frequent events 
The approach presented in Example 3-3, is only valid for infrequently occurring hazards. For hazards 
which occur more frequently than once every thirty years (i.e. one rock fall event occurring on 
average once every three years) the probability density function for the maximum hazard parameter 
intensity within a given year will fail to consider the probability density functions for smaller intensity 
hazard parameter events within the same year (i.e. the second largest and the third largest hazard 
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parameter intensities within a given year). To ensure that such data is not lost, the probability 
density function for shorter time periods should be developed, as is shown in Example 3-4.  
Example 3-4: Develop the probability density function for the maximum hazard parameter intensity 
within a specified time period using Example 3-3 as a base. 
Continuing with Example 3-3, the shape of the maximum hazard parameter intensity probability 
density and cumulative distribution functions for different time perspectives (i.e. the maximum event 
during one month or six months) for a Gumbel Type I distribution maintains an identical shape to the 
functions presented in Figure 3-12, but the definitions of the defining constants α and u change as a 
function of the considered time perspective. These defining constants are redefined with Equations 
(3.15) and (3.16) (Ang & Tang, 1984, p. 233). 
 N nα α=  (3.15) 
 
( )ln
N n
n
N
u u
α
= +  (3.16) 
Where: 
N = the considered time perspective [years] 
αN = the Gumbel Type I inverse measure of the dispersion of XN [  ] 
uN = the Gumbel Type I characteristic largest value of the initial variate XN [  ] 
XN = the maximum hazard parameter intensity during the considered time perspective N [   ] 
 
The probability density and cumulative distribution functions for the maximum expected hazard 
parameter intensity during a different time perspective (one month, six months) is estimated with 
Equations (3.17) and (3.18) (Ang & Tang, 1984, p. 232).  
 
( )( )( ) x uN NN N
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( )( ) x uN N
N
e
XF x e
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−
=  (3.18) 
Where: 
fXN(X) = the probability density function for the largest hazard parameter intensity during the 
time perspective N 
FXN(X) = the cumulative distribution function for the largest hazard parameter intensity 
during the time perspective N 
 
3.5.4 Exposed object section length, direct consequence, and service 
interruption continuous functions 
The second step of obtaining continuous functions from discrete values is to fit continuous functions 
to the assessed exposed object section lengths, the estimated direct consequence and the estimated 
service interruption durations. The resulting continuous functions will take the general form of 
Equations (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21). 
 ( ) ( , , )hii iEL x f L hi x=  (3.19) 
 ( ) ( , , )
n n
HI
m mDC x f DC HI x=  (3.20) 
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 ( ) ( , , )
n n
HI
m mSI x g SI HI x=  (3.21) 
Where: 
ELi(x) = the exposed object section i length as a function of the hazard parameter intensity 
[m] 
DCmn(x) = the direct consequence function fitted to the estimated direct consequences [CHF] 
SImn(x) = the service interruption duration function fitted to the estimated service 
interruption durations [days] 
Example 3-5: Linearly interpolate and extrapolate the exposed object length, the estimated direct 
consequence and the estimated service interruption duration functions. 
One way to develop these continuous functions is by interpolating and extrapolating linear functions 
between and beyond the determined exposed object section lengths, the estimated direct 
consequences and service interruption durations. This interpolation and extrapolation process can be 
conducted with Equations (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24) (Souders, 1966, p. 13). 
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Where: 
hi0, hi1, hi2, hi3 = reference hazard parameter intensities employed within the geographic 
coincident analysis 
HI0, HI1, HI2, HI3 = reference hazard parameter intensities employed in the consequence 
estimation 
Li
hi0, L i
hi1, L i
hi2, L i
hi3 = object section exposed lengths determined from the geographic 
coincident analysis [m] 
Lmax = the total length of the object section [m] 
DCmn
HI0, DCmn
HI1, DCmn
HI2, DCmn
HI3 = estimated direct consequences for the given component 
class and failure mode as a function of the hazard parameter intensity [CHF/100m] 
SImn
HI0, SImn
HI1, SImn
HI2, SImn
HI3 = estimated service interruption durations for the given 
component class and failure mode as a function of the hazard parameter intensity 
[days/100m] 
K = exposed object section length extrapolation factor (typically 0.333) [  ] 
F = estimated direct consequence extrapolation factor (typically 0.333) [  ] 
G = estimated service interruption duration extrapolation factor (typically 0.333) [  ] 
By extending these discrete values to continuous functions, these three data sets can be easily 
interrelated. Such a presentation of example estimated direct consequences, estimated service 
interruption durations and exposed object section lengths as a function of the hazard parameter 
intensity is made in Figure 3-13.  
It is important to mention that this example assumes that the object section exposed lengths, the 
direct consequences and the service interruption durations follow a linear trend between each data 
point. As shown in Figure 3-14, variants to this assumption are by all means possible. As there are an 
infinite number of potential variants and to ensure a consistent approach is uniformly applied across 
all objects and hazards, within this work it has been assumed that the exposed object section length, 
direct consequence and service interruption duration continuous functions evolve linearly. 
Additionally it should be noted that to ensure the extrapolated data points are considered in the 
subsequent vulnerability and risk analysis but do not automatically dominate the resultant analysis, 
extrapolation factors significantly less than one (in these cases 0.333) or the maximum potential 
value are employed. 
The responsive approach: An integrated socially-sustainable technically-optimal decision model 
58   
      
Figure 3-13: a) Linearly interpolated direct consequences and service interruption durations as a function of 
the hazard parameter intensity, b) Linear interpolated exposed object section length as a function of the 
hazard parameter intensity. 
 
Figure 3-14: Other potential functions which also meet the estimated direct consequences. 
 
3.5.5 Conclusion and critique 
In this section, methodologies for developing continuous functions from the local hazard parameter 
intensity, exposed object section lengths, direct consequences and service interruption duration 
discrete data complied in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. While these methodologies do provide only a best fit 
continuous function and they do have a potential to under or over estimate the associated values, as 
is descriptively shown in Figure 3-14, and thus can add some uncertainty into the calculation process, 
these continuous functions make the resulting vulnerability and risk assessments possible by 
ensuring the exposed object section lengths, estimated direct consequences and estimated service 
interruption durations can all be quantified at the same hazard parameter intensities.  
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3.6 Quantifying object section vulnerability and risk 
3.6.1 Overview 
In Sections 3.2 to 3.4, the discrete local hazard parameter intensities, exposed object section lengths, 
infrastructure object failure mode(s), direct consequences and service interruption durations were all 
assessed. In Section 3.5, this data has been extrapolated from discrete values to continuous 
functions. In this section, these continuous functions will be used in conjunction with the general 
vulnerability and risk Equations (3.8) and (3.7) to assess the vulnerability and risk of an infrastructure 
object section with respect to a given hazard parameter. 
3.6.2 Vulnerability and risk assessment considering a single failure mode 
By employing the continuous functions developed within Section 3.5 to further specify the general 
vulnerability and risk equations introduced in Section 3.1, one arrives at Equations (3.25) and (3.26). 
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Where: 
fXn,i(X) = the probability density function for the largest annual hazard parameter intensity at 
the considered object section i 
By distributing the terms in Equations (3.25) and (3.26), one can solve for the direct consequence and 
service interruption duration vulnerability and risk Equations, as presented in Equations (3.27) to 
(3.30). 
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Example 3-6: Compute the direct consequence and service interruption duration vulnerability curves 
and risks for an 100 meter long highway roadway object section given the hazard parameter 
probability distribution, exposed object section length, direct consequence and service interruption 
duration continuous functions detailed in Figure 3-12 and Figure 3-13. 
Applying Equations (3.27) and (3.28) to assess the direct consequence and service interruption 
duration vulnerability curves for a 100 meter long highway roadway object section given the hazard 
and consequence continuous functions detailed in Figure 3-12 and Figure 3-13 yields the direct 
consequence and service interruption vulnerability functions presented in Figure 3-15. 
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Figure 3-15: Object section direct consequence and service interruption duration vulnerability curves for a 
given hazard parameter. 
Applying Equations (3.29) and (3.30) to assess the direct consequence and service interruption 
duration risks for a 100 meter long highway roadway object section given the hazard and 
consequence continuous functions detailed in Figure 3-12 and Figure 3-13 yields, respectively, the 
direct consequence and service interruption duration annual risks of 240.60 CHF and 0.047 days. 
3.6.3 Vulnerability and risk assessment considering multiple failure modes  
Section 3.6.2 presents a quantitative vulnerability and risk assessment procedure by assuming there 
is only one failure mode controlling the object’s response to a given hazard across all hazard 
parameter intensities. Such an assumption is ubiquitously true for the culvert component but can be 
only potentially true for each of the other five components if given favorable object resistance and 
applied hazard parameter interactions.  
If there are multiple active failure modes across the range of potential hazard parameter intensities 
or if there are multiple failure modes potentially active for a specific hazard parameter intensity or 
intensity range, such an assumption is invalid. For the former situation, take the example of a bridge 
which responds in failure mode B6 (bridge surface submerged in liquid) for medium intensity floods 
but responds in failure mode B1 (pier foundation is undermined) for high intensity floods. For the 
latter situation, take the example of a gallery exposed to a high intensity rockfall hazard which can 
potentially respond in failure modes G4, G5 or G6 as a function of the rockfall impact location.  
To consider this first situation, one must first identify the failure modes which are active across a 
given hazard intensity range, define the intensity range across which each failure mode is dominate 
and confirm that only one failure mode is active for each potential hazard intensity. If the hazard 
parameters for the different failure modes are not all identical, one must also relate the individual 
hazard parameter intensities to the hazard intensity.  
With such an assessment conducted, one can then employ the vulnerability and risk Equations (3.25) 
and (3.26) and the hazard parameter intensity ranges applicable to each failure mode to assess the 
vulnerability and risk for each individual failure mode. The independent failure mode vulnerabilities 
and risks are then combined resulting in a composite assessment which considers the influence of 
each active failure mode. Applying this approach to Equations (3.25) and (3.26) and considering three 
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failure modes (p, q, and r) with the respective hazard parameter intensity ranges (0 to a, a to b and b 
to c) results in Equation (3.31) and (3.32).  
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Where: 
Vulnerabilityi
H(x) = the vulnerability function of object section i with respect to hazard H by 
considering the active failure modes p, q and r [CHF] 
Riski
H = the risk of object section i with respect to hazard H by considering the active failure 
modes p, q and r [CHF] 
The second multiple failure mode combination is commonly the result of varying hazard-object 
interaction geometry and object resistance. These influences can be assessed by iteratively analyzing 
the hazard and object with the failure assessment process by calling the hazard and object parameter 
intensities as a function of their respective probability distributions. From such an analysis, one can 
identify the failure modes which can potentially be active across the hazard parameter intensity 
range and determine the probability of each failure mode within each hazard parameter intensity 
range.  
Applying this approach to Equations (3.25) and (3.26) and considering three failure modes (j, k and l) 
results in Equations (3.33) and (3.34). 
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3.6.4 Conclusion 
In this section, the general vulnerability and risk Equations (3.8) and (3.7), presented in Section 3.1, 
have been applied in conjunction with the continuous local hazard parameter intensity probability 
distribution, exposed object section length, direct consequences and service interruption duration 
functions developed in Sections 3.2 to 3.4 to assess an object section’s vulnerability and risk given a 
single or multiple failure modes.  
3.7 Quantifying continuous object vulnerability and risk 
3.7.1 Overview 
In Section 3.6, a methodology was presented for employing the continuous functions for the local 
hazard parameter intensities, the exposed object section lengths, the infrastructure object section 
failure mode(s), the direct consequences and service interruption durations to assess the 
vulnerability and risk of an object section. This section presents a methodology for expanding the 
scope employed in Section 3.6 from the object section to the continuous object which is comprised 
of numerous object sections all of the same component. For example, Figure 3-16 presents a link 
which has been cut into continuous objects, labeled with numbers, and each continuous object has 
been cut into object segments, labeled with letters. 
 
Figure 3-16: Defining continuous objects and object sections. 
In widening this scope, there are reconstruction economies of scale and mutually inclusive direct 
consequences and service interruption durations. These scale effects are considered by developing a 
continuous object effective exposed length from the combined expose lengths of each object section 
which considers an infrastructure component and natural hazard specific attenuation factor. This 
effective exposed continuous object length is then employed in Sections 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 to quantify 
the continuous object direct consequence and service interruption duration vulnerabilities and risks 
considering that the continuous infrastructure object responds in a single or multiple failure modes.  
3.7.2 Calculating the continuous object effective exposed length 
To transition this assessment from the individual object section to the continuous object, one should 
consider the influence of reconstruction economies of scale and mutually inclusive direct 
consequences and service interruption durations. Herein, these scale factors are considered by 
1
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assessing the effective exposed object section length by formulating an effective exposed length 
function, the general form of which is presented in Equation (3.35). 
 ( ) ( , , ( ), , )
n n
x x
i i m maEL x f x RES EL x DC SI=  (3.35) 
Where: 
aELi(x) = the effective exposed length of object section i as a function of the hazard 
parameter intensity x [m] 
RES = reconstruction economies of scale [   ] 
Example 3-7: Develop the effective exposed object section length by considering repair economies of 
scale and mutually inclusive indirect consequences. 
On way to assess the effective exposed object section length is to multiply the sum of the linearly 
interpolated or extrapolated object lengths exceeding 100 meters with an object length attenuation 
factor. Estimated object length attenuation factors are given in Table 3-7. This effective exposed 
object section length is then used in place of the exposed object section length in the vulnerability 
and risk calculations. 
Table 3-7: Estimated component length natural hazard specific attenuation factors. 
 Natural Hazards 
Components Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Bridge 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.80 0.80 
Culvert 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.30 
Gallery 0.80 0.25 0.50 0.80 0.30 
Retaining Wall 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.75 
Roadway 0.80 0.10 0.50 0.80 0.80 
Tunnel - - - 0.30 - - - - - - 0.30 
To better understand the reasoning behind the component length attenuation factors, consider a 20 
meter long roadway object exposed to each of the five hazards. The avalanche, rockfall and torrent 
hazards occur abruptly and therefore the majority of the service interruption duration is dedicated to 
repairing the affected object. Therefore, when the object length is extended from 20 meters to 200 
meters, the direct consequences and service interruption times significantly increase at a close to 
proportional rate. Following this argument, component length attenuation factors of 0.80 are 
reasonable estimates for the avalanche, rockfall and torrent hazards.  
The landslide hazard event is a comparatively longer duration event and therefore a larger portion of 
the service interruption duration is dedicated to the occurrence of the actually event. Additionally, 
repairing infrastructure objects affected by landslides commonly requires the availability of 
specialized equipment. Therefore as the effected roadway object length increases from 20 meters to 
200 meters, the direct consequences and service interruption duration times are assumed to 
increase at a less than proportional rate. Thus, herein, the landslide roadway length attenuation 
factor has been estimated at 0.50.  
In considering the last hazard, flood, the occurrence of the event constitutes the majority of the 
service interruption time and a roadway object affected by a static flood commonly requires only 
minor debris cleanup. Therefore as the effected object length increases from 20 meters to 200 
meters, the direct consequences and service interruption times are herein assumed to only slightly 
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increase. Thus the flood roadway component effected length attenuation factor has been estimated 
at 0.10. 
The effective exposed object section length calculation can therefore be conducted with Equation 
(3.36). In Equation (3.36) one can observe that the first 100m of the continuous object is non-
attenuated. With each effective exposed object section length assessed, one can determine the 
effective exposed continuous object length by summing of the effective exposed object section 
lengths as shown in Equation (3.37). 
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Where: 
J = the applicable component length natural hazard specific attenuation factor [  ] 
n = the total number of object sections located within the continuous object I [  ] 
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Where: 
aELI(x) = the effective exposed length of continuous object I as a function of the hazard 
parameter intensity [m] 
To further contextualize Equation (3.36), consider the example of a 300 year static flood event 
inundating 4811 meters of a continuous highway object. As earlier introduced, the unit direct 
consequences and service interruption durations have been estimated for a unit length of 100 
meters. Thus if one were to directly apply the exposed object length, the resulting direct 
consequences and service interruption durations for the flooded section of highway would be more 
than forty-eight times greater than the direct consequences and service interruption durations for a 
100 meter length of roadway. Such a solution would significantly overestimate the direct 
consequences and service interruption durations by applying Equation (3.36) and summing the 
individual effective exposed object section lengths, one can assess the effective exposed continuous 
object length. As presented in Figure 3-17, the effective exposed continuous object length is 571 
meters, an eighty-eight percent decrease from the exposed continuous object length but still more 
than five and a half times greater than the respective estimated indirect consequences for a 100m 
length of roadway. 
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Figure 3-17: Exposed continuous object length and effective exposed continuous object length. 
 
 
3.7.3 Calculating continuous object vulnerability and risk to a single hazard 
The continuous object vulnerability to a given hazard h, assuming the entire continuous object 
responds in the same failure mode, is assessed in a similar manner to Equations (3.27) and (3.28) 
with the effective exposed continuous object length replacing the exposed object section length, as 
shown in Equations (3.38) and (3.39). 
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Where: 
VulnerabilityI,DC,mn
h = the continuous object I direct consequence vulnerability with respect to 
the hazard parameter h assuming each object section responds in the identical failure mode 
mn [CHF] 
VulnerabilityI,SI,mn
h = the continuous object I service interruption duration vulnerability with 
respect to the hazard parameter h assuming each object section responds in the identical 
failure mode mn [CHF] 
The annualized continuous object risk to the given hazard over a specified reference period, 
assuming the continuous object is exposed to a single hazard, is assessed by summing the individual 
object section effective annualized risk. In the general sense, an object risk to a given hazard 
parameter can be computed with Equations (3.40) and (3.41). 
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Where: 
RiskI,DC
h = the annual continuous object I direct consequence risk with respect to the hazard 
parameter h [CHF] 
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RiskI,SI
h = the annual continuous object I service interruption duration risk with respect to the 
hazard parameter h [days] 
Example 3-8: Quantify the direct consequence and service interruption duration annualized risks 
given the data presented in Example 3-3 and Example 3-7. 
From the information presented earlier in Example 3-3 and Example 3-7, one can employ Equations 
(3.40) and (3.41) to evaluate the annualized continuous object risk to given hazard parameter. In this 
example, the road object annualized direct consequence and service interruption duration risks to a 
static flood hazard are respectively 803 CHF/year and 0.181 days/year. 
 
3.7.4 Calculating continuous object risk to multiple hazards  
With the risks evaluated independently for a given continuous object exposed to multiple hazards, 
these individual hazard-continuous object risks are combined into a multi-hazard continuous object 
risk. The simplest approach is to just assume that all the hazards are mutually exclusive. With such an 
assumption, one can employ Equation (3.42) to assess the multi-hazard object risk. 
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Where: 
RiskI = the multi-hazard continuous object risk [CHF] 
RI
Hz = the individual hazard specific object risks [CHF] 
While such an approach is simple and straightforward, it overestimates the continuous object’s risk 
exposure by assuming that all hazards are mutually exclusive, for any temporally coinciding hazards 
would be counted twice. While such an assumption may be valid for the avalanche hazard, which is 
the only hazard to occur in the depths of winter, such an assumption is a gross simplification for 
correlated hazards like flood and torrent hazards. Hazard temporal coincidence is herein assumed to 
be predominately the result of one hazard triggering another hazard, such as a flood inducing a 
torrent, or both hazards being triggered by a tertiary instigator, such as a flood and landslide being 
triggered by excessive localized rainfall. To evaluate the resulting multi-hazard-object risk, a 
correlation-based calculation procedure has been developed.  
Assuming the effects of each hazard on the respective continuous object have been completely 
captured in the object risk evaluation process, the avalanche hazard is not correlated to any of the 
other four hazards and the hazard correlation factors among the remaining five hazards can be 
estimated or evaluated, one can employ Equation (3.43) to estimate the total multi-hazard object 
risks. 
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Where: 
RI
H1 = the continuous object I’s risk to avalanche hazards [CHF] 
RI
Hi, RI
Hj, RI
Hk, RI
Kl = the continuous object I’s risk to the four hazards (flood, landslide rockfall, 
torrent) are called in decreasing risk magnitude [CHF]  
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CA,B = the correlation factor between the greater magnitude hazard risk A and the lesser 
magnitude hazard risk B [   ] 
In developing Equation (3.43), it has been assumed that the magnitude of an object’s risk to each of 
the four non-avalanche hazards can be used as a proxies for determining the causality chain position 
of the various hazards. While this may not be a correct assumption in all instances, it will ensure that 
the computed multi-hazard object risk is conservatively assessed. 
Example 3-9: Develop an example object hazard correlation matrix. 
A key element of Equation (3.43) are the hazard correlation factors. Herein the hazard correlation 
factors have been estimated and the resulting hazard correlation factors for a given pair of hazards 
are detailed in Table 3-8. 
Table 3-8: Example component hazard correlation matrix. 
 Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall  Torrent  
Avalanche - - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Flood 0.00 - - - - 0.30 0.05 0.30 
Landslide 0.00 0.30 - - - - 0.05 0.40 
Rockfall 0.00 0.05 0.05 - - - - 0.05 
Torrent 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.05 - - - - 
The hazard correlation matrix, Table 3-8, estimates the probability of two hazards temporally 
coinciding with the instigator (larger magnitude risk) and instigated (lesser magnitude risk) hazards 
respectively as row and column titles. While the correlation factors presented in Table 3-8 have been 
purely estimated, the procedure detailed herein can be further adapted to the given component 
failure mode or environment by employing regional or even environmental-specific correlation 
factors.  
In Table 3-8, one can observe that it has been assumed that there is no correlation between the 
avalanche hazard and the flood, landslide, rockfall and torrent hazards as it is assumed that the 
avalanche hazard is temporally mutually exclusive from the four other hazards. Furthermore, 
correlation factors between single hazard risks (avalanche hazard risk correlated with an additional 
avalanche hazard risk) have not been included in Table 3-8 as it has been assumed that the effects of 
each hazard on the respective object have been completely captured in the object section and 
continuous object risk evaluation process. 
Applying this multi-hazard-object risk evaluation process to an abstract case of a continuous object 
exposed to the five hazards (avalanche, flood, landslide, rockfall and torrent) with respective direct 
consequence risk magnitudes of CHF 3,500, CHF 17,325, CHF 4,425, CHF 150 and CHF 24,350. It can 
be observed that of the four non-avalanche risks, the torrent risk is the largest risk followed by the 
flood, the landslide and the rockfall risks in descending order. Thus from Equation (3.43) and Table 
3-8, the multi-hazard continuous object risk is computed following: 
 
3500 24350 17325(1 0.30) 4425(1 0.40)(1 0.30)
150(1 0.05)(1 0.05)(1 0.05)IRisk
+ + − + − −
=
+ − − −
 
Thus the multi-hazard object direct consequence risk considering potential hazard correlations is CHF 
41,965. If all hazards were assumed to be mutually exclusive following Equation (3.42), the resulting 
multi-hazard object risk would be CHF 49,750, an 18.5% overestimation. 
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3.7.5 Conclusion and critique 
In this section, the scope of analysis is expanded from a single object section to a continuous object 
comprised of multiple object sections. In making this transition, post-failure reconstruction 
economies of scale and mutually inclusive direct consequences and service interruption durations 
are considered by assessing an effective exposed continuous object length. The effective exposed 
continuous object length is developed by multiplying the continuous object length exceeding 100 
meters by a hazard specific attenuation factor. This effective exposed continuous object length is in 
turn employed to assess the direct consequence and service interruption vulnerability and risk of a 
continuous object responding in a single and in multiple failure modes to a given hazard. These risk 
values will in turn be employed in Section 3.8 to quantify the risk of a link composed of multiple 
continuous objects. 
3.8 Quantifying link risk 
3.8.1 Introduction and overview 
In Sections 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 the methodology for assessing the risk of failure of a continuous object 
with respect to a single and to multiple hazards is formulated. In Section 3.8, the methodology for 
quantifying risk of failure of a link comprised of multiple continuous objects exposed to multiple 
hazards is developed by considering the fact that a functional failure of a continuous object or object 
section within a link is a functional failure of the entire link. Thus, link level service interruption 
duration risks are developed by considering the geographic-based correlation between continuous 
object service interruption duration risks.The developed methodology is used to quantify the total 
risk of failure of a given link with respect to multiple natural hazards. 
3.8.2 Calculating multi-hazard, multiple continuous object link risk4 
Expanding the risk assessment methodology from a single continuous object exposed to multiple 
hazards to a single link comprised of multiple continuous objects each exposed to multiple hazards 
introduces an additional aspect – geography-based hazard correlations. For direct cost risks, it is 
herein assumed that all hazard specific object risks are mutually exclusive and thus the link direct 
consequences risk can be assessed with Equation (3.44). 
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Where: 
Link _RiskDC = the link direct consequence risk due to all hazard continuous object risks [CHF] 
RiskI,DC
H = continuous object I’s direct consequence risk exposure to hazard H [CHF] 
For service interruption duration risks, a service interruption incurred by any object within the link is 
a service interruption incurred by the entire link. Therefore, when considering service interruption 
duration risks, one must consider geography-based hazard correlations. As shown in Figure 3-18, this 
process of considering geography-based hazard correlations begins by first assigning the continuous 
                                                          
4 In this section, the service interruption risks of objects contained within a given geographic region (i.e. slope, 
gully, basin, link) are attributed directly to the respective region for notation simplification purposes. 
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objects within a given link along a three level hierarchical classifications – drainage basins, gullies and 
slopes.  
 
Figure 3-18: Geographically-based object classifications. 
The correlation between hazards are either produced by two or more hazards occurring at the same 
time or by one hazard instigating an additional hazard(s) (e.g. a flood causing a torrent). The causality 
chain between a set of hazards is a product of the local hazard parameter intensities, topography, 
and geology. As the feasibility of developing causality chains and correlation matrices for each 
location is questionable, it is herein assumed that inter-hazard correlations are a product of the 
relative geographic level (slope, gully and drainage basins). 
With objects geographically assigned, hazard correlation matrices for each geographic hierarchical 
level (slope, gully, basin and multi-basin) must be assessed or estimated. Once formulated, these 
correlation matrices can be employed in conjunction with Equation (3.45) to assess how the 
estimated hazard correlations between the inferior hierarchical level continuous objects’ and object 
sections’ hazard specific risks combine to formulate a superior hierarchical level continuous objects’ 
and object section’s hazard specific risk.  
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1 1,1 1 1,1
, , ,
1
, ,
, , ,
1
, , ,
, , ,
1
, ,
, , ,
1
,
,
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
n
I SI i SI j SI
i
n
k k k k k k k
I SI i SI q SI
i
n
l l l l l l l k l
I SI i SI r SI
i
n
m m m m m m
i IN SI s SI
m
iI SI
k m l
R R LC R LC
R R LC R LC
R R LC R LC LC
R LC R LC
R
LC LC
=
=
=
=
⎡ ⎤= − + ⋅⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= − + −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤
− +⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠=
× − −
∑
∑
∑
∑
( )
( )
( )( )( )
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }
1 1
, ,
, ,
, ,
, ,
,
, ,
, ,
, , ,
1
,
, , ,
2
max
max
max
max
max
1
1 1 1
j SI i SI
k k
q SI i SI
l l
r SI i SI
m m
s SI i SI
m p p
t SI i SI
n
p p p p p p
i IN SI t SIp
iI SI
k p l p m p
i
R R
R R
R R
R R
R R
RR LC R LC
R
LC LC LC
=
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪ ≥⎪ ⎪
=⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪
=⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪
=⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪
=⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪
=⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪
− +⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠=⎪ ⎪
× − − −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑ , , , ,k l m pq SI r SI s SI t SIR R R
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪≥ ≥ ≥⎩ ⎭
 (3.45) 
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Where: 
RI,SI
1 = superior hierarchical level service interruption duration risk with respect to avalanche 
hazard [days] 
RI,SI
k = superior hierarchical level service interruption duration risk with respect to hazard k 
[days] 
Ri,SI
,1 = inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section service interruption 
duration risk with respect to the avalanche hazard [days] 
Rj,SI
,1 = maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section service 
interruption duration risk with respect to the avalanche hazard [days] 
Rq,SI
,k = maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section service 
interruption duration risk with respect to hazard k [days] 
k, l, m, p = hazard reference variables 
j, q, r, s, t = maximum inferior hierarchical level continuous object and object section service 
interruption duration risk reference variables with respect to each hazard 
n = the number of continuous objects and object sections in the inferior hierarchical level 
LCA,B = the correlation factor specifying the correlation between the initial hazard A and the 
secondary hazard B, both within the same inferior hierarchical level 
If there is only one continuous object or object section within the inferior hierarchical level, the 
assessed continuous object or object section’s hazard specific service interruption duration risks are 
transferred directly to the superior hierarchical level, as shown in Equation (3.46). 
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With the service interruption duration risks transferred to the highest geographical hierarchical level, 
the link risk can be assessed by summing the individual hazard risks as is shown in Equation (3.47). 
 
5
,
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=
=∑  (3.47) 
Where: 
Link_RiskSI = link risk level service interruption duration risk with respect to all five hazards 
[days] 
The process of developing a hazard correlation matrix for each geographic hierarchical level is 
presented in Example 3-10 and in Example 3-11 these hazard correlation matrices are employed to 
assess the link service interruption duration risks from continuous object service interruption 
duration risks. 
Example 3-10: Estimate the hazard correlation matrix for each geographic hierarchical level. 
Slope risk correlation matrix 
The first matrix, Table 3-9, details the estimated correlation between different hazard specific object 
service interruption duration risks located within the same slope, Figure 3-19. As in Table 3-8, the  
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Figure 3-19: Geographically-based object assessment – hazard specific object service interruption duration 
risks located within the same slope. 
Instigator (larger magnitude risk) hazard and the instigated (smaller magnitude risk) hazard are 
located along the rows and columns respectively. In comparing Table 3-9 to Table 3-8, one can 
observe that the two matrices are almost identical, but diagonal values dealing the estimated 
correlation between identical hazards (i.e. two flood hazards each affecting two different objects at 
the same time) have been added to Table 3-9.  
Table 3-9: Example estimated correlation matrix for hazard specific object service interruption duration risks 
located within the same slope. 
 Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall  Torrent  
Avalanche 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Flood 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.05 0.30 
Landslide 0.00 0.30 0.95 0.05 0.40 
Rockfall 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 
Torrent 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.05 0.90 
Table 3-9 can then be employed to determine the hazard specific risks affecting each slope. As in 
determining the multi-hazard object risk, the sequence in which hazards are designated as instigator 
hazards has been assumed to be directly related to the maximum of each hazard specific object 
service interruption duration risk magnitude. Thus the risk of the objects located within a given slope 
with respect to each hazard can be evaluated from the hazard specific object risks by applying 
Equation (3.45) and the estimated correlation factors from Table 3-9. 
Gully risk correlation matrix 
With the hazard specific service interruption duration risk evaluated for each slope within the link, 
Figure 3-20, the focus then shifts to evaluating the hazard specific service interruption duration risk 
for each gully. To accomplish this, an estimated correlation matrix for the hazard specific slope 
service interruption duration risks within the same gully has been developed Table 3-10. In 
comparing Table 3-10 to Table 3-9, the object risk correlation matrix, it can be seen that the 
correlation factors for all the hazard specific risks in Table 3-10 are lower, with the landslide risk 
correlation factors being significantly lower. This significant reduction in the landslide risk correlation 
has been made to reflect the assumption that the landslide occurrence is the product of localized  
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Figure 3-20: Geographically-based object assessment - hazard specific object service interruption duration 
risks located within the same gully. 
parameters (e.g. local topography, geology, water concentration). With the slope risk correlation 
matrix estimated, the hazard specific risk exposure of a given gully can be evaluated with Equation 
(3.45) or Equation (3.46) by employing the slope as the inferior hierarchical level and the gully as the 
superior hierarchical level. 
Table 3-10: Example estimated correlation matrix for hazard specific slope service interruption duration risks 
within the same gully. 
 Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall  Torrent  
Avalanche 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Flood 0.00 0.95 0.20 0.05 0.30 
Landslide 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.25 
Rockfall 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.02 
Torrent 0.00 0.30 0.25 0.02 0.85 
Basin risk correlation matrix 
 
Figure 3-21: Geographically-based object assessment - hazard specific object service interruption duration 
risks located within the same basin. 
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With the hazard specific service interruption duration risks evaluated for each gully within the link, 
Figure 3-21, the focus then shifts to evaluating the hazard specific risks for each basin. This is 
accomplished by first estimating a correlation matrix for hazard specific gully risks located within the 
same basin, Table 3-11. In comparing the slope risk correlation and the object risk correlation 
matrices, Table 3-11 and Table 3-10, it can be seen that all of the hazard correlation factors are lower 
in Table 3-11, reflecting the increasing geographical distance between hazards, with the avalanche 
and torrent specific risk correlation factors significantly decreased. This reduction is due to the 
assumption that avalanche and torrent hazards are predominately instigated by intense localized 
precipitation and thus when one compares two different gullies, the occurrences of intense localized 
precipitation, inducing avalanche and torrent hazards will be only partially correlated.  
Table 3-11: Example estimated correlation matrix for hazard specific gully service interruption duration risks 
within the same basin.  
 Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall  Torrent  
Avalanche 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Flood 0.00 0.60 0.05 0.00 0.10 
Landslide 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.02 
Rockfall 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Torrent 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.20 
With the gully service interruption duration risk correlation matrix formulated, one can calculate the 
hazard specific basin risks by employing Equations (3.45) or (3.46) and by defining the gully and the 
basin respectively as the inferior and superior hierarchical levels.  
Multi-basin risk correlation matrix 
 
Figure 3-22: Geographically-based object assessment - hazard specific object service interruption duration 
risk located within the same link. 
With the hazard specific service interruption duration risks evaluated for each basin within the link, 
Figure 3-22, the focus then shifts to evaluating the total hazard specific risks. To accomplish this, one 
must first estimate a correlation matrix for hazard specific service interruption duration risks located 
in different basins, Table 3-12. In comparing Table 3-12 to Table 3-11, respectively the basin and gully 
risk correlation matrices, one can observe that hazard specific risk correlation factors are further 
decreased to approaching or equal to zero. Most notably, the flood hazard risk correlation factor 
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which had maintained a rather high correlation factor for the gully correlation matrix, is assumed to 
be significantly reduced reflecting the assumption that floods in different drainage basins are only 
slightly correlated. 
Table 3-12: Example estimated correlation matrix for hazard specific basin service interruption duration 
risks. 
 Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall  Torrent  
Avalanche 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Flood 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Landslide 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rockfall 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Torrent 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 
With the hazard specific basin service interruption duration risk correlation matrix estimated, one 
can evaluate the total hazard specific link risk by employing Equation (3.45) or (3.46) and by defining 
the basin and the link respectively as the inferior and superior hierarchical levels.  
Example 3-11: Calculate the link service interruption duration risks of a link composed of 10 
continuous objects in a geographical configuration detailed in Figure 3-18 and having the assessed 
service interruption duration risks detailed in Table 3-13. 
Table 3-13: Assessed hazard specific object service interruption risks. 
 Link Segment Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Co
nt
in
uo
us
 O
bj
ec
ts
 
0.0.0.1 0.180 1.200 2.50 0.175 2.100 
0.0.0.2 0.000 1.750 0.000 0.000 3.285 
0.0.1.3 0.560 0.430 0.765 0.425 0.625 
0.0.1.4 1.500 0.135 2.250 1.185 0.295 
0.1.0.5 3.500 0.125 2.850 1.650 0.180 
0.1.0.6 0.000 1.950 0.195 0.000 3.765 
0.1.1.7 0.465 0.835 1.250 0.380 1.540 
0.1.1.8 2.255 0.245 1.855 0.715 0.445 
1.0.0.1 1.975 0.000 1.665 0.435 0.000 
1.0.0.2 0.495 0.255 0.065 0.185 0.365 
In Figure 3-18, Example 3-10 and Table 3-14, one can observe that the process of calculating the link 
service interruption duration risk will have to pass through each geographic hierarchical level 
following the schematic presented in Figure 3-23. 
 
Figure 3-23: Schematic for assessing the link service interruption duration risk. 
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Conducting this assessment by employing Equation (3.45), Equation (3.46) and the correlation 
matrices detailed in Example 3-10 yields the results presented in Table 3-14. 
Table 3-14: Hazard specific service interruption duration risks for each hierarchical level. 
 Link Segment Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Sl
op
es
 
0.0.0 0.180 1.225 0.105 0.150 3.495 
0.0.1 1.556 0.200 2.288 1.489 0.373 
0.1.0 3.500 0.956 1.716 1.415 3.783 
0.1.1 2.302 0.409 1.918 0.906 0.951 
1.0.0 2.025 0.119 1.668 0.571 0.208 
G
ul
lie
s 0.0 1.592 0.657 1.763 1.599 3.551 
0.1 3.960 0.519 2.210 2.230 3.926 
1.0 2.025 0.119 1.668 0.571 0.208 
Ba
si
ns
 
0 5.075 0.739 3.808 3.829 6.766 
1 2.025 0.119 1.668 0.571 0.208 
Link - - - - 6.897 0.823 5.476 4.401 6.964 
Thus, summing the hazard specific link service interruption duration risks yields a link service 
interruption duration risk of 24.6 days. If this calculation was conducted assuming that all of the 
hazard specific object service interruption duration risks were mutually exclusive, the resulting link 
service interruption duration risk would have been assessed as 46.8 days, an increase of 90.3%. 
3.8.3 Computing link total equivalent financial link risk exposure 
The last step in the risk calculation process is the quantification of the total equivalent financial link 
risk exposure. This is conducted by summing the direct consequence risk and the service interruption 
duration risk multiplied by the daily financial valuation of the losses and additional expenditures 
incurred from transport and societal related impacts of infrastructure link I’s reduced functional 
performance, Equation (3.48). 
 
,
_ _ _DC SI I dailyLink Risk Link Risk Link Risk IC= + ⋅  (3.48) 
Where: 
Link_Risk = the financial equivalent link risk exposure considering direct and indirect 
consequences [CHF] 
Example 3-12: Assess the total equivalent financial link risk exposure for the link detailed in Figure 
3-18 with hazard specific direct consequence risks detailed in Table 3-15, hazard specific service  
Table 3-15: Assessed hazard specific continuous object direct consequence risks. 
 Link Segment Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Co
nt
in
uo
us
 O
bj
ec
ts
 
0.0.0.1 3,250 8,765 13,850 1,330 11,255 
0.0.0.2 0 7,230 0 0 14,965 
0.0.1.3 4,790 5,440 5,480 4,690 8,670 
0.0.1.4 10,395 1,855 11,870 8,550 3,955 
0.1.0.5 18,610 2,240 12,155 7,585 1,390 
0.1.0.6 0 10,405 2,015 0 16,485 
0.1.1.7 3,685 7,665 7,925 3,695 9,250 
0.1.1.8 13,270 2,335 9,350 7,725 4,560 
1.0.0.1 9,785 0 8,960 4,655 0 
1.0.0.2 4,365 2,640 935 1,860 1,125 
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interruption duration risks detailed in Table 3-13 and a daily indirect consequences resulting from the 
closure of the given link of 34,000 CHF/day. 
Employing Equation (3.44) to calculate the total link direct consequence by considering all hazard 
specific continuous object direct consequence risks yields a total link direct consequence risk of 
301,010 CHF. From Example 3-11, the total link service interruption duration risk is 24.6 days. By 
employing Equation (3.48), the resulting total financial equivalent link risk is 1,136,000 CHF.  
 
3.8.4 Conclusion 
Section 3.8.2 presents a methodology for quantifying the direct consequence and service 
interruption duration risks resulting from a link composed of multiple continuous objects each 
exposed multiple hazards. In particular, the direct consequence risks have been assumed to be series 
independent while the service interruption duration risks have been assumed to be series 
dependent. Thus to quantify the service interruption duration risks, hazard correlation matrices for 
each geographic hierarchical level (i.e. slopes, gullies, basins and intra-basins) are formulated and 
employed to determine the link service interruption duration risks. With both risk types quantified, in 
Section 3.8.3, the total link risk is assessed by multiplying the service interruption duration risk by the 
indirect consequences of closing the link for a given day. Therefore, by applying this methodology, 
one can quantify the total risk exposure of a link composed of multiple continous infrastructure 
objects each exposed to multiple hazards. 
3.9 Calculate risks over multiple years  
3.9.1 Overview 
With the risk assessment methodologies for an infrastructure object section, a continuous 
infrastructure object and an infrastructure link each exposed to a single or to multiple hazards, the 
question now turns to how to assess these risks over an extended time period. This temporal aspect 
of risk is quantified by first assessing the number of events that can probabilistically occur within a 
given time period. This present value of these probabilistic events is then assessed to consider any 
potential inflation or depreciation rates. The resulting value is a present value quantification of the 
risk exposure with respect to the given hazard over multiple time periods.  
3.9.2 Quantifying temporal effects on assessed risk 
To broaden the risk assessment temporal horizon from one year to T years, one must consider the 
probability of the various failure events occurring over a temporal horizon extending beyond one 
year. The general form for the distribution of an event occurring at a given time t is quantified with 
the Poisson Process, Equation (3.49). 
 
( )( , )
!
n
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n
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=  (3.49) 
Where: 
P(n,t) = the probability of n events in period t 
n = the number of events 
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t = the considered time period [years] 
ν = the event occurrence rate [years]-1 
Further specifying the probability detailed in Equation (3.49) by including only events smaller in 
intensity than a given intensity yields Equation (3.50).  
 ( ) ( ), , ( , , )
!
i
ttP n X x t P n X x i e
i
νν − ⋅⋅≤ = ≤ ⋅  (3.50) 
Where: 
P(n, X ≤ x, t) = the probability of n events in period t that are less in intensity than or equal to 
a threshold intensity x  [  ] 
x = a threshold or reference intensity 
Expanding Equation (3.50) yields Equation (3.51). 
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Equation (3.51) can be simplified to Equation (3.52). 
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To determine the number of events that are less than or equal to a given threshold event x, an 
infinite sum is taken of Equation (3.52) resulting in Equation (3.53). 
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Where: 
E(n, X ≤ x ,t) = the number of events less than or equal to a given threshold event x occurring 
within time t 
Through algebraic derivation, Equation (3.53) reduces to Equation (3.54). 
 ( , , ) ( )E n X x t P X x t≤ = ≤ ⋅  (3.54) 
Applying this finding to the calculation of risk during a time horizon T years, assuming the failed 
objects are immediately returned to their original states and considering potential discount rates, the 
object direct consequence and service interruption duration risks for a given hazard parameter can 
be computed with Equations (3.55) and (3.56). 
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Where:  
rateDC = the direct consequence discount rate [   ] 
rateSI = the service interruption discount rate [  ] 
T = the risk assessment temporal horizon [years] 
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RiskDC,T
H = the object direct consequence risk for a given hazard H over a time perspective of 
T years  [CHF] 
RiskSI,T
H = the object service interruption duration risk for a given hazard H over a temporal 
horizon of T years [days] 
Example 3-13: Develop the equations quantifying an object’s risk with respect to given hazard by 
considering the largest hazard parameter intensity during a defined time perspective N 
Refining the risk assessment methodology further by considering the largest hazard parameter 
intensity during N years rather than considering just the largest hazard parameter intensity in a given 
year as defined by Equation (3.17), causes the object direct consequence and service interruption 
duration risk Equations (3.55) and (3.56) respectively evolve to Equations (3.57) and (3.58). 
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Where: 
RiskDC,T,N
H = the object direct consequence risk for a given hazard H over a time perspective of 
T years considering the maximum hazard parameter intensity in N years [CHF] 
RiskSI,T,N
H = the object service interruption duration risk for a given hazard H over a time 
perspective of T years considering the maximum hazard parameter intensity in N years [days] 
Example 3-14: Using the approach presented in Example 3-13, evaluate the object direct 
consequence and service interruption duration risks to a given hazard for two different time 
perspectives (N) (one year and one month), two different discount rates (0 and 0.02) over five 
different temporal horizons (T) (1, 10, 25, 50 and 100 years). 
To evaluate how the different variables, including the event time perspectives (N), the discount rate 
and the risk assessment temporal horizon (T) can influence the evaluated object direct consequence 
and service interruption duration risks to a given hazard parameter, these risks have been evaluated 
for the predefined two different event time perspectives using two different financial discount rates 
over five different time horizons, as shown in Table 3-16.  
Table 3-16: Direct consequence and service interruption duration risks evaluated using two different time 
perspectives, two different discount rates over five different time horizons. 
 One Potential Failure per Year  
(N = 1) 
One Potential Failure per Month 
(N=1/12) 
 RiskDC,T
H RiskSI,T
H RiskDC,T,N
H RiskSI,T,N
H 
T [Years] 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
1 1,670 1,704 0.338 1,678 1,696 0.339 
10 16,704 18,677 3.377 16,779 18,590 3.394 
25 41,760 54,724 8.444 41,947 54,469 8.486 
50 83,519 144,950 16.887 83,894 144,274 16.971 
100 167,039 538,964 33.774 167,788 536,451 33.943 
In comparing the two vertically oriented halves of Table 3-16, one can quickly observe that the 
duration of the considered time perspective – the maximum hazard parameter intensity within a 
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given year or the maximum hazard parameter intensity within a given month – does not have a 
significant impact on these computed risks. This finding should stand as long as the shortest return 
period event (in this case 30 years) is significantly larger that the employed time perspective (1 year). 
Where such a relationship is not maintained, a time perspective shorter than 1 year should be 
employed, see Example 3-15. 
Turning to the discount rates, it can be seen that for short risk assessment temporal horizons, the 
discount rate influence is limited, but as the assessment time horizon extends beyond 10 years, this 
influence becomes significant. Therefore, in calculating multi-year risks, one should specify and 
consistently employ a single discount rate. 
In selecting a time horizon over which the various risks should be evaluated, one should consider 
how the calculated risks will be employed. If they are purely intended to be employed in comparing 
and contrasting the object and link risks, the employed time horizon will not influence the evaluation 
process as long as it is held consistent across all objects and links. If the evaluated risks are intended 
to be employed in assessing different design and retrofit options and implementation schedules, it is 
recommended to use a longer time horizon, such as 50 year time horizon, so that the magnitude of 
the long-term potential financial and temporal losses can be appropriately considered. 
3.9.3 Conclusion and critique 
In this section, a methodology for quantifying a risk extending over multiple considered time periods 
and considering the temporal valuation of money is presented. This valuation is formulated by 
summing the product of the infrastructure risk over a single time period and the compounding 
interest equation evaluated at each considered time period.  
It is important to note that as this assessment methodology employs current hazard identification 
maps over an extended temporal horizon, by default, it is assumed the risk remains constant over 
the considered temporal horizon. Additionally it is assumed that if the infrastructure object does fail 
during the given time period, it is immediately reconstructed to its original state. Where reality strays 
from these assumptions, a more detailed approach which considers the varying hazard parameter 
intensity, varying infrastructure object resistance and post-failure reconstruction implications should 
be developed. 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a comprehensive vulnerability and risk calculation methodology. This 
methodology is initiated by conducting a geographic coincident analysis between the considered 
hazards and infrastructure objects. For the coincident hazards and object sections, the exposed 
object section lengths and the hazard parameter intensities are recorded for specific return period 
events. Additionally all object data is obtained from the various databases and previous onsite 
inspections. The respective component failure assessment process is then employed to determine if 
the given object section is affected by the given range of hazard parameter intensities and if so, in 
which failure mode(s) the object section responds. With the potentially active failure modes 
identified, experienced practitioners are asked to develop unit estimates, given a set of predefined 
hazard parameter intensities, of the direct consequences and service interruption durations resulting 
from an object section of a given class responding in a specific failure mode. These discrete data sets 
are then employed to develop continuous probability distribution functions and linearly interpolated 
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and extrapolated functions. These functions and the identified failure mode(s) are then employed to 
quantify the direct consequence and service interruption duration risks of the given infrastructure 
object section. 
The analysis scope is then extended from the individual infrastructure object section to the 
continuous object which is comprised of a number of object sections. In making this expansion, 
reconstruction economies of scale resulting from mutually inclusive direct consequences and service 
interruption durations are considered by assessing an effective exposed continuous object length. 
This effective exposed continuous object length is in turn employed to assess the continuous object 
vulnerability and risk due to object sections responding in a single or multiple failure modes. 
With the continuous object single hazard risks assessed, the analysis scope is expanded further to the 
link level. At the link level, the focus is on assessing the link risk due to multiple continuous objects 
being exposed to multiple hazards. To conduct this assessment, both intra-hazard correlations and 
geographically based hazard correlations are considered. The resulting assessment provides a link 
direct consequence and service interruption duration risk assessment. These two values can then be 
combined by considering the daily indirect consequences incurred from transport and societal 
related impacts of a link’s reduced functional performance. 
These analyzed risks are then extended to multiple year risks by considering the probability of having 
a given event occur over the considered time period and the time valuation of money over the 
considered time period. The end result of the methodology presented in this chapter is an actionable 
comprehensive methodology for assessing the vulnerability and risk of infrastructure object sections, 
continuous objects and links to natural hazards. Additionally, by implementing this comprehensive 
methodology, it is believed an infrastructure manager can better quantify the risk exposure of a 
given infrastructure object and link, determine if increases in infrastructure resistance or in natural 
hazard protection measures are warranted, focus risk mitigation funding to the most risk prone 
regions of the infrastructure network and finally transparently quantify the financial risk exposure of 
an infrastructure network. 
This methodology forms a foundational approach for conducting a system wide natural hazard risk 
assessment. When this methodology is integrated into an existing infrastructure management 
system, the infrastructure manager will be able to actively consider an infrastructure object’s 
potential natural hazard failure risk in modeling the infrastructure deterioration and in developing 
optimal maintenance solutions. Furthermore, through implementing this methodology, the 
infrastructure manager will be able to determine the required annual funding which should be 
invested and made available for natural hazard prevent and failure response. The expected end 
result is reduced infrastructure object failure potential, improved natural hazard protection systems 
and a more stable funding and infrastructure management. 
This vulnerability and risk assessment methodology is employed in Chapter 4 to assess the 
vulnerability and risk of selected infrastructure objects located along the Jaun Pass and the A2 
highway as it transverses the towns of Zofingen and Brittnau. 
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4 Infrastructure vulnerability assessment case studies 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the comprehensive procedure for assessing vulnerability and risk of infrastructure 
developed in Chapter 3 is employed to analyze two different case studies. The first case study, Case 
Study A, focuses on analyzing a link of the A2 highway exposed to potential flood hazards. In the 
second case study, Case Study B, selected infrastructure objects from the Jaun Pass roadway link – 
specifically a gallery and tunnel infrastructure objects – are analyzed using the developed assessment 
methodology. These case studies will also be employed to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
developed vulnerability and risk assessment methodology and to highlight areas for additional 
development and improvement. 
4.2 Case Study A: Vulnerability and risk assessment of the Zofingen A2 
highway 
   
Figure 4-1: a) Looking North at the A-2 highway located west of the Wigger River and b) Looking south at a 
portion of the levee separating the A-2 Highway from the Wigger River. 
Zofingen, located in the Canton of Aargau, is a 10,500 person town situated within the Wigger Valley, 
a north facing river valley located in north-central Switzerland. The primary private transportation 
access route servicing the Wigger Valley is the A2 Highway, a four lane limited access highway 
situated on the eastern bank of the Wigger river. This case study analyzes the vulnerability and risk of 
a 6729m link of the A2 which runs between Oftringen interchange in the north and the Mehlsecken 
interchange in the south.  
Table 4-1: Zofingen A2 highway continuous infrastructure objects, presented in a north to south sequence. 
Ref Infra. Type Infra. Class Length [m] 
1 Road Highway 546 
2 Bridge Highway 36 
3 Road Highway 357 
4 Bridge Highway 40 
5 Road Highway 5750 
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Figure 4-2: Coincident analysis between the considered hazards and the A2 highway link.5 
hazard, the flood hazard, and secondly only the latter two continuous infrastructure objects, 
infrastructure objects 4 and 5 presented in Table 4-1, are the only continuous objects exposed to the 
flood hazard. 
These two continuous infrastructure objects were then cut into 100 meter long object sections 
resulting in one 40m long object section from the exposed A2 bridge and fifty-seven 100m long and  
  
Figure 4-3: Selected bridge and highway infrastructure object section exposure to flood hazard. 
 
                                                          
5 The contribution of the levee protect system bordering the Wigger River was actively considered in the 
development of the Zofingen flood hazard identification maps and thus any additional contribution from the 
levee is not directly considered within this work. 
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Table 4-2: Zofingen A2 selected exposed bridge and highway object section discrete data. 
Object Section: Bridge Section Highway Section 
Hazards: Flood Flood 
Return period: 30 100 300 1000 30 100 300 1000 
Hazard parameter 
intensity (m depth) 
0 2.5 2.8 3.0 0 0.1 1.2 1.4 
Object exposed 
length (m) 
0 22 24 24.5 0 100 100 100 
one 50m long object sections from the exposed A2 highway. A detailed coincident analysis was then 
conducted between each object section and the available flood parameter data, the flood depth 
identification maps, for each return period event. A visual presentation of this coincident analysis is 
made in Figure 4-3 and a tabular presentation is made in Table 4-2. 
It should be noted that the specific hazard parameter intensity data presented in Table 4-2 has been 
estimated from the hazard-object coincident analysis as the hazard data is presented purely as 
hazard parameter ranges rather than specific parameter intensities. 
With the exposure of the bridge and highway objects confirmed and the hazard parameter intensities 
quantified, the next step is to apply the respective component failure assessment process presented 
in Section 3.3 and Appendix A.6 to identify if these hazard parameter intensities can cause the 
concerned object section to fail. 
 
Figure 4-4: Eastern elevation of the exposed A2 bridge. 
The bridge component failure assessment process was applied to analyze exposure of the A2 
highway bridge, shown in Figure 4-4, to the flood depth intensities presented in Table 4-2, yielding 
the results shown in Table 4-3. Specifically, in applying the bridge component failure assessment 
process, one can observe that the bridge is exposed only to the flood hazard (thus step A for the 
flood hazard is negative). Furthermore, the flood depth does not exceed the bridge clearance nor is 
the bridge foundation susceptible to scour. Thus the bridge does not experience failure to any of the 
expected flood depth intensities.  
The roadway component failure assessment process was then applied to analyze the exposure of the 
A2 highway section, shown in Figure 4-1a, to the flood depth intensities presented in Figure 4-2, 
yielding the results shown in Figure 4-4. As mentioned earlier, the resistance of the supporting 
objects – specifically the levees lining the Wigger River have been considered in the development of 
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Table 4-3: Zofingen exposed A2 bridge failure assessment steps and hazard scenario identification. 
Bridge Assessment Steps Avalanche Flooding Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
A Bridge location  Hazard location Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
B Clearance > Hazard Height - Yes - - - 
C Pier Foundation Depth > Hazard Rupture Surface 
or Scour Depth 
- Yes - - - 
D Vertical Resistance > Applied Vertical Force - - - - - 
E Bearing Resistance > Applied Superstructure 
Forces 
- - - - - 
F Horizontal Resistance > Applied Horizontal Force - - - - - 
G Pier Resistance > Applied Horizontal Pier Forces - - - - - 
H Clearance + Structural Height > Hazard Height - Yes - - - 
 Failure Scenario - - - - - 
flood depth intensity maps. Thus, in applying the roadway component failure assessment process, no 
additional supporting objects were considered. Thus, for the flood hazard, assessment step A is 
negative and steps B and C are non-applicable. Additionally, as the expected flood induced scour 
depth is negligible, assessment step D is positive, resulting in failure scenario R2-F – roadway is 
inundated with liquid. Furthermore, as the roadway object has no resistance to a flood depth 
intensity, the roadway section is assumed to experience failure in mode R2-F as soon as the flood 
depth exceeds 0m. 
Table 4-4: Zofingen A2 highway object section failure assessment steps and hazard scenario identification. 
Roadway Assessment Steps Avalanche Flooding Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
A Roadway location  Hazard location Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
B Supporting Object Location ≠ Hazard Location - - - - - 
C Supporting Objects Intact? - - - - - 
D Hazard Rupture Surface or Scour Depth = 0 - Yes - - - 
 Failure Scenario - R2-F - - - 
With the roadway failure mode identified as R2-F, one can estimate the direct consequences and 
service interruption durations for a highway class roadway object failing in mode R2 to a flood 
hazard. These values were previously presented in Table 3-6.  
  
Figure 4-5: a) Gumbel Type I distribution fitted to the local flood depth intensities and the exposed object 
section length as a function of the flood depth intensity. 
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With the discrete data sets identifying the local hazard parameter intensity as a function of return 
period, the exposed object lengths, the direct consequences and the service interruption durations 
determined, employing the procedure presented in Section 3.5, continuous functions are fitted to 
these discrete data sets. A Gumbel Type I distribution has been fitted to the expected local hazard 
parameter intensities and interpolating and extrapolating linear functions to the selected exposed 
object section length are presented in Figure 4-5. The interpolated and extrapolated linear functions 
to the direct consequences and service interruption times are presented in Figure 3-13. 
The procedures presented in Section 3.6, and Equations (3.27) to (3.30) were then employed to 
quantify the direct consequence and service interruption vulnerability curves and the risk of the each 
exposed highway object section. The direct consequence and service interruption duration 
vulnerability curves for the considered highway object section is presented in Figure 4-6a. 
Furthermore, the direct consequence and service interruption duration annual risks for the 
considered highway object section are respectively 305.90 CHF/year and 0.0715 days/year. 
      
Figure 4-6: a) Direct consequence and service interruption vulnerabiliy curves as a function of the flood 
depth intensity and b) The exposed continuous object length and the effective exposed continuous object 
length as a function of the flood depth intensity. 
Expanding the analysis from the selected object section to the continuous A2 highway continuous 
object, the procedure presented in Section 3.7 was employed to assess the continuous object 
effective exposed length. This was conducted by employing the estimated object length flood specific 
attenuation factor for a roadway component detailed in Table 3-7 and Equation (3.36). The 
continuous object exposed length and the continuous object effective exposed length for the A2 
highway continuous object are presented in Figure 4-6b. Furthermore, the direct consequence and 
service interruption annualized risks for the A2 continuous object were assessed by employing 
Equations (3.40) to (3.41). The annualized direct consequence and service interruption risks to the 
flood depth are 816.14 CHF/year and 0.184 days/year. As this is the only exposed continuous object 
within the studied A2 link, per the procedure presented in Section 3.8, these effective continuous 
object annualized risks are equivalent to the link annualized direct consequence and service 
interruption risks. 
Equations (3.55) and (3.56) were then employed to expand the direct consequence and service 
interruption risks time horizon from one year to 50 years by uniformly using a discount rate of 0.02, 
resulting in direct consequence and service interruption risks of 70,822 CHF and 15.97 days. 
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Considering the daily financial valuation of the losses and additional expenditures incurred from 
transport related impacts of closing this A2 highway link is 64,740 CHF per day (Hajdin, Axhausen, 
Bell, Birdsall, & Erath, 2008), the total financial equivalent link risk exposure considering direct and 
indirect consequences, following Equation (3.48), is 1,104,600 CHF/50 years. 
By analyzing this section of the Zofingen A2 highway link with the developed vulnerability and risk 
assessment methodology, one can quantify the annual and multi-year risks facing this given roadway 
link. With this information, an infrastructure manager can analyze the viability of potential mitigative 
actions including strengthening the levee system separating the Wigger River from the A2 highway, 
identifying potential detour roadway links which can be employed in the case of the flooding of the 
A2 highway, and informing the local government administration and community of these potential 
risks. Through this informed decision making process, infrastructure managers can efficiently reduce 
the potential and consequences of future natural hazard induced infrastructure failures. 
4.3 Case Study B: Vulnerability and risk assessment of selected objects 
within the Jaun Pass 
The Jaun Pass is a class 1 east-west oriented high mountain roadway pass linking the Fribourg 
Cantonal town of Charmey to the Bern Cantonal towns of Boltigen, Reichenbach and eventually 
Spiez. This case study focuses on objects located along a 7.8 km section of the Jaun Pass extending 
from the La Jogne river eastward to the Fribourg-Berne cantonal boarder. In addition to the Class 1 
roadway objects, this section also includes numerous retaining walls, six bridges, six culverts, one 
gallery and one tunnel. Even though the retaining wall, bridge, culvert and roadway objects are 
exposed to numerous avalanche, rockfall, landslide and torrent hazards, as this is the only case study 
containing gallery and tunnel objects, this case study will focus on these two objects. 
4.3.1 The Jaun Pass gallery 
 
Figure 4-7: Looking east at Jaun Pass gallery. 
The 371 m long gallery, shown in Figure 4-7 and detailed in Figure 4-9, was constructed in 1974 and is 
located immediately east of the La Jogne bridge on the western side of the case study. Structurally, 
the gallery roof is composed of a continuous 80 cm thick reinforced concrete slab spanning 8 meters 
across the roadway. On the uphill side, the gallery roof is supported by a continuous 4 meter high 
reinforced concrete retaining wall and the top of the gallery roof is flush with the in situ soil. On the 
downhill side, the gallery roof is supported by 50 cm by 50 cm reinforced concrete columns spaced at 
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3.5 meters on center. Contextually, the gallery is situated at the foot of a 1000m high avalanche and 
torrent shoot which during normal rain events contains water which is conveyed over the gallery in a 
dedicated open conduit. The uphill slope has a 20% grade and the downhill slope gently slopes away 
from the gallery at a 2% grade6.  
In conducting a geographic coincident analysis between the SilvaProtect natural hazard indication 
maps, the Fribourg Cantonal natural hazard identification maps and the STM specified gallery 
location, Figure 4-8, it can be seen that the gallery, the orange line transversing each image, is 
exposed to avalanche, torrent and flooding hazards and not exposed to rockfall and landslide 
hazards.  
 
Figure 4-8: Jaun Pass gallery - Natural hazard indication and identification maps. 
To facilitate the analysis of the Jaun Pass gallery, the gallery continuous object is cut into four object 
sections with respective lengths of 85, 100, 100 and 86m. Applying the gallery component failure 
assessment process, Figure A-18, it can be seen that as the Jaun Pass gallery foundations are well 
embedded in the hill side and the top of the uphill gallery wall is flush with the in situ soil, thus the 
assessment steps B to D are all positive and step E is negative, Table 4-5.  
Furthermore, it can be seen that while both the flood and torrent hazards pass over the gallery, it is 
believed that the hazards will not apply a significant horizontal or vertical force to the gallery roof – 
thus assessment steps F to H are all positive. Additionally, even though the gallery wall incorporates 
an open-air culvert to guide water across the gallery, it is believed that during torrent and flood 
hazard events, the roadway passing through the gallery will also be flooded with water and debris. 
Therefore step I is negative for both the flooding and torrent hazards and the respective failure 
scenarios are G7-T (gallery flooded with torrent debris) and G7-F (gallery flooded with water).  
                                                          
6 These dimensions have been estimated from the onsite visual site assessment. 
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Figure 4-9: Jaun Pass structural analysis schematic in a) cross section and b) elevation. 
Turning to the avalanche hazard, one must assess if the gallery wall, gallery roof and frame structural 
resistance to the static earth pressure and a high intensity avalanche hazard (PA = 30kN/m
2). Ideally 
this would be accomplished by quantifying the gallery resistance in terms of the expected avalanche 
pressure intensities. As the gallery’s structural resistance or even a generalized structural rating has 
not been included in a centralized database, it was decided to employ a finite element program to 
quantify the structural resistance of a 3.5 meter wide strip of the gallery wall and roof centered 
around one of the gallery column. This analysis, focusing on the gallery assessment steps F, G and H, 
found that the gallery has more than sufficient strength to resist the combined forces of the high 
intensity avalanche hazard, the static soil pressure, and the gallery members’ self weight. Thus, even 
though high intensity avalanches can and do occur at this location, the gallery has been designed to 
withstand these forces – thereby ensuring that this hazard does not pose any additional risk to this 
section of the roadway link. Thus, as shown in Table 4-5, for the avalanche hazard, assessment steps 
A and E are negative and steps B-D and F-I are all positive. 
Table 4-5: Jaun Pass gallery failure assessment steps and failure scenario identification. 
Gallery Assessment Steps Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
A Gallery location  Hazard location No No Yes Yes No 
B Gallery foundational depth > Hazard rupture 
surface or scour depth 
Yes Yes - - Yes 
C Gallery wall resistance > Applied horizontal force Yes Yes - - Yes 
D Wall column resistance > Applied horizontal force Yes Yes - - Yes 
E Gallery wall height > Hazard height No No - - No 
F Gallery roof resistance > Applied vertical force Yes Yes - - Yes 
G Roof support resistance > Applied vertical forces Yes Yes - - Yes 
H Gallery frame resistance > Combined horizontal & 
vertical forces 
Yes Yes - - Yes 
I Is hazard  Flood or torrent Yes No - - No 
 Hazard Scenario - G7-F - - G7-T 
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4.3.2 Jaun Pass gallery discrete data 
The natural hazard data for this area is currently limited to only hazard parameter identification 
maps which segment the hazard data into four color coded zones by considering both hazard 
parameter intensity and hazard parameter probability. Thus, for the flood and torrent hazards, one is 
unable to determine where within each return period (30, 100, 300 and 1000 years) the given natural 
hazard intensity rests and the geographic extents of these respective events. In face of these 
limitations, it has been assumed, as shown in Figure 4-8, that the yellow flooding and red torrent 
zones represents respectively 0, 0.3, 0.6 and 1.4m water depth and 0, 0.6, 1.1 and 1.4m deposited 
depth for each of the four reference return periods (30, 100, 300 and 1000). Furthermore, from the 
hazard map information shown in Figure 4-8, it can be determined that the maximum length of the 
flooding and torrent zones are respectively 354m and 88m. As with the hazard intensity data, one 
must also assume the gallery length exposed to each hazard given the predefined return periods (30, 
100, 300 and 1000). Thus it has been assumed that 0, 85 215 and 354m of the Jaun Pass gallery is 
exposed to the flood hazard and 0, 40, 80 and 88m of the gallery is exposed to the torrent hazard, 
both respectively taken at 30, 100, 300 and 1000 return periods.  
Table 4-6: Jaun Pass gallery discrete continuous object data. 
Failure mode G7-T G7-F 
Return period 30 100 300 1000 30 100 300 1000 
Hazard parameter intensity (m depth) 0 0.6 1.1 1.4 0 0.3 0.6 1.4 
Object exposed length (m) 0 40 80 88 0 85 215 354 
Hazard intensity (m depth) 0 0.5 1 2 0 0.5 2 
Unit direct consequences (CHF/100m) 0 24000 48000 72000 0 14400 38400 
Unit Service interruption (days/100m) 0 6 8 10 0 2 4 
The last pieces of information needed to compute the total direct consequences and service 
interruptions resulting from each hazard exposure, are the estimated unit direct consequences and 
service interruptions for the predefined hazard intensities. As presented in Figure 4-8, for a flood 
water depth of 0, 0.5 and 2m, the unit direct consequences for a 100m length of class 1 gallery have 
been estimated at 0, 14400 and 38400 CHF and the unit service interruption durations have been 
estimated at 0, 2 and 4 days. Likewise, for a torrent deposited depth of 0, 0.5, 1 and 2, the unit direct 
consequences have been estimated at 0, 24000, 48000 and 72000 CHF and the unit service 
interruption durations have been estimated at 0, 6, 8 and 10 days.  
4.3.3 Assessing an example object section – fitting continuous functions 
Taking one of the two middle object sections and assuming the hazard location is symmetrically 
applied to each object section results in the discrete data presented in Table 4-7. One can then apply 
the procedure presented in Section 3.5 to transition the discrete data to continuous functions. First a  
Table 4-7: Jaun Pass galley section discrete data. 
Object Section Section 2 & 3 Section 1 & 4 
Failure Modes G7-T G7-F G7-T G7-F 
Return period 30 100 300 1000 30 100 300 1000 30 100 300 1000 30 100 300 1000
Hazard parameter 
intensity (m depth) 
0 0.6 1.1 1.4 0 0.3 0.6 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 1.4
Object exposed 
length (m) 
0 20 40 44 0 42.5 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.5 77 
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Figure 4-10: Gumbel Type I distribution fitted to the Jaun Pass gallery: a) Torrent hazard and b) Flood hazard. 
 
Figure 4-11: Jaun Pass gallery section exposed length for: a) Torrent hazard, b) Flood hazard. 
 
Figure 4-12: Jaun Pass gallery direct consequences and service interruption times estimated for:  
a) Torrent induced failure modes G7-T, b) Flood induced failure mode G7-F. 
Gumbel Type I distribution is fit to the return period based hazard parameter data, Figure 4-10. 
Equations (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24) are then employed to develop continuous functions from the 
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discrete exposed section length, direct consequences and service interruption hazard parameter 
intensity linked data, Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12.  
In these six figures presented above, one can observe that the torrent hazard has a higher probability 
of occurring, Figure 4-10, but the flood hazard effects a larger portion of the object segment, Figure 
4-11. Lastly, the torrent hazard unit direct consequence and service interruption durations are 
significantly higher than the flood hazard direct consequences and service interruption durations, 
Figure 4-12. 
4.3.4 Object segment vulnerability and risk 
With these continuous functions developed, one can calculate the vulnerability curves and risks for 
this object section. The vulnerability curves are developed by applying Equations (3.27) and (3.28) to 
the exposed length, unit direct consequences and unit service interruption duration functions 
presented above results in the vulnerability functions shown in Figure 4-13. 
 
Figure 4-13: Jaun Pass gallery segment direct consequence and service interruption duration vulnerability 
curves for: a) Torrent, b) Flood hazard. 
From the vulnerability functions presented above, one can observe that the vulnerability functions 
are within the same order of magnitude. The gallery-flood vulnerability curves initially outpace the 
gallery-torrent vulnerability curves. At higher hazard parameter intensities, the torrent service 
interruption duration vulnerability curve exceeds the flood service interruption duration vulnerability 
curve and the flood direct consequence vulnerability curve exceeds the torrent direct consequence 
vulnerability curve.  
Equations (3.27) and (3.28) are respectively employed to calculate the direct consequence and 
service interruption duration risks from the probability density functions and vulnerability curves 
presented above. The resulting object section risks are presented in Figure 4-14. 
Figure 4-14: Jaun Pass gallery direct consequence and service interruption duration risks with respect to the 
flood and torrent hazards. 
Object Section Section 2 & 3 Section 1 & 4 
Failure Mode G7-T G7-F G7-T G7-F 
Direct consequence risk 176.20 229.04 0 47.66 
Service interruption risk 0.0330000 0.023778 0 0.005954 
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4.3.5 Continuous object effective exposed length, vulnerability and risk 
    
Figure 4-15: Exposed and effective exposed continuous object section lengths of the Jaun Pass gallery to:  
a) Torrent hazard, b) Flood hazard. 
The Jaun Pass gallery direct consequences and service interruption duration vulnerability curves are 
then assessed from the effective exposed gallery continuous object lengths, estimated direct 
consequences and estimated service interruptions duration using Equations (3.38) and (3.39). From 
the vulnerability curves presented in Figure 4-16, one can observe that the gallery direct 
consequence vulnerability to both the torrent and flood hazards are fairly equivalent but the gallery 
service interruption vulnerability is noticeably different, with the torrent hazard incurring a more 
than 25% increased service interruption duration when compared to the flood hazard vulnerability. 
  
Figure 4-16: Juan pass gallery vulnerability to the: a) Torrent hazard and b) Flood hazard. 
Turning to Table 4-8, one can observe that the foundational discrete data is presented in the first half 
of this table. In particular, one can observe the differences between the torrent and flood hazard 
exposed gallery continuous object lengths and the unit direct consequences. The annualized direct 
consequence and service interruption duration risks, assessed with Equations (3.40) and (3.41), are 
presented in the central section of Table 4-8. From the annualized risks, one can observe that the 
torrent hazard which has a significantly smaller geographical reach, incurs a more than 22% greater 
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direct consequences and more than 75% longer service interruption times as compared to the flood 
hazard incurred direct consequences and service interruption times. By considering the unit indirect 
costs of the additional driving time and distance induced by closing the Jaun Pass for one day (15260 
CHF/day) (Hajdin, Axhausen, Bell, Birdsall, & Erath, 2008), one can determine the financial equivalent 
annualized indirect risk incurred by each hazard. When these incurred indirect risks are compared 
against the direct consequence annualized risks, one can observe that the indirect risks for the 
torrent and flood hazards are respectively more than 280% and 190% greater than the annualized 
direct consequence risks. 
Table 4-8: Jaun Pass Gallery analyzed risk considering hazard scenarios G7-T and G7-F 
Failure mode G7-T G7-F 
Return period 30 100 300 1000 30 100 300 1000 
Hazard parameter intensity (m depth) 0 0.6 1.1 1.4 0 0.3 0.6 1.4 
Object exposed length (m) 0 40 80 88 0 85 215 354 
Hazard intensity (m depth) 0 0.5 1 2 0 0.5 2 
Unit direct consequences (CHF/100m) 0 24000 48000 72000 0 14400 38400 
Unit Service interruption (days/100m) 0 6 8 10 0 2 4 
Equivalent length factor  0.3 0.25 
Annualized direct conseq. risk (CHF/yr) 352.32 287.63 
Annualized service interruption (days/yr) 0.0650 0.0362 
Unit indirect consequences (CHF/day) 15260 CHF/day 
Annualized indirect risk (CHF/yr) 992.43 551.95 
Annualized hazard risk (CHF/yr)  1,344.75 CHF/yr 839.58 CHF/yr 
Hazard risk over 50 yrs (CHF/50 yr) 116,691.99 CHF/50 yrs 72,764.49 CHF/50 yrs 
Inter-hazard correlation factor 0.30 0.25 
Annualized object risk (CHF/yr) 1932.46 CHF/yr & 0.0903 days/yr 
Object risk over 50 yrs (CHF/50 yrs) 167,627.13 CHF/50 yrs & 4.518 days/50 yrs 
The annualized object risk for the Jaun Pass gallery was then assessed using Equation (3.43) and 
Table 3-8. This assessment has found that annually more than 1900 CHF are at risk due to the torrent 
and flood hazards. The gallery financial equivalent and service interruption risks over a 50 year 
reference period respectively considering discount rates of 0.02 and 0.00 were then quantified with 
Equations (3.55) and (3.56). This assessment found that the over a 50 year reference period, the 
gallery equivalent financial risk is 167,600 CHF and the total expected service interruption risk is 4.5 
days.  
Thus through applying this vulnerability and risk assessment methodology to the Jaun Pass Gallery, 
one can quantify the gallery’s annualized risk exposure to each hazard – a key tool for assessing the 
gallery’s level of risk exposure. With this quantified risk, an infrastructure manager can start to assess 
the viability and the appropriateness of various environmental, contextual, object and transportation 
network risk mitigation actions. In the case of the Jaun Pass gallery, such mitigation activities could 
include: increasing the capacity of the open-air conduit transversing the gallery or constructing 
retention basins and check dams to diminish the torrent intensity and occurrence probability.  
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Figure 4-19:  Jaun Pass tunnel unit direct consequences and service interruption times estimated for:  
a) Torrent hazard, b) Flood hazard. 
For the sake of consistency, unit direct consequences and service interruption times have been 
estimated for a 100m length of a class 1 tunnel exposed to torrent and flood hazards, Figure 4-19. In 
conducing these estimates, it has been assumed that as the tunnel utilities are suspended from the 
tunnel roof, the tunnel could only experience failure in failure modes T1-F and T1-T, tunnel ‘flooded’ 
with liquid or debris.  
In Table 4-10, one can observe that the tunnel hazard parameters and object exposed lengths are 
both zero for all considered return period events (30, 100, 300 and 1000). Therefore the object 
vulnerability, annualized risk and risk over a 50 year reference period are all negligible. This 
assessment therefore confirms that this tunnel built in 1993 is well designed and does not warrant 
any modifications or additions. 
Table 4-10: Jaun Pass tunnel analyzed risk considering hazard scenarios T1-F and T1-T. 
Failure mode T1-F T1-T 
Return period 30 100 300 1000 30 100 300 1000 
Hazard parameter intensity (m depth) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Object exposed length (m) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hazard intensity (m depth) 0 0.5 2 0 0.5 1 2 
Unit direct consequences (CHF/100m) 0 50,000 150,000 0 100,000 200,000 250,000
Unit Service interruption (days/100m) 0 6 10 0 8 10 12 
Equivalent length factor  0.3 0.25 
Annualized direct risk (CHF/yr) 0 0 
Annualized service interruption (days/yr) 0 0 
Unit indirect consequences (CHF/day) 15260 CHF/day 
Annualized indirect risk (CHF/yr) 0 0 
Annualized hazard risk (CHF/yr)  0 CHF/yr 0 CHF/yr 
Hazard risk over 50 yrs (CHF/50 yr) 0 CHF/50 yrs 0 CHF/50 yrs 
Inter-hazard correlation factor 0.30 0.30 
Annualized object risk (CHF/yr) 0 CHF/yr & 0 days/yr 
Object risk over 50 yrs (CHF/50 yrs) 0 CHF/50 yrs & 0 days/50 yrs 
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4.4 Conclusion and critique 
In this chapter, the infrastructure vulnerability and risk assessment methodology developed in 
Chapter 3 has been employed to quantify the natural hazard risks potentially affecting a number of 
infrastructure objects. These case studies confirm that it is feasible to apply this methodology to 
conduct a detailed comprehensive assessment of the natural hazard risks affecting the built 
transportation infrastructure. Furthermore, through quantifying the natural hazard risks affecting 
each infrastructure link, an infrastructure manager can determine the potential losses facing each 
infrastructure object and transparently focus the limited funds and time to address the most critical 
risks. In reviewing these case studies in detail, one can observe that there are three main areas for 
additional improvement – natural hazard intensity data reporting, direct consequence and service 
interruption estimation and inter-hazard correlation estimation.  
The current methods of reporting the natural hazard parameter intensities, reporting hazard 
intensity ranges for each event return period (Case Study A) or reporting general hazard risk-based 
regions (Case Study B), are both too abstract to be directly employed in this assessment 
methodology without making additional onsite assessments or general estimations. The interesting 
fact is that in process of developing either of these two reporting formats, much more detailed data 
is modeled and formulated, but unfortunately this level of data is not included in the final reported 
data. Thus it is proposed that the natural hazard data reporting practices be expanded so that two 
different sets of data be reported, one set similar to the current reporting format which is intended 
to be distributed on printed hazard identification maps and one set identifying the local hazard 
parameters intensities which is intended to be digitally distributed. Without such an improvement, 
additional onsite assessments will need to be conducted for each exposed infrastructure object to 
acquire the needed natural hazard data.  
Turning to the second area for additional improvement, the direct consequence and service 
interruption duration estimation, one can see from these case studies that the direct consequence 
and service interruption duration values for each hazard parameter intensity threshold has been 
roughly estimated. With such estimations, one can gain a ballpark estimate of the order of 
magnitude of the given risk affecting a given infrastructure object but one is unable to directly 
compare and contrast different hazard risks affecting different infrastructure object types. Thus it is 
proposed to formulate a group of experienced practitioners who can use their experience to further 
refine these direct consequence and service interruption duration estimates.  
The last main area for additional improvement, intra-hazard and inter-hazard correlation estimation, 
is currently addressed by developing estimated intra-hazard and geographically-based inter-hazard 
correlation factors. While such estimates employed within this work are a beginning, further 
assessment accuracy can be achieved by modeling the intra-hazard and inter-hazard correlation for 
each of the three main topographic regions of Switzerland – the mountainous region, the valley 
region and the plain region. Through such additional work, one would be able to clarify and validate 
the intra-hazard and inter-hazard correlation estimates currently employed in this vulnerability and 
risk assessment methodology. 
While the comprehensive vulnerability and risk assessment methodology developed in Chapter 3 and 
applied to analyze two different case studies in Chapter 4 does require additional industry and 
research activities before it is employed in a large-scale implementation, it does form, for the first 
time, a solid and comprehensive methodology for quantifying the risks affecting the built 
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transportation infrastructure. With this quantified risk, risk managers can start to address the most 
pressing issues, but the long-term implementation of analytically optimal maintenance solutions 
address sudden or gradual failure modes are still exposed to financial funding support failures due to 
incongruent evaluation of the provided level of performance between the infrastructure manager’s 
nominal evaluation measures and the experiencing society. 
These exposures are addressed in the second half of this work. Chapter 5 identifies the infrastructure 
object parameters the public personality interacts with. It then specifies a process for modeling how 
the performance differences between subsequent interactions can be evaluated using two case 
studies to illustrate how an individual’s experience-based assessments evolve in time as the 
individual interacts with a changing infrastructure system. Next in Chapter 6, the work formulates an 
approach for incorporating additional experiences into the individual’s evaluative norms. The 
affective assessment approach is then employed to analyze two cases to better understand the 
implications an experience-based evaluation approach can have on the evaluations of a set of 
interactions (Case Study E and Case Study F). These case studies examine the implications an 
experience-based evaluation perspective has for individuals with different experience histories and 
within environments with different deterioration rates. Lastly, the feasibility of applying such an 
experience-based evaluation approach is assessed in Chapter 7 by conducting a pilot study (Case 
Study G). In this study, it is determined that conducting a calibration study was not feasible within 
this work, but should be pursued in the immediate future. The work comes back to the 
Comprehensive Natural Hazard Risk Assessment Methodology in Chapter 8, the conclusion.
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5 Social experienced-based with an infrastructure system’s 
condition 
5.1 Introduction 
Operating and maintaining an infrastructure system is a union of two dichotomous entities: the 
analytical civil engineer and the experiencing public. In a perfect society, the concerns of the former 
would be actively and completely supported by the latter, but in practice, this support can be less 
than incomplete. This chapter presents two descriptive case studies to demonstrate how the public’s 
experience-based assessments can fluctuate in time, to highlight core elements central to quantifying 
the dynamic social experience-based assessment of risk, and to conjecture the potential 
ramifications of divergence between these two dichotomous entities. The first case study analyzes 
the changing social assessments following a fatal motor vehicle-pedestrian accident in the center of 
Lausanne, Switzerland. The second case study focuses on an individual’s theoretical interaction with 
the Brooklyn Bridge and investigates how an individual’s experience-based assessments may evolve 
as they interact with a given infrastructure object. This chapter closes by descriptively exploring the 
potential implications such fluctuating social experience-based assessed performance observed in 
these two cases may have on the management of infrastructure systems. 
5.1.1 Incongruent evaluation methods 
Civil engineers employ codes and guidelines developed from laws, jurisprudence and industry 
practices to maintain the built civil engineering systems. Often civil engineers find that their 
analytically optimal maintenance solutions fail to be fully realized because societal funding or 
approval is left unfulfilled (ASCE, 2005) (The Economist, 1999) (The Economist, 2005). It is this human 
and social influence that can be a failure source of the analytically optimal maintenance plans (The 
Economist, 1998). To better understand this dynamic process and to develop truly sustainable 
solutions, civil engineers must personally understand and actively consider how society’s experience-
based evaluation of an infrastructure system dynamically evolves in time.  
 
Figure 5-1: Civil engineer's role in developing sustainable solutions. 
5.1.2 Engineer’s vs. society’s evaluation 
To become a civil engineer, a person conducts extensive training over a number of years to learn how 
to quantify forces, stresses, strains, deflections and eventually failure probabilities. As a result of this 
training, when a civil engineer views a bridge, he no longer sees just an elevated roadway connecting 
two separate landmasses, he instead sees stresses and moments, cracks and corrosion. Civil 
engineers, individually and as a community, have employed this analytical viewpoint to develop 
Analytically 
Optimal Solution
Experience-Based 
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observation-based inspection and assessment methods to detail the current level of performance, 
model future performance levels, and estimate the funds required to achieve given levels of future 
performance (Hartle, Thomas, Mann, Danovich, Sosko, & Bouscher, 2002). This inspection and 
assessment process has been automated and streamlined through the development and 
implementation of bridge management systems. 
Like a civil engineer, each person in society has also conducted extensive training, but rather than 
studying problem analysis and analytical assessments, this training relies on personal interactions 
and experiences. This training starts soon after birth and continually develops and evolves with each 
additional interaction within the bounds of the person’s mental and physical capacities (Simon, 
1957). To evaluate each new interaction and to determine and select the desired response, each 
person employs their previous experiences to form evaluation benchmarks or norms. An evaluation 
norm is herein defined as the perceived summary of the set of all previous interactions with a 
specific parameter and is employed to evaluate future interactions with the given parameter. 
Following each interaction, the interaction’s result and ramifications are assessed against the 
individual’s norm and this assessment is subsequently incorporated into the existing evaluation norm 
which in turn is employed by the individual to assess the next interaction (Kahneman & Miller, 2002). 
A detailed presentation of the specific steps of an evolving evaluation process is detailed in Chapter 
6. 
To demonstrate one approach currently employed by civil engineers, consider the Life Quality Index 
(LQI) an approach employed to evaluate the loss of a human life.7 The LQI is a financial evaluation of 
the maximum optimal life-saving investment that should be employed to save a life given the local 
country’s annual production, life expectancy and work to leisure ratio. The developers of the life 
quality index propose that engineers should analyze potential life-saving investments within a cost-
benefit framework and employ the LQI as an upper bound on the value of a human life. Through 
implementing this approach, the LQI developers envision that civil engineers can equally distribute 
risk reduction funds, that risk management decisions can be transparently conducted, and that once 
the assessment process is known and accepted, this approach can remove the day-to-day risk 
decisions from the public arena, where in the LQI developers’ opinion, it does not belong (Nathwani, 
Lind, & Pandey, 1997).  
Unfortunately, when civil engineers conduct such an analysis they are only considering the life saving 
investment of their particular project – a minute section of the environment. From this analysis, risk 
reduction measures which are assessed as too financially prohibitive are prevented from being 
implemented and thus, in principle, funds can be allocated to more pressing risks. An example posed 
by the LQI developers is the potential investments of chloroform reduction at 70 pulp and paper mills 
(an investment of $19.3 million/life saved) verses the investment in reducing developing world 
diarrheal diseases (an investment of $1.03/life saved). They argue, admirably so, that such risk 
reduction funds should be reduced from prohibitive investments like chloroform reduction and 
increased for advantageous investments like diarrheal disease reduction programs (Nathwani, Lind, 
& Pandey, 1997).  
Unfortunately, the LQI developers have failed to recognize the lack of a mechanism to transfer these 
saved risk reduction funds to these more worthy causes. Rather such saved risk reduction funds are 
commonly split between internal profit for the owner (the pulp and paper mill owners) and external 
                                                          
7 A detailed analysis of the Life Quality Index is included in Appendix B. 
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cost savings for the customer (the paper product customer). The end result of implementing such an 
approach is that a nominal evaluative measure of the maximum life-saving investment is publically 
stated, no mechanism is specified for shifting these saved funds to more pressing needs and by 
removing the decision process from the public realm, decision makers are exposing themselves and 
their decisions to potential evaluation gaps between their nominal evaluative measure and the 
societal experience-based evaluation of a potential life saving investment.  
Rather than blindly employing such nominal values or attempting to construct a regulatory 
framework to administer the redirection of saved risk reduction funds to more worthy causes, it is 
proposed that civil engineers must establish a better understanding and actively consider how 
society’s experience based evaluations are formed and dynamically evolve in time.  
5.2 Case Study C: Changing perceptions in a post-intentional action 
environment8 
5.2.1 Case Study Overview 
Managing civil infrastructure, particularly in a post-intentional action environment, is a complex 
process and potential risk mitigation structural modifications often can jeopardize the financial 
sustainability of a given civil infrastructure. This case study presents the social and infrastructure 
management ramifications resulting from a non-ideologically motivated intentional fatal motor 
vehicle accident on a major bridge in the center of Lausanne. The public exposure to the intentional 
action, the civil infrastructure management following the intentional action, the media coverage and 
the subsequent criminal investigation are qualitatively analyzed.  
This analysis shows that the post-intentional action criminal investigation and public usage of the 
operating civil infrastructure object can substantially reframe and attenuate the potential social 
experience-based assessed risk. Furthermore, infrastructure managers can, once the object has been 
deemed safe by structural engineers, attenuate social assessed risk by returning the object to full 
public use following an intentional action. Thereafter, the civil engineer can focus on primarily 
technical aspects in reviewing and developing potential long-term risk mitigation structural 
modifications. 
5.2.2 Grand-Pont: A Lausanne transportation link 
The Grand-Pont was built in 1844 to span the Flon river valley which, at the time, separated 
Lausanne from Lake Geneva and the vineyards to the south and east. The Grand-Pont was built as a 
175 m long, 10 m wide and 25 m high masonry arch bridge comprised of six inferior and 19 superior 
arches, Figure 5-2a. The bridge has since undergone four major modifications to raise the 
surrounding earth to the top of the inferior arches (1874), to widen the roadway by adding cantilever 
pedestrian walkways and replacing the pedestrian railings (1892), to further widen the bridge to the 
current width of 15.3m by increasing the length of the cantilevered pedestrian walkways (1934), and 
to refurbish the masonry arch pillars (2001) (Rapport du Jury, 2005), Figure 5-2b. Since the 1840s, the 
City of Lausanne has extended southward and the Grand-Pont has become the key transportation 
link connecting Lausanne’s commercial, governmental and religious centers with the judicial and 
                                                          
8 Portions of this case study are based upon (Birdsall & Brühwiler, 2006a). 
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5.2.4 The Grand-Pont Accident details 
On July 8, 2003, at the height of the mid-day lunch hour, a car approaching the Grand-Pont left the 
roadway, drove down the bridge’s eastern pedestrian walkway, through the pedestrian railing and 
off the bridge – landing on a roadway 11 meters below. The Opel Vectra was traveling at 50 
Table 5-1: Average yearly Lausanne mortality and traffic statistics (2001-2002) (Canton de Vaud, 2006). 
Item µ Experience* Exposure** 
Total deaths 1142 1 in 111 1 in 1.11 
Vehicular deaths 8.5 1 in 14,919 1 in 149 
Homicides 1 1 in 126,814 1 in 1,268 
Suicides 23.5 1 in 5,396 1 in 54 
All violent deaths 61.5 1 in 2,062 1 in 20.6 
Traffic accidents 1929 1 in 66 1 in 0.66 
Traffic injuries 491 1 in 258 1 in 2.58 
Pedestrian accidents 101.5 1 in 1,249 1 in 12.5 
* Chance of personally experienced during an average year. ** Chance of being exposed during an average year 
(based on an assumed average exposure radius of 100 people per given event). 
kilometers per hour when it entered the sidewalk at the Rue du Grand-Pont pedestrian crosswalk, 
Figure 5-4 (Antonoff, 2003). As the car drove down the sidewalk, between the road and the building, 
it came in contact with ten pedestrians, leaving six people injured on the sidewalk and sweeping 
another four off the walkway on its hood – crushing and killing three of the four on the roadway 
below (Le Matin Online, 2003a). The deceased included three women aged 22 to 40, one of whom 
was 21 weeks pregnant. The injured included three men, three women and a child aged 2 whose 
pregnant mother was killed in the accident. The driver of the car suffered minor injuries in the 
accident and was detained for questioning (Combremont, 2003). 
The first responders to the injured were the adjacent witnesses and local police officers. One officer 
immediately drove the injured 2-year-old to Lausanne’s hospital even before the emergency crews 
arrived. Within two minutes of the accident, emergency ambulances and fire crews started to arrive 
at the accident scene, in all nine ambulances and 22 medical emergency personnel responded to the 
accident (Zingg, Le Matin, 2003a). The affected individuals were assessed and stabilized or recovered 
onsite before being transported to the local hospital, Figure 5-5a and Figure 5-5b. The accident was 
observed by pedestrians walking across the Grand-Pont, patrons eating lunch in neighboring 
restaurants, and employees and clients standing in the adjacent businesses (Antonoff, 2003). As the 
emergency response mounted, pedestrians congregated on the eastern Grand-Pont walkway to 
watch the on-going emergency rescue, Figure 5-5c. Rescue personnel employed blankets to shield 
the public’s view during the recovery operation and the Grand-Pont vehicular traffic was halted in 
both directions during the rescue effort to facilitate access to the accident site (Le Journal, 2003a) (Le 
Journal, 2003b). 
In the days following the Grand-Pont accident, there was an out-pouring of public mourning for the 
injured and deceased, and disbelief and anger directed against the driver. The accident location 
became a make-shift shrine where members from the public congregated to lay flowers and pay their 
respects to the injured and deceased. One mourner even experienced a subsequently fatal heart 
attack at the accident site (Zingg, 2003b). The public reaction became more complex two days after 
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restricted zone and breaking through this railing which was design purely for pedestrian loading was 
completely unforeseen, but he assured the public that Lausanne’s bridges and pedestrian railings 
met the Swiss building codes (Le Journal, 2003a). In the days following the accident, the private 
owner of the pedestrian railing replaced the original railing with a similar strength railing, citing the 
original railing did meet pedestrian loading requirements and was located in a vehicle-restricted zone 
(Rime, 2004). 
On the evening of the first accident, the driver was questioned by the police. He stated that as he 
was turning onto the Grand-Pont, his attention was distracted as he adjusted the station on his radio. 
As an unintended result, he reported, his car deviated and when he lifted his eyes from the radio, he 
noticed he was on the sidewalk and there was someone in front of him. Thereafter, he lost control of 
his car. The driver remembered hearing screams but did not remember hitting and running over 
pedestrians, driving through the pedestrian railing, or driving off the bridge. The next memory the 
driver did have was unbuckling his seatbelt, extracting himself from the car, and waiting beside his 
overturned car for medical attention. 
On July 22, 2003, the driver was charged with first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, 
intention to cause serious and minor bodily harm, endangering the life of others, and reckless driving 
(Bédat, 2003). The driver’s lawyer requested the judge to issue a complete review of the Grand-Pont, 
the pedestrian sidewalk, the driver’s car, and the driver’s physical and mental states at the time of 
the accident (Co, 2004). This request was granted and the subsequent multi-faceted review extended 
from the fall of 2003 until July 2005 (Passer & Bédat, 2005). The Lausanne Judicial Tribunal examined 
this review and judged the driver mentally sound at the time of the accident and therefore able to 
stand trial. A criminal trial was convened in November 2005 and the driver was found guilty and 
received a 10-year sentence (Le Temps, 2005).  
5.2.5 The second Grand-Pont accident 
At 1:30am on October 18, 2003, four months after the first Grand-Pont accident, a second man 
attempted to commit suicide by driving off the Grand-Pont. Contrary to the previous incident, this 
individual made his attempt in the middle of the night rather than in the middle of the day and 
obliquely engaged the pedestrian railing at the center of the bridge rather than perpendicularly 
engaging it on the Grand-Pont approach. These modifications, combined with the fact the driver also 
intercepted one of the lamp posts that lines the Grand-Pont, prevented his car from leaving the 
bridge surface. The vehicle impact did dislodge a 4 meter section of pedestrian railing and the 
adjacent lamp post from the bridge which fell and crushed two cars parked underneath the Grand-
Pont. 
No one was hurt during this incident, but this second incident reinforced the potential lack of safety 
provided by the Grand-Pont railings, particularly in the face of this new risk source. Furthermore, the 
second accident occurred in a location where the City of Lausanne had complete legal responsibility. 
The Lausanne public works response following this second accident was to immediately strengthen 
the existing railing by connecting each individual railing section together with two steel wire ropes 
threaded through the cast iron railing elements at two different elevations. 
Additionally, the Lausanne civil engineering office initiated a long-term railing design selection 
process and public design competition to determine a location-specific architecturally-appropriate 
permanent method to separate the roadway from the walkway (Muhieddine, 2003). A permanent 
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The article set’s temporal distribution by month is presented in Figure 5-7 and is overlaid by key 
events and periods for reference. It can be observed that while there was initially strong media 
presence following the accident, this presence quickly diminished. Additional media attention surges 
were registered when the second Grand-Pont accident, the first railing modification, and the Grand-
Pont accident first anniversary occurred. Otherwise between August 2003 and June 2005, while the 
complete review of the Grand-Pont, the car and the driver were in process, the media attention 
directed at the Grand-Pont accident was relatively light. The media attention returned to the Grand- 
 
Figure 5-7: Article temporal distribution by month. 
Pont accident when the driver was ruled liable to stand trial and reached a heightened apex during 
the criminal trial. 
The geographic reach of each event was investigated by sorting the article data set into three groups 
by geographic target audience (Lausanne, Geneva and the Swiss-German region of Switzerland). The 
number of articles published in each geographic region per month is plotted in Figure 5-8. One can  
  
Figure 5-8: Number of articles published within the Lausanne, Geneva, and Swiss-German regions of 
Switzerland per month. 
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observe that the Grand-Pont accident and the initial investigation reporting spanned all three 
geographic areas. The coverage of the 2nd accident likewise extended to all three areas but at a 
reduced magnitude. Thereafter, between January 2004 and June 2005, during which the accident 
review and the long-term structural modification selection process transpired, only the Lausanne 
media sources published articles. The Grand-Pont accident articles did once again span all three 
regions once the criminal trial began. 
 
Figure 5-9: Accident, actor, and structural modification article topic comparison. 
The geographic article data for Lausanne and Geneva were then sub-sorted by primary topic into 
accident specific articles, actor specific articles and structural modification specific articles by 
reviewing the title and the first three lines of text of each article. The topic temporal distribution is 
presented in Figure 5-9. One can observe the accident specific articles were focused around the time 
period immediately following the accident, the second Grand-Pont accident, the accident’s first year 
anniversary and the criminal trial. Juxtaposed, the actor specific articles were also initially focused 
around the accident, but were thereafter distributed between June 2004 and October 2005 as the 
Grand-Pont accident complete review was being conducted. Additionally, this media attention was 
almost purely focused to the Lausanne region. The actor specific media coverage then reached an 
apex during the criminal trial in November 2005. 
While the accident specific and actor specific articles were actively published during the time period 
studied, a surprisingly few number of structural modification specific articles were published. The 
structural modification articles started at a diminutive apex during October 2003 following the 
second Grand-Pont accident. Thereafter, between the emergency retrofit in October 2003 and the 
selection of a conceptual permanent design in November 2005, very few structural modification 
focused articles were published. 
The Swiss residents, and the Lausanne residents in particular, were also exposed to an indiscernible 
risk education source – their personal usage and interaction with the operating Grand-Pont. As 
mentioned earlier, the Grand-Pont carries an average daily vehicular traffic of 15,600 vehicles. 
Without even considering the active pedestrian or public transport traffic, this vehicular volume is 
equivalent to 8% of Lausanne’s population crossing the Grand-Pont twice each day. Through this 
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personal exposure, a large portion of Lausanne’s population had the opportunity to personally 
experience and reconfirm the safe operation of the Grand-Pont. 
5.2.7 Reframing and attenuating experience-based assessed risk 
The individuals present at the first Grand-Pont accident and emergency response were exposed to a 
high intensity experience through personally viewing the accident and emergency response. The 
broader Lausanne community was also exposed to the accident through the subsequent intense 
media coverage. But the duration of these first and second hand personal experiences were 
temporally limited as the Grand-Pont returned to operation within hours of the accident and the 
media attention dissipated in the month following the accident. 
Four months after the first accident, there was an additional intentional action directed against the 
Grand-Pont pedestrian railings, but the Lausanne public was shielded from this event by the 
occurrence time (1:30am) and the limited media exposure. But the Lausanne community was not 
shielded from their personal usage of the Grand-Pont in their necessary daily activities, the long-
duration criminal investigation and the criminal trial actively detailed in the media. 
It is argued that these additional events significantly reframed and attenuated the experience-based 
safety risk assessment impression made by the Grand-Pont accident. This attenuated perceived risk 
can be observed in the fact that only 9 articles, 4.5% of the total 198 Grand-Pont articles addressed 
the safety, the emergency structural retrofit or the long-term structural modifications as its primary 
topic. This attenuated social experience-based risk assessment afforded Lausanne’s civil engineering 
community the professional freedom to respond to the events as they unfolded from a primarily 
technical standpoint – first by rationalizing the low potential for additional intentional acts, then by 
quickly responding by implementing a limited-term emergency retrofit and initiating a systematic 
conceptual permanent design selection process. 
5.3 Case Study D: Experiencing an evolving evaluation9 
5.3.1 Case Study Overview 
Managing and mitigating civil infrastructure gradual deterioration comprises the bulk of an 
infrastructure manager’s maintenance focus. Furthermore, the glacial rate at which infrastructure 
objects deteriorate can present management difficulties in their own right. This case study presents a 
descriptive theoretical set of interactions and the associated induced assessments an individual has 
with a specific object. These interactions and assessments are then analyzed to identify what 
elements are within the scope of civil engineers, what ramifications such experience-based 
assessments pose to the management of infrastructure systems and potential management 
solutions. 
5.3.2 An evolving normative evaluation 
To detail an evolving normative evaluation, please join the author on a mental pilgrimage to the 
Brooklyn Bridge. To set the stage, assume the reason for the pilgrimage is because you have been  
 
                                                          
9 Portions of this case study are based upon (Birdsall & Brühwiler, 2006b). 
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The return trip home 
On your return trip home after spending your first day filling 
out paperwork, you notice blisters forming on the backs of 
your heals. You guess the combination of fairly new shoes 
and a noticeable increase in your amount of daily walking is 
not the best combination. As you reach toward mid-span 
your concentration becomes focused on the orange and red 
sunset accents filling the sky. On your way off the bridge and 
toward your apartment you can feel the chill of the fall 
starting to set in and you know that it will soon be a bit 
harder walk. 
Third week of work 
By now you have purchased more comfortable walking shoes 
and a large vented umbrella and you find that you have 
gotten used to the daily commute or rat-race as some might 
call it. Now that you’ve grown accustomed to the commute, 
you are no longer taken back by the curtness of the people 
(some of your friends might even say that you’ve grown a bit 
more curt yourself) or by the views and sights from the 
bridge – granted you still do stop and watch the last few 
moments of sunlight on particularly clear days. Now you find 
yourself noticing the large semi-tractor trailers that pass on 
the roadway below and their exhaust that wafts onto the 
walkway. You also notice the amount and arrangement of 
trash and litter on the walkway and how it varies with the 
wind, the time of day and the cleaning cycle of the garbage 
men. What you have also started to notice is the small 
variations in the localized deterioration of the main cable 
paint and wire wrapping, the walkway’s wooden boards, and 
the chain-link fencing boarding the walkway.  
Six months later 
By the end of February you’ve amassed quite a range of 
“commuting” clothing including a thick down parka, wind 
proof hat and gloves, heavy-duty hiking boots for those 
mornings when the New York area is blanketed in snow, and 
of course a hand-knit wool scarf. Your co-workers were not 
surprised to see you walking to and from work during the 
warmer months of September and October but now in the 
depths of February they give you strange and inquisitive 
looks when you arrive to the office red-faced and foggy-
glassed. Additionally, now that you’ve grown accustomed to 
your environment, you now only notice particularly out of the 
“ordinary” things like tourists walking and gawking as they  
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cross the bridge in the morning, or damage left behind by some individual who had too much “fun” 
the preceding night. It is only the items presenting a significant environmental change from day to 
day that draws your attention now, not the views, not the traffic, not the curt people, not the long 
walk, and not the cold air – only the items that significantly change. 
5.3.3 Analyzing personal evaluation evolution 
From the descriptive example included above, it can be observed that when an individual interacts 
with and evaluates his environment, the evaluation process is limited to parameters personally 
experienced. For a civil engineering object such as the Brooklyn Bridge this set of evaluation 
parameters include such items as the architectural appeal, the traffic volume, the surrounding views, 
the walkway surface and the general cleanliness. A further interesting observation is that the bridge’s 
current condition is not directly employed in the evaluation process, for a number without a 
benchmark is valueless. Rather it is the structure’s changing performance with respect to the 
individual’s evaluation norm, formed from the individual’s interactions with the given bridge and 
similar bridges. In formulating the norm for a given parameter, a given person mentally references 
each previous interaction they have had with the given parameter and weights each interaction by 
the relative variance the said interaction has in reference to the respective norm (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). 
One can also see that during the first few interactions the individual responds like a tourist. The 
individual’s attention is initially drawn to the parameters in the environment exhibiting the most 
significant change to his previous interactions – the architecture, the view from midspan, the number 
of commuters, the demeanor of the people. After a number of interactions, the person’s physical 
adaptation (the purchasing of activity appropriate gear) and the experience-based evaluation norm 
adaptation starts with the parameters exhibiting the largest amount of change taking the lead. Over 
time, this evaluation norm shifts thereby reducing the impact these parameters have on the 
individual and allowing other parameters to draw the individual’s attention such as the truck 
exhaust, the amount and location of litter, and localized deterioration. Following a large number of 
interactions, the person completes the physical and evaluation norm adaptation to the “new” 
environment resulting in the individual noticing only the items which change within this “new” 
environment. 
5.4 Parameters influencing social experience-based assessments 
To identify parameters influencing social experience-based assessments, one must observe that 
society’s interaction with an object is influenced by the structural and system parameters, the 
individual user parameters and the temporal frequency of these parameters. Parameter classification 
and examples from the Brooklyn Bridge series interactions are presented in Table 5-2. From Table 5-2 
it can be seen that a majority of parameters are beyond the influence of the civil engineering field 
and there are only a few parameters such as the use of the structure, the structural condition and  
Table 5-2:  Parameter source, temporal nature and examples 
Parameter source Temporal nature Examples 
Component/system Continually evolving Pedestrian traffic, weather, structural condition 
Component/system Discrete event Localized trash and damage 
Individual user Continual evolution Adaptable to social and physical environment 
Individual user Discrete event Blisters, commuting clothing 
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Figure 5-10: Experience-based assessed performance as a function of structural performance in time. 
the localized damage level within a civil engineer’s realm. 
To hypothesize about the potential ramifications of evolving societal evaluation one must recognize 
the incongruent evolutionary rates of a bridge’s deteriorating condition and society’s adaptation to 
this changing environment. Bridges are commonly designed with life-spans of 80 or additional 
yearsas shown in Figure 5-10, but as seen in the Brooklyn Bridge case example, an individual is able 
to adapt to and with the changing environment in a matter of weeks or months. Therefore, as an 
infrastructure object slowly ages and starts to deteriorate, society is unable to recognize this 
deterioration for they are evolving with the changing environment.  
As is presented in Figure 5-10, society only recognizes and considers the condition of a bridge when: 
1) The object is newly built 
2) Distinguishing positive and negative events occur 
3) The object reaches a critical deteriorated state 
Therefore as an object deteriorates, currently within the realm of a bridge’s condition, it is only the 
occurrence of infrequent critical events and when the bridge reaches a limit state (safety, 
serviceability, durability) that can induce society to recognize the deteriorated condition of a bridge. 
This phenomenon was also observed and very well documented in Graham and Thrift’s assessment 
of societal aspects of repair and maintenance.  
5.5 Communicating to society 
Civil engineers currently communicate to society by employing their expertise to advise society of 
potential dangerous situations (ASCE, 2005) and by employing their responsibility as wards of the 
society’s wellbeing to limit the use of or close infrastructure objects in critical condition (Hartle, 
Thomas, Mann, Danovich, Sosko, & Bouscher, 2002). It is suggested that civil engineers currently fail 
to even consider estimating the potential impact analytically optimal management solutions may 
have on the society’s experience-based assessment of performance and what constraints this 
evolving assessed performance may impose on funding and implementing the analytically optimal 
management solution. 
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For instance, as shown in Figure 5-11, a focused, high quality but incomplete maintenance action 
implemented to change elements society regularly interacts with has the potential to provide society 
with an evaluation benchmark thereby facilitating each individual in personally experiencing the level 
of service provided. Such evaluation benchmarks are particularly poignant for assessing structural 
deterioration. When taken one step further, such focused actions when implemented as the given 
object is approaching an increased deterioration state have the potential to aid society in identifying 
structural deficiencies and funding needs. 
 
Figure 5-11: Gained maintenance lead time by employing a focused incomplete action. 
In the Brooklyn Bridge example, locally replacing the walkway boards or repainting only a part of the 
railing are examples of focused, high quality but incomplete maintenance actions which are the core 
of the “Harnessed Approach.” While such focused and incomplete actions are, on the face value, 
individually logistically and economically inefficient, they have the potential to reduce the 
implementation risks of otherwise optimal management solutions. 
5.6 Reflecting backwards – moving forward 
To develop and implement sustainable management solutions, an infrastructure manager must have 
not only an analytically optimal management solution, but also have the long-term political and 
financial support to fully implement the optimal management solution. Without this support, the 
implementation of such analytically optimal solutions commonly fail to be realized and in their wake 
leave a situation which is far from optimal. 
The two case studies presented in this chapter detail two different types of situations which must 
commonly be weathered during the implementation of analytically optimal solutions – a severe 
discrete event and an individual’s evolving evaluative norm.  
In Case Study C, it was shown that while the severe discrete event can induce significant responses 
within the general and civil engineering communities, these induced experience-based assessed risks 
can be quickly attenuated as the public reinteracts with the operating affected object during their 
required daily activities and as the public attention shifts to alternative issues. This attenuated 
experience-based assessed risk can provide the civil engineering community the opportunity to 
systematically evaluate and respond to such emerging risk sources.  
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In Case Study D, a descriptive set of interactions were presented to demonstrate how an individual’s 
evaluative measures and thus what they consciously experience shifts as an individual’s range and 
depth of experience grows and evolves. While this ability to adapt is one of the most significant 
strengths of each individual, it poses significant challenges for the civil engineering community, for as 
infrastructure objects deteriorate, society unconsciously adapts to this degrading performance. 
Additionally, an individual’s experience-based assessment of the provided infrastructure 
performance is limited to the elements he personally interacts with – the structure’s architectural 
appeal, the weather, localized damage and personal contextual events. This limited range of 
parameters poses additional challenges for an infrastructure manager, for it is commonly only the 
significant structural elements, the bridge girders, expansion joints and decks, which are the primary 
focus of infrastructure management systems. As it has been theorized in this second case study, an 
infrastructure manager can transform these socially significant parameters into a communication 
tool to bring general awareness to the deteriorated state of specific components by implementing 
focused, high quality but incomplete maintenance actions.  
To assess the potential implementation risks induced by evolving societal experience-based assessed 
risk and thus to select and effectively implement an analytically optimal management solution, 
methodologies, models and procedures have to be identified and developed for quantitatively 
assessing societal experience-based assessed risk. These tasks are further developed in Chapters 6 
and 7. In particular, existing findings and methodologies for assessing and quantifying perceived risk 
from numerous different fields are presented in the first quarter of Chapter 6. The elements of a 
quantitative model for assessing this evolving socially assessed risk, the affective assessment 
approach, is presented in the middle half of Chapter 6. The affective assessment approach is then 
applied in two different examples in the last quarter of Chapter 6 to show both the breath of the 
model and the different influences personal experience, exposure frequency and magnitude of 
parameter change can have on an individual’s induced risk assessments and the individual’s 
evaluative norm. A potential procedure for implementing the affective assessment approach to 
assess an individual’s experience-based risk assessments in an existing infrastructure system is then 
developed in Chapter 7. 
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6 Affective assessment approach: Quantifying experience-based 
evaluations 
6.1 Introduction 
Infrastructure managers are charged with developing and implementing analytically optimal and 
financially efficient management solutions to fulfill society’s needs. During the past thirty years, 
infrastructure managers have turned to infrastructure management systems to aid in the 
development of optimal management solutions. Unfortunately infrastructure management systems 
determine society’s needs by estimating the value of intangibles with nominal measures. While this 
approach does simplify the solution development process, it actively ignores the potential for 
societal sensitivity to amplify or attenuate the value of the given intangible. 
This chapter develops the affective assessment approach from key psychology tenets to quantify 
how an individual constructs and refines his experience-based evaluation measures as they are 
exposed to a sequence of interactions. This affective assessment approach is then employed in three 
different case studies to show how an individual’s affective responses can shift in time. The first case 
study demonstrates the steps employed by the affective assessment approach to quantify an 
individual’s experience and to reformate his assessed range of experience. To better understand the 
dynamic trends and local intricacies of societal sensitivity to varying levels of preexisting assessed 
experience and provided levels of performance, the second case study analyzes three different 
individuals exposed to seven different levels of performance to highlight how personal experience, 
frequency of exposure and interaction intensity can influence an individual’s induced affect. The third 
case study analyzes an individual’s response to a three-week theoretical construction traffic 
modification to explore how the induced affect can be integrated directly into the quantification of 
user costs.  
The findings from these three case studies are then employed to assess the feasibility of three 
potential management philosophies – analytically developed maintenance decisions, socially 
developed maintenance decisions, and analytically developed socially sensitized decisions. 
6.1.1 Experience-based risk assessment – foundations of the affective 
assessment approach 
Infrastructure maintenance is driven by the interaction of three key elements: the infrastructure’s 
deterioration state, the available maintenance funding, and the public’s experience-based evaluation 
of the provided assessment, Figure 6-1. Civil engineers are commonly asked to take a leading role in 
formulating optimal maintenance plans. Their engineering training and professional experience has 
provided each civil engineer with the skills to calculate a given infrastructure’s deterioration state, to 
formulate potential short and long-term maintenance methods, and to estimate the relative cost of 
each potential method. But when it comes to the third aspect, quantifying the public’s assessment of 
the provided performance, civil engineers find themselves beyond their domain of experience. Civil 
engineers therefore commonly revert to either 1) ignoring societal issues by actively limiting the 
scope of their work to purely technical issues, 2) employing the precautionary principle and 
overdesigning the given infrastructure element in question or 3) attempt to include societal issues in 
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their technical decisions by employing nominal intangible evaluation measures like the Life Quality 
Index or similar assessment approaches. Unfortunately each of these different approaches 
circumvent the key issue – society’s evaluations are the product of their given interactions with the 
given infrastructure object evaluated against their continually evolving range of experience which is 
constructed from all previous interactions and further tempered by all subsequent interactions. This 
chapter takes an essential step along this path by applying key findings from the field of psychology 
to develop an experience-based assessment approach to quantify an infrastructure user’s assessed 
interactions. 
 
Figure 6-1: Infrastructure maintenance – three key elements. 
6.2 The general mechanisms of an evolving evaluation process 
6.2.1 Early quantification of an experience-based decision process 
Even as early as 1738, it was recognized by researchers in economic theory that not all individuals 
equally value the same good. In particular, Daniel Bernoulli wrote in his Exposition of a New Theory 
on the Measurement of Risk that the “utility of an item may change with circumstances” and “(t)he 
man who is emotionally less affected by a gain will support a loss with greater patience” (Bernoulli, 
1954, pp. 24, 26). To quantify this phenomenon, Bernoulli proposed equation (6.1): 
 
1
( )m n p q m n p qBP AC AD AE AF AB+ + + += ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −??  (6.1) 
where: 
BP = the value of the potential action 
AB = the initial value of goods 
AC, AD, AE, AF,…. = the future potential value of the goods (sequentially increasing) 
m, n, p, q,… = the number of ways the respective action can be achieved 
From this equation it can be seen that as the value of the individual’s initial value of goods increases, 
the value of the potential action decreases. Thus a decision that a rather financially limited individual 
may view as highly valuable, a non-financially limited individual may view with lesser value or even 
complete indifference. Thus the valuation assigned to a given good, tangible or intangible, is as much 
a factor of the given good as it is the individual context in which the valuation is made. 
6.2.2 Laying the foundation for a contextually based decision processes 
The general psychological theory on how individuals define, conceptualize and evaluate their reality 
– the psychology of personal constructs – was formulated by George Kelly and who first published his 
theory in 1955 (Kelly G. A., 1955). In working with farmers and other general citizens of the mid-west 
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United States during the 1930s, Dr. Kelly observed that his patients showed the most psychological 
improvement when he was able to assist his patients in ordering and understanding the confusion 
they currently found themselves in (Boeree, 1997). From these observations and experiences Dr. 
Kelly formulated his fundamental postulate that “A person’s processes are psychologically 
channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events.” (Kelly G. A., 1963, p. 46). This fundamental 
postulate was further supported by 11 corollaries, or conjectures, presented in Appendix C.  
The fundamental postulate and the corollaries of the psychology of personal constructs directly links 
a person’s actions to how he anticipates his respective interactions. These anticipations are based on 
the individual’s constructs – the individual’s discrete mental concepts of his experienced reality. Each 
construct addresses a limited range of the individual’s experienced reality and an individual’s mental 
concept of reality is comprised of a limited number of total constructs. An individual’s constructs are 
formulated from the individual’s previous interactions. As an individual is exposed to additional 
interactions, he unconsciously modifies, further structures, formulates additional or discards his 
constructs as needed. When an individual’s interactions extend beyond his pre-existing scope of 
experienced reality, he employs fragments of multiple, and potentially contradictory, constructs to 
anticipate this “new” interaction. As the scope of an individual’s experienced reality increases, the 
individual’s ability to adapt is limited by his ability to adapt each of his various constructs (Kelly G. A., 
1963). 
In analyzing how this theory influences general societal interaction, one can observe that each 
individual constructs his experienced reality differently, but the similarity of two individuals is 
determined by the similarity of their respective personal constructs. Lastly, if a person can 
understand the construction process of another individual, he can actively play a role in helping this 
individual in exploring or even modifying his personal constructs.  
6.2.3 General concepts defining the shape and details of an experience-based 
decision process 
Numerous researchers have worked to further explore and document how an individual mentally 
constructs his experienced reality and how these constructions influence the individual’s sensitivities 
to future interactions. This work has particularly focused on the construction, experience and 
modulation corollaries. 
While George Kelly was formulating his theory on the psychology of personal constructs, Herbert 
Simon, an economist by training, was attempting to simulate the human decision making processes 
with computers. Dr. Simon observed that individuals did not closely follow the classical concepts of 
rationality in which each potential alternative is actively considered, modeled, and evaluated. Rather 
an individual’s finite computation and predictive abilities caused the individual to limit the number of 
alternatives considered. By considering only a segment of reality, the given individual’s range of 
potential options was reduced thereby significantly altering the resulting decision. Dr. Simon coined 
this form of decision making where an individual’s finite faculties limits the range of reality 
considered, bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). 
This limited number of alternatives considered can also be influenced by the range of an individual’s 
experience or the amount of information available to the individual. Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman employed numerous interview-based experiments to study how an individual’s limited 
information can influence the individual’s future expectations and decisions. In particular, they 
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observed that an individual will employ his experience, in this case limited to the provided 
information, as an evaluation anchor or norm from which they will make intuitive adjustments in the 
formulation of various assessments, future expectations and decisions. In most cases, this process of 
anchoring and adjustment results in an extremely efficient decision process. Unfortunately, under 
certain circumstances, the approach of anchoring and adjustment causes individuals to exhibit biases 
towards the norm, show a limited imagination of potential additional options or consequences, 
overestimate the validity of an assessment, and ignore issues of probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). 
Interaction evaluation mechanism: 
With the range of considered alternatives defined and future expectations formulated, the individual 
then employs his senses – sight, sound, touch and smell – to observe his experienced portion of 
reality (Mahoney, 2003). The individual unconsciously and/or consciously compares these 
observations against his pre-existing expectations to identify the elements of his experienced reality 
that has deviated from his pre-existing expectations. It is these positive or negative deviations and 
how they relate to the pre-existing expectations, and not the current state of the observation, that 
the individual then employs in the evaluation of the given interaction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Thus, an individual quantifies the interaction with the contextual evaluation or affect – the “positive 
or negative quality” of the interaction and not the current state of the observed interaction (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, p. 397).  
In valuating interactions, Dr. Kahneman and Dr. Tversky observed in studying individuals’ responses 
to games of chance that they exhibited heightened valuation sensitivities to probabilities that 
approach zero and absolute probability (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It is proposed that this theory 
can be extended to normative evaluations with the bounds of the norm being analogous to the zero 
and absolute probability. This hypothesis can be applied to a normative valuation process by 
observing that as an additional interaction approaches and extends beyond the limits of the person’s 
experience, the limits of his norm, a heightened valuation can be observed (Kelly G. A., 1955) (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002).  
With the given interaction valuated, the individual is then faced with the task of forming a decision 
from this valuation. Rather than striving for a maximum condition state in the process of formulating 
decisions, individuals commonly employ a satisfying approach in which the observations are assessed 
on a satisfactory or unsatisfactory scale. While this approach significantly reduces the required 
assessment faculties and is relatively quick, it causes the individual to settle for satisfactory condition 
states rather than striving for maximum condition states (Simon, 1957).  
Post-interaction norm reformation: 
Once the individual has observed, assessed and evaluated each additional interaction, he then 
employs this additional observed interaction to refine, temper or even reformulate his evaluation 
norm. In studying this evaluation and reformation process in patients undergoing semi-invasive 
medical treatments by having the patients evaluating the current interaction (the experienced affect) 
on a scale from 0 to 10, Daniel Kahneman observed that retrospective evaluations conducted at the 
completion of the treatment were equivalent to the average of the peak and end evaluations 
(Kahneman, 2000). As this retrospective experience-based assessment is influenced by the 
individual’s most extreme and most recent interactions, his evaluation norms can shift as his 
affective evaluation of his interactions shift. Thus, an individual’s evaluation norm is a function of the 
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intensity and sequence of his previous interactions, and can in turn frame and alter his resulting 
evaluation of a future interaction (Kahneman, 2003) (Frederick & Loewenstein, 2003).  
The influence of gradual evaluation norm reformation and the sequence of an individual’s 
interactions can have over a given evaluation is well described in Brickman and Campbell’s 
identification of the “hedonic treadmill.”  Brickman and Campbell observed that “[a]s the 
environment becomes more pleasurable, subjective standards for gauging pleasurableness will rise, 
centering the neutral point of the pleasure-pain, success-failure continuum at a new level such that 
once again as many inputs are experienced as painful as are pleasurable.” (Brickman & Campbell, 
1971, p. 287) Thus as the individual’s subjective standards rise, an interaction that was once 
evaluated as pleasurable can be later viewed as painful. 
This experience-based evaluation process has three key implications, 1) each individual has unique 
evaluation norms which are the product of the intensity, range and sequence of his respective 
environmental interactions, 2) evaluation norms of different individuals vary as much as their 
respective intensity, range and sequence of interactions differ and 3) an individual’s evaluation 
norms can be significantly altered by a small number of very high intensity interactions or a large 
number of relatively low intensity interactions (von Glasersfeld, 1996). 
6.3 Quantifying experience-based affective evaluation 
In light of the dynamic evaluation findings presented above, it is proposed to employ an affect-based 
evaluation approach and the human temporal sensitivity documented by (Brehmer, 1970) to quantify 
the impact of a sequence of interactions. This affect-based evaluation approach differs in three key 
aspects from previous works – the affective assessment is a direct function of the range of previous 
experience, both the perceived standard deviation and the perceived mean are weighted with the 
temporal depreciation factor, and the stimuli measurement is conducted as a function of the 
parameter performance units (i.e. speed in km/hr). This affect-based approach is applied in Sections 
6.4 and 6.5 to quantify the user sensitivity to varying levels of service and to identify more 
representative methods for assessing user assessments of an operating infrastructure system. 
The affective assessment approach focuses on the evaluation of the current interaction against the 
individual’s previous perceived experience. This approach can be broken down into three key phases: 
an initial interaction, a second interaction, and subsequent interactions. 
6.3.1 The initial interaction 
This assessment process begins with an individual experiencing a new interaction for the first time. 
As shown in Figure 6-2a, this initial interaction has, for demonstrative purposes, an intensity (S1) of 
50 on a range of 0 to 100. As this is the individual’s first interaction with the given environment, the 
initial interaction’s induced affect (its induced emotion) is equal to 1. Following the findings of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the individual uses this initial interaction as an anchor (hereafter 
referred to as the initial perceived mean experience, pμ1) and an adjustment (hereafter referred to 
as the initial perceived standard deviation experience, pσ1) to form a distributed perceived range of 
experience.10 As this is the individual’s first interaction, the initial perceived mean experience (pμ1) is 
equal to the intensity of the initial interaction (S1). Additionally, a minimum intensity value is 
                                                          
10 Throughout this work, all perceived ranges of experiences are assumed to be normally distributed. 
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specified for the perceived standard deviation experience (pσmin) to ensure that the perceived 
standard deviation does not become too small  - thereby creating a hypersensitive individual. In this 
example, a minimum intensity value of 10 is employed. 
Prior to a second interaction, the individual unconsciously employs this initial perceived range of 
experience to formulate his emotional sensitivity, his potential affect, to a second interaction. The 
individual’s potential affect following this initial interaction is computed using Equation (6.2) and is 
graphed in Figure 6-2b. 
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=  (6.2) 
Where: 
ASi = the potential induced affect for interaction i given the interaction intensity, the perceived 
mean and the perceived standard deviation of experience of all previous interactions. 
AF = the affective assessment factor which is in this and all other examples set to a value of 2 
in agreement with the findings of Brehmer (1970). 
Si = the measured intensity of the current interaction i. 
pμi-1 = the perceived mean experience for all previous interactions (1 to i-1). 
pσi-1 = the perceived standard deviation of experience for the previous interactions (1 to i-1). 
Thus the individual’s potential induced affect for a second interaction given the initial interaction is 
presented in Equation (6.3). 
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In Equation (6.3) and in Figure 6-2b, one can observe that as the offset between the initial perceived 
mean experience and the second interaction intensity increases, the resulting induced affect 
increases by a multiple of 2 for every additional perceived standard deviation.  
 
Figure 6-2: a) Range of perceived experience following the initial interaction, b) Potential induced affect for 
the second interaction. 
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6.3.2 The second interaction 
The individual then experiences his second interaction. As presented above, the previous perceived 
range of experience of the initial interaction is employed to determine the individual’s induced 
affect. Taking the assumption that the intensity of the second interaction is equal to a value of 34 on 
a range of 0 to 100, the associated induced affect is: 
 
34 50
10
2 2 3.03AS
−
= =  
Following this second interaction, the individual must reformulate his perceived range of experience 
and thus reformulate his perceived mean and perceived standard deviation of experience. This 
reformation process, as observed by Kahneman (2000), is influenced by the induced affect and the 
memory depreciation for all previous interactions. The induced affect, as noted above, for the first 
and second interactions are respectively 1 and 3.03. Memory depreciation is incorporated into the 
affective-assessment approach by employing a depreciation factor (Dj) introduced in Equation (6.4) 
and plotted in Figure 6-3b.  
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Where: 
Dj = the memory depreciation factor for the considered interaction j [  ] 
j = the number of interactions between the considered interaction and the current interaction 
[  ] 
A = the number of non-depreciated interactions (currently set to 2) [  ] 
n = the memory depreciation rate (currently set at 1.06) [  ] 
Thus the memory depreciation of the initial and the second interactions are both equal to 1. 
     
Figure 6-3: a) Second interaction and associated induced affect, b) Memory depreciation as a function of 
number of subsequent interactions. 
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The individual then reconstructs his perceived mean and perceived standard deviation experience by 
weighting each interaction intensity with its respective induced affect and memory depreciation as 
shown in Equations (6.5) and (6.6). 
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Where: 
pσmin = the minimum perceived standard deviation of experience [  ] 
Thus the perceived mean and the perceived standard deviation following the second interaction are: 
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Figure 6-4: a) Shift in perceived range of experience, b) Shift and dilation in potential affect. 
With the perceived range of experience reconstructed, the individual then recomputes his potential 
induced affect for the subsequent interaction following Equation (6.2). 
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The evolutionary experience of transitioning from the initial interaction to the second interaction is 
shown in Figure 6-4. During this transition, the individual reconstructs his previous perceived range 
of experience, shown in gray, by including the affective valuation of the second interaction, denoted 
AS2, for the measured intensity S2. The inclusion of the affective and memory depreciation values 
causes the individual’s perceived mean experience to shift and has the potential to cause the 
perceived standard deviation of experience to dilate or contract. Furthermore, in comparing the 
individual’s potential induced affect for a third interaction against the second interaction, one can 
observe that the individual’s sensitivity for all intensities above the value (pμ1+pμ2)/2 has increased 
and the individual’s sensitivity for values below this point has decreased.  
 
Figure 6-5: Schematic of the process of assessing the induced affective response.  
 
Table 6-1: Interaction intensity, perceived mean experience, perceived standard deviation of experience, and 
induced affect. 
Interaction (i) Intensity (Si) Perceived Mean (pμi-1) Perceived Deviation (pσi-1) Induced Affect (ASi) 
1 50 - - 1.00 
2 34 50.0 10.0 3.03 
3 56 37.9 10.0 3.49 
4 42 46.3 10.0 1.35 
5 35 46.1 10.0 2.16 
6 57 44.1 10.0 2.44 
7 46 47.0 10.0 1.07 
8 38 47.5 10.0 1.92 
9 29 46.5 11.6 3.36 
10 42 43.0 10.0 1.06 
6.3.3 The subsequent interactions 
With foundation for the individual’s experience-base evaluative norm formulated during the first two 
interactions, consider the potential induced responses of the same individual being exposed to an 
additional eight interactions. The process of assessing the induced affective response for each 
additional interaction given the respective previous perceived range of experience and recalculating 
the perceived range of experience is identical to the process presented in Section 6.3.2 and is 
schematically presented in Figure 6-5. 
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The interaction intensity, perceived range of experience and induced affect for the total set of ten 
interactions are presented in Table 6-1 and plotted in Figure 6-6. The intensity for these eight 
interactions have a maximum intensity of 57 and a minimum of 29. In Table 6-1, one can also observe 
that rather than including the perceived range of experience values for each interaction (the 
perceived mean and perceived standard deviation), the values for the previous interaction (i-1) are 
employed. The previous perceived range of experience values are listed, because these are the 
values upon which the current interaction’s induced affect is computed.  
 
Figure 6-6: Interaction intensity, perceived range of experience and induced affect. 
In Figure 6-6, one can observe that the intensity (Si), the previous perceived mean for each 
interaction (pμi-1), the breath of the previous perceived first standard deviation (pσi-1), and the 
associated induced affect are clearly presented. Across this set of interactions, one can observe that 
initially the individual’s perceived range of experience is very sensitivity to each additional 
interaction. This can be seen in perceived range of experience shift between interactions 3 and 4 
where an interaction intensity deviating 19.1 units from the previous perceived mean experience 
causes the perceived mean to shift by 9.6 units. By interaction 9, the perceived range of experience is 
much less sensitive to an additional interaction with an interaction intensity deviating 17.5 units from 
the previous perceived mean causing the perceived mean to shift by only 3.5 units. This solidification 
of the individual’s perceived range of experience is a direct product of the individual’s increasing 
level of experience with the given entity. In interaction 3, the individual (who has experienced only 
two other interactions) responds to the positive interaction by significantly raising his expectations 
for interaction 4. While in interaction 9, the individual responds to the negative interaction by only 
slightly adjusting his expectations but for the most part just enduring this negative interaction. 
6.4 Case Study E: Experience-based assessment of a roadway performance 
From the affect-based assessment approach presented in Section 6.3, one can observe an 
individual’s potential induced affect is significantly influenced by his previous perceived range of 
experience, the intensities of the subsequent interactions and the frequency in which an individual 
interacts with the given risk source. This case study explores how sensitive an individual’s induced 
affect is to varying levels of previous perceived range of experience, subsequent interaction 
intensities and risk source exposure frequencies. These findings are then placed into four different 
contexts and conditions commonly encountered by the practicing civil engineer including gradually 
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deteriorating roadways, traffic accident induced congestion, construction induced lane closures and 
traffic volume induced congestion. 
6.4.1 Individual preexisting range of experience 
Consider three individuals – a local, a foreigner and a new driver – all commuting to work each 
morning along a given roadway during a four month period (60 total interactions). The breadth and 
depth of the three individuals’ previous range of experienced speeds with the given or similar 
roadways are presented in Table 6-2. The specific interaction performance values for each individual 
were randomly generated assuming the roadway speed is normally distributed with the following 
mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ) values: 
Table 6-2: Individual preexisting range of experience. 
Ref Individual Duration µ [km/h] σ [km/h] # Interactions 
1 Local 15 years 90 10 3600 
2 Foreigner 5 years 62 10 1200 
3 New driver 3 months 90 10 45 
6.4.2 Roadway case study conditions 
To better understand the dynamic trends and local complexity of subjective interaction evaluation, 
seven different roadway conditions, presented in Table 6-2, are considered. The first condition – no 
deterioration – assumes the roadway performance remains consistent with the local’s previous 
experience (µ = 90 km/hr and σ = 10 km/hr). Condition B, minor deterioration, assumes the roadway 
average performance decreases linearly from 90 km/h to 80 km/h during the course of the case 
study – a performance modification commonly the result of minor roadway surface quality 
deterioration. The major deterioration condition, which is indicative of significant reduction in 
roadway capacity associated with a lane closure, assumes the average roadway performance 
decreases uniformly by 60 km/h for the duration of the case study. The additional four conditions – 
frequent and infrequent, minor and major deterioration – assume the individual is randomly exposed 
to either the minor or major deteriorated roadway conditions on average once a week or once every 
two months, respectively. These additional four conditions are included to model the potential 
impact of frequent and infrequent events such as higher than normal vehicle volume (minor 
deterioration) and traffic accidents or lane closures (major deterioration). 
Table 6-3: Roadway condition parameters and associated representative conditions. 
Ref Condition µ [km/h] σ [km/h] # Interactions Representative condition 
A No deterioration 90 10 60 out of 60 ‘Perfectly’ maintained roadway 
B Minor deterioration 90-80 10 60 out of 60 Roadway surface deterioration 
C Major deterioration 30 10 60 out of 60 Land closures 
FB Frequent – minor 90-80 10 12 out of 60 Vehicle demand ~ road capacity 
FC Frequent – major 30 10 12 out of 60 Weather events & accidents 
IB Infrequent – minor 90-80 10 2 out of 60 Vehicle demand ~ road capacity 
IC Infrequent – major 30 10 2 out of 60 Traffic accidents 
6.4.3 Presentation of case study results 
The affective assessment approach introduced in Section 6.3 was employed to model the induced 
subjective evaluation for the three individuals experiencing each of the seven roadway conditions. 
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The total number of negative interactions (herein defined as an interaction value which is less than 
the respective preexisting perceived mean), the summation of the total induced negative affect 
across all 60 case study interactions and the maximum interaction negative affect for each individual 
– roadway combination are presented in Table 6-4. 
Additionally, the breath of the first perceived standard deviation (representative of an individual’s 
preexisting perceived experience), the interaction performance values and the induced affect for all 
three individuals under the no deterioration, minor deterioration, major deterioration, frequent 
minor deterioration, frequent major deterioration and infrequent major deterioration states are 
presented in Figure 6-7a to Figure 6-7f. 
No deterioration 
For the first roadway condition, no deterioration, the total and maximum negative induced affect 
(Table 6-4) is near or at a minimum for each individual. In Figure 6-7a, the foreigner’s pre-case study 
first perceived standard deviation, representative of the foreigner’s perceived range of experience, 
initially induces a positive affect but this affect quickly dissipates as the foreigner adapts to the 
higher performance. Within this deterioration state, the only individual who would observe a change 
of performance would be the foreigner during his initial ten interactions with his new environment. 
Constant minor deterioration 
In the second roadway condition, constant minor deterioration, one can observe that the total and 
maximum negative induced affect is higher than the no deterioration condition, but this increase is, 
across the board, less than thirty percent (Table 6-4). Additionally, as seen in Figure 6-7b, the 
foreigner’s pre-case study first perceived standard deviation, representative of the foreigner’s 
perceived range of experience, initially induces a positive affect but quickly dissipates as the 
foreigner adapts to the higher yet slowly deteriorating condition. Additionally, as the performance 
gradually deteriorates, each individual’s perceived range of experience also gradually deteriorates 
preventing them from observing this deterioration. 
Constant major deterioration 
The constant major deterioration roadway condition, the third condition, induces the second largest 
total and maximum negative induced affect. Furthermore, the foreigner’s pre-case study lower 
expected performance causes the foreigner to have a smaller induced negative affect as compared to 
the local or new driver. These initial induced affect variances converge within the first five case study 
interactions resulting in all three individual’s converging on similar, and a markedly reduced affect. 
Thus, even though each individual experiences a massive concentrated induced affect as they shift  
Table 6-4: Number, total and max negative induced affect for all individual-condition combinations. 
  Induced affect 
  Local Foreigner New Driver 
Ref Road Condition # Sum Max # Sum Max # Sum Max 
A No deterioration 35 69 5.3 30 56 5.2 35 69 5.3 
B Minor deterioration 39 88 6.7 31 70 6.7 39 88 6.7 
C Major deterioration 42 175 58.0 44 118 8.4 42 168 57.7 
FB Frequent – minor 31 78 15.9 25 64 15.7 31 78 15.9 
FC Frequent – major 36 325 94.0 30 276 69.3 36 128 38.0 
IB Infrequent – minor 15 70 5.0 17 56 5.0 15 70 5.0 
IC Infrequent – major 23 113 50.5 22 88 30.9 21 97 50.3 
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Figure 6-7: Interaction values, perceived range of experience and induced affect for a) no deterioration,  
b) minor deterioration, c) major deterioration, d) frequent minor deterioration, e) frequent major 
deterioration and f) infrequent major deterioration. 
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into the constant deterioration state, they adapt to this deteriorated state surprisingly quickly. 
Therefore, it is expected that these individuals would only observe a change of performance during 
and following the performance shift, but as they adapt to this constant deteriorated state their 
ability to ascertain this deteriorated performance decreases. 
Frequent minor deterioration 
Within the frequently experienced minor deterioration roadway condition, each individual randomly 
experiences a minor deteriorated roadway on average once a week – with these deteriorated 
performance interactions denoted by the green circles in Figure 6-7d. As with the previous three 
cases, the foreigner’s adaptation to these higher, yet deteriorating, performance is clearly present. 
Interestingly, the individuals’ reduced interaction with the deteriorating roadway prevents the 
perceived range of experience from gradually shifting. Rather the perceived range of experience 
adaptation process is much more abrupt and accompanied with amplified induced negative affects. 
Thus, within such an environment, the individuals will be able to observe the minor deterioration and 
their perceived range of experience is much less likely to shift with the deteriorating performance as 
is the case for the constant minor deterioration state. 
Frequent major deterioration 
The fifth roadway condition, frequently experienced major roadway deterioration, Figure 6-7e, 
peppers all three individuals with a barrage of major deterioration events – on average once a week. 
The magnitude, frequency and uncertainty of these events creates the highest induced total and 
maximum negative affect of all seven cases. The performance uncertainty of this condition causes 
the perceived range of experience to continuously shift in all three individuals. Additionally, this 
performance uncertainty specifically causes the new driver, who has just 3 months of previous 
driving experience, to broaden his perceived range of experience, thereby adapting to this extremely 
uncertain state of service. While it is expected that each individual will significantly observe all of 
these major deterioration events, as they interact with this environment, their perceived range of 
experience will expand as they adapt to and eventually become significantly less sensitive to this 
deteriorated and an erratic level of performance.  
Infrequent minor deterioration 
Within the second to last condition, infrequent minor deterioration, the exposure frequency and 
interaction performance deterioration are too small to induce either a noticeable negative affect or a 
shift of the perceived range of experience. Thus it is expected that the individuals will not observe 
these deteriorated states nor will their perceived range of experience significantly shift. 
Infrequent major deterioration 
In the last condition, infrequent major deterioration, the magnitude of each deteriorated interaction 
is large enough to significantly shift the perceived range of experience but the events are spaced far 
enough apart to facilitate the individual’s readaptation to the non-deteriorated condition. This 
readaptation in turn further resensitizes the individual to potential subsequent major deterioration 
interactions. Thus within such environment, not only will each individual significantly observe each 
deteriorated state but their perceived range of experience will have time to recalibrate towards the 
non-deteriorated conditions. 
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6.4.4 Implications for infrastructure managers 
In assessing the implications these findings have for the infrastructure management field, the two 
key questions that should be asked are: 1) what is the source of the deteriorated performance 
(structural deterioration or construction projects) and 2) does the manager want to stimulate or 
suppress the individual’s ability to observe these deteriorated states.  
If the deteriorated performance is caused by structural deterioration, to help support the eventual 
implementation of a maintenance action, it would be best for society to be able to observe this 
deteriorated performance but sustain a high expectation of infrastructure performance. From this 
study, it is expected that an environment similar to either the frequent minor deterioration or the 
infrequent major deterioration would help to aid the public in observing these deteriorated states 
and in sustaining a high expectation of performance – two motivators for supporting maintenance 
actions.  
If the deteriorated performance is a product of the infrastructure manager’s implemented 
construction project, it would be best for society’s ability to observe this deterioration to be limited. 
From this study, it is expected that constant environments similar to the no deterioration, minor 
deterioration or major deterioration states would help to aid the public in adapting to these 
deteriorated performance states.  
This analytical approach of simulating the expected infrastructure performance, modeling the 
perceived range of experience and induced affect for each major group of citizens and selecting the 
management approach which provides the desired response (either heightening or suppressing the 
public’s observation abilities) is proposed to be actively employed by infrastructure managers as a 
tool to help select an analytically optimal maintenance solution from the set of potential 
maintenance solutions which has a high potential of inducing a socially sustainable environment. 
6.4.5 Reviewing case study findings 
From this case study, one can observe an individual’s versatility in adapting to changing 
environments ranging from gradual minor deterioration to abrupt major deterioration shifts. 
Unfortunately, this strength can also be a limitation for it reduces and eventually suppresses 
potential induced affective responses which are normally completely considered within standard civil 
engineering analytical assessments of intangibles.  
Table 6-5: Individual ability to observe the change and the duration of this observation window for each 
individual-condition combination. 
  Observation ability Observation 
window 
Simulated Represented 
Roadway Condition Ref Road Condition Local Foreigner New Driver
A No deterioration Very Low Very Low Very Low Non existent ‘Perfectly’ maintained roadway
B 
Minor 
deterioration 
Low Very Low Low Non existent Roadway surface deterioration 
C 
Major 
deterioration 
High 
Moderate-
High 
High 
Present after 
shift 
Lane closures 
FB Frequent – minor Low Very Low Low Ever present Vehicle volume ~ road capacity
FC Frequent – major Very High Very High High Present-limited Vehicle volume >> road capacity
IB Infrequent – minor Very Low Very Low Very Low Non existent Vehicle volume ~ road capacity
IC Infrequent – major Moderate 
Low-
Moderate
Moderate 
Present after 
each event 
Traffic accidents 
The responsive approach: An integrated socially-sustainable technically-optimal decision model 
132   
This ability to adapt and the associated sensitivity suppression are apparent in the minor 
deterioration, frequent minor deterioration, infrequent minor deterioration and major deterioration 
condition states. Unfortunately, an individual’s versatility can also be a limitation by heightening an 
individual’s sensitivity as seen in the frequent and infrequent major deterioration conditions. Thus in 
Table 6-5, a general summary of an individual’s potential observation ability and observation window 
for each individual-condition combination is presented. With this information, infrastructure 
managers can work to select analytically optimal maintenance solutions which either help to 
heighten or suppress the public’s ability to observe the deteriorated condition states. Through aiding 
the public in observing or adapting to deteriorated condition states, an infrastructure manager can 
work towards creating an environment supportive of the long-term implementation of an analytically 
optimal maintenance solution. 
6.5 Case Study F: Affective redistribution of user costs11 
6.5.1 Case study overview 
The following case study focuses on eastbound US interstate I-26, the inbound Northwest highway 
access route for Charleston, South Carolina, at the US-52 and Ashley Phosphate Road junction, mile 
marker 209. This highway link is shown in Figure 6-8a and b and is denoted with small black arrows. 
The data employed herein was obtained from traffic monitoring site 0071-1 of the South Carolina 
Traffic and Polling and Analysis System and was collected by an automatic traffic recorder (SCDOT, 
2008). This study addresses the hourly traffic data for the 42 working-day period between November 
9, 2005 and January 10, 2006. It is assumed, the studied individual commutes along this section of 
highway each work day between the morning hours of 7:00 and 8:00 on all non-national holidays.  
In Figure 6-9a, the average speed and volume for this section of roadway is presented. It can be 
observed that the volume peaks at 7:00, the beginning of the morning commute, and then exceeds 
the highway’s capacity resulting in a drop of the average speed. The 7:00 traffic speed and volume  
         
Figure 6-8: a) Charleston metro area, b) Eastbound I-26 at the US-52 and Ashley Phospahte Road junction 
(Google, 2006). 
                                                          
11 Portions of this case study are based upon (Birdsall & Brühwiler, 2006). 
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for the studied 42-day period is presented in Figure 6-9b. From Figure 6-9b, it can be seen that the 
speed and volume are relatively inversely correlated, with the speed reaching a maxima when the 
volume is at a minimum and vice versa. Of particular interest are days 30 to 36 which are the working 
days between December 22 and January 2, the Christmas and New Year holiday time. It is during this 
period that the traffic volume drops and the traffic speed achieves free-flow conditions. 
  
Figure 6-9: a) Average hourly speed and volume, b) 7:00 traffic speed and volume. 
6.5.2 Affective assessment of traffic data 
The traffic speed data was analyzed with the affective assessment approach introduced in Section 6.3 
and the results for the 7:00 traffic data are presented in Figure 6-10. This analysis employs the 
average traffic speed, shown as a solid line, to sequentially define the perceived mean and perceived 
standard deviation, shown with the shaded region, are in turn employed to evaluate the induced 
affective assessment of the subsequent commuting speeds, shown in bold. In this analysis, it is 
assumed that the given individual’s experience is limited to this study, therefore the interaction on 
day 2 is completely framed by the interaction on day 1. This framing results in a large affective 
response, for the interaction on day 2 is significantly beyond the individual’s previous experience. 
This experience shift induces the individual to redefine and reconstruct his previous perceived  
  
Figure 6-10: Affective analysis of 7:00 traffic speed. 
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experience (his perceived mean and perceived standard deviation). As the individual’s interactions 
transpire, his evaluation measures respond and evolve, sometimes at a slow rate as on days 13 and 
21, sometimes at a rapid rate as on days 9, 11 and 16. This analytical process, as in the psychological 
process, results in a dynamic experience-based evaluative measure. 
What is of particular interest is the individual’s Christmas holiday commuting interactions, days 30 to 
36. It is during this time that the individual experiences free-flow traffic conditions for an extended 
period of time. Initially this traffic change has a significant affect, for the individual is accustomed to 
the constrained traffic conditions. As the individual’s experience with the free-flow traffic conditions 
broadens, the novelty and the induced affect diminish, for the individual’s perceived range of 
experience has evolved to accept and even anticipate these free-flow conditions. As a direct result, 
when the individual once again experiences constrained traffic conditions, on days 37 and 38, the 
affect of these standard and sub-standard traffic conditions is amplified. 
6.5.3 Affective analysis applied to user cost distribution 
With this insight into the dynamic nature of an individual’s affective valuation, it is only natural for it 
to be applied to the standard analytical quantification of traffic speed, the driving speed user costs. 
For an example case study, the Interstate I-26 traffic speed data is extended for an additional three 
weeks to include a theoretical 15-day construction period to accommodate the theoretical 
rehabilitation of an overpass. The traffic data for the additional three weeks is developed by 
assuming the construction traffic speed directly corresponds to the three week period between days 
12 and 26 but is uniformly reduced by a speed of 20 km/hr. 
 
Figure 6-11: Affective analysis of 7:00 construction traffic speed. 
The original 42-day traffic data and the additional 15-day construction traffic data for all 24 hours 
were then analyzed with the affective analysis approach. The results for hour 7:00 are presented in 
Figure 6-11. It can be observed that the initial 42 days of data frames this three-week construction 
period, providing a pre-established evaluative measure. Therefore when the 20 km/hr speed 
reduction is introduced, the response is initially significant, but as the individual experiences this 
speed reduction, his evaluative measures adjust to this new condition and the induced affective 
valuation reduces. By day 57, the end of the 3-week construction period, the individual’s evaluative 
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measures have adjusted to and compensated for the construction conditions and therefore the 
induced affective valuation is substantially reduced. 
When this affective assessment is applied to weight and redistribute, in a net zero sum, the standard 
traffic delay user costs, the result is apparent. The affect-weighted individual user costs per day for 
the 7:00 to 8:00 traffic period are presented against the standard user costs in Figure 6-12. The 
standard user costs were calculated by multiplying the additional time delay for each day introduced 
by the 20 km/hr construction speed reduction, by the number of users considered, one, and the user 
constant time valuation factor, x. The affect-weighted user costs were calculated by multiplying the 
affective valuations presented in Figure 6-11 by the respective standard user costs and the total 15-
day user costs and dividing by the 15-day affective valuation and user cost summations.12 In Figure 
6-12, one can observe that by affectively weighting the user costs, 16% of the total user costs are 
redistributed over the first three days, the first 20% of the construction period. These aligned and 
redistributed construction user costs more-closely model the dynamic and evolutionary nature of 
user valuation as compared to the standard nominal user cost assessment approach and can thus 
help an infrastructure manager in identifying the high ‘cost’ periods of a construction project. 
 
Figure 6-12: Standard and affect-weighted user costs during the construction period. 
6.6 Implications for infrastructure management 
Case Study E and Case Study F presented above demonstrate how societal sensitivity can adapt, shift 
or even remain constant under varying levels of service. The question that still remains is what 
implications does a dynamically changing societal sensitivity have in store for infrastructure 
management. This question can be investigated by considering the long-term feasibility of three 
different management approaches – analytically developed and implemented decisions, socially 
developed and implemented decisions and a analytically-developed socially-sensitized decision 
process. 
 
                                                          
12 For non-hindsight calculations it is proposed to employ previous construction zone traffic performance data 
in parallel with statistical construction traffic modeling to calculate the future traffic performance, the standard 
user costs, and the associated affective assessment. 
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Analytically developed and implemented decisions 
When an infrastructure manager develops and implements decisions by considering purely technical 
issues, the manager focuses on providing or achieving specified short and long-term technical and 
financial constraints, such as preventing major deterioration on all structures or minimizing the total 
user incurred costs, at the lowest invested cost. As the considered time perspective of these 
management programs commonly extends into multiple years or even decades, it is not uncommon 
for societal sensitivity to adjust or even drastically change during the implementation of such 
management solutions. When societal sensitivity changes in time, an interest gap can develop 
between the analytically and financially optimal infrastructure manager’s maintenance plan and 
society’s interests and concerns. As this analytical-social experience-based gap widens, society’s 
political and financial support of the infrastructure manager’s maintenance plans can be placed into 
jeopardy. Thus, even though an analytically developed infrastructure management solution may 
appear to be the optimal decision on paper, potential analytical-social gaps can compromise an 
infrastructure manager’s well laid plans by undermining political or financial support. 
Socially developed and implemented decisions 
One approach to circumvent potential analytical-social gaps is to pass the majority of the decision 
development and implementation tasks directly onto society. The functionality of purely socially 
formulated and implemented decisions is highly influenced by the given stakeholders’ previous 
assessed experience and range of interactions as seen in the case studies presented in Sections 6.4 
and 6.5. This said, the frequency with which individuals interact with infrastructure systems – 
particularly transportation infrastructure systems – helps to ensure that the induced affective 
assessments and the range of perceived experience quickly converges across all individual groups, 
even for individual’s with different preexisting perceived experiences as seen in Figure 6-6. 
Unfortunately, while society may reach a consensus on a particular decision, the analytical validity of 
this decision can be significantly paced into question. As seen in the case studies presented above, 
individuals can become desensitized to interactions with static or linearly-constant performance 
deterioration values and can conversely become sensitized to interactions with uncertain 
performance values. Thus commonly it is the uncertain or rapidly changing performance issues such 
as traffic accidents, natural hazard induced failures or the frequent vehicular congestion that are 
addressed in highly socially influenced decision processes while static or linearly changing 
performance issues including roadway surface deterioration and other forms of gradual deterioration 
remain unaddressed or even unnoticed. Thus, while purely socially developed and implemented 
decisions may, on the surface, appear to be addressing the key problems at hand, they can be 
potentially unfit for addressing static or linearly changing performance issues. 
Analytically founded, socially sensitized decision process 
Returning to the public responsibility of the infrastructure manager, to develop and implement 
analytically efficient solutions which fulfill the needs and concerns of society, a feasibility way 
forward is for infrastructure managers to formulate a set of analytically optimal maintenance 
decisions and then to model the potential societal sensitivity in time for each potential solution as 
has been conducted in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. With a societal sensitivity perspective, an infrastructure 
manager can then select the maintenance solution which develops enough societal sensitivity to 
ensure the required funding is provided (i.e. the infrequent-major deterioration combination) but 
prevents social sensitivity from reaching levels which start to undermine society’s faith in the 
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infrastructure manager (i.e. the frequent-major deterioration combination) – thereby bridging the 
analytical-social experience-based gap.  
Preliminary studies have shown that societal sensitivity to both minor and major deterioration events 
can be actively managed. Societal sensitivity to minor deterioration events can be amplified by 
introducing performance evaluation benchmarks and societal sensitivity following major 
deterioration events can be attenuated by assisting society in personally interacting with and 
revalidating the performance of the built infrastructure as has been observed in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. 
As these societal sensitivity management tools are still in their infancy, infrastructure managers are 
encouraged to select analytically optimal maintenance solutions which are projected to maintain the 
desired level of societal sensitivity and to only consider potential active societal sensitivity 
management tools in focused as needed cases. 
6.7  Conclusions 
Infrastructure managers are charged with fulfilling society’s needs by effectively and efficiently 
managing the built infrastructure. During the past thirty years, infrastructure managers have 
increasingly turned to infrastructure management systems to develop analytically optimal 
management solutions. Unfortunately, these management systems assess society’s valuation of 
intangibles with nominal valuation measures negating the possibility of considering contextual issues 
which can potentially amplify or attenuate society’s experience-based evaluation of the given 
intangible. 
To better understand the dynamic nature of societal sensitivity, the affective assessment approach 
has been developed from key psychology and behavioral economics findings and employed to 
analyze society’s sensitivity in different demonstrative case studies. This approach focuses on 
modeling the process by which an individual’s assessed range of experience is constructed, how his 
interaction induced affective responses are assessed and the processes by which these affective 
responses are employed to refine or even redefine his assessed range of experience.  
In Case Study E, three theoretical individuals – a local, a foreigner and a new driver – are exposed to 
seven different levels of roadway performance. From these case study results, one can observe that 
individuals can adapt to almost any level of performance so long as the performance level is 
constant. Unfortunately this adaptation results in the attenuation of societal sensitivity to constant 
or gradually changing levels of performance and in the amplification of societal sensitivity to rapidly 
changing levels of performance. Thus if society is left to its own accords, only rapidly changing 
condition states (i.e. traffic accidents or natural hazards) will most likely be addressed while constant 
and gradually changing condition states (i.e. roadway surface deterioration, lane closures, and 
roadway capacity limitations) will most likely be not addressed or even go unnoticed. 
In Case Study F, the potential affective responses induced by documented highway traffic speeds 
under non-construction and construction periods is analyzed. The individual’s construction period 
affective responses are then employed as a benchmark against which the standard nominal user 
costs are aligned and redistributed. While the total sum of the user costs remains constant, the 
affective response user cost redistribution more closely models the individual’s perceived costs by 
capturing the dynamic and evolutionary nature of this affective user cost evaluation. 
To ensure the built infrastructure is maintained in an analytically optimal fashion, infrastructure 
managers must take the lead in developing potential analytically optimal management plans. But the 
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infrastructure manager’s work does not end here for he still must assess the potential societal 
sensitivity to each potential management plan. The analytically and socially optimal management 
plan is thus the analytically optimal plan which ensures a background societal sensitivity level is 
maintained while preventing societal sensitivity from reaching levels which can undermine society’s 
faith in the infrastructure manager. By implementing the analytically-optimal socially-sustainable 
management solution, the infrastructure manager can optimally address the technical infrastructure 
issues while working to confirm that the implemented activities are supported over the long-term by 
the respective society. 
In Chapter 7, this approach is applied through a pilot case study using GPS documentation and semi-
structured qualitative surveys to assess the feasibility and applicability of this method.  
  
Chapter 7: Methods for documenting an experience-based assessment of risk 
 
  139 
 
7 Methods for documenting an experience-based assessment of 
risk13 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Context 
When an infrastructure manager conducts a risk assessment, he employs the level of acceptable risk 
within the respective industry to determine the required safety and operational changes to ensure 
the range of risk sources operate in an `acceptable’ manner. A citizen from the risk source’s 
community forms an experience-based assessment of the given risk from his interactions with the 
risk manager’s `acceptably’ operating risk sources. From this personal experience-based assessment 
of risk, the general citizen forms his own acceptable level of risk. The resulting key question is: How 
does the risk manager’s `acceptable’ level of risk compare to the general citizen’s `acceptable’ level 
of risk and what tools can the risk manager use to induce different levels of acceptable risk (Figure 
7-1)? 
 
Figure 7-1: Acceptable level of risk: Relating the risk manger's usage and the general citizen's experience-
based assessment. 
If the risk manager’s acceptable level of risk is more conservative than the general public’s 
acceptable level or risk, a lack of public support and funding for the risk manager’s decisions can be 
the result. On the other hand, when the public’s acceptable level of risk is more conservative than 
the risk manager’s acceptable level of risk, the public’s safety expectations can be left unfulfilled by 
the risk manger – potentially jeopardizing the public’s trust in the risk manager. Finally, when the risk 
manager’s acceptable level of risk is in close agreement with the public’s acceptable level of risk, a 
publicly-supportive environment can be produced. 
To improve the probability of achieving a close agreement between the risk manager’s and the 
public’s acceptable level of risk, one should monitor representative citizens’ personal experience-
based assessments of risk to determine how their various interactions cause their acceptable level of 
risk to be refined or even redefined. Thus, when variations between the risk manager’s and the 
public’s acceptable level of risk are observed, a risk manager can evaluate both potential technical 
management changes, modifying the risk manager’s definition of the acceptable level of risk, and 
                                                          
13 Portions of this chapter are based upon (Birdsall & Brühwiler, 2007). 
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operational management changes that can induce changes in the general citizen’s definition of the 
acceptable level of risk. 
Documenting the continually refining and redefining process of an individual’s experience-based 
assessment of risk is logistically intensive if not altogether impossible. Logistically feasible risk source 
exposure documentation methodologies must be identified if such risk assessment monitoring 
activities are to enter general risk management. This identification process is initiated by assessing 
existing agent-system documentation methods within the transportation fields, testing the most 
promising method, evaluating approaches for quantifying and contextualizing data, detailing how 
these methods can be applied within the context of infrastructure management and proposing key 
elements of an experience-based assessment of risk monitoring program. 
Normative evaluation 
From the field of psychology, one can observe an individual employs their senses (sight, sound, touch 
and smell) to assess their environment interactions (Mahoney, 2003). From these assessments, the 
individual forms mental constructs – discrete relative mental concepts of their environment (Kelly G. 
A., 1955). The individual then employs these existing constructs to frame and evaluate their future 
experiences (Kahneman, 2003). Where environmental changes are either unconsciously or 
consciously observed, the individual is spurred to determine if the change correlates with a previous 
construct, whether the change is positive or negative and if any reaction is required (Bargh & 
Chartand, 1999) (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). The individual then employs these 
future interactions to refine or redefine, where warranted, their personal constructs to ensure they 
reflect their experienced reality (Kahneman, 2000) (Kelly G. A., 1955). The end result is a unique 
experienced reality for each individual. This experienced reality is a product of the intensity, range, 
and sequence of the individual’s environmental interactions (von Glasersfeld, 1996). 
From these observations, an individual’s experience-based assessment of risk is defined as a function 
of the individual’s uncertainty with a risk source and how the individual’s risk source interactions vary 
with respect to his pre-established norms. Therefore, to reformulate the individual’s experience-
based assessment of risk, one must document in detail an individual’s actual and perceived temporal 
interactions with a given risk source. Thus, potential participant environmental documentation 
approaches must be identified and evaluated. 
A risk environment, in this case a public transport system, is selected with which the participant is 
required to frequently interact with during the course of their daily activities. This risk environment 
was chosen for it has been documented to produce a cognitive risk assessment process which is 
predominately an unconscious and automated decision process rather than an active and pensive 
decision process (Brehmer, 1970). This test environment will assist in evaluating potential participant 
experience-based assessment of risk research methodologies. 
7.2 Participant-system interaction documentation methodologies 
To reconstruct an individual’s experience-based assessment of risk, one must first document the 
individual’s daily interactions with the risk source and the individual’s resulting induced affect. Within 
a public transportation system, this documentation process includes recording time, location, 
performance and induced affective parameters. Interaction is defined as the direct personal usage of 
a public transportation system. All secondary and tertiary exposure venues (learning about public 
transportation risk issues from the media or from talking with colleagues) are actively ignored for it is 
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assumed the individual’s frequent and personal usage of the system will outweigh external 
influences. Through consulting the field of transportation engineering, it can be seen there are 
already a number of time, location and performance documentation methodologies, Table 7-1, 
including: (1) self administered travel surveys, (2) human-system interaction documentation, (3) 
passive cellular signal tracking, (4) active cellular signal tracking, and (5) global position system (GPS) 
tracking. 
Table 7-1: Participant-system documentation methodologies. 
Method Aspects Limitations 
Travel survey 
Manually record date, start & end 
locations 
Incorrect documentation 
common 
Human-system 
interaction 
Automatically records time at start, 
end & other key waypoints 
System requirements, data 
of insufficient detail 
Passive cellular 
signal 
Movements through cellular network Anonymously recorded 
Active cellular 
signal 
GPS receiver in cell phone broadcasts 
location 
USA only 
GPS tracking 
GPS receiver documents location & 
time multiple instances a minute 
Limited battery & data 
storage 
Self-administered travel survey 
Self-administered travel surveys are the most basic of the location documentation approaches. In 
this approach, respondents are asked to document the date and the start and end locations of their 
daily trips taken within a transportation system. Providing this information is relatively simple and 
non-time intensive task for a participant and it can therefore be easily applied to longitudinal studies 
involving a large number of respondents. From each study, one can ascertain the frequency and 
range of the participant’s travels (Axhausen, Zimmermann, Schönfelder, Rindsfüser, & Haupt, 2002). 
While this methodology documents the location and date of the various interactions, it fails to 
document the individual’s micro (how long a station stop lasted) or even global temporal 
experienced performances (how long the entire trip took). Furthermore, as this methodology asks 
participants to document their daily trips, short trips and multiple location trips are commonly either 
non-recorded or recorded incorrectly (Wolf, 2004). 
Human-system interaction documentation 
In the human-system interaction documentation approach, a participant’s interaction with a system 
is recorded at key points, commonly at entry, exit and waypoints. This methodology is commonly 
integrated within the given system and such systems have been used to establish customer 
preferences, to document participant movements and even to rate a participant’s likelihood to 
commit a crime (Cho, Kim, & Kim, 2002) (Landfried, 2006).  
The completely integrated nature of this approach has the potential to be ethically questionable as 
was recently the case in the United States (AP, 2006), and therefore it is essential to actively obtain 
and document a participant’s permission to use such collected information. Furthermore, as this 
method only documents the individual’s interactions at key points, the individual’s experiences at 
intermediate points may not be able to be determined. As an individual’s risk construction is a 
continuously refining and redefining process, this discrete documentation methodology does not 
adequately document an individual’s interactions. 
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Passive agent cellular signal tracking 
Passive agent cellular signal tracking is essentially an adaptive human-system interaction 
documentation methodology in which cell phone towers serve as waypoints. The methodology is as 
follows: take a person carrying a cell phone, at any point in time the cell phone is connected to one 
or more cell towers. As the cell phone moves through a cellular network, the cell phone’s signature is 
passed from one cell phone tower to the next. Through signal analysis and triangulation, a cellular 
service provider can determine the location and speed of a cell phone carrier. This methodology has 
already been tested in a number of countries to anonymously monitor traffic speeds (Smith, Zhang, 
Fontaine, & Green, 2003) (Ygnance, Remy, Bosseboeuf, & Da Fonseca, 2000). 
To effectively implement such a documentation approach, one needs to actively engage the cell 
phone service providers and to address the cell phone customer privacy issues. The current approach 
employed by cell phone providers is to 1) issue limited term access to cell phone signature data 
(extending from a few days to many months) and 2) remove all identifying customer data prior to 
releasing the cleansed data to a third party (Fontaine & Smith, 2004). The anonymous nature of 
passive cellular tracking negates its applicability to documenting an individual’s set of experiences for 
one is unable to match an individual with their respective interactions. 
Global positioning system (GPS) tracking 
The global positioning system (GPS), established in 1993, is a system of 24 geostationary satellites. 
Each satellite, uses an atomic clock for reference, continuously broadcasts its location and time. 
These broadcasts are received by a GPS receiver which computes the distance to each satellite from 
the delay between sent and receipt times. The GPS receiver then employs triangulation to determine 
its location to an accuracy of 10 meters (Garmin, 2006). GPS receivers have been applied in many 
different civilian settings including navigation, trip documentation, and physical training (Wikipedia, 
2007). To employ a GPS receiver to document movement, one must first turn on the unit, permit the 
unit to calibrate its position (an approximately 30 second process) and finally manually start data 
acquisition. While this is a rather lengthy process, it is believed that by requiring the participant to 
manually initiate data acquisition, the researcher can ensure a participant has active control over and 
full knowledge of the collection of their personal data. During active data acquisition, the GPS 
receiver automatically records time, location and speed data approximately every five seconds. 
While GPS tracking currently offers the most promise in documenting a participant’s interactions 
within a transportation network, the limited battery life and data storage capability (both under 30 
hours) requires the participant to daily charge and upload the recorded data. These additional tasks 
can potentially compromise the feasibility of this documentation methodology. 
Active agent cellular signal tracking 
In 1999, the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) started a phased 
implementation of requiring cell phones providers to be able to provide a cell phone’s location in the 
event an emergency phone call (911) was placed (FCC, 2007). The required accuracy has resulted in 
most service providers building a global positioning system (GPS) receiver into each new cell phone. 
In the event of an emergency, the service provider can query this GPS receiver (Charles, 2006). 
Currently within the United States of America there are approximately 100 million GPS capable 
phones in operation but only one company, Nextel, permits customers to have direct access to this 
usually encrypted capability. With this access and an inexpensive program, Nextel users can 
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broadcast their location and speed every 15 seconds to a server or website (Mologogo, 2007). While 
this capability is readily available in the United States, to the author’s knowledge, such capabilities 
and access have not yet been introduced in Europe. 
While this documentation approach is ideal for documenting an individual’s experience within a 
transportation system, given the requisite permission, it has not yet been introduced into the 
European market. Therefore other documentation methods will have to be employed until this 
capability arrives. 
In the absence of the active agent cellular signal tracking, GPS tracking, with a 10 meter accuracy and 
full-day experience documentation capability, is currently the most promising participant-system 
documentation approach for a public transportation system. 
7.3 Case Study G: GPS-based interaction documentation case study 
7.3.1 Case study overview 
To further explore the feasibility of documenting the experience-based assessment of risk, a four 
month case study was launched. In this study, the participant documented their daily interactions 
within a public transportation system with a Garmin Forerunner 205 GPS receiver, a wrist-mounted 
GPS unit originally designed for triathlon training. To improve the accuracy of the collected data, the 
participant was encouraged to turn on and calibrate the GPS unit prior to each use. 
Additionally, the participant was asked to complete an 8-question semi-focused survey each day. This 
8-question survey asked the participant to list three positive and three negative events that occurred 
during their day and to rate the intensity, between 10 and 0 and -10 and 0 respectively. Additionally, 
the participant was asked to list two events that occurred during their day’s travels and to rate the 
events’ intensities between -10 and 10. While it is fully understood that intensity ratings can be 
extremely contextually sensitive, even to the extremely minor events (Schwarz, 1987), the 
participant is asked to list and rate events from their daily interactions to document what the 
individual is focused on and perceives as changing in their daily lives. To improve survey response 
frequency, the participant was encouraged to fill in the survey at the same time each day. The GPS 
and survey data were digitally submitted by the participant each day. 
7.3.2 Raw GPS documentation 
During the case study, over one-hundred thousand data points detailing the individual’s location, 
speed and acquisition time were collected. These data points detailed 220 distinct trips. This data 
was then classified into different trip types, 25 in all, using the starting point, end point and general 
location. An example trip and the associated experienced speeds as a function of distance are 
presented in Table 7-2a and b respectively. From these figures, one can observe the GPS location and 
speed measurement detail. From the Table 7-2b), one can also observe the calibration induced error 
immediately adjacent to distance 0, the significant speed differences between walking and riding the 
metro and even the two intermediate stops on the metro.            
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Table 7-2: a) An example trip - EPFL to a local shopping center, b) Trip speed as a function of trip distance. 
In the detail presentation of this GPS documentation, Figure 7-2, the location of each data point is 
represented by a diamond. At higher speeds, such as when the participant is riding the metro, the 
data points are more spread out, but when the participant moves at slower speeds the data points 
are more closely spaced providing a detailed automated documentation of the individual’s activities. 
 
Figure 7-2: Detailed presentation of GPS documentation. 
7.3.3 Analyzing the GPS documentation 
The experience of additional trips along the same path can be relatively assessed by comparing the 
obtained GPS data for each subsequent trip. One such method is conducted by overlaying a 
subsequent trip on top of a previous trip and computing the time required to exceed a predefined 
range of movement. 
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Figure 7-3: Contextual analysis using influence circles. 
Figure 7-3 presents such an analysis. In this figure, one can observe that a subsequent trip is overlaid 
on the trip presented in Figure 7-2. 80 meter diameter influence circles, defining the referenced 
range of movement, are then sequentially added to the initial trip data points. The center of each 
circle coincides with a data point not contained with a preexisting influence circle. The time required 
for the individual to move from the center of a given circle to its perimeter is then calculated. The 
process of assigning unbounded data points to the preexisting influence circles is then repeated for 
the subsequent trip and the time required to extend beyond the respective influence circle’s 
perimeter is calculated. These computed perimeter crossing times are then compared to determine 
how the individual’s interactions have changed between the two trips. 
The impact of this relative experienced change is modeled for demonstrative purposes using the 
affect-based assessment approach, presented in Section 6.3. In this approach, the induced affect of 
an interaction is defined as a function of the offset the current interaction varies from the preexisting 
perceived mean experience.  
 
Figure 7-4: Affect-based assessment - An example analysis. 
The affect-based assessment for an influence circle within the participant’s commute path between 
home and work is presented in Figure 7-4. In this figure, one can observe that the individual passes 
through this influence circle on thirteen different trips during the studied period. Furthermore, the 
individual’s experienced times varied from a minimum of 4 seconds to a maximum of 60 seconds. 
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The modeled induced affect for each subsequent experience and the resulting perceived mean are 
presented. 
While this affect-based assessment approach can indicate how a given experienced time varies from 
a previous set of experienced times and how the average perceived experienced time evolves from 
one trip to the next, it is unable to indicate the motive or instigators behind this modified 
experienced time. Such increased times, as experienced during trips 2 and 8 presented in Figure 7-4, 
may be the product of a negative experience, such as increased traffic slowing the participant down, 
or a positive experience, such as stopping briefly to talk with a friend. Both events would induce a 
different affective response but both would produce an identical GPS history. 
7.3.4 Semi-focused survey analysis and results 
During the case study, the participant also submitted the semi-focused surveys by email at the end of 
each day. At the end of the case study, this set of surveys were analyzed and coded in bulk. The three 
positive and three negative daily event questions were coded into 13 classifications and the two daily 
travel event questions were initially coded into 18 classifications and then sub-coded into 5 
comprehensive classifications. The 5 comprehensive classifications and examples of their 
represented events are presented in Table 7-3. 
Table 7-3: Travel event classification. 
Classification Example represented events 
Weather-time change 
Shortening of the length of the day, changing weather 
conditions 
Personal factors Personal health and schedule events, work requirements 
GPS documentable events Missing a bus or train, changing of a train schedule 
Travel environment 
Number of passengers on train/bus, reading newspapers on 
the train 
General environmental 
changes 
Metro station construction, opening of an additional building 
entrance 
The distribution and the average rating for each comprehensive classification are presented in Figure 
7-5. One can observe that while the GPS documentable events classification is the largest 
comprehensive classification, it still accounts for only 40% of the documented travel events. 
Furthermore, from the intensity rating responses introduced in Section 7.3.1, the two most extreme 
average rating comprehensive categories, weather-time change and environmental changes, are not 
considered by the GPS documentation approach. 
From these survey results, one can observe that while the GPS documentation does account for a 
significant portion of the noted events, these are still numerous additional sources contributing to 
the individual’s experience-based assessment of risk other than those documented by GPS tracking.  
Chapter 7: Methods for documenting an experience-based assessment of risk 
  147 
  
Figure 7-5: Travel event classification: Response distribution and average rating. 
7.3.5 Case study summation 
From this case study, one can observe that the GPS tracking approach provides an adequate 
automated documentation of the individual’s movements and location-linked interactions within an 
individual’s environments. Likewise, the semi-focused survey provides an insight into what the 
individual views as a significant event and introduces a perspective of the event topic coverage 
offered by the GPS tracking. 
What is missing from the approaches employed during this case study is a confirmation of the 
psychological context and perspective of the interactions an individual has with their environment. 
Without this perspective, a researcher cannot differentiate between positive and negative 
experiences producing identical GPS histories. 
7.4 Additional participant survey methods 
To further complement and contextualize the GPS tracking approach, the feasibility of applying three 
different qualitative survey research methodologies, presented in Table 7-4, originally developed 
within the field of hedonic psychology – “the study of what makes experiences pleasant or 
unpleasant” – are evaluated (Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, Preface, 1999). 
Table 7-4: Participant survey methods. 
Method Aspects Limitations 
Experience sampling 
method (ESM) 
Portable timer indicates survey time; Avoids 
hindsight bias, multiple surveys per day 
Potential for survey 
fatigue 
Ecological momentary 
assessment (EMA) 
Timer indicated survey, survey data 
complemented with quantitative data  
Requires intensive 
analysis 
Day reconstruction 
method (DRM) 
Multi-phased event diary, reconstruct 
pervious day 
Participant time intensive 
45-75 minutes 
Experience sampling method (ESM) 
In the experience sampling method, developed by Csikszentmihalyi et al., participants employ a 
portable timer, such as a wrist watch or beeper, to indicate when they should manually or digitally 
complete a short predefined survey (Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977). This process is 
replicated multiple times during a day and through this approach, researchers are able to collect a 
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detailed real-time documentation of an individual’s experiences while minimizing hind-sight bias. 
Early studies employed a wrist alarm watch and paper forms. More recently, studies have evolved to 
using personal digital assistants (PDAs) for both notification and data collection. Furthermore, ESM 
has been employed to collect an upwards of fifty survey periods per participant within a given week 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter, 2003). The experience sampling method has been used in the 
psychology, hedonic psychology and human system-interaction research fields (Intille, Rondoni, 
Kukla, Ancona, & Bao, 2003).  
Ecological momentary assessment (EMA) 
The ecological momentary assessment (EMA) approach is an extension of the ESM where the range 
of collected data is broadened to include environmental, social, psychological and biological states 
(Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999). In EMA, the participants are signaled by a timer to manually or 
digitally fill out a survey detailing their current state and recent previous events. This survey data is 
then complemented with environmental or participant quantitative data such as documenting 
participant medical vital signs (Smyth & Stone, 2003). By including environmental events, researchers 
have the potential to study the relationship between various environmental conditions and the 
resulting impact on the respondent in natural settings. The significant drawback of this research 
approach is the quantity of collected temporally dependent data. For a researcher or research team 
to process and analyze this volume of information can be a daunting task but the results are 
commonly worth the investment. 
Day reconstruction method (DRM) 
The day reconstruction method (DRM), developed in 2004, is a relatively recent systematic 
reconstruction documentation methodology (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006). 
In DRM, the study focus is the reconstruction of the individual’s previous day. In the first of three 
phases, respondents are first asked to provide general background information on emotional, 
financial and life perspective topics. In the second phase, respondents are asked to write a 
confidential detailed event-based diary of their previous day’s activities. This diary is intended only to 
assist the respondent in reconstructing the previous day’s activities and is not submitted. In the last 
phase, respondents are asked to employ a provided response form to detail each event in their 
event-base diary. In particular, the response form addresses topics such as when, what, where, with 
whom, and how they felt during each episode. Respondents normally invest between 45 and 75 
minutes to complete all three phases of the DRM. Thus far, DRM has been employed in the hedonic 
psychology and medical research fields (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006) 
(Spiegel, Knutson, Leproult, Tasali, & Van, 2005).  
Participant survey method critique 
The ESM and EMA participant survey methods offer the ability to gather real-time participant data. 
Unfortunately moving through a transportation system requires a number of the individual’s faculties 
limiting the feasibility of taking real-time measurements. Furthermore, as the experience-based risk 
assessment reformation process continues for a period after using a transportation system, real-time 
measurements may miss this post-exposure risk assessment reformation. 
The DRM offers an extremely detailed analysis of an individual’s day. Unfortunately, this approach is 
extremely time intensive limiting the potential survey application frequency. Therefore this 
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approach, at the most, can be applied once or twice monthly to gain snapshot pictures of the 
individual’s interactions and experience-based risk assessments. 
7.5 Formulating a fused contextual and affective documentation method 
It is believed, the contextual and affective quantification of recorded GPS and environmental data 
could best be achieved by having the participant’s previous day’s GPS and environmental data 
analyzed immediately each morning upon submission and the five most significant event variations 
presented to the participant in a survey format. This survey would ask the participant if they 
remembered anything specific from each of the five documented event variations. If the participant 
responds in the negative, no further questions would be asked, but the participant responds in the 
positive, further qualifying and contextualizing questions would be asked. These survey responses 
would be used to determine which environmentally documented events were consciously observed 
by the participant and what relative affective impact they induced.  
While this questioning approach does by definition pose potentially leading questions which may 
increase the participant’s likelihood of responding in the positive or in the negative, it significantly 
condenses the survey administration time and format. Additionally, less structured and more open-
ended survey structures are not suggested for they would result in an increased the length of survey 
administration times. 
It is hoped that a broader survey perspective touching upon more general aspects of the participants’ 
transportation activities and their general hedonic states can be achieved by additionally 
administering the day reconstruction method (DRM) survey twice each month. Early in a research 
program, these DRM surveys would provide an insight into the participants’ allocation of time, 
general hedonic states and interaction evaluation. This information would also provide the 
researcher with a base context within which the participant’s environmental documentation data can 
be analyzed. As the research program unfolds, additional DRM surveys would provide insights into 
how the individual’s activities, hedonic states and values vary in time. The collected environmental 
data can then be compared against these longitudinal qualitative insights to test potential causal 
linkages between environmental changes and induced affective responses. 
7.6 Selecting case study environments 
Selecting case study environments that are representative of the risk sources in question, finding 
participants who are interested in participating in an experience-based risk assessment monitoring 
program and developing a participant compensation package are elements essential to the success 
of a monitoring research program. In the example of a public transportation system, an initial 90 day 
case study focusing on further investigating the experience-based assessment of risk reformation 
processes would be the most appropriate next step. The controlling factor in the design of this initial 
case is the selection of 20 to 30 participants who are interested in participating in the research 
program, and not the specific environment. It is proposed that such individuals can be located 
through publicizing at local research institutions and within the given public transportation systems.  
As this monitoring program requires daily participant action, it is suggested to have financial 
compensation as a key element of the participant compensation package. To ensure that the 
financial compensation can address issues including encouraging initial involvement in the 
monitoring program, giving the participants a sign of appreciation for providing daily environmental 
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and survey data and thanking the participants for completing the study, a multi-staged release of the 
financial compensation is proposed. Institutions are also encouraged to rely upon the strength of 
personal contacts and to pool the available limited resources into a limited number of prizes 
awarded at random to participants who complete the monitoring program. 
Once this control case study is completed, secondary and tertiary cases investigating citizen 
experience-based assessment of risk reformation within public transportation systems actively under 
construction and undergoing varying levels temporal and quality performance is encouraged. Within 
these focused cases, the environment (the public transportation line under construction) is a 
significant constraint in selecting the case and a group of participants who normally interact with this 
environment should be located. As this initial condition significantly reduces the potential participant 
pool, it is proposed to directly publicize for interested individuals directly within the given 
transportation lines.  
7.7 Key elements of an experience-based assessment of risk monitoring 
program 
In developing an experience-based assessment of risk monitoring program, a manager must develop 
responses to the following questions: 
? How does the general citizen interact with the given system? 
? What interaction documentation methodologies can be applied to document the representative 
citizens’ interactions with the given system? 
? What is the relative applicability and effectiveness of these various interaction documentation 
methodologies? 
? Through what avenues can the documented interactions be contextualized with qualitative 
methods? 
? What specific environments would be most applicable in addressing the given experience-based 
assessment of risk questions? 
In the example presented above, the key elements of a research program to monitor a citizen’s 
experience-based assessment of a public transportation system related risk were highlighted. The 
direct personal usage of a public transport system by the general citizen is so frequent that all 
secondary and tertiary exposure venues were actively ignored. The relative applicability and 
effectiveness of potential personal usage documentation methods including travel surveys, human-
system interaction documentation, passive cellular signal analysis, active cellular signal monitoring 
and GPS tracking were evaluated. Given the risk source of a public transport system, it was found 
that GPS tracking provided the most feasible location and time documentation approach.  
In selecting applicable qualitative methods for contextualizing the environmental documentation 
data, the participant’s limited faculties while using a public transport system, the time delay 
associated with the experience-based risk assessment reformation process and potential participant 
survey fatigue issues limited the qualitative methods to a daily focused survey and the semi-monthly 
Day Reconstruction Method survey. The focused survey is intended to be administered each morning 
and to investigate the individual’s experience-based assessments of the previous day’s five most 
significant documented event variations. The DRM survey is proposed to be administered twice each 
month to initially provide an insight into the individual’s allocation of time, hedonic states and 
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valuation of interactions and over the long-term provide insights into how the individual’s activities, 
hedonic states and values vary in time.  
It is proposed to initially apply the developed monitoring program within a 90 day, 20-30 participant 
control case to further investigating the experience-based risk assessment reformation processes. 
Following this initial case, additional focused cases investigating citizen experience-based risk 
assessment reformation within public transportation systems under construction and undergoing 
varying levels temporal and quality performance is encouraged.  
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on developing a procedure to document an individual’s continually refining 
and redefining evaluation process. A case study was conducted employing a wrist mounted GPS unit 
to document the movements of the participant and an eight-question semi-focused daily survey to 
document what the individual is focused on and perceived as changing during his daily travels. This 
case study has found that while the GPS documentation methodology documents the physical 
movement of the participant, it failed to record additional parameters observed by the individual 
including weather, travel environment and general environmental changes parameters. Additionally, 
this case study failed to document the individual’s psychological context and perspective during his 
interactions and thus one is unable to determine if a given interaction has neutral, negative or 
positive affect on the individual.  
To work towards further complementing and contextualizing the GPS tracking approach three 
hedonic psychology participant survey methods were evaluated. This review found that while the 
experience sampling and the ecological momentary assessment methods showed potential to 
document an individual’s interactions in real time, but as moving through a transportation system 
requires a number of faculties, the feasibility of employing such methods in union with a GPS 
documentation approach is viewed as low feasibility. The day reconstruction method provides a 
detailed analysis of an individual’s day. Thus it is believed that employing a directed survey 
conducted each morning to explore previous day’s activities which differed most significantly from 
the individual’s previous interactions in conjunction with semi-monthly administered day 
reconstruction method would provide a good balance between detail and longitudinal qualitative 
insights  
It is envisioned that the knowledge gained from these citizen experience-based assessment of risk 
monitoring programs will aid risk managers in better understanding the influence operational 
management changes can have on the general citizen’s experience-based assessment of risk, 
calibration of the affective assessment approach and definition of acceptable level of risk. 
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8 Conclusion 
This work focused on identifying and rectifying two analytical limitations of current infrastructure 
management systems: a) unforeseen natural hazard induced technical failures and b) political-
financial funding support failures due to incongruent evaluation of the level of performance between 
infrastructure manager’s nominal evaluation and the experiencing society. To address these 
limitations, the current work employed a two part approach – first by developing a methodology for 
quantifying the long-term natural hazard risks to the built infrastructure and secondly by formulating 
an approach for simulating an individual’s experience-based evaluation of the provided level of 
infrastructure performance. The implementation of these approaches across an transportation 
infrastructure system by an infrastructure manager enables that manager to: a) improve 
performance simulation of potential natural hazard risks, thus actively considering an infrastructure 
object’s natural hazard risk in modeling the infrastructure deterioration and in developing optimal 
maintenance solutions, b) determine the annual funding that should be invested and made available 
for natural hazards, and c) study how proposed technically optimal solutions may be socially received 
and can thus select those solutions which best maintain societal support throughout the duration of 
the maintenance solution. These tools form a technically optimal, socially sustainable infrastructure 
management model with implications for the subfield of infrastructure management and the entire 
civil engineering field, but first the development process must be summarized, the approaches 
detailed, and the findings discussed. 
8.1 Component Failure Assessment Procedure 
To quantify the long-term natural hazard risks to the built infrastructure, this work first had to 
develop an assessment procedure for systematically examining the simplified failure modes of each 
transportation infrastructure component (i.e. bridge, gallery, retaining wall, roadway, and tunnel), as 
the current natural hazard assessment methods and infrastructure management models lack a 
procedure for analyzing component failure modes.  
The component failure assessment process development was derived from hazard-component 
failure scenarios. The most general set of failure scenarios was developed by first identifying 
numerous situations in which a given hazard can cause the partial or complete failure of a given 
component. Common failure modes were identified for different failure scenarios. These individual 
failure modes were then embedded into a structured assessment process and representative simple 
structural models, using the pertinent hazard and object data. These simple models, presented in 
Appendix A, were then employed to assess the potential of failure within each assessment step.  
Findings, Implications, and Applications 
Thus, one can systematically qualitatively and quantitatively determine if an infrastructure object is 
vulnerable to a given hazard intensity and if so, which failure mode controls for the given hazard 
intensity. Furthermore, this component failure assessment procedure forms a key linkage within the 
comprehensive natural hazard risk assessment methodology, connecting the hazard and 
infrastructure object data to the failure mode and consequence data. This linkage eliminates the 
need to assume an average level of consequences resulting from an infrastructure object’s failure 
and replaces it with a vulnerability curve. 
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The component failure assessment procedure has four application implications for the subfield of 
infrastructure management and the field of civil engineering. First, an infrastructure manager can 
move towards integrating natural hazard risk assessments directly into existing infrastructure 
management systems. Second, the procedure facilitates the comprehensive natural hazard risk 
assessment methodology. Third, while more infrastructure and hazard data is required for the 
procedure, this required data is specifically identified aiding in the efficiency of the overall 
infrastructure data collection process. Lastly, the component failure assessment process is intended 
to be employed not only at a single hazard intensity but rather at a number of potential hazard 
intensities. Through such an application process, one can identify not only the failure mode at each 
specific hazard intensity, but also the overall range of each failure mode. Additionally, if there are 
uncertainties concerning the hazard parameter and/or object parameter intensities, the component 
failure assessment process should be applied, with each analysis employing sampled probability 
based parameter data. However, the procedure is not without limitations, notably, one must 
iteratively conduct the failure assessment analysis with each analysis sampling the hazard and object 
parameter intensities as a function of their respective probability distributions.  
The current natural hazard and infrastructure component parameter collection practices within 
Switzerland place two significant limitations on applying these component failure assessment 
processes. First, current hazard and infrastructure data collection procedures are respectively the 
product of existing natural hazard assessment and the infrastructure management requirements. To 
apply these component failure assessment processes, a number of additional hazard and 
infrastructure parameter data needs to be collected, but approaches exist for minimizing and 
streamlining the data collection process. Secondly, the failure assessment process for the bridge, 
gallery and retaining wall components requires that multiple hazard parameter intensities be 
determined for a given hazard intensity. Currently, within Switzerland, the natural hazard parameter 
intensity data is reported separately for each individual hazard parameter. This hinders the process 
of interrelating different parameters for the same hazard. Thus it is strongly suggested that all hazard 
parameters for a given hazard be directly correlated or even integrated into a single overarching data 
set for the given hazard. 
8.2 Comprehensive Natural Hazard Risk Assessment Methodology 
The Comprehensive Natural Hazard Risk Assessment Methodology was formulated (in Chapter 3) and 
applied (in Chapter 4) following a review of the existing vulnerability assessment methodologies (in 
Chapter 2) which revealed that a comprehensive risk assessment platform for assessing natural 
hazard risks to the built transportation infrastructure does not currently exist. 
To develop the comprehensive natural hazard risk assessment methodology, this work first 
developed the component failure assessment procedure discussed above. This component failure 
assessment procedure forms a key linkage within the comprehensive natural hazard risk assessment 
methodology, connecting the hazard and infrastructure object data to the failure mode and 
consequence data. This linkage eliminates the need to assume an average level of consequences 
resulting from an infrastructure object’s failure and replaces it with a vulnerability curve. Next, data 
constraints were identified, notably, hazard intensity, failure consequences, and object expose 
lengths were found to be discrete data points requiring the development of continuous functions 
fitted to these datasets. From this data, one can calculate the object section vulnerability and risk 
with respect to the local hazards. 
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The scope was then expanded to continuous object analysis requiring the development of natural 
hazard attenuation factors to reduce the continuous object length thereby considering the influence 
of reconstruction economies of scale and mutually inclusive direct consequences and service 
interruption durations. This facilitated the assessment of continuous object vulnerability and risk. 
The scope of analysis was expanded further to transportation infrastructure link level by assessing 
the link risk due to multiple continuous objects being exposed to multiple hazards. This process 
required the development of geographically based natural hazard correlation matrices for each 
geographic feature (level). Next, the work assessed failure risks over time by considering the 
probability of having a given event occur over the considered time period and the time valuation of 
money.  
To complete the methodology, the approach was employed in Chapter 4 to analyze the vulnerability 
and risk of selected infrastructure objects within two different roadway links. This analysis illustrated 
the feasibility of the methodology being applied to existing infrastructure systems and its potential to 
be used to relatively quantify different risks. 
Findings, Implications, and Applications 
The author identified three findings associated with this methodology. First, it allows infrastructure 
mangers to better quantify the risk exposure of a given infrastructure object and link, determine if 
increases in infrastructure resistance or in natural hazard protection measures are warranted, focus 
risk mitigation funding to most risk prone regions of the infrastructure network, and finally 
transparently quantify the financial risk exposure of an infrastructure network. Second, the 
methodology integrates a natural hazard risk assessment platform into the existing infrastructure 
management systems. Third, the approach requires additional component and natural hazard data to 
be collected, but methods to streamline this process have been identified (in Chapter 3) thus 
enabling existing data collection systems to easily adapt to these additional requirements. 
The application of the methodology to the case studies (in Chapter 4) show not only that it is feasible 
to conduct a detailed comprehensive assessment of the natural hazards affecting the built 
infrastructure, but that there are three main areas for additional improvement in the methodology: 
a) natural hazard intensity data reporting, b) direct consequences and service interruption estimation 
and c) inter-hazard correlation estimation.  
The current methods of reporting the natural hazard parameter intensities, reporting hazard 
intensity ranges for each event return period (Case Study A) or reporting general hazard risk-based 
regions (Case Study B), are both too abstract to be directly employed in this assessment 
methodology without making additional onsite assessments or general estimations. It is proposed 
that the natural hazard data reporting practices be expanded so that two different sets of data be 
reported, one set similar to the current reporting format which is intended to be distributed on 
printed hazard identification maps and one set identifying the local hazard parameters intensities 
which is intended to be digitally distributed. Without such an improvement, additional onsite 
assessments will need to be conducted for each exposed infrastructure object to acquire the needed 
natural hazard data.  
Turning to the second area for additional improvement, the direct consequence and service 
interruption duration estimation, one can see from these case studies that the direct consequence 
and service interruption duration values for each hazard parameter intensity threshold has been 
roughly estimated. With such estimations, one can assess the order of magnitude of the given risk 
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affecting a given infrastructure object but one is unable to directly compare and contrast different 
hazard risks affecting different infrastructure object types. Thus it is proposed to formulate a group 
of experienced practitioners who can use their experience to further refine these direct consequence 
and service interruption duration estimates.  
The last main area for additional improvement, intra-hazard and inter-hazard correlation estimation, 
is currently addressed by developing estimated intra-hazard and geographically-based inter-hazard 
correlation factors. While such estimates employed within this work are a beginning, further 
assessment accuracy can be achieved by modeling the intra-hazard and inter-hazard correlation for 
each of the three main topographic regions of Switzerland – the mountainous region, the valley 
region and the plain region. Through such additional work, one would be able to clarify and validate 
the intra-hazard and inter-hazard correlation estimates currently employed in this vulnerability and 
risk assessment methodology. 
Overall, however, this methodology forms a foundation for conducting a system wide natural hazard 
risk assessment. When applied across an entire transportation infrastructure system, the 
infrastructure manager can actively consider an infrastructure object’s potential natural hazard 
failure risk exposure in modeling the infrastructure deterioration and in developing optimal 
maintenance solutions. He can also determine the annual funding which should be invested and 
made available for natural hazard prevention and failure response. This is important because, 
currently, natural hazard induced failure responses are not directly funded or considered by 
infrastructure management systems. The expected end result is reduced infrastructure object failure 
potential, improved natural hazard protection systems, and a more stable funding and infrastructure 
management.  
8.3 Affective Assessment Approach 
To address the second limitation of infrastructure management systems, political-financial funding 
support failures due to incongruent evaluation of the level of performance between an infrastructure 
manager’s nominal evaluation and the experiencing society, this work formulated an approach for 
simulating an individual’s experience-based evaluation of the provided level of infrastructure 
performance—the affective assessment approach. 
The affective assessment approach was developed from findings within the behavioral economics 
and psychology fields (in Chapter 6) and the realization that existing intangible evaluation 
approaches do not address the incongruities between an infrastructure manager’s nominal 
evaluation and the experiencing society (Appendix B). A critical review of the Life Quality Index, an 
approach for assessing the maximum value of a life (Appendix A), accentuates these incongruities by 
showing the good intentioned proposal of developing a unified rationale for evaluating life-saving 
investments so that these decisions might be removed from the public arena actively exposes the 
risk manager and his decisions to potential differences between the analytically-based performance 
evaluation and societal experience-based performance evaluations, thus, forming the foundational 
need for the Affective Assessment Approach. 
This approach first identified the infrastructure object parameters the public personality interacts 
with. It then specified a process for modeling how the performance differences between subsequent 
interactions can be evaluated using two case studies to illustrate how an individual’s experience-
based assessments evolve in time as the individual interacts with a changing infrastructure system. 
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Next in Chapter 6, an approach for incorporating additional experiences into the individual’s 
evaluative norms was formulated. The affective assessment approach was then employed to analyze 
two cases to better understand the implications an experience-based evaluation approach can have 
on the evaluations of a set of interactions (Case Study E and Case Study F). These case studies 
examined the implications an experience-based evaluation perspective has for individuals with 
different experience histories and within environments with different deterioration rates. Lastly, the 
feasibility of applying such an experience-based evaluation approach was assessed in Chapter 7 by 
conducting a pilot study (Case Study G). In this study, it was determined that conducting a 
documentation and calibration study was not feasible within this work, but should be pursued in the 
immediate future. 
Findings, Implications, and Applications 
The work identified four key implications of this approach. First, it challenges infrastructure 
managers to step beyond their current purely analytical decision models and actively consider how 
potential management decisions may be received by the general public. Second, it proposes an 
approach for assessing how an individual’s previous experience, interaction sequence and interaction 
intensity can cause the evaluation of an infrastructure performance to change. Third, through 
implementing the approach, an infrastructure manager can work to determine how analytically 
optimal solutions may be socially received and which solution can a) help the general public in 
observing or in ignoring infrastructure deterioration and b) prevent the provided performance from 
undermining or diluting society’s level of expected performance. Such social dynamics can assist in 
ensuring the maintenance solution is fully implemented and funded. The funding connection has not 
yet been confirmed but the link is strongly suspected to exist especially in direct democracy funding 
situations as are found in Switzerland. Fourth, the functional performance of an infrastructure object 
is a primary medium for the infrastructure manager to communicate the current structural state of 
the object.  
While, the potential applications of this approach have been demonstrated in Chapter 6, this model 
has not been calibrated to a given person or situation. The following aspects should be calibrated: a) 
the affective assessment factor, b) the memory depreciation factor, and c) the number of non-
depreciated interactions. Additionally, the affective assessment approach has been applied to 
simulate the potential induced affect of single individual experiencing a single parameter, the 
experienced speed. This approach should be broadened by segmenting the experienced speed into 
subclassifications by considering the environment in which the speed is experienced (e.g. 
predominate times, weather conditions or trip purposes) and generalized by aggregating the 
individuals of society into social groups (e.g. business commuters, leisure drivers, professional 
drivers).  
Through calibrating these parameters and by broadening and aggregating the application of the 
affective assessment approach, would facilitate an infrastructure manager to more effectively predict 
an individual’s sensitivities to changing environments, enabling the manager to more accurately 
choose the technically optimal socially-sustainable management solution. 
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8.4 Fusing the Approaches 
Returning to the chart Figure 1-3 introduced in the introduction, one can see that while the above 
approaches appear distinctly separate on one level, on another level, they come together to form a 
two prong technically optimal, socially sustainable infrastructure management model. These 
approaches when implemented into an existing infrastructural management system improve the 
system on both a limited level and a broader level. On the limited level, these approaches address 
the analytical limitations of current infrastructure management systems enabling infrastructure 
managers to:  
? Improve performance simulation of potential natural hazard risks, thus actively considering an 
infrastructure object’s natural hazard risk in modeling the infrastructure deterioration and in 
developing optimal maintenance solutions  
? Improve annual funding assessments 
? Study how proposed technically optimal solutions may be socially received and work to select 
solutions which best maintain their social support throughout the duration of the maintenance 
solution.  
On a broader level, this model enables infrastructure managers to close two key engineering gaps: 
? Appropriately quantifying and preventing natural hazard induced infrastructure failures 
? Appropriately quantifying and effectively communicating infrastructure maintenance and 
funding needs to politicians and the general public 
This should result in improved infrastructure management systems, built infrastructure, and fewer 
incongruities in communicating with the serviced population. 
 
Figure 8-1: A technically optimal, socially sustainable management system. 
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Further Study 
Once, the Component Failure Assessment Procedure has been automated, the recommended natural 
hazard and infrastructure object data has been collected, the Affective Assessment Approach has 
been calibrated, and these approaches have been integrated into an existing infrastructure 
management system, it is essential to conduct a joint implementation and monitoring study to 
examine to impact of this approach. Such a study should assess the ease of implementation and the 
medium term costs and benefits of each approach. 
8.5 Overall Conclusions 
Current infrastructure management systems are not technically optimal or social sustainable as they 
overlook potential sudden failure modes and potential incongruities between the analytically 
assessed and socially experience-based evaluated provided infrastructure performance. Therefore, 
this work developed the Component Failure Assessment Procedure, the Comprehensive Natural 
Hazard Risk Assessment Method, and the Affective Assessment Approach to form a technically 
optimal, socially sustainable infrastructure management model with implications for the subfield of 
infrastructure management and the wider civil engineering community. 
Implications for Infrastructure Management 
There are implications for the subfield of infrastructure management if the technically optimal 
socially-sustainable decision model is integrated into existing infrastructure management systems on 
two levels: the infrastructure manager level and the subfield level. On the infrastructure manager 
level, this model enables managers to: 
? Improve the technical performance by assessing and quantifying risks posed by natural hazards 
and strengthening social sustainability by identifying and selecting infrastructure management 
solutions which help the serviced public in personally experiencing the current level of structural 
performance. 
? Identify analytically optimal solutions which will result in the undermining or dilution of the 
society’s expected performance so they can be removed from consideration. 
? Minimize the natural hazard induced sudden failures and start to consider how to manage the 
built infrastructure in such a way that it can be used as a tool to communicate with the serviced 
public. 
On the subfield level, this model enables researchers to: 
? Realize that the transportation infrastructure systems they research are not isolated systems as 
the current infrastructure management models assume by default. 
? Look beyond the purely analytical aspects of infrastructure systems and actively consider how 
the provided levels of performance will be socially framed and received. 
? Explore avenues for cross disciplinary work with natural hazard assessment, emergency 
management, behavioral economics, and psychology decision-making domains. 
Implications for Civil Engineering 
On the wider civil engineering field level, this model enables practitioners to: 
? Look beyond their analytical approaches and consider analytical scopes respective of their field’s 
title, engineering the civil society. 
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? Begin to remove one of remaining technical stumbling blocks of civil engineering in the public’s 
eye – appropriately quantifying and preventing natural hazard induced infrastructure failures. 
? Begins to remove on the remaining implementation stumbling blocks of civil engineering – 
appropriately quantifying and effectively communicating infrastructure maintenance and funding 
needs to politicians and the general public. 
Finally, in an age when infrastructure managers are starting to observe the strengths and weaknesses 
of infrastructure management systems, this work introduces and proposes a two prong integrated 
socially-sustainable technically-optimal decision model addressing two key gaps in current 
infrastructure management and civil engineering: a) appropriately quantifying and preventing natural 
hazard induced infrastructure failures and b) appropriately quantifying and effectively 
communicating infrastructure maintenance and funding needs to politicians and the general public. 
While this model has limitations, with further development and implementation, it should improve 
existing infrastructure management systems, built infrastructure, and remove the evaluation 
incongruities currently limiting infrastructure management and civil engineering.  
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A Failure assessment procedure 
A.1 Element resistance assessment equations 
The ultimate strength punching shear, direct shear and flexural strength Equations (A.1), (A.2) and 
(A.3) were developed by the United States government through extensive experimental testing to 
assess the plastic response of reinforced concrete member response to high magnitude forces. These 
equations were chosen for it is believed that they will accurately assess the reinforced concrete 
member’s response to natural hazard high intensity loading. 
The punching shear capacity of a doubly reinforced rectangular concrete member can be assessed 
with Equation (A.1). It should be noted that Equation (A.1) intentionally does not consider the 
contribution of shear reinforcement (US Army, 1990, p. 4.40). 
 4 'c dcv f=  (A.1) 
Where: 
vc = the punching shear stress capacity [N/mm
2] 
f’dc = the dynamic ultimate compressive strength of concrete [N/mm
2] 
Likewise the direct shear capacity of a doubly reinforced rectangular concrete member can be 
assessed with Equation (A.2) (US Army, 1990, p. 4.39). 
 0.18 'd dcV f b d= ⋅  (A.2) 
Where: 
Vd = the ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
b = width of the concrete compression face [mm] 
d = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the tensile 
reinforcement [mm] 
Additionally, the ultimate moment resistance of a doubly reinforced rectangular concrete member 
can be assessed with Equation (A.3) (US Army, 1990, p. 4.34). 
 
( )'' ' ( ')
2 0.85 '
s s dss ds s ds
u
dc
A A fA f A fM d d d
b b f b
−⎛ ⎞⋅
= ⋅ − + ⋅ −⎜ ⎟
⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎝ ⎠
 (A.3) 
Where: 
 Mu = the ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
 As = the area of the tensile reinforcement within the width b [mm
2] 
 As’ = the area of the compression reinforcement within the width b [mm
2] 
d’ = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the compression 
reinforcement [mm] 
fds = dynamic design stress for reinforcement [N/mm
2] 
A.2 Bridge failure assessment procedure 
Bridges are elevated objects constructed to carry the given roadway or railway over bodies of water, 
established transportation routes over uneven ground. Within this work and as shown in Figure 3-7,  
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Figure A-1: A typical bridge configuration. 
a bridge object is assumed to be composed of four key elements – foundation, piers and abutments, 
bearings and superstructure. In Table 3-3, 23 different potential hazard scenarios are considered in 
assessing the capacity of a bridge object. When these hazard scenarios are analyzed as a group, six 
failure modes can be identified and can be arranged into the structured assessment process 
presented in Figure 3-8. 
Table A-1: Bridge failure modes and associated hazards. 
 Potential Hazards 
Failure mode Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Foundation is undermined - x x - - 
Superstructure is overloaded vertically in 
shear or flexure 
x - - x - 
Superstructure is overloaded horizontally in 
shear or flexure 
x x x x x 
Bearings are overloaded horizontally or 
vertically 
x x x x x 
Bridge pier is overloaded horizontally in shear 
or flexure 
x - x x x 
Bridge surface submerged in liquid or debris x x x x x 
 
 
Figure A-2: Bridge component failure assessment process. 
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Bridge component failure assessment step A 
The first step of the bridge failure assessment procedure, step A: bridge location ≠ hazard location, 
requires one to conduct a geographic coincident analysis between the location of the given bridge 
and the geographic reach of the five potential hazards. If a given hazard is not coincident with the 
given bridge, it is assumed that the bridge will not be affected by the given hazard. If the given 
hazard and bridge are coincident, one must assess the potential failures for the complete range of 
applicable hazard intensities. 
Bridge component failure assessment step B 
The second assessment step, step B: clearance > hazard running height, assesses if the given hazard 
height surpasses the bridge’s clearance. The definition of bridge clearance and hazard running height 
are detailed in Figure A-3 and analytical defined in Equation (A.4). 
        
Figure A-3: Assessing if hazard running height surpasses bridge clearance for a) a bridge crossing a stream 
and b) a bridge crossing uneven ground. 
 { }H B H A F L R TRD C RD RD H RD RD H> = ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨  (A.4) 
Where: 
CB = bridge clearance measured between the bottom of the superstructure and the average 
water level or surrounding earth [m] 
RDH = hazard running depth [m] 
RDA = avalanche running depth [m] 
HF = flood height [m] 
RDL = landslide running depth [m] 
RDR = rockfall running depth [m] 
HT = torrent height [m] 
If the hazard running depth does not exceed the bridge clearance, it is assumed the hazard does not 
come in contact with the bridge superstructure and therefore one only needs to assess the capacity 
of the bridge pier and bridge foundations (assessment steps C and G), but hazard running depth does 
exceed the bridge clearance then one needs to conduct a complete assessment of the bridge 
superstructure, bearings, piers and foundations.  
Bridge component failure assessment step C 
The third step of the bridge component failure assessment process is: step C: pier foundation depth >  
Bridge Superstructure
Pier
Foundation
RDH CB
Stream
Bridge Superstructure
Pier
Foundation
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Figure A-4: Assessing if landslide depth exceeds abutment depth for a) a deep landslide or b) a shallow 
landslide. 
hazard rupture surface or scour depth, and assesses the hazard intensity load affect on the bridge 
foundation.  
It has been assumed that only two hazards, flood and landslide, can potentially undermine a bridge’s 
foundations. The former hazard, landslide, is particularly applicable to the bridge abutments as is 
shown in Figure A-4. To assess a bridge abutments’ vulnerability to landslides, one needs to verify 
that the abutment depth is deeper than the landslide fracture surface depth at the abutment 
location, as is presented in Equation (A.5). 
 BA LD D>  (A.5) 
Where: 
DBA = abutment or pier depth measured from the ground surface at the downhill side of the 
abutment[m] 
DL = landslide rupture surface depth measured from the ground surface at the downhill side 
of the abutment [m] 
In Figure A-4a, while a landslide does destabilize the embankment, the depth of the landslide at the 
abutment does not exceed the abutment depth, Equation (A.5), and thus the abutment is assumed 
to not fail. In Figure A-4b, a deep landslide destabilizes the embankment and the landslide rupture 
surface depth at the abutment location does exceed the abutment depth – thereby causing the 
expected failure of the abutment. The landslide rupture surface depth hazard should be assessed by 
an experienced geologist. While this assessment is typically general in nature, i.e. shallow or deep, 
such information can help to identify if the bridge abutment foundations are exposed to a potential 
landside hazard. 
In assessing the flood hazard impact on the bridge foundations, whether or not the flood exceeds the 
bridge clearance has significant influence on the resulting flood induced scour depth, as shown 
schematically in Figure A-5. When flood water flows around a bridge’s foundations, the local 
increased water speed created by the resulting vortices removes soil and stones from around each 
foundation, Figure A-5b. If the flood water height exceeds the bridge clearance, the water flow shifts 
from a non-pressurized flow to a pressurized flow, significantly increasing the general and localized 
water speeds. This increased water velocity not only causes the local pier scour to increase but also 
causes general scour of the stream floor, Figure A-5c. 
DBA
DL
DLDBA
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Figure A-5: Schematics detailing a) original pre-scour condition, b) a non-pressurized scour, c) pressurized 
scour. 
Stream induced scour of bridge foundations – abutments and piers – can be evaluated following the 
approaches presented in Evaluating Scour at Bridges (Richardson & Davis, 2001). The process of 
identifying a scour depth assessment procedure of a bridge pier place on a spread footing is 
presented in Example A-1. 
Example A-1: Identify an approach for evaluating the scour depth adjacent to a bridge pier placed on 
a spread footing foundation under non-pressurized and pressurized flow conditions. 
This example focuses on identifying an approach for assessing the vulnerability of a bridge pier 
placed on a spread footing to non-pressurized and pressurized scour as spread footings are one most 
scour vulnerable bridge foundation types. As seen in Equations (A.6) and (A.7), the non-pressurized 
scour of a bridge pier is influenced by the pier geometry, the stream’s hydraulic conditions during the 
flood, the stream bed conditions and the interaction between the pier and the footing. In particular, 
Equation (A.6) assesses how the presence of the footing works to shield the pier from scour and 
Equation (A.7) quantifies the total resulting scour induced by the presence of the pier (Richardson & 
Davis, 2001, pp. 6.10, 6.27).  
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Where: 
Khpier = footing shielding of pier coefficient [  ]  
f = lateral footing extension measured from edge of pier [m] 
a = pier width [m] 
h0 = elevation of bottom of footing measured from stream bed [m] 
T = footing thickness [m] 
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Where: 
yspier = local scour depth induced by the pier geometry [m] 
y1 = average upstream main channel depth prior to contraction scour [m] 
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V1 = average flow velocity immediate upstream of the pier [m/s] 
g = 9.807 gravitation acceleration [m/s2] 
PK1 = pier nose shape correction factor [  ] 
PK2 = angle of flow attack correction factor [  ] 
PK3 = bed condition scour depth correction factor [  ] 
PK4 = pier armoring scour depth correction factor [  ] 
To determine the localized scour induced by the presence of the footing, one must determine how 
the pier induced scour changes the stream’s hydraulic condition, Equations (A.8) and (A.9), how the 
footing geometry modifies the stream’s hydraulic patterns, Equations (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12), and 
the resulting scour induced by the footing considering the general footing geometry, the stream 
hydraulic state and the stream bed conditions, Equation (A.13) (Richardson & Davis, 2001). 
 2 1 2
spieryy y= +  (A.8) 
 1 12
2
V yV
y
=  (A.9) 
Where: 
y2 = adjusted flow depth for spread footing induced scour calculations [m] 
V2 = adjusted flow velocity for spread footing induced scour calculations [m/s] 
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Where: 
Kw = wide pier in shallow flow correction factor [  ] 
af = spread footing width [m] 
D50 = median diameter of bed material [m] 
V50 = critical velocity of D50 sized material [m/s] 
yf = elevation bottom of footing measured from stream bed [m] 
VF = average flow velocity below top of footing [m/s] 
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D84 = diameter of 84% bed material is smaller [m] 
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Where: 
ysfooting = local scour depth induced by the footing geometry [m] 
FK1 = footing nose shape correction factor [  ] 
FK2 = angle of flow attack correction factor [  ] 
FK3 = bed condition scour depth correction factor [  ] 
FK4 = footing armoring scour depth correction factor [  ] 
The resulting combined total pier and footing scour is purely the sum of the two independent scour 
depths, as presented in Equation (A.14) (Richardson & Davis, 2001, p. 6.37). 
 stotal spier sfootingy y y= +  (A.14) 
Where: 
ystotal = total scour depth adjacent to the pier measured from the non-scoured stream bed [m] 
If the water has come in contact with the bridge superstructure, the superstructure will further 
restrain the flow of water. This future restraint causes the flow of the stream to shift from non-
pressurized flow to pressurized flow, significantly increasing the stream flow velocity. This increased 
flow rate in turn causes additional bed material to be uniformly scoured out from underneath the 
bridge. This uniform scour depth, considering the clearance under the bridge and the bed material, 
can be quantified with Equation (A.15) (Richardson & Davis, 2001, p. 6.22). 
 11
1 50
5.08 1.27 4.44 0.19b aspressure
b
y H Vy y
H y V
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
= − + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (A.15) 
Where: 
yspressure = depth of vertical contraction scour measured from the non-scoured stream bed [m] 
Hb = clearance between the lowest superstructure point and the non-scoured stream bed [m] 
Va = average flow velocity of D50 bed material before scour [m/s] 
The resulting total scour, considering the influence of the pier, footing and superstructure clearance, 
is likewise the sum of the individually assessed scour depths, Equation (A.16) (Richardson & Davis, 
2001, p. 6.33). 
 stotal spier sfooting spressurey y y y= + +  (A.16) 
 
 
These resulting total scour depths for each hydraulic condition are then compared against the depth 
of the pier footing, Equation (A.17) 
 0 stotalh y>  (A.17) 
If this failure assessment confirms Equation (A.17) is false, it is assumed that the pier has failed due 
to scour. 
Bridge component failure assessment step D 
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The fourth failure assessment step, step D vertical resistance > applied vertical force, focuses on 
evaluating the vertical resistance of the bridge superstructure and the applied vertical hazard force. 
In Table 3-3, one can observe that it has been assumed that only two hazards – avalanche and 
rockfall hazards – can induce a bridge superstructure to fail vertically.  
   
Figure A-6:  Bridge superstructure configuration a) a structural concrete deck, b) a bridge deck supported by 
concrete beams. 
Assuming the bridge superstructure follows one of two structure configures, either the bridge 
superstructure is composed of a structural concrete deck or is composed of longitudinal beams 
supporting a concrete deck, Figure A-6a and Figure A-6b, respectively.  
 
Figure A-7: Bridge deck overloaded in shear or flexure. 
Considering the first bridge superstructure configuration, the punching shear strength can be 
determined with Equation (A.18) and considering the second bridge superstructure configuration and 
assuming the bridge deck is a doubly reinforced concrete member, Figure A-7, the punching shear, 
direct shear and moment capacity can be respectively computed with Equations (A.19), (A.20) and 
(A.21).  
 4 'cBS dcBSv f=  (A.18) 
 4 'cBD dcBDv f=  (A.19) 
 0.18 'dBD dcBD BD BDV f b d=  (A.20) 
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( )'' ' ( ' )
2 0.85 '
sBD sBD dsBDsBD dsBD sBD dsBD
uBD BD BD BD
BD BD dcBD BD
A A fA f A fM d d d
b b f b
−⎛ ⎞
= ⋅ − + ⋅ −⎜ ⎟
⋅ ⋅⎝ ⎠
 (A.21) 
Where: 
vcBS = the punching shear stress capacity of the bridge structural deck [N/mm
2] 
f’dcBS = the dynamic ultimate compressive strength of the bridge structural deck [N/mm
2] 
vcBD = the punching shear stress capacity of the bridge deck [N/mm
2] 
f’dcBD = the dynamic ultimate compressive strength of concrete in the bridge deck [N/mm
2] 
VdBD = the ultimate direct shear capacity of the concrete deck [N] 
bBD = width of the concrete compression face of the concrete deck [mm] 
dBD = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the tensile 
reinforcement of the bridge deck [mm] 
 MuBD = the ultimate moment resistance of the bridge deck [Nmm] 
 AsBD = tensile reinforcement area within the width bBD of the bridge deck [mm
2] 
 As’BD = compression reinforcement area within the width bBD of the bridge deck [mm
2] 
d’BD = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the compression reinforcement 
centroid of the bridge deck [mm] 
fdsBD = dynamic design stress for reinforcement of the bridge deck [N/mm
2] 
For the avalanche hazard it can be assumed that the applied force is uniformly distributed and thus it 
can be assumed that the bridge deck will not fail in punching shear. Additionally, assuming the bridge 
deck performs as fixed-fixed beams, the induced maximum shear and moment forces can be 
computed with Equations (A.22) and (A.23) (AISC, 1998, p. 4.195). 
 
2
HV BD BD
HBD
p b LV =  (A.22) 
 
2
12
HV BD BD
HBD
p b LM =  (A.23) 
Where: 
VHBD = the maximum hazard induced shear force within the bridge deck [N] 
MHBD = the maximum hazard induced moment force within the bridge deck [Nmm] 
pHV = the hazard vertical pressure [N/mm
2] 
bBD = the horizontal spacing of the bridge superstructure beams [mm] 
For the avalanche hazard, the hazard vertical pressure can be computed from the avalanche 
horizontal pressures by considering the uphill slope as is shown in Equations (A.24). 
 ( )tanAV AH Bp p α=  (A.24) 
Where: 
pAV = the avalanche vertical pressure [N/mm
2] 
αB = the bridge uphill slope [rad] 
Turning to the rockfall hazard and assuming the bridge deck has a negligible cushion, the vertical 
force imposed on the bridge deck can be computed with Equation (A.25) (Chikatamarla, 2007, pp. 11-
12). 
 0.7 0.4 0.62.8 sin( )RVBD R BD R RP r E E α=  (A.25) 
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Where: 
PRVBD = the rockfall vertical force applied to the bridge deck [kN] 
rR = the radius of the boulder at the contact point [mm] 
EBD = the bridge deck modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
αR = the rockfall angle of attack measured from the vertical 
Thus, the respective induced punching shear, direct shear and moment forces are a function of the 
location of the rockfall impact point and can be calculated with Equations (A.26), (A.27), and (A.28) 
(Chikatamarla, 2007, pp. 11-12). 
 
2
2
RVBD
RBD
BD
cBD R
P
v
dd rπ
= ⎛ ⎞
+⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (A.26) 
 
( )RVBD BD BD
RBD
BD
P L a
V
L
−
=  (A.27) 
 
( )RVBD BD BD BD
RBD
BD
P L a a
M
L
−
=  (A.28) 
Where: 
vRBD = the bridge deck ultimate rockfall induced punching shear [N/mm
2] 
VRBD = the bridge deck maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
MRBD = the bridge deck maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
aBD = the horizontal position of the rockfall impact point measured from the closest bridge 
superstructure beam [mm] 
These potentially induced hazard forces are then combined with the standard self, dead and live 
forces normally carried by the bridge to assess if the bridge deck capacity is exceeded. 
With the assessment process for the local vertical failure of the bridge superstructure formulated, 
one must now analyze the potential of the bridge superstructure to globally fail in the vertical 
direction. This requires one to assess if the applicable hazards – avalanche or rockfall – can exceed 
the shear or flexural strength of the bridge structural deck or the bridge deck beams, for bridge deck 
configurations A and B respectively. For the first and second gallery configurations, assuming the 
bridge structural deck and the bridge beams, respectively, are doubly reinforced concrete members, 
each member’s shear and flexural capacity can be determined using Equations (A.2) and (A.3) 
resulting in Equations (A.29) and (A.30). Please note the alternative definitions of the second bridge 
superstructure configuration width and depth variables detailed in Figure A-8. 
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Figure A-8: Structural configuration of bridge superstructure. 
 0.18 'dBS dcBS BS BSV f b d= ⋅  (A.29) 
 
( )'' ' ( ' )
2 0.85 '
sBS sBS dsBSsBS dsBS sBS dsBS
uBS BS BS BS
BS BS dcBS BS
A A fA f A fM d d d
b b f b
−⎛ ⎞
= ⋅ − + ⋅ −⎜ ⎟
⋅ ⋅⎝ ⎠
 (A.30) 
Where: 
VdBS = bridge superstructure ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
bBS = bridge superstructure concrete compression face width [mm] 
dBS = distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the tensile 
reinforcement within the bridge superstructure [mm] 
 MuBS = bridge superstructure ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
 AsBS = tensile reinforcement area within the bridge deck width bBD [mm
2] 
 As’BS = compression reinforcement area within the bridge deck width bBD [mm
2] 
d’BS = distance from the extreme compression fiber to the compression reinforcement 
centroid of the bridge superstructure [mm] 
fdsBS = bridge superstructure reinforcement dynamic design stress [N/mm
2] 
The forces applied to the bridge superstructure are a function of the physical reach of the given 
hazard. To analyze the avalanche hazard, Figure A-9, one can observe that the applied forces are 
assumed to be uniformly distributed across the bridge superstructure. Thus assuming the bridge 
superstructure responds as a simply supported beam, the maximum hazard induced direct shear and 
moment forces can be computed with Equations (A.31) and (A.32) (AISC, 1998, p. 4.190).  
 
Figure A-9: Bridge superstructure loading and potential flexural hinge locations. 
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2
AV BS B
ABS
p b LV =  (A.31) 
 
2
8
AV BS B
ABS
p b LM =  (A.32) 
Where: 
VABS = maximum bridge superstructure avalanche induced direct shear [N] 
MABS = maximum bridge superstructure avalanche induced moment [Nmm] 
LB = bridge span length between two adjacent supports [m] 
For the first bridge superstructure configuration and the second bridge superstructure configuration, 
when the bridge deck has sufficient strength to withstand the applied local hazard forces, bBS is equal 
to the width of the bridge and the spacing between the bridge beams, respectively. Within the 
second bridge configuration, if the bridge deck does not have sufficient strength to withstand the 
applied hazard forces, a significant portion of the hazard force will be shed and the variable bBS will 
be equal to the width of the bridge beam. 
Shifting to assessing the rockfall hazard and considering the first bridge superstructure configuration, 
the induced rockfall forces are a function of the location of the rockfall impact point. By assuming the 
bridge superstructure responds as a simply supported beam, the maximum rockfall induced direct 
shear and moment forces can be calculated with Equations (A.33) and (A.34) (AISC, 1998, p. 4.192). 
 ( )max
RVBD BS
B
RBS
RBD B BS
B
P a
L
V
P L a
L
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
= ⎜ ⎟
−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (A.33) 
 
( )( )RVBD B BS BS
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B
P L a a
M
L
−
=  (A.34) 
Where: 
VRBS = the bridge superstructure maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
MRBS = the bridge superstructure maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
aBS = the lateral position of the rockfall impact point measured from the uphill gallery wall 
[m] 
Expanding the rockfall hazard assessment to second bridge superstructure configuration, the forces 
imposed into the bridge beams are a function of whether the bridge deck fails under the applied 
rockfall hazard (thereby shedding a portion of the rockfall force) and the distance between the 
rockfall impact location and the closest bridge beam. If the bridge deck does fail, the force 
transferred to the bridge beam is equal to the maximum direct shear of the bridge deck as shown in 
Equations (A.35) and (A.36). 
 ( )max
RBD BS
B
RBS
RBD B BS
B
V a
L
V
V L a
L
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
= ⎜ ⎟
−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (A.35) 
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( )( )RBD B BS BS
RBS
B
V L a a
M
L
−
=  (A.36) 
If the bridge deck has sufficient capacity to withstand the induced rockfall forces, the resulting bridge 
beam induced shear and flexural forces can be assessed with Equations (A.37) and (A.38). 
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− −
=  (A.38) 
Through this structured process, one can verify if the bridge deck has enough capacity to absorb the 
directly applied hazard forces and if these members can transfer the applied hazard forces to the 
bridge beams. Additionally, this process highlights equations that can be employed to assess if the 
bridge beams have sufficient capacity to withstand these applied forces. It should be noted that 
while the detailed equations only address the concrete member capacity and the applied hazard 
forces, all additional forces including self weight, dead force and live force should also be considered 
within this assessment. 
Bridge component failure assessment step E 
The fifth bridge failure assessment step, step E: bearing resistance > applied superstructure forces, 
assesses if the bridge bearings have sufficient capacity to withstand the hazard imposed vertical 
uplift and the horizontal shifting forces. This assessment process first focuses on assessing the bridge 
bearing capacity to withstand hazard induced vertical uplift.  
In assessing the bridge bearing vertical capacity, dynamic hazard and bearing frictional forces are 
neglected and the assessment focuses on the hazard static buoyancy forces, the bridge 
superstructure weight and the bearing vertical capacity. The only hazards which can impose 
buoyancy forces are liquid hazards and thus it is assumed only flood and torrent hazards can cause a 
bridge’s bearings to vertically fail. In general, the vertical bearing capacity is assessed by subtracting 
the superstructure weight from the weight of the displaced hazard volume (buoyancy force) and 
confirming that this value is smaller than the total bearing vertical capacity, as shown in Figure A-10 
and Equation (A.39). 
 BV DH BSB W W> −  (A.39) 
Where: 
BBV = the bridge bearing vertical capacity [kN] 
WDH = weight of the displaced hazard volume [kN] 
WBS = weight of the bridge superstructure [kN]  
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Figure A-10: Assessing the vertical capacity of bridge bearings to resist static buoyancy forces. 
In detail, for the bridge depicted in Figure A-10, one can assess the bridge bearing vertical capacity, 
the weight of the displaced hazard volume and the bridge superstructure weight respectively with 
Equations (A.40), (A.41) and (A.42). 
 
i
n
BV BBV
i
B P=∑  (A.40) 
 ( )DH H B HB H BS BT DH BS BTW RD C RD b L w b Lρ= − − =  (A.41) 
 BS BS BS BTW w b L=  (A.42) 
Where: 
PBBVi = vertical capacity of bridge bearing i [kN] 
RDH = hazard running depth [m] 
RDHB = hazard running depth on top of the bridge superstructure [m] 
LBT = total bridge length measured from end to end or expansion joint to expansion joint [m] 
ρH = hazard density [kN/m3] 
wDH = distributed buoyancy force per square meter [kN/m
2] 
wBS = bridge superstructure weight per square meter [kN/m
2] 
If the hazard buoyancy force exceeds the bridge superstructure weight and the bearing vertical 
capacity, it is assumed that the bridge superstructure will be lifted off its bearings resulting in the  
  
Figure A-11: Assessing the horizontal bridge bearing capacity to resist applied horizontal hazard forces. 
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complete loss of the bridge superstructure. 
To assess the horizontal capacity of the bridge’s bearings, the imposed equivalent static hazard 
forces are compared against the bridge bearing capacity, as shown in Figure A-11 and Equation 
(A.43). One should note that herein a bridge’s horizontal bearing capacity is assumed to include the 
bridge bearing structural and frictional induced horizontal capacity and any secondary horizontal 
force paths, such as horizontal shear keys.  
 BH HHB P>  (A.43) 
Where: 
BBH = total bridge bearing horizontal capacity [kN] 
PHH = total horizontal applied force [kN] 
In detail, for the bridge cross section shown in Figure A-11, one can assess the bridge bearing 
horizontal capacity and the applied horizontal hazard forces with Equations (A.44) and (A.45). 
 
i
n
BH BBH
i
B P=∑  (A.44) 
 ( )HH HH BT DH B HH BSEP p L R C p A= − =  (A.45) 
Where: 
PBBHi = horizontal capacity of bridge bearing or force path i [kN] 
pHH = hazard horizontal pressure [kN/mm
2] 
ABSE = area of bridge superstructure exposed to the hazard [m
2] 
If the applied horizontal force exceeds the total horizontal bridge bearing capacity, it is assumed that 
the bridge superstructure will laterally slide off its bearings resulting in the complete loss of the 
bridge superstructure. 
Bridge component failure assessment step F 
The sixth bridge failure assessment step, step F: horizontal resistance > applied horizontal force, 
focuses on assessing if the bridge superstructure globally has sufficient capacity to withstand the 
applied horizontal hazard forces. As the bridge is being loaded in its strong axis, it is assumed that the 
bridge superstructure has sufficient capacity to locally withstand the applied horizontal hazard 
forces. This assumption may not hold true for thin steel trusses, tall non-composite steel beams and 
tall thin-walled concrete girders. For such elements, the local horizontal capacity of the individual 
bridge superstructure elements should also be assessed, an analysis step not included within this 
document. Given these assumptions, the bridge superstructure shear and moment capacities 
considering the applied horizontal hazard forces can be determined, in general, with Equations (A.46) 
and (A.47) respectively. 
 UBSH HHBSV V>  (A.46) 
 UBSH HHBSM M>  (A.47) 
Where: 
VUBSH = bridge superstructure ultimate direct horizontal shear capacity [kN] 
VHHBS = hazard induced horizontal shear force [kN] 
MUBSH = bridge superstructure ultimate horizontal moment capacity [kNm] 
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MHHBS = hazard induced horizontal moment [kNm] 
assuming the bridge deck is the primary contributor to the bridge superstructure horizontal stiffness 
and the tensile and compressive steel reinforcement are uniformly distributed across the bridge 
deck, for the bridge shown in Figure A-12, the bridge superstructure ultimate shear and moment 
strengths can be determined with Equations (A.48) and (A.50). 
 ( )( )( )' '0.18 1UBSH dcBD BD BD sBD sBDV f H W n A A= + − −  (A.48) 
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 (A.50) 
Where: 
f’dcBD = the bridge deck dynamic ultimate compressive concrete strength [N/mm
2] 
y = distance between the neutral axis and the extreme compression fiber [mm] 
WBD = bridge deck width [m] 
HBD = bridge deck height [m] 
n = steel reinforcement to concrete modulus of elasticity ratio [  ]  
 
Figure A-12: Bridge superstructure horizontal loading and potential flexural hinge locations. 
In determining the hazard induced horizontal global shear and moment forces, it is assumed each 
span of the bridge can be analyzed as a propped cantilever, as shown in Figure A-12.  
For distributed hazards, avalanche, flood, landslide and torrent, it is assumed that the bridge 
superstructure is horizontal with the top surface of the hazard, thereby ensuring that the hazard is 
uniformly applied across the superstructure. Thus the hazard induced horizontal global shear and 
moment forces can be determined with Equations (A.51) and (A.52), respectively.  
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=  (A.52) 
For the concentrated hazard, rockfall, and following the process employed to develop Equation 
(A.25), the applied horizontal force can be determined with Equation (A.53) and the induced shear 
and moment forces can be quantified with Equations (A.54) and (A.55) 
 0.7 0.4 0.62.8 cos( )RHBS R BS R RP r E E α=  (A.53) 
Where: 
PRHBS = the rockfall horizontal force applied to the bridge deck [kN] 
EBS = the bridge superstructure modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
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 (A.55) 
Where: 
VRHBS = the bridge superstructure maximum rockfall induced horizontal direct shear [N] 
MRHBS = the bridge superstructure maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
aBS = the longitudinal position of the rockfall impact point measured from the closest support 
or expansion joint [mm] 
If the induced horizontal hazard shear or moment forces are found to exceed the bridge 
superstructure’s horizontal capacity, disproving Equation (A.46) or (A.47), it is assumed that the 
bridge superstructure fails. 
Bridge component failure assessment step G 
The seventh bridge failure assessment step, pier resistance > applied horizontal pier forces, assesses 
if one or more of the given bridge’s piers is overloaded by the hazard induced shear or flexure forces. 
As the bridge pier is being loaded in its strong axis, it is assumed that the bridge pier has sufficient 
capacity to locally withstand the applied horizontal hazard forces. Given this assumption, the bridge 
pier shear and moment capacities considering the applied horizontal hazard forces can be 
determined, in general, with Equations (A.56) and (A.57) respectively. 
 UBPH HHBPV V>  (A.56) 
 UBPH HHBPM M>  (A.57) 
Where: 
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VUBPH = bridge pier ultimate direct horizontal shear capacity [kN] 
VHHBP = hazard induced horizontal shear force [kN] 
MUBPH = bridge pier ultimate horizontal moment capacity [kNm] 
MHHPH = hazard induced horizontal moment [kNm] 
Given the bridge pier shown in Figure A-13, assuming the bridge superstructure contribution to the 
bridge pier stiffness is negligible and assuming the bridge pier tensile and compressive steel 
reinforcement is uniformly distributed across the bridge pier, the bridge pier ultimate shear and 
moment strengths can be determined with Equations (A.58) and (A.60). 
 ( )( )( )' '0.18 1UBPH dcBP BP BP sBP sBPV f D W n A A= + − −  (A.58) 
 
'
1
0.18 ndc
UBPH i
i
fM I
y
=
⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  (A.59) 
 
( )( )( )
( )( )( )
3 2 ' 2
'
2
'
1 1
120.18
1
2
BP BP SBP BP sBP BP
dc
UBPH
BP
BP BP sBP sBP
W D n A D A D
fM
y DW D n A A y
⎛ ⎞
+ − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞
+ + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (A.60) 
Where: 
f’dcBP = the bridge pier ultimate compressive concrete strength [N/mm
2] 
WBP = bridge pier width [m] 
DBP = bridge pier depth [m] 
AsBP = the bridge pier tensile reinforcement [mm
2] 
AsBP’ = the bridge pier compression reinforcement [mm
2] 
 
Figure A-13: Bridge pier horizontal loading and potential flexural hinge locations. 
In determining the hazard induced horizontal global shear and moment forces, it is assumed the 
bridge pier can be modeled as a vertical cantilever, as shown in Figure A-13.  
For the distributed hazards – avalanche, flood, landslide and torrent – the induced horizontal global 
shear and moment forces for hazards which do not surpass the bridge clearance can be quantified 
with Equations (A.61) and (A.62), respectively. 
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 ( )( )1.5HHBP HH BP BP B HV p W H C RD= − −  (A.61) 
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− −
=  (A.62) 
If the given hazard does surpass the bridge clearance, these values are increased by the amount of 
hazard induced horizontal force is transferred through the bridge superstructure and into the bridge 
pier. Thus under such a condition, the horizontal global shear and moment forces can be determined 
with Equations (A.63) and (A.64). 
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 (A.64) 
For the concentrated hazard, rockfall, following the procedure employed to develop Equation (A.25) 
and assuming the rockfall impacts only the bridge pier, the applied horizontal force can be 
determined with Equation (A.65) and the induced shear and moment forces can be quantified with 
Equations (A.66) and (A.67). 
 0.7 0.4 0.62.8 cos( )RHBP R BP R RP r E E α=  (A.65) 
Where: 
PRHBP = the rockfall horizontal force applied to the bridge pier [kN] 
EBP = the bridge pier modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
 RHBP RHBPV P=  (A.66) 
 ( )( )RHBP RHBP BP B HM P H C RD= − −  (A.67) 
Where: 
VRHBP = the bridge pier maximum rockfall induced horizontal direct shear [N] 
MRHBP = the bridge pier maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
If the rockfall impacts the bridge superstructure rather than the bridge pier, the applied horizontal 
force can be determined with Equation (A.68) and the induced shear and moment forces can be 
quantified with Equations (A.69) and (A.70). 
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α − − −
=  (A.68) 
 RHBP RHBPV P=  (A.69) 
 ( )( )0.5RHBP RHBP BP H BM P H RD C= + −  (A.70) 
If the induced horizontal hazard shear or moment forces are found to exceed the bridge pier’s 
horizontal capacity, invalidating Equation (A.56) or (A.57), it is assumed that the bridge pier fails. 
Bridge component failure assessment step H 
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The eighth and final bridge failure assessment step, clearance + structural height > hazard running 
depth, assesses if the bridge’s running surface can potential become submerged in liquid or debris – 
thereby preventing free public usage of the infrastructure object. This failure assessment step can 
quantitatively be assessed with Equation (A.71). 
 B BS HC d RD+ >  (A.71) 
If it is determined that Equation (A.71) is invalid for the given hazard intensity and bridge, it is 
assumed that the bridge will be submerged in liquid or debris. 
Thus through applying the structured failure assessment process presented herein, one can 
systematically qualitatively and quantitatively determine if a bridge is vulnerable to a given hazard 
intensity and if so, which failure mode controls. 
A.3 Culvert failure assessment procedure 
Culverts are tubular objects constructed underneath roadway objects to ferry moving bodies of 
water unnoticed and unobserved underneath a given roadway, Figure A-14. When a culvert fails to 
perform as intended, water pools on the uphill side of the roadway and, unless the uphill water 
retention basin has adequate capacity for this retained water, the pooled water will overtop the 
roadway.  
  
Figure A-14: A typical culvert configuration. 
In Table 3-2, one can observe that a culvert object is assumed to potentially fail in 5 different hazard 
scenarios. When these hazards scenarios are analyzed as a group, two independent failure modes 
can be identified. These failure modes and their associated inducing hazards are presented in Table 
A-2. 
Table A-2: Culvert failure modes and associated hazards. 
 Potential Hazards 
Failure mode Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Culvert buried in debris x - x x x 
Culvert capacity exceeded - x - - - 
In further analyzing these two potential failure modes, they can be arranged into a structured 
assessment process shown in Figure A-15. 
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Figure A-15: Culvert component failure assessment process. 
Culvert component failure assessment step A 
To conduct the first step of the culvert failure assessment procedure, assessment step A: culvert 
location  hazard location, one must conduct a geographic coincident analysis between all five 
hazards and the culvert location. Typically, it is during this phase of the analysis that the true scope of 
the culvert analysis becomes evident as typically only two to three of the potential five hazards are 
coincident with the culvert object. 
Culvert component failure assessment step B 
The second step, culvert height > (1/2)*hazard deposited depth, focuses on determining if the culvert 
can become blocked or partially blocked by avalanche, landslide, rockfall or torrent debris, as shown 
in Figure A-16. This assessment is formally conducted with Equation (A.72). It is herein assumed that 
if the deposited hazard debris exceeds one-half of the height of the culvert, the capacity of the 
culvert is so reduced that water will start to pool on the uphill side of the culvert and will eventually 
overtop the roadway. 
 { }
2
C
H H A L R T
HDD DD DD DD DD DD> = ∨ ∨ ∨  (A.72) 
Where: 
HC = height of the culvert inlet [m] 
DDH = hazard deposited depth [m] 
DDA = avalanche deposited depth [m] 
DDL = landslide deposited depth [m] 
DDR = rockfall deposited depth [m] 
DDT = torrent deposited depth [m] 
   
Figure A-16: Culvert potentially blocked by deposited debris. 
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Culvert component failure assessment step C 
Turning to the third culvert assessment step, culvert discharge > hazard discharge, requires one to 
obtain flood hazard discharge data from the hazard intensity maps and to obtain the culvert design 
discharge from the KUBA database or calculate the culvert design discharge with Equation (A.73) 
(Normann, Houghtalen, & Johnston, 2001).  
 
2/3 2c c
C
c u
a Rh S gQ
n K
⋅ ⋅
=  (A.73) 
Where: 
QC = culvert design discharge [m
3/s] 
SC = culvert slope [m/m] 
aC = culvert cross-sectional area [m
2] 
Rh = hydraulic radius [m] 
nC = Manning’s roughness coefficient for the given culvert [  ] 
Ku = hydraulic constant (19.63) [  ] 
Thus by applying this general culvert assessment process presented herein, one can qualitatively and 
quantitatively determine if any of the five considered hazards can induce a culvert to fail. 
A.4 Gallery failure assessment procedure 
Galleries are protection structures designed to shield roadways and railways from the affects of 
gravitational hazards - torrents, landslides, rockfalls and avalanches. Within this work, there are two 
different gallery configurations considered, Figure A-17. In the first configuration, the gallery uphill 
wall and roof are respectively doubly reinforced wall and slab elements. In the second configuration, 
the gallery uphill wall is composed of gallery wall structural members which span between and bear 
upon the gallery wall supports. Likewise, the gallery roof is composed of gallery roof structural 
members which span between and bear upon the gallery roof supports. Within both configurations, 
it is assumed that the gallery downhill wall is composed of a line of columns. Additionally, Figure A-17 
presents two potential uphill wall exposures. In configuration 1, the uphill wall is completely 
embedded in the hillside while the uphill wall in configuration 2 is partially or completely exposed.  
 
Figure A-17: Gallery configurations 1 and 2. 
In Table 3-2, one can observe that 21 different hazard failure scenarios are considered for the gallery 
component. When these hazard scenarios are analyzed as a group, seven independent failure modes 
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can be identified. These failure modes and the hazards which can potentially induced each of these 
respective failure modes presented in Table A-3. 
Table A-3: Gallery failure modes and associated hazards. 
 Potential Hazards 
Failure mode Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Foundation is undermined - x x - - 
Gallery wall is overloaded locally in shear or 
flexure 
x - x x - 
Gallery wall supports are overloaded in shear 
or flexure 
x - x x - 
Gallery roof is overloaded in shear or flexure x - x x x 
Gallery roof supports are overloaded in shear 
or flexure 
x - x x x 
Gallery frame laterally collapses x  x x - 
Gallery is ‘flooded’ with liquid or debris - x - - x 
In further analyzing the five hazards and the gallery’s structural elements, these failure modes can be 
arranged into a structured assessment process shown in Figure A-18. In Figure A-18, one should note 
that failure modes 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 are all global failure modes, while failure modes 2 and 4 are local 
failure modes. In modes 2 and 4, a portion of the structure does fail thereby shedding a part of the 
applied hazard force but these localized failures do not preclude the gallery from failing in an 
additional global failure mode.  
Gallery component failure assessment step A 
The first step of the gallery failure assessment procedure, assessment step A: gallery location ≠ 
hazard location, requires a geographic coincident analysis to be conducted between all five hazards 
 
Figure A-18: Gallery component failure assessment process. 
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and the gallery location. Generally, it is during this phase that the true analysis scope is defined as 
typically only two or three hazards are coincident with the gallery component.  
Gallery component failure assessment step B 
The second step, gallery foundational depth > hazard rupture surface or scour depth, requires one to 
determine the gallery foundational depth, the landslide rupture surface depth and the flood scour 
depth, as shown in Figure A-19.  
 
Figure A-19: Foundation undermined by landslide or flood hazards. 
The uphill and downhill gallery foundational depths, respectively DG and DG’, can be obtained from 
original design plans or from an onsite inspection. The landslide rupture surface depth at the uphill 
and downhill gallery wall foundations, DL and DL’ respectively, should be assessed by an experienced 
geologist. While this assessment is typically general in nature, i.e. shallow or deep, such information 
can help to identify if the gallery foundations are below or above the landslide hazard. The flood 
scour depth, ys, can be assessed by employing the scour assessment procedure detailed within the 
bridge assessment procedure or with other scour assessment procedures presented in the Evaluating 
Scour at Bridges manual (Richardson & Davis, 2001). In determining if the gallery foundational depth 
is exceeded, the uphill gallery foundation depth is compared against the local landslide rupture 
surface depth and the downhill gallery foundation depth is compared against the local landslide 
rupture surface depth and the flood scour depth. 
Gallery component failure assessment step C 
To conduct the next two analysis steps, C and D, one must assess to which hazards the uphill gallery 
wall element is exposed. If the gallery wall is embedded in the uphill slope, as is the case for gallery 
configuration 1, the gallery wall elements are not exposed to any of the potential three hazards – 
avalanche, landslide or rockfall – and thus analysis steps C and D are automatically positive. But if the 
uphill gallery wall extends above grade, as shown in the second gallery configuration, one must 
assess if the applied horizontal hazard forces can exceed the gallery wall structural strength. If either 
of these two capacity values are exceeded, it is assumed the gallery foundation fails. 
Analysis step C, assesses if the applied horizontal hazard forces exceed the ultimate punching shear, 
direct shear or moment strengths of the gallery uphill wall elements, as shown in Figure A-20. This 
analysis step is completely applicable to the second gallery configuration in which the uphill gallery 
wall is composed of timber, concrete or steel structural wall members which span between and 
horizontally bear upon the wall columns.  
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Figure A-20: Gallery wall or wall members overloaded in shear or flexure. 
The analysis of the punching shear strength is also applicable to the gallery uphill wall in the first 
gallery configuration, but the ultimate direct shear and moment strengths for this first gallery 
configuration are considered within analysis step D. The structural punching shear, direct shear and 
moment capacity of the structural wall members within gallery configuration 2 can be assessed using 
Equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) resulting in Equations (A.74), (A.75) and (A.76). 
 4 'cGWM dcGWMv f=  (A.74) 
 0.18 'dGWM dcGWM GWM GWMV f b d=  (A.75) 
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Where: 
vcGWM = the gallery wall structural member punching shear stress capacity [N/mm
2] 
f’dcGWM = the gallery wall structural member dynamic ultimate concrete compressive strength 
[N/mm2] 
VdGWM = the gallery wall structural member ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
bGWM = the gallery wall structural member concrete compression face width [mm] 
dGWM = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the tensile 
reinforcement within the gallery wall structural member [mm] 
 MuGWM = the gallery wall structural member ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
 AsGWM = the gallery wall structural member tensile reinforcement area within the width bGWM 
[mm2] 
 As’GWM = the gallery wall structural member compression reinforcement area within the 
width bGWM [mm
2] 
d’GWM = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the compression 
reinforcement within the gallery wall structural member [mm] 
fdsGWM = the gallery wall structural member reinforcement dynamic design stress [N/mm
2] 
The first applicable hazard, avalanche hazard loading, is a uniformly distributed load and thus the 
critical gallery parameters are the gallery structural wall member’s direct shear and moment 
capacities. Conservatively assuming the wall members are simply supported and the avalanche forces 
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are applied across the complete span of the structural wall member, the avalanche induced 
maximum shear and moment force can be calculated with Equations (A.77) and (A.78) respectively 
(AISC, 1998, p. 4.190). 
 
2
AH GWM G
AGWM
p b LV =  (A.77) 
 
2
8
AH GWM G
AGWM
p b LM =  (A.78) 
Where: 
VAGWM = the gallery structural wall member maximum avalanche induced shear force [N] 
MAGWM = the gallery structural wall member maximum avalanche induced moment [Nmm] 
bGWM = the gallery structural wall member vertical width [mm] 
LG = the spacing distance between the gallery structural frames [mm] 
Turning to the second applicable hazard, landslide hazard loading, is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed force and thus the critical parameters are likewise the gallery structural wall member’s 
direct shear and moment capacities. These forces can be conservatively computed with Equations 
(A.77) and (A.78) by replacing the avalanche horizontal pressure (pAH) with the landslide horizontal 
pressure (pLH), thus resulting in Equations (A.79) and (A.80). 
 
2
LH GWM G
LGWM
p b LV =  (A.79) 
 
2
8
LH GWM G
LGWM
p b LM =  (A.80) 
Where: 
VLGWM = the gallery structural wall member maximum landslide induced shear [N] 
MLGWM = the gallery structural wall member maximum landslide induced moment [Nmm] 
The third and final applicable hazard, rockfall hazard forcing, is assumed to be a localized point force 
and thus the critical parameters are the gallery structural wall member’s punching shear, direct shear 
and moment capacities. Assuming the gallery wall has a negligible cushion, the applied rockfall force 
can be computed with Equation (A.81) (Chikatamarla, 2007, pp. 11-12). 
 0.7 0.4 0.62.8 cos( )RGWM R GWM R RP r E E α=  (A.81) 
Where: 
PRGWM = the rockfall force applied on the gallery roof member [kN] 
EGWM = the gallery wall member modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
αRH = the rockfall angle of attack measured from the horizontal [rad] 
As a rockfall is assumed to be a concentrated force, the initial critical parameter is a punching shear 
failure of the gallery wall which is applicable to both gallery configurations. Taking the example of a 
doubly reinforced concrete wall member, the applied horizontal rockfall punching shear force can be 
computed with Equation (A.82) (US Army, 1990, p. 4.40). 
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Where: 
VRGWM = the gallery wall member ultimate rockfall induced punching shear [N/mm
2] 
dcGWM = the distance between the centroids of the compression and tensile reinforcement 
within the gallery wall member [mm] 
dGWM = the distance between the extreme compression fiber and the centroid of the tensile 
reinforcement within the gallery wall member [mm] 
Continuing with just the second gallery configuration, if the wall structural member has enough 
capacity to withstand the applied punching shear forces, the applied rockfall force is transferred to 
the gallery structural frames. This induces shear and flexural stresses in the gallery structural wall 
member which is a function of the location of the impact point. Thus the maximum rockfall induced 
shear and flexural forces in the gallery wall member can be respectively computed with Equations 
(A.83) and (A.84). 
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Where: 
VRGWM = the gallery wall member maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
MRGWM = the gallery wall member maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
Thus through this process, one can determine if a gallery wall structural member will fall in punching 
shear, direct shear or moment overload. 
Gallery component failure assessment step D 
Turning to the fourth failure assessment step, gallery wall supports are overloaded in shear or 
flexure, requires one to assess if the applicable hazards – avalanche, landslide or rockfall – can 
exceed the shear or flexural strength of the gallery wall supports.  
 
Figure A-21: Structured configuration of the uphill gallery wall. 
α
HG
NTS
A A
A
B
A
B
α
NTS
Section A-A Section B-B
dGW
bGW
dGW
bGW
B B
The responsive approach: An integrated socially-sustainable technically-optimal decision model 
188   
For the first and second gallery configurations, assuming the gallery wall and gallery wall support, 
respectively, are doubly reinforced concrete members, each member’s shear and flexural capacity 
being calculated using Equations (A.2) and (A.3) resulting in Equations (A.85) and (A.86). Please note 
the alternative definitions of the second gallery wall configuration width and depth variables, 
detailed in Figure A-21. 
 0.18 'dGW dcGW GW GWV f b d= ⋅  (A.85) 
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Where: 
f’dcGW = the gallery wall dynamic ultimate concrete compressive strength [N/mm
2] 
VdGW = the gallery wall ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
bGW = the gallery wall concrete compression face width [mm] 
dGW = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the tensile reinforcement centroid 
within the gallery wall [mm] 
 MuGW = the gallery wall ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
 AsGW = the gallery wall tensile reinforcement area within the width bGWM [mm
2] 
 As’GW = the gallery wall compression reinforcement area within the width bGWM [mm
2] 
d’GW = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the compression centroid 
reinforcement within the gallery wall [mm] 
fdsGW = the gallery wall reinforcement dynamic design stress [N/mm
2] 
 
Figure A-22: Gallery wall loading and potential flexural hinge locations. 
Graduating to the gallery wall supports, one can quickly observe that the hazard forces applied to the 
gallery wall supports are a function of how the gallery wall is loaded. Analyzing the avalanche and 
landslide hazards, Figure A-22, one can observe that applied forces are a function of the depth of the 
hazard and the exposed gallery width.  
Thus assuming the gallery wall responds as a propped cantilever, the maximum avalanche or 
landslide induced direct shear and moment forces can be computed with Equations (A.87) and 
(A.88). 
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Where: 
VHGW = the gallery wall maximum hazard induced direct shear [N] 
MHGW = the gallery wall maximum hazard induced moment [Nmm] 
pHH = the applied landslide or avalanche horizontal pressure [N/mm
2] 
RDH = the landslide or avalanche running depth [m] 
HG = the gallery height [m] 
When the gallery wall structural members have sufficient strength to withstand the applied hazard 
forces, bGW, for the first and second gallery configurations, is equal to the length of the gallery section 
under analysis or the spacing between the gallery structural frames. Within the second gallery 
configuration, if the gallery wall structural members do not have sufficient strength to withstand the 
applied hazard forces, a significant portion of the hazard force will be shed, and the variable bGW will 
be equal to the width of the wall support. 
Turning to the rockfall hazard and considering the first gallery configuration, the induced rockfall 
forces are a function of the height of the rockfall impact point. By considering this parameter and by 
assuming the gallery wall responds as a propped cantilever, the maximum rockfall induced direct 
shear and moment forces can be calculated with Equations (A.89) and (A.90) (AISC, 1998, p. 4.194). 
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Where: 
VRGW = the gallery wall maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
MRGW = the gallery wall maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
Expanding the rockfall hazard analysis to include the second gallery configuration, the forces induced 
into the gallery structural frame is a function of whether the gallery wall structural members fail 
under the applied rockfall hazard (thereby shedding the rockfall force) and the distance between the 
rockfall impact location and the closest gallery structural frame. If this condition controls, the force 
transferred to the gallery structural frame is equal to maximum direct shear of the gallery wall 
structural members as is shown in Equations (A.91) and (A.92).  
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But if the gallery wall structural members have sufficient capacity to withstand the induced rockfall 
forces, the resulting gallery structural frame induced forces can be assessed with Equations (A.93) 
and (A.94). 
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These potentially induced hazard forces are then combined with the standard self, dead and live 
forces normally carried by the gallery to assess if the gallery wall supports capacity is exceeded. 
Thus through this structured two step analysis process, one can ascertain if the gallery wall structural 
members have sufficient capacity to withstand the directly applied hazard forces and if they can 
transfer these forces to the gallery wall supporting members. Furthermore, one can determine if the 
gallery wall supporting members likewise have sufficient capacity to withstand these applied hazard 
forces. In conducting this assessment, one should keep an open mind to additionally imposed self, 
dead or live forces. Where such additional forces do exist, they should be included in this 
assessment. 
Gallery component failure assessment step E 
With the capacity of the gallery wall verified, the focus of analysis then progresses to gallery roof – 
 analysis steps E, F and G. In Table A-3, one can observe that four hazards, avalanche, flood, landslide 
and torrent hazards, can potential induce the gallery roof to fail. The first step of this analysis is to 
confirm if the given hazard comes in contact with the gallery roof, Equation (A.95). 
 'G HH RD>  (A.95) 
Where: 
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HG’ = the uphill gallery wall height measured from the surrounding earth [m] 
For the four hazards, avalanche, landslide, rockfall and torrent, the hazard running depth respectively 
takes the form of the avalanche running depth RDA, the landslide running depth RDL, the rockfall 
running height HR, and the thickness of the torrent TD.  
Gallery component failure assessment step F 
Once it has been confirmed that the hazard does come in physical contact with the gallery roof, the 
process of assessing the structural capacity of the gallery roof begins, Figure A-23. This process 
parallels the process employed to assess the structural capacity of the gallery wall by first assessing 
the structural capacity and induced forces within the gallery roof members.  
 
Figure A-23: Gallery roof or wall members overloaded in shear or flexure. 
Considering the first gallery configuration, the punching shear strength can be determined with 
Equation (A.96) and considering the second gallery configuration and assuming the gallery roof 
structural member is composed of a doubly reinforced concrete member, the punching shear, direct 
shear and moment capacity can be respectively computed with Equations (A.97), (A.98) and (A.99).  
 4 'cGR dcGRv f=  (A.96) 
 4 'cGRM dcGRMv f=  (A.97) 
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Where: 
vcGR = the gallery roof punching shear stress capacity [N/mm
2] 
f’dcGR = the gallery roof dynamic ultimate concrete compressive strength [N/mm
2] 
vcGRM = the gallery roof structural member punching shear stress capacity [N/mm
2] 
f’dcGRM = the gallery roof structural member dynamic ultimate concrete compressive strength 
[N/mm2] 
VdGRM = the gallery roof structural member ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
bGRM = the gallery roof structural member concrete compression face width [mm] 
dGRM = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the tensile 
reinforcement within the gallery roof structural member [mm] 
 MuGRM = the gallery roof structural member ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
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 AsGRM = the gallery roof structural member tensile reinforcement area within the width bGRM 
[mm2] 
 As’GRM = the gallery roof structural member compression reinforcement area within the width 
bGRM [mm
2] 
d’GRM = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the centroid of the compression 
reinforcement within the gallery roof structural member [mm] 
fdsGRM = the gallery roof structural member reinforcement dynamic design stress [N/mm
2] 
Three of the four applicable hazards – avalanche, landslide and torrent – can be assumed to be 
uniformly distributed forces and thus it can be assumed that the gallery roof structural members will 
not fail in punching shear. Additionally, assuming the gallery roof structure members perform as 
fixed-fixed beams, the induced maximum shear and moment forces can be computed with Equations 
(A.100) and (A.101) (AISC, 1998, p. 4.195). 
 
2
HV GRM G
HGRM
p b LV =  (A.100) 
 
2
12
HV GRM G
HGRM
p b LM =  (A.101) 
Where: 
VHGRM = the gallery structural roof member maximum hazard induced shear [N] 
MHGRM = the gallery structural roof member maximum hazard induced moment [Nmm] 
bGRM = the gallery structural roof member horizontal width [mm] 
For the avalanche and landslide hazards, the hazard vertical pressure can be computed from the 
avalanche and the landslide horizontal pressures by considering the uphill slope as is shown in 
Equations (A.102) and (A.103). 
 ( )tanAV AH Gp p α=  (A.102) 
 ( )tanLV LH Gp p α=   (A.103) 
Where: 
pLV = the landslide vertical pressure [N/mm
2] 
αG = the gallery uphill slope [rad] 
For the torrent hazard, the vertical pressure is a function of the torrent deposited depth as shown in 
Equation (A.104). 
 TV T Tp d DD=  (A.104) 
Where: 
PTV = the torrent vertical pressure [N/mm
2] 
dT = the deposited torrent debris density [N/m
3] 
Turning to the rockfall hazard, the force imposed on the gallery roof can be computed with Equation 
(A.105). 
 ( )0.5 0.4 0.7 0.62.8 tan sin( )RGRM GRC GRC GRC R R RP H E r Eφ α−=  (A.105) 
Where: 
PRGRM = the rockfall force applied on the gallery roof member [kN] 
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HGRC = the height of the gallery roof cushioning material [mm] 
φGRC = the gallery roof cushioning material internal friction angle [rad] 
EGRC = the gallery roof cushioning material modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
Thus, the respective induced punching shear, direct shear and moment forces are a function of the 
location of the rockfall impact point and can be calculated with Equations (A.106), (A.107), and 
(A.108) (Chikatamarla, 2007, pp. 11-12). 
 
2
2
RGRM
RGRM
GRM
cGRM R
P
v
dd rπ
= ⎛ ⎞
+⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (A.106) 
 
( )RGRM G GRM
RGRM
G
P L a
V
L
−
=  (A.107) 
 
( )RGRM G GRM GRM
RGRM
G
P L a a
M
L
−
=  (A.108) 
Where: 
vRGRM = the gallery roof member ultimate rockfall induced punching shear [N/mm
2] 
VRGRM = the gallery roof member maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
MRGWM = the gallery roof member maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
aGRM = the horizontal position of the rockfall impact point measured from the closest gallery 
roof structural frame [mm] 
dcGRM = the distance between the centroids of the compression and tensile reinforcement 
within the gallery roof member [mm] 
dGRM = the distance between the extreme compression fiber and the centroid of the tensile 
reinforcement within the gallery roof member [mm] 
These potentially induced hazard forces are then combined with the standard self, dead and live 
forces normally carried by the gallery to assess if the gallery roof structural members’ capacity is 
exceeded. 
Gallery component failure assessment step G 
Turning to the seventh failure assessment step, gallery roof supports are overloaded in shear or 
flexure, requires one to assess if the applicable hazards – avalanche, landslide, rockfall or torrent – 
can exceed the shear or flexural strength of the gallery roof supports. For the first and second gallery 
configurations, assuming the gallery roof and gallery roof support, respectively, are doubly reinforced 
concrete members, each member’s shear and flexural capacity can be calculated using Equations 
(A.2) and (A.3) resulting in Equations (A.109) and (A.110). Please note the alternative definitions of 
the second gallery roof configuration width and depth variables, detailed in Figure A-24. 
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Figure A-24: Structural configuration of the gallery roof. 
 0.18 'dGR dcGR GR GRV f b d= ⋅  (A.109) 
 
( )'' ' ( ' )
2 0.85 '
sGR sGR dsGRsGR dsGR sGR dsGR
uGR GR GR GR
GR GR dcGR GR
A A fA f A fM d d d
b b f b
−⎛ ⎞
= ⋅ − + ⋅ −⎜ ⎟
⋅ ⋅⎝ ⎠
 (A.110) 
Where: 
VdGR = the gallery roof ultimate direct shear capacity [N] 
bGR = the gallery roof concrete compression face width [mm] 
dGR = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the tensile reinforcement centroid 
within the gallery roof [mm] 
 MuGR = the gallery roof ultimate moment resistance [Nmm] 
 AsGR = the gallery roof tensile reinforcement area within the width bGRM [mm
2] 
 As’GR = the gallery roof compression reinforcement area within the width bGRM [mm
2] 
d’GR = the distance from the extreme compression fiber to the compression reinforcement 
centroid within the gallery roof [mm] 
fdsGR = the gallery roof reinforcement dynamic design stress [N/mm
2] 
The forces applied to the gallery roof supports are a function of the physical reach of the hazard. To 
analyze the avalanche, landslide and torrent hazards, Figure A-25, one can observe that the applied 
forces can be assumed to be uniformly distributed across the gallery roof. Thus assuming the gallery 
roof responds as a propped cantilever, the maximum hazard induced direct shear and moment forces 
can be computed with Equations (A.111) and (A.112) (AISC, 1998, p. 4.193).  
 
Figure A-25: Gallery roof loading and potential flexural hinge locations. 
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25
8
HV GR G
HGR
p b WM =  (A.112) 
Where: 
VHGR = the gallery roof maximum hazard induced direct shear [N] 
MHGR = the gallery roof maximum hazard induced moment [Nmm] 
WG = the gallery width [m] 
When the gallery roof structural members have sufficient strength to withstand the applied hazard 
forces, bGR, for both the first and second gallery configurations is equal to the length of the gallery 
section under analysis or the spacing between the gallery structural frames. Within the second 
gallery configuration, if the gallery roof structural members do not have sufficient strength to 
withstand the applied hazard forces, a significant portion of the hazard force will be shed and the 
variable bGR will be equal to the width of the roof support. 
Shifting to assessing the rockfall hazard and considering the first gallery configuration, the induced 
rockfall forces are a function of the location of the rockfall impact point. By assuming the gallery roof 
responds as a propped cantilever, the maximum rockfall induced direct shear and moment forces can 
be calculated with Equations (A.113) and (A.114) (AISC, 1998, p. 4.194). 
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 (A.114) 
Where: 
VRGR = the gallery roof maximum rockfall induced direct shear [N] 
MRGR = the gallery roof maximum rockfall induced moment [Nmm] 
bGR = the lateral position of the rockfall impact point measured from the uphill gallery wall 
[m] 
Expanding the rockfall hazard assessment to second gallery configuration, the forces imposed into 
the gallery roof supports are a function of whether the gallery roof structural members fail under the 
applied rockfall hazard (thereby shedding a portion of the rockfall force) and the distance between 
the rockfall impact location and the closest gallery roof support. If this condition controls, the force 
transferred to the gallery roof support is equal to the maximum direct shear of the gallery roof 
structural members as shown in Equations (A.115) and (A.116). 
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 (A.115) 
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If the gallery roof structural members have sufficient capacity to withstand the induced rockfall 
forces, the resulting gallery roof support induced shear and flexural forces can be assessed with 
Equations (A.117) and (A.118). 
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Through this structural process, one can verify if the gallery roof structural members have enough 
capacity to absorb the directly applied hazard forces and if these members can transfer the applied 
hazard forces to the gallery roof supporting members. Additionally, this process highlights equations 
that can be employed to assess if the gallery roof supporting members have sufficient capacity to 
withstand these applied forces. It should be noted that while the detailed equations only address the 
concrete member capacity and the applied hazard forces, all additional forces including self weight, 
dead force and live force should also be considered within this assessment. 
Gallery component failure assessment step H 
Turning to the eighth assessment step, assessing the gallery frame capacity to resist the applied 
horizontal and vertical forces induced by avalanche, landslide and rockfall hazards, requires one to 
quantify the gallery frame properties and the applied hazard forces. To quantify the gallery frame 
properties, it is assumed that the moment of inertia of each gallery wall is equal to the average of the 
uphill and downhill wall moment of inertias and that the gallery responds globally as a rigid frame to 
applied horizontal and vertical forces. Thus, assuming the gallery walls and roof are doubly 
reinforced concrete members, the moment of inertia of each element can be computed with 
Equation (A.119) and the average wall moment of inertia can be computed with Equation (A.120) 
(Merritt, Loftin, & Ricketts, 1996, pp. 8.43-44). 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 3'
3s
bI d d k A d k d A d k′= − ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅  (A.119) 
 
'
2
GW GW
GW
I II +=  (A.120) 
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Figure A-26: Gallery frame loading and potential flexural hinge locations. 
When one considers the three different hazards, there are four different ways these loading 
configurations can load in the rigid gallery frame. The first configuration, detailed in Figure A-26, 
addresses an avalanche, landslide or rockfall hazard impacting but not overtopping the uphill wall of 
the gallery. The hazard induced axial, shear, and moment gallery wall forces can be computed with 
Equations (A.121), (A.122) and (A.123). 
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Where: 
AGW = the hazard induced axial wall forces [kN] 
VGW = the hazard induced shear wall forces [kN] 
MGW = the hazard induced moment wall forces [kNm] 
 
 Avalanche Landslide Rockfall 
P RDApAHbGW RDLpLHbGW PRGWM 
a RDA/2 RDL/2 HR 
b HG-RDA/2 HG-RDL/2 HG-HR 
 
The second configuration, detailed in Figure A-26, addresses an avalanche or landslide hazard 
reaching or exceeding the top of the gallery wall. The induced axial, shear and moment gallery wall 
forces can be computed with Equations (A.124), (A.125) and (A.126). 
 ( )
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 (A.126) 
The third configuration, detailed in Figure A-26, addresses an avalanche or landslide hazard 
blanketing the roof of a gallery inducing axial, shear and moment gallery wall forces. These forces can 
be computed with Equations (A.127), (A.128) and (A.129). 
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 (A.129) 
The fourth configuration, detailed in Figure A-26, addresses a rockfall point force hazard impacting 
the roof of a gallery and inducing axial, shear and moment gallery wall forces. These forces can be 
computed with Equations (A.130), (A.131) and (A.132). 
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If the considered gallery follows gallery configuration 2 and is exposed to avalanche or landslide 
hazards which exceed the height of the gallery wall height, Equation (A.95), one must consider the 
potential for horizontal and vertical hazard loading. This can be accomplished by superimposing 
frame loading configurations 2 and 3 as detailed in Figure A-26.  
These potentially induced gallery frame hazard forces are then combined with the standard self, 
dead and live forces normally carried by the gallery to assess if the gallery frame capacity is 
exceeded. 
Gallery component failure assessment step I 
If the gallery has sufficient capacity to structurally withstand the applied hazard forces, one must 
assess if the gallery can become inundated with flood waters or torrent debris, assessment step I, 
thereby denying public use of the gallery ‘protected’ roadway. Such assessment is conducted by 
further analyzing the hazard-object coincident analysis to determine if and to what extent the gallery 
object can become inundated.  
By applying the general gallery assessment process presented herein, one can qualitatively and 
quantitatively determine which of the five considered hazards can induced the gallery to fail. 
A.5 Retaining wall failure assessment procedure 
Retaining walls are hardened structural objects constructed to hold back earthen embankments above or 
below roadways,  
Table A-4.  
 
Figure A-27: Different retaining wall functional locations. 
Herein, the term ‘retaining wall’ is extended to also include additional restraint oriented protective 
objects whose primary objective is restrain static or dynamic forces (e.g. avalanche barriers, check 
dams, levies, rockfall fences). When a retaining wall fails to perform as designed, the given hazard 
either breaks through or overtops the given retaining wall.  
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Table A-4: Retaining wall failure modes and associated hazards. 
 Potential Hazards 
Failure mode Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Foundation is undermined - x x - - 
Retaining wall is overloaded locally in shear - - - x - 
Retaining wall is overloaded globally in shear or 
flexure 
x x x x x 
Retaining wall foundation is overturned x x x x x 
Hazard flows over retaining wall x x x x x 
In  
Table A-4, one can observe that it is assumed a retaining wall can fail in 18 different hazard scenarios. 
When these hazard scenarios are analyzed as a group, five independent failure modes can be 
identified. These failure modes can, in turn, be arranged into a structure assessment process, as 
shown in Figure A-28. 
 
Figure A-28: Retaining wall component failure assessment process. 
Retailing wall component failure assessment step A 
The first step of the retaining wall failure assessment procedure, assessment step A: retaining wall 
location ≠ hazard location, requires a geographic coincident analysis to be conducted between the 
five potential hazards and the given retaining wall’s location. Typically, it is during this phase of 
analysis that the true scope of the retaining wall failure assessment becomes evident as typically only 
two or three of the potential five hazards are coincident with the given retaining wall’s location. 
Retailing wall component failure assessment step B 
The second step, wall foundation depth > hazard rupture surface or scour depth, focuses on 
determining if the retaining wall foundation can become compromised by a landslide or flood 
induced scour, as depicted in Figure A-29 and quantitatively assessed in Equation (A.133).  
Where: 
DRWF = retaining wall foundation depth [m] 
DH = hazard rupture surface depth at the retaining wall location [m] 
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The landslide rupture surface depth should be assessed by an experienced geologist. While this 
assessment is commonly conducted in a general nature, i.e. shallow or deep, such information can 
 
Figure A-29: Retaining wall foundation undermined by landslide or flood hazards. 
 RWF HD D>  (A.133) 
help to identify if the retaining wall foundations are above or below a potential landslide rupture 
surface. The potential scour depth can be assessed using the procedure presented in the bridge pier 
scour assessment or through alternative procedures presented in Evaluating Scour at Bridges manual 
(Richardson & Davis, 2001).  
Retailing wall component failure assessment step C 
The third retaining wall failure assessment step, wall local resistance > applied horizontal force, 
determines if the retaining wall’s internal resistance is sufficient to prevent a local punching shear 
failure, Figure A-30. In retaining walls, local punching shear is assumed to only be potentially present 
in above ground retaining walls and is assumed to only be induced by rockfall hazards. Within these 
assumptions, the potential punching shear failure mode can be quantitatively assessed with Equation 
(A.134). 
 cRW RRWν ν>  (A.134) 
Where: 
νcRW = retaining wall punching shear stress capacity [N/mm2] 
νRRW = rockfall induced punching shear stress [N/mm2] 
 
Figure A-30: Rockfall punching shear loading of a retaining wall. 
The retaining wall punching shear stress capacity is commonly a key design parameter of retaining 
walls, particularly rockfall nets, and should be readily available on the given retaining wall’s design 
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plans. The rockfall force applied to the retaining wall can be quantified with Equation (A.135) and the 
rockfall induced punching shear stress for a rockfall net and a concrete wall can be determined with 
Equations (A.136) and (A.137) respectively.  
 0.7 0.4 0.62.8 cos( )RRW R RW R RRWP r E E α=  (A.135) 
Where: 
PRRW = the rockfall force applied on the retaining wall [kN] 
ERW = the retaining wall modulus of elasticity [N/mm
2] 
αRRW = the rockfall angle of attack measured from a line perpendicular to the retaining wall 
surface [rad] 
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 (A.137) 
Where: 
dcRW = the distance between the retaining wall compression and tensile reinforcement 
centroids [mm] 
dRW = the distance between the retaining wall extreme compression fiber and tensile 
reinforcement centroid [mm] 
If the rockfall induced punching shear exceeds the retaining wall punching shear capacity, it is 
assumed that the retaining wall along the entire width of the given rockfall hazard experiences 
failure. 
Retailing wall component failure assessment step D 
The fourth retaining wall failure assessment step, wall global resistance > applied horizontal force, 
assesses if the given retaining wall has sufficient global shear or flexural capacity to resist the applied 
hazard loading. The approach employed in this analysis is controlled by the type of hazard under 
consideration.  
If the hazard is a mass movement hazard (avalanche, landslide, rockfall), it is herein assumed the 
retaining wall can be modeled as a simply supported beam and the applied avalanche and landslide 
hazard loads are uniformly distributed along the height of the hazard, as shown in Figure A-31. 
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Figure A-31: Assessing retaining wall global resistance to the applied mass movement hazard force. 
With a simply supported beam one needs to confirm that the retaining wall brace, retaining wall 
shear and retaining wall moment all have sufficient capacity to withstand the applied hazard forces. 
These different elements can be assessed, in general, with Equations (A.138), (A.139) and (A.140), 
respectively. 
 URW HRWR R>  (A.138) 
 URW HRWV V>  (A.139) 
 URW HRWM M>  (A.140) 
Where: 
RURW = the retaining wall brace ultimate capacity assessed parallel to the slope [kN] 
RHRW = the retaining wall brace maximum hazard induced force assessed parallel to the slope 
[kN] 
VURW = the retaining wall ultimate shear capacity [kN] 
VHRW = the retaining wall maximum hazard induced shear [kN] 
MURW = the retaining wall ultimate moment capacity [kNm] 
MHRW = the retaining wall maximum hazard induced moment [kNm] 
The retaining wall brace, retaining wall shear, and retaining wall moment ultimate capacities are best 
obtained from the given retaining wall’s design plans or from an experienced practitioner as there 
are numerous different retaining wall types and configurations. 
For avalanche and landslide hazards, the retaining wall maximum induced brace, shear and moment 
forces can be obtaining using Equations (A.141), (A.142) and (A.143), respectively (AISC, 1998, pp. 4-
191,198). 
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Where: 
HRWB = the height of the retaining wall brace [m] 
For a rockfall hazard, the retaining wall maximum induced brace, shear and moment forces can be 
obtaining using Equations (A.144), (A.145) and (A.146), respectively (AISC, 1998, pp. 4-192,199). 
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In this global assessment of the retaining wall, the process through which the hazard force is 
distributed across two or more vertical retaining wall supports has not be considered within this 
assessment process, as the above included assessment process has assumed the hazard coincides 
with the vertical retaining wall member under consideration. For additional information concerning 
the hazard force distribution between and among two or more vertical supports, please consult the 
gallery wall assessment procedure. 
Thus through the assessment process included above, one can quantify if the retaining wall has 
sufficient capacity to withstand the imposed mass movement hazard forces. 
If the hazard is a flood or torrent hazard, it is herein assumed the retaining wall can be modeled as a 
cantilever and the applied hazard loading follows a hydrostatic distribution along the depth of the 
hazard, as shown in Figure A-32. 
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Figure A-32: Assessing retaining wall global resistance to the applied flood or torrent hydrostatic hazard 
force. 
With a cantilever beam, one needs to confirm that the retaining wall has sufficient shear and 
moment capacity to withstand the applied hazard forces. These two parameters can be assessed, in 
general, with Equations (A.139) and (A.140), respectively. 
The retaining wall shear and retaining wall moment ultimate capacities are best obtained from the 
given retaining wall’s design plans or from an experienced practitioner as there are numerous 
different retaining wall types and configurations. 
The retaining wall maximum induced shear and moment forces for flood and torrent, assuming the 
hazard forces are purely hydrostatic, can be obtaining using Equations (A.147) and (A.148) 
respectively (AISC, 1998, pp. 4-196). 
 
2
2
2
max
2
H RW H
HRW
H H H
W RD
V
W RD
γ
γ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪
= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 (A.147) 
 
3
3
6
max
6
H RW H
HRW
H H H
W RD
M
W RD
γ
γ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪
= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 (A.148) 
Where: 
WRW = the retaining wall width [m] 
WH = the hazard width [m] 
γH = the hazard’s specific gravity [kN/m3] 
Thus through the assessment process included above, one can quantify if the retaining wall has 
sufficient capacity to withstand the imposed flood or torrent hazard forces. 
Retailing wall component failure assessment step E 
The fifth retaining wall failure assessment step, wall foundation resistance > applied horizontal 
moment, assesses if the retaining wall foundation can potential be overturned by the imposed 
hazard forces. In general, the overturning capacity of a retaining wall foundation can be assessed 
with Equation (A.149). 
 URWF HRWFM M>  (A.149) 
RDH
Flood or Torrent
pHH
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Where: 
MURWF = the retaining wall foundation ultimate moment capacity [kNm] 
MHRWF = the retaining wall foundation maximum hazard induced moment [kNm] 
Considering the retaining wall configuration shown in Figure A-31, the maximum hazard imposed 
moment on the retaining wall foundation can be quantified with Equation (A.150) as presented in 
Figure A-33. 
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Figure A-33: Assessing the retaining wall foundation to the applied mass movement or rockfall hazard. 
The retaining wall foundation ultimate moment capacity can be assessed, in terms of the reaction 
perpendicular to the slope and negating the self weight of the retaining wall, with Equation (A.151). 
 URWF HRWV RWBM R B=  (A.151) 
As there are numerous different retaining wall and brace foundation configurations which are in turn 
influenced by the local soil conditions, thus the vertical capacity of both the retaining wall and brace 
need to be obtained from the retaining wall plans or independently assessed by a trained foundation 
specialist. 
If it is found that the imposed hazard forces do cause the retaining wall foundations to be over 
turned, it is herein conservatively assumed that retaining wall along the entire width of the given 
mass movement hazard will also be overturned. 
Considering the retaining wall configuration shown in Figure A-32 for the flood and torrent hazards, 
the maximum hazard imposed moment on the retaining wall foundation can be quantified with 
Equation (A.152), as presented in Figure A-34. 
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Figure A-34: Assessing retaining wall foundation to the applied flood and torrent hazard forces. 
The retaining wall foundation ultimate moment capacity is a direct function of the type of retaining 
wall foundation employed and the local geological conditions, thus the moment capacity of the 
retaining wall needs to be obtained from the retaining wall plans or independently assessed by a 
trained foundation specialist. 
If it is found that the imposed hazard forces do cause the retaining wall foundations to be over 
turned, it is herein conservatively assumed that retaining wall along the entire width of the given 
flood or torrent hazard will also be overturned as long as the other retaining wall sections have equal 
or lesser moment capacities. 
Retailing wall component failure assessment step F 
Turning to the sixth and last retaining wall assessment step, retaining wall height > hazard height, 
assesses if the retaining wall is physically overtopped by the given hazard. This step is rather 
straightforwardly assessed with Equation (A.153). 
 RW HH RD>  (A.153) 
If the hazard does not overtop the given retaining wall, it is assumed that the retaining wall survives 
and the given hazard is effectively restrained. 
Thus through applying this retaining wall failure assessment process and the detailed assessment 
procedure detailed herein, one can qualitatively and quantitatively determine if and in what failure 
mode a retaining wall can potentially experience a failure due to any of the five considered hazards. 
A.6 Roadway failure assessment procedure 
Roadways include highways, roadways and small country lanes and comprise more than ninety-five 
percent of the road transportation network. Roadway objects are constructed by leveling the given 
location to a smooth grade, placing an appropriate gravel-based foundation and laying an asphalt or 
concrete roadway surface. While roadway objects, in comparison to all other objects, are by and 
large constructed in less hazard risk prone locations, these objects have negligible resistance, beyond 
their given location, to natural hazards. In consulting the five hazards, it is herein assumed that a 
roadway object can fail in seven different failure scenarios, as presented in Table A-5. When these 
seven potential failure scenarios are assessed as a group, two independent failure modes can be 
identified – specifically the roadway foundation can become compromised or the roadway can 
become buried in liquid or debris. 
Table A-5: Roadway failure modes and associated hazards. 
RDH
Flood or Torrent
pHH
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 Potential Hazards 
Failure mode Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Roadway foundation compromised - x x - - 
Roadway buried in liquid or debris x x x x x 
As a roadway’s only internal resistance to natural hazards is its location, roadway objects are 
commonly locally strengthened by constructing supporting culvert and retaining wall objects 
respectively under and above or below a given roadway in locations where the roadway object 
transects significant transverse grades, crosses small moving bodies of water, runs parallel to known 
flood or torrent hazard zones, or crosses recognized avalanche, landslide or rockfall hazard zones.  
Considering the positive influence culvert and retaining wall supporting objects can have on roadway 
object resistance and the two potential failure modes presented in Table A-5, these two failure 
modes can be arranged into a structured assessment process presented in Figure A-35. 
 
Figure A-35: Roadway component failure assessment process. 
Roadway component failure assessment step A 
The first step of the roadway failure assessment procedure, assessment step A: roadway location ≠ 
hazard location, requires a geographic coincident analysis to be conducted between the locations of 
the five potential hazards and the location of the given roadway object. It is during this phase of 
analysis that the true scope of the roadway failure assessment becomes evident, as typically only two 
or three of the potential five hazards are coincident with the given roadway object. 
Roadway component failure assessment step B 
In the second step of the roadway failure assessment procedure, assessment step B: supporting 
object location ≠ hazard location, a geographic coincident analysis is conducted between the given 
roadway object location, the hazard location and the supporting object location. If it is found that the 
supporting object is geographically coincident with the given hazard effecting the roadway object, 
the failure assessment process graduates to assessing the supporting object’s capacity in step C, and 
if not, the assessment process transitions to assessment step D. 
Roadway component failure assessment step C 
In the third step, assessment step C: supporting objects intact?, focuses on assessing if the 
supporting objects coincident with the given hazards effecting the studied roadway object has 
sufficient capacity to withstand the applied hazard forces. This is determined by conducting a failure 
assessment for the respective component and hazard. If it is found that the supporting object does in 
fact have sufficient capacity to withstand the applied hazard forces, it is herein assumed that the 
hazard will be prevented from coming in contact with given roadway and thus the roadway survives. 
Natural Hazard Event
Hazard Rupture Surface or 
Scour Depth = 0
Supporting Object Location  
Hazard Location
NoYes – Roadway Survives
No – Roadway buried in 
liquid or debris (R2)
Yes – Roadway foundation 
compromised (R1)
Roadway Location  
Hazard Location No
Yes – Roadway 
Survives
Roadway Assessment Steps
A
B
C
D
Supporting Objects Intact?
NoYes
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If it is found that the supporting object does not have sufficient capacity and experiences either 
structural or functional failures, it is herein assumed that the complete hazard intensity is 
transitioned directly onto the roadway. 
Roadway component failure assessment step D 
The fourth and final assessment step, hazard rupture surface or scour depth = 0, assesses if the 
roadway foundation can become compromised by a landslide or flood induced scour, as depicted in  
Figure A-36 and quantitatively assessed in Equation (A.154).  
0LD =  (A.154) 
As it is herein assumed that roadway objects have negligible foundational depths, if the landslide or 
scour depth at the roadway location exceeds a value of 0 at and location under the roadway, it is 
 
Figure A-36: Roadway foundation undermined by landslide or flood hazards. 
herein assumed that the roadway foundation will be undermined along the width of the flood 
induced scour or landslide hazard. The landslide rupture surface depth should be assessed by an 
experienced geologist. While this assessment is commonly conducted in a general nature, i.e. shallow 
or deep, such information can help to identify if the retaining wall foundations are above or below a 
potential landslide rupture surface. The potential scour depth can be assessed using the procedure 
presented in the bridge pier scour assessment or through alternative procedures presented in the 
Evaluating Scour at Bridges manual (Richardson & Davis, 2001). 
If the analysis conducted in fourth step of the roadway failure assessment validates Equation (A.154), 
it is herein assumed that the roadway object is structurally intact but the given roadway object is 
buried under the liquid or debris causing the roadway to be functionally inoperable along the entire 
width of the hazard. 
Through applying this roadway failure assessment process and the detailed assessment included 
herein, one can qualitatively and quantitatively determine if and in what failure mode a roadway, 
and its supportive objects, can potentially experience a failure due to any of the five considered 
hazards. 
A.7 Tunnel failure assessment procedure 
Tunnels are hardened structural objects constructed to pass roadways and railways through or under 
a masses of earth, rock or water. Tunnel objects are constructed either through a cut and cover 
process or by cutting a passageway through the in situate earth and rock. Within this immediate 
work, it is assumed that the buried nature of the tunnel component protects and precludes it from 
Roadway
DL
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potential avalanche, landslide and rockfall hazards. Therefore the process of assessing the failure of a 
tunnel object, focuses on the potential functional failure modes. 
Table A-6: Tunnel failure modes and associated hazards. 
 Potential Hazards 
Failure mode Avalanche Flood Landslide Rockfall Torrent 
Tunnel is ‘flooded’ with liquid or debris - x - - x 
Tunnel and utilities ‘flooded’ with liquid 
or debris 
- x - - x 
In Table 3-2, one can observe that it is assumed a tunnel object can fail in 4 different hazard 
scenarios. When these hazard scenarios are analyzed as a group, two independent failure modes can 
be identified, – specifically the inundation of the tunnel itself with liquid or debris or the inundation 
of the tunnel lighting and ventilation utilities with liquid or debris, Table A-6. These two failure 
modes can be arranged into a structured assessment process presented in Figure A-37.  
 
Figure A-37: Tunnel component failure assessment process. 
Tunnel component failure assessment step A 
The first step of the tunnel failure assessment process, assessment step A: tunnel entrance location ≠ 
hazard location, requires a geographic coincident analysis to be conducted between the two 
potential hazards, flood and torrent, and the tunnel entrance locations. If either of the two hazards 
are coincident with either of the tunnel entrances, and precluding any significant tunnel slopes, the 
tunnel is assumed to be inundated along its entire length.  
Tunnel component failure assessment step B 
With the coincident analysis conducted, the assessment then graduates to assessing the level of 
damage exacted upon the tunnel. The second tunnel assessment step determines if the tunnel 
utilities, including electrical, communication and ventilation utilities, are also inundated with the 
flood or torrent hazards. This assessment is conducted with Equation (A.155) and detailed in Figure 
A-38. 
 TTU
F
DD
H
H
⎛ ⎞
> ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (A.155) 
Where: 
HTU = the height of the lowest tunnel electrical, communication or ventilation utilities [m] 
Natural Hazard Event
Tunnel Utility Elevation 
> Hazard Height
Yes – Tunnel ‘flooded’ 
with liquid or debris (T1)
No – Tunnel and utilities ‘flooded’ 
with liquid or debris (T2)
Tunnel Entrance Location  
Hazard Location No
Yes – Tunnel 
Survives
Tunnel Assessment Steps
A
B
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Figure A-38: General tunnel configuration. 
Thus through this general tunnel assessment process and the detailed assessment process presented 
herein, one can qualitatively and quantitatively determine if a tunnel can potentially experience a 
functional failure due to the considered hazards – flood and torrent. 
  
NTS
HTU
DDT or HT
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B Limits of Analytical Risk Management 
B.1 Managing risk sources in civil engineering 
Risk sources within the civil engineering and construction industries are managed and mitigated as in 
any other industries but in these domains, the most common risk management activities are 
integrated into the building codes and standards. These risk management policies and approaches 
are developed through a highly empirical process employing system, elemental and material testing. 
With these manuals, civil engineers are able to analyze a structure, be it a bridge or a building, and 
determine if it has the structural capacity to withstand the anticipated forces. Unfortunately these 
codes do have their limitations and where these limitations are breached, professional modes of 
practice take the place of formalized codes. 
B.2 Expanding the limits of formalized codes – the life quality index 
One such area in which the building code limits are surpassed is in evaluating what is an acceptable 
level of investment to advert the loss of a life. As highlighted by Tengs et. al. in their cross 
comparison of the cost-effectiveness of five-hundred life-saving interventions which have been 
either fully implemented, partially implemented or not implemented, the cost-effectiveness of life 
saving interventions can vary significantly from a net gain on investment in fields such as drug and 
alcohol treatment to a potential net investment cost of tens of millions of dollars per life saved in the 
fields of chemical and radiation control (Tengs, et al., 1995).14 
While it is good to see that cost-effectiveness is being actively considered in practical decision 
making, the cost-effectiveness range of these risk reduction measures leaves the question of an 
acceptable maximum cost-effectiveness limit unanswered. The variance of risk reduction measures 
from project to project even within the same industry has further complicated the civil engineer’s 
task of designing a `safely operating´ structure for it has become difficult if not impossible to define 
what is a `safe enough´ safely operating structure. 
One approach for determining the acceptable level of life-saving investment is the Life Quality Index 
(LQI) developed by Nathwani, Lind and Pandey (1997). The motivation for developing the LQI was to 
improve “the overall public welfare by reducing risk to life in a cost-effective manner” for in the 
words of the LQI developers one should choose the “prospect to save life or produce wealth if no 
alternative presents a greater life expectancy net or work-time cost.” (Pandey, Nathwani, & Lind, 
2006, pp. 342, 352).  
B.3 Life quality index theoretical foundation 
The theoretical foundation of the LQI is constructed on four key tenets: 
                                                          
14 It should be noted that in a subsequent letter to the editor submitted by a representative of the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), it was stated that of the eleven EPA related life-saving 
interventions included in the cross comparison, only two – radionuclide regulations in underground uranium 
mines ($101,60014/life) and in elemental phosphorous plants ($11,400,000/life) – were actually implemented. 
In all other cases, “a control option less costly than that listed was adopted, or a decision was made not to 
regulate at all.” (Puskin & Bunger, 1996, p. 131) 
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1) Risk reduction funds should be equally distributed. 
2) Risk management decisions should be accountable and transparent. 
3) Potential adversely affected individuals should be fairly compensated. 
4) The amount of investment should reflect society’s work to leisure equilibrium. (Nathwani, 
Lind, & Pandey, 1997) 
Equal distribution of risk reduction funds 
The first theoretical LQI tenet posed by the LQI developers is that risk reduction funds, which are 
assumed to be a fixed and scarce commodity, should be invested “in an impartial manner, since gain 
in life expectancy is valued equally, irrespective of who gets it.” If such an approach were to be 
implemented in practice, the LQI developers take the view point that the available resources would 
purchase the maximum benefit for the general society (Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 1997). 
Supporting this argument, the LQI developers have highlighted the investment dichotomy between 
treating the effects of water born diseases in the developing world and chemical regulatory 
standards in industrialized countries. In particular, the LQI developers note that in 1993 diarrheal 
diseases took the lives of approximately 3 million children the loss of which could have been 
prevented through the dissemination of food safety education, hygienic behavior promotion and 
administration of oral rehydration salts (ORS) amounting to a total investment of $1.03/life saved 
(World Health Organization, 2007) (Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 1997). This and other similar needs 
were left unfulfilled while multi-million dollar regulatory investments per life saved such as 
radionuclide emission control at elemental phosphorous plants ($11.84 million/life saved), 
strengthening buildings in earthquake regions (23 million/life saved), and chloroform reduction at 70 
pulp and paper mills ($19.3 million/life saved) were being required by law (Tengs, et al., 1995). 
Accountability principle 
The LQI developers’ second tenet is an “Accountability Principle” in which “Decisions for the public in 
regard to health and safety must be open, quantified, defensible, consistent and applied across the 
complete range of hazards to life.” The authors continue to state that “(t)here is a need for a single, 
clear process for managing risks affecting the public. Once known and accepted, this rationale 
removes day-to-day decisions about risk from the political arena where they do not belong.” 
(Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 1997, p. 23) In the view of the LQI developers, this unified industry 
standard would give the practitioners the tools and support they need for making difficult decisions 
concerning allocating life-saving investment funds. 
Currently within the science and engineering practice, cost-benefit analysis is actively used but as is 
commonly said `the devil is in the details’ with the various risk assessments considering, weighing or 
even ignoring the direct and indirect risk elements (National Resarch Council, 1983). This has 
introduced confusion and uncertainty within society who has begun to question the processes and 
analyzes decision makers employ in reaching their decisions. This has resulted in society losing faith 
in the decision maker’s priorities and thus society commonly reverts to the precautionary principle – 
demanding additional regulations and regulatory processes which, in turn, further widens the cost 
differential among life-saving interventions (Slovic, 1999). 
Fair compensation 
The third foundational tenet posed by the LQI developers is that potential losers of life-saving 
investment reallocations can be transformed into non-losers through the allocation of secondary 
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compensation (Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 1997). The developers employ the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
Principle which defines an efficient situation as a situation in which the winners can in theory 
compensate the losers but that compensation is not required to actually be transferred (Wikipedia, 
2008). Through using this approach, the developers state “the cost of a project and affected 
individuals who bear the additional risk are compensated. This compensation if it is viewed as fair by 
those affected, transforms the potential losers into non-losers thus making the policy for all at least 
neutral.” (Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 1997) 
One commonly sighted example of a Kaldor-Hicks efficient situation is the introduction of additional 
risk exposure tasks for factory workers. In this environment, factory workers are commonly 
compensated for exposure to dangerous situations with additional compensation or danger pay. 
From the viewpoint of the Kaldor-Hicks efficient situation if the employees accept these employment 
conditions – exposure to the dangerous situations for the associated financial compensation – the 
potential losers are transferred into non-losers (Viscusi & O'Connor, 1984). 
Ratio of work to leisure 
The last tenet posed by Nathwani and his coauthors is that life-saving investment should “reflect 
peoples’ revealed preference for the work/non-work (leisure) time ratio” (Pandey, Nathwani, & Lind, 
2006, p. 342). The LQI developers state that such a work/leisure balance is reached by workers in a 
similar fashion as the way in which consumers choose between consumption and leisure – through 
the marginal rate of substitution. Per this argument developed by Nathwani and his colleagues, a 
worker determines how many hours he should work each week, how many weeks he should work 
each year and how many years he should work in a life-time by directly considering the marginal rate 
of substitution of gains from potential additional work offsetting the potential loss of leisure time. 
Thus, in the view of the LQI developers, the ratio of working time to leisure time is a direct reflection 
of how much time the average worker is willing to forfeit for the resulting gain. 
Upon these four fundamental tenets, the LQI developers have employed macroeconomic and 
mathematical derivation processes to formulate the Life Quality Index. While these derivation steps 
are not directly included herein, the specific derivation steps and reasoning can be found within 
(Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 1997) (Pandey, Nathwani, & Lind, 2006). 
B.4 The life quality index 
B.4.1 The life quality index equation 
The life quality index for a given country is a function of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
(the annual financial resources at the given country’s disposal), the life expectancy (a reflection of 
the number of working years a person can contribute) and the proportion of an individual’s lifetime 
invested in working within the given country. The original formulation of the LQI is: 
 (1 )w woL g e
−
=  (B.1) 
Where: 
L0 = the original life quality index [$/person] 
g = the real gross domestic product per capita [$/person/year] 
e = the life expectancy at birth [years] 
w = the average amount of an individual’s lifetime invested in working [  ] 
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Thus, the LQI is calculated by raising the gross domestic product per capita (g) by the proportion of 
time spent working (w) and multiplying this quantity by the life expectancy at birth (e) raised by the 
proportion of time spent in non-work related activities (1-w) (Nathwani, Lind, & Pandey, 1997). 
As this index is a function of the productivity (g), the length of time a given individual can contribute 
to society by working (the life expectancy e) and the ratio between substituting additional work for 
less leisure time and vice versa (w), the LQI increases as a society’s annual production and life 
expectancy increases and decreases as the society moves to substituting additional leisure for a 
reduction in work. 
In 2004, two of the original LQI developers released a secondary life quality indicator by considering 
work-leisure tradeoffs, such that: 
 
1
1 1
w
w w
oL g e L− −= =  (B.2) 
Where: 
L = redefined LQI considering work-leisure tradeoffs (Pandey & Nathwani, 2004) 
This redefined LQI formulation will be subsequently referred to as the LQI or L and will be the 
equation employed in all subsequent discussions, analyzes and examples. In this LQI formulation, the 
economic production of a given country is raised by the country’s ratio of working to leisure activities 
and multiplied by the country’s life expectancy. 
Example B-1 - Calculate the Life Quality Index for a country: 
Taking the country of Switzerland in 2004 for example, where the real GDP per capita (g) is $50,387 
(IMF, 2007), life expectancy at birth is 81.304 years (World Health Organization, 2007), and the ratio 
of work time is 0.137615 and employing Equation (B.2): 
 
0.1376
1 1 0.1376($50387) (81.304 )
w
wL g e years− −= =  
Resulting in a Life Quality Index of 457.50. 
In this form, the LQI is just what its name implies, a social index and indicator which can be used to 
track the economic and life expectancy developments of a country in time and to compare the 
economic and life expectancy developments of various countries against one another. 
B.4.2 Deriving the maximum life-saving investment 
Where the potential application of the LQI for the civil engineering community becomes evident is 
when one considers how the LQI fluctuates in time as a function of changes in the life expectancy 
and GDP per capita. These life expectancy and financial modifications can be considered as the 
implications of additional safety measures. This form of the LQI is determined by taking the 
derivative of the LQI, by assuming the work to leisure ratio remains constant in the face of changing 
life expectancy, resulting in: 
 
1
1 1
1
w w
w w
wdL g dg e g de
w
−
− −
= ⋅ +
−
 (B.3) 
                                                          
15 0.1376 = [(40 hours/week)(50 weeks/year)(49 years/life)] / [(24 hours/day)(365 days/year)(81.304 years/life) 
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Where: 
de = the new safety regulation impact on the life expectancy at birth 
dg = the financial investment required to implement this new safety regulation per exposed 
individual 
dL = the change of the LQI as a function of a new safety regulation 
Normalizing both sides with respect to the LQI produces: 
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1 1
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−
=  (B.4) 
Which simplifies to: 
 1
w dgdL dew
L g e
⋅
−
= +  (B.5) 
For a regulation to be beneficial, the dL, the change of the life quality index, must be greater than 
zero, thus: 
 1 0
w dg dew
g e
− + ≥  (B.6) 
Finally, solving for the required financial investment (dg) per individual protected yields: 
 
1
g dedg
w
e
w
⋅
= −
⋅
−
 (B.7) 
The authors of the LQI propose this value, dg, is the maximum optimal life-saving investment applied 
to save, de, number of lives that can be sustained by a country with an annual production g, a life 
expectancy e and a work to leisure ratio of w. 
Example B-2 - Calculate the maximum optimal life-saving investment for Switzerland: 
Continuing with the Switzerland example introduced in Example B-1, calculate the maximum optimal 
investment that should be expended to implement a safety regulation which reduces the risk to life 
uniformly by 1·10-6. 
The maximum optimal investment is determined with Equation (B.7). This equation requires one to 
obtain or calculate the variables g, e, w and de. The first three variables g, e and w were calculated as 
$50,287, 80.304 years and 0.1376 respectively in Example B-1, but the impact of the new safety 
regulation on the life expectancy (de) must be determined by calculating the life-expectancy change 
induced by the new regulation. 
The Switzerland 2004 life-table is presented in Example B-1 where: 
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Figure B-1: Optimal life-saving investment (dg), life expectancy (e) and GDP per capita (g) plotted across the 
data set. 
In Figure B-1, the optimal life-saving investment per 1 million individuals (dg/1·106), the life 
expectancy (e) and the GDP per capita (g) for each of the 190 representative countries have been 
sorted by increasing the dg values (please note that as dg, the optimal life-saving investment, is an 
expenditure, it is shown as a negative value). In Figure B-1, one can see that over 60 percent of the 
countries in the studied data set, the GDP per capita and the optimal life-saving investment are just 
slightly increasing, while the life-expectancy for these same countries exhibits strong growth. 
  
Figure B-2: The optimal life-saving investment per one million citizens (shown in millions of dollars) plotted 
against a) Work to leisure ratio (w), b) Life Expectancy (e) 
Interestingly enough, during the last 40% of the data set, the GDP per capita and optimal life-saving 
investment show exponential growth while the life-expectancy growth slows. 
Looking at the individual variable influence upon the resulting optimal life-saving investment, it can 
be seen in Figure B-2a that the work to leisure ratio (w) has no significant correlation with the 
optimal life-saving investment. In Figure B-2b one can observe that below a life expectancy of 70 
years of age, the optimal life-saving investment is consistently low. It is only when the life-expectancy 
surpasses 70 years of age that the optimal life-saving investment exponentially increases. 
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Furthermore, in Figure B-3, one can observe that the change in life expectancy (de) increases linearly 
with an increasing original life-expectancy (e). From these two figures, one can observe that as the 
potential length of life increases, the associated optimal life-saving investment and the resulting 
change in life expectancy also increases. 
From this cross country analysis, one can observe that the optimal life-saving investment is a function 
of the given country’s GDP per capita, life expectancy, and work to leisure ratio. A large portion of 
the world, the developing countries in particular, has a relative low and consistent optimal life-saving 
investment reflecting the limited resources available to the given countries. As additional financial 
and human production resources become available (GDP per capita and life expectancy increases) 
the optimal life-saving investment increases at an exponential rate. Through the LQI approach, 
analytical risk analysts can compute the optimal life-saving intervention costs for various countries 
around the globe and through applying this approach they can ensure the life-saving investment 
does not outstretch the country’s available resources. 
 
Figure B-3: The change in life expectancy (de) plotted against the Life expectancy (e) 
B.5 Applications of the LQI in industry17 
The life quality index and the derived optimal life-saving investment have been employed as a 
fundamental element in the cost benefit analysis of a number of different risk decision processes 
including in regulating particulate matter and ozone levels in Canada, in evaluating various nuclear 
safety options, in determining the acceptable level of investment to advert traffic and road accidents 
and in formulating an inspection planning regime for offshore production facilities. 
Regulating particular matter and ozone levels in Canada 
Ozone molecules and particulate matter (including soot, acids, sulphates and nitrates) pose a threat 
to life, for these particles penetrate deep into lungs blocking and damaging the individual’s bronchi 
and alveolar sacs – reducing the individual’s lung capacity. If exposure time and levels persist, 
                                                          
17 Please note: the life quality index and optimal life saving investment values stated within this section are 
directly from their respective source documents. The respective calculation values and approaches have not 
been updated to match the calculation approaches presented in Equation (B.2). Lastly, the dollar valuations 
have not been updated to reflect inflation. 
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significant lung damage can accumulate, contributing to an increased risk to life of the individual 
(Pope, et al., 1995). In Canada, the particulate matter and ozone standards are first formulated by 
the Standards Development Committee which are then submitted to and ratified by the Canadian 
Council of Ministers of the Environment. 
In 2000, the Canadian Standards Development Committee employed a cost benefit analysis based 
upon the Air Quality Valuation Model to estimate health benefits associated with pollution 
reduction, the LQI optimal life-saving investment to formulate a financial valuation for each life saved 
and the U.S. EPA data to estimate the cost and emission regulation efficiency options for various air 
particulate and ozone regulations ranging from PM10/PM2.5 = 70/35 to 50/25 mg/m
3 and 70 to 60 ppb 
respectively. This cost benefit analysis found that when evaluated independently, the most stringent 
particulate regulation level PM10/PM2.5 = 50/25 was still cost effective with an estimated cost of $1.6 
billion, an avoided mortality savings of $12.3 billion and a cost benefit ratio of 7.7 while the most 
liberal ozone regulation 70 ppb was cost effective with an estimated implementation cost of $790 
million, an avoided mortality savings of $740 million and a cost benefit ratio of 0.9. A potential 
composite particulate-ozone regulation was reached by combining to slightly less stringent 
regulation options resulting in a PM10/PM2.5/ozone = 60/30/65 regulation limits with a joint 
estimated cost of $2.41 billion, an avoided mortality savings of $8.16 billion and a cost benefit ratio 
of 3.3 (Pandey & Nathwani, 2003). 
Selecting nuclear safety programs for Canadian nuclear reactors 
A number of Canadian nuclear reactors are envisioned to reach the end of their service lives within 
the next 15 years. To continue operating these reactors, cost effective refurbishment solutions must 
be found – otherwise the most cost effective solution will be to decommission the facilities. A key 
element in evaluating the cost effectiveness of the various refurbishment options is selecting 
refurbishment options which efficiently meet the plant worker and neighboring population radiation 
exposure limits. The worker age-adjusted low-level ionizing radiation mortality risk is estimated at 
0.026 lives/Sv (National Academy of Sciences, 1990) 
To evaluate the various ionizing radiation reduction options, the investigators computed the relative 
change in life expectancy of a 35 year old worker exposed to 1 mSv/year/person over a 30 year 
professional life. The resulting change in life expectancy (de/e) was equal to 5.1982*10-4. Likewise 
the optimal life-saving investment for the 35 year old worker was computed to be 112.9 
$/year/person/Sv with a total compensation of 4967 $/person/Sv for the remaining expected 44 
years of life. The investigators then compared the cost of the safety measures installed during 
construction of a typical plant against the financial equivalent lost of life adverted by the active 
functioning of said safety measures (considering population distribution near the plant and local 
environmental conditions affecting radiation dispersion) and found that the safety improvement 
costs ($1.7 billion) are justified to advert the expected mean population dose of 1300-1400 Sv 
(Ontario Hydro, 1987) (Pandey & Nathwani, 2003). 
Roadway maintenance and safety in the Netherlands 
The quality of a roadway surface, the roadway skid resistance and tire rut depth, is a function of the 
amount of invested upkeep maintenance. The roadway surface quality influences the number of 
road accidents and fatalities with the surface quality being inversely related with the number of 
accidents and fatalities. In this specific case, the risk managers explored if the current level of road 
maintenance was justified against the potential number of adverted accidents and fatalities. 
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Considering the road segment in question, the risk managers determined that reducing the level of 
annual maintenance at a savings of 20€ million would result in 6 additional depths per year. In 
applying the life quality index and through considering non-fatal accident related costs, the risk 
managers determined the additional loss of life and damage costs would total 39€ million – far 
exceeding the saved maintenance investment. Thus from the application of the LQI, the risk 
managers were able to confirm that the current level of maintenance is appropriate and necessary 
(Pandey, van Noortwijk, & Klatter, 2006). 
Inspection planning for offshore production facilities 
Fixed offshore welded steel structures – commonly used in oil production operations – are highly 
susceptible to fatigue crack development. Direct or indirect visual inspection of the steel members 
and welded connections can be employed to verify the occurrence and developmental extent of 
potential cracks. Unfortunately, these cost prohibitive preventative measure can quickly jeopardize 
the financial stability of such offshore structures. Thus, risk-based assessments are employed in 
developing inspection regimes. 
In the case at hand, the inspection plan developers employed a LQI based risk assessment approach 
which considered potential personal, environmental and ecological risks. Through applying this 
approach, the development team was able to formulate an optimal inspection plan which fulfilled 
the stated acceptance criteria which included the LQI valuation of life (Faber, Straub, & Goyet, 2003). 
From these examples, one can observe that current complex engineering decision processes in a 
wide range of technical domains and geographic locations can be addressed through applying a life 
quality index based risk assessment. This can aid risk analysts in arriving at analytically optimal 
decisions that balance available resources against the implement life-saving regulations. 
B.6 Investigating the validity of the LQI theoretical foundation 
B.6.1 LQI: The solution? 
If engineering decisions including such items as particulate matter and ozone pollution regulation, 
nuclear safety programs in Canadian nuclear reactors, roadway maintenance investment and 
offshore production facility inspection planning fulfill if not surpass the LQI optimal life-saving 
investment requirements, why is there still such significant public concern and distrust of the 
decisions set forth by risk managers (Slovic, 1999)? It is proposed that this public concern and 
potential distrust is a direct product of the different risk assessment approaches employed by 
technical risk managers and the experiencing public. 
B.6.2 Equally distributed risk reduction funds 
On the surface, the argument of equally distributed life-saving interventions to obtain the largest 
gain, without considering who the recipient is sounds reasonable, but the LQI developers made two 
flawed assumptions counterintuitive to human nature in formulating this tenet. The LQI developers 
have assumed: 
a) safety expenditure is directly transferable between risk sources  
b) individuals are capable of impartially allocating life-saving investment 
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Within this figure the voluntary risks (e.g. swimming and alcohol consumption) are represented with 
an x, the involuntary risks (e.g. nuclear power and commercial aviation) are represented with a filled 
circle and the inconclusive risks (i.e. handguns and large construction) are represented with open 
circles. From this figure, one can observe that a significant dispersion in the amount of money 
invested in combating the various risk sources. Furthermore, more resources are invested on average 
in combating involuntary risk sources in comparison to voluntary experienced risk sources.  
Such contextual influence over the risk valuation is also apparent in a research study conducted by 
Michael Siegrist (1997) who asked a group of individuals to state the amount they were willing to 
allocate for a safer medicine. The key element of this experiment was that stated valuations for risks 
represented as probabilities (e.g. 0.0006) were compared against risks represented as frequencies 
(600 in 1,000,000). Dr. Siegrist found that risks presented in a frequency format were consistently 
allocated a higher value than risks represented in a probability format. 
If such societal valuations are blindly ignored rather than directly addressed, the employed technical 
risk management policy may be incongruent with society’s expectations – creating an environment 
of distrust between the public and the risk manager. 
B.6.3 Accountability principle 
The LQI developers’ second tenet is that a unified rationale should be developed for taking action in 
society’s interest for managing risks affecting the public. They then propose that once this rationale 
is known and accepted, this rationale should remove the day-to-day risk decisions from the political 
arena where, in LQI developers’ opinion, they do not belong. 
While, it is important to develop a unified rationale for managing risks affecting the public, it is 
essential that this process involve direct public participation or at least a public vetting stage rather 
than unilaterally removing the day-to-day risk decisions from the political arena, as is proposed by 
the LQI developers. Since the direct result of well or poorly managed risks is the increase or decrease 
of public health and safety, this process by all means should involve the people who are directly 
affected – the public and associated stakeholders.  
Indirect and direct public participation in governmental decisions has been a key element of direct 
and representational democracies for centuries. Recently, one approach to further foster public and 
stakeholder involvement has been the formation of deliberative democracies – governmental bodies 
composed of common citizens who discuss, deliberate, formulate and manage the implementation 
of policy decisions for issues commonly relegated to formal governmental bodies (Fung & Wright, 
2003). Two poignant examples of deliberative democracies are the formulation of environmental 
regulations within the United States and the management of local communities in Kerala, India.  
Within the United States the bulk of environmental regulations are formulated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), a federal governmental body. One of the primary legislative policies 
employed by the EPA is the Endangered Species Act (ESA) which forbids any government agency, 
corporation or citizen from harming or harassing endangered and threaten species or their 
respective environments. While these regulations do prevent communities from negligently altering 
the environments of endangered or threaten species, it also prevents communities from taking 
actions which improve an endangered or threaten species’ environment. It is within this former case 
that Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs), a form of deliberative democracy, has fostered. Habitat 
conservation plans are conservation oriented land use plans which have been tailored to meet the 
The responsive approach: An integrated socially-sustainable technically-optimal decision model 
226   
environmental and economic constraints of the given location. The development of HCPs has shown 
that when multiple economic, political, environmental and civic stakeholders are each individually 
motivated to participate in creating a HCP, the end result is a sound marriage between the 
environmental and economic constraints of the given region. But where only one or two 
stakeholders motivated to participate, commonly a land-owner or natural resource extraction 
company, the resulting HCP is significantly slanted towards meeting the economic interests of the 
involved stakeholders  (Karkkainen, 2003).  
In Kerala, one of India’s 28 states, a five year deliberative democracy pilot program was conducted 
between 1996 and 2001. Within this program, forty percent of the state’s developmental investment 
funds were allocated directly to over 1200 newly created Local Self-Governing Institutions (LSGIs). 
Each LSGI was comprised of citizen volunteers from the respective local area. These volunteers, who 
were commonly first given informal civic training, were charged with assessing the local community’s 
developmental needs and formulating development related projects. Through the course of the five 
year program, it was found that when adequate civic training was provided, the LSGIs helped to 
greatly improve the efficiency and applicability of the development investment. Instances where the 
civic training resources were scarce due to financial or political constraints, the quality of the 
developmental investment also suffered  (Isaac & Heller, 2003). 
These two example cases show that public involvement, particularly when the local citizens are 
personally motivated and given informal civics training, can be an asset, rather than a potential 
complication to be avoided, for formulating public decisions. 
In formulating their accountability principle, The LQI developers add the condition that once this 
process is known and accepted, the process will be removed from the political arena. The developers 
fail to consider that public acceptance for a process is highly sensitive to public trust and public trust 
is fueled by transparency and public interaction (Freudenburg, 2003). By removing this risk 
management process from the public realm, the developers are undermining public interaction and 
are developing a ripe environment for diminished public trust and potential rejection of this 
proposed process (Frewer, 2003). 
Lastly, in assessing and mitigating extremely rare risks (i.e. the safe functioning of a nuclear power 
plant, environmental regulation, mitigating natural risks) the information contained and discussed 
within the analytical risk assessment process is commonly the only venue through which the general 
public can be exposed to analytical risk information. If this sole remaining avenue for accessing the 
truth and reanchoring one’s experience-based risk assessment is removed, the general public will be 
completely adrift – left to the whims and currents of the media and popular viewpoints (Leiss, 2003). 
In such an ostracized environment, it is not surprising that the general public’s experience-based risk 
assessment can significantly differ from the practitioner’s analytical risk assessment. 
B.6.4 Fair compensation 
The third tenet posed by the LQI developers is that potential losers of life-saving investment 
reallocations can be turned into non-losers through the allocation of secondary compensation if the 
compensation is viewed as fair by those affected. In forming this tenet, the LQI developers fail to 
consider the limitation that stakeholders in public risk decisions, particularly potential losers, are 
seldom in a position where they can freely express their opinions and demand what they believe is 
‘fair’ compensation. 
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Within the factory worker example presented earlier, the acceptance of the risky working 
environment and the associated danger pay without confirmation that alternative employment 
choices and opportunities are in fact available to the factory workers is a prime example of negative 
liberty – the workers have liberty from oppression (the ability not to work in the elevated hazardous 
work environment) but the costs of this liberty (leaving the job) is not considered (Wikipedia, 2008). 
The intricacies of negative liberty have been extensively studied by Amartya Sen who in analyaing the 
causal forces of famines has shown that famines are commonly caused not by the shortage of food 
but by the inability of the starving population to purchase or acquire food (Sen, 1981). The 
individuals starving in a famine are free to choose (they have liberty) but their choice was 
constrained by their financial situation. Thus the only choice they had was to starve to death 
(negative liberty). Without positive liberty – “the opportunity and ability to fulfill one’s own 
potential” – the choice made by the factory worker or by the starving citizen can by no means be 
viewed as ‘fair’ (Wikipedia, 2008). Thus to actually transfer potential losers into non-losers through 
secondary compensation, one must transparently engage the general public or given group in active 
discussion and interaction in an environment devoid of the negative liberty constraints thereby 
ensuring the given group has the knowledge and the capacity to evaluate and freely accept or reject 
the offered compensation. Only under such situations can chosen compensation be deemed `fair´ 
compensation. 
B.6.5 A solution for the LQI? 
From these investigations and discussions, one can observe that a large range of information, 
capability and political barriers can undermine the validity and applicability of the LQI theoretical 
tenets. In face of these barriers one is faced with the question of which way to proceed –  
1) Employ an LQI based analytical risk management approach by declaring these barriers as 
non-consequential and proceed unilaterally in managing risks in conformance with the LQI 
thereby removing the day-to-day risk decisions from the political arena where, in LQI 
developers’ opinion, they do not belong. 
2) Employ a populist risk management approach by minimizing the analytical practitioners’ 
influence in the risk management process and transferring the risk management approach 
over to the political establishment and the general civic communities. 
3) Develop the basis for a joint socially and analytically optimal risk management approach by 
declaring a need for a analytically based risk management approach and investigating how 
the management of the risk source contextual elements can influence society’s experience-
based risk assessment. 
This first option, declaring the capability and political barriers non-consequential and proceeding 
unilaterally in managing risks in conformance with the LQI recommended investment levels is a 
relatively compact and actionable solution for the risk assessment, decision formation and policy 
implementation would be all conducted by the same entity – the analytical practitioner. 
Unfortunately, this option wrests the risk management process from the social and political realms 
and hence if the developed decisions prove contrary to society’s desires or concerns the resulting 
reactionary response could significantly undermine, if not outright jeopardize, the analytical 
practitioner’s participation in the risk management process. 
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The second option, transferring the risk management approach over to the political establishment 
and general civil communities has been proven to be a valid solution for managing issues in which 
multiple stakeholders have a strong motive to be involved in the deliberative process and where 
sufficient civic training and support is provided. Thus this approach should be valid for making very 
geographically, temporally and subject focused risk decisions – such as determining the location of a 
power plant. Unfortunately the stakeholders’ personal interest or analytical expertise may be 
exceeded when the technical aspects of the risk source passes either into less contentious or more 
complex technical aspects, undermining the risk management body. 
The third option – declaring a need for a analytical based risk management approach but investing 
time and resources into researching how the management of the risk source contextual elements can 
influence the social experience-based risk assessment would facilitate the analytical risk manager in 
contextualizing and tuning the risk management policies to meet society’s concerns while 
maintaining the majority of the risk management tasks within the same entity – the analytical 
practitioner.  
This third option is the perspective and approach actively employed in this work.  
B.7 A Path Forward – Investigating the Dynamics of Experience-Based Risk 
Assessment 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 lay the foundation for building a bridge connecting the analytical and social 
experienced-based aspects of risk management. The three main steps of this methodological 
construction project are: 
1)  Developing a quantitative model from key findings within the psychology and sociology 
fields to simulate an individual’s social experience-based risk responses to sequence of 
events (Chapter 5). 
2) Employing this quantitative model to simulate the experience-based risk assessment 
responses to different risk management approaches – with addressing particular attention to 
how the risk source event magnitude and societal risk source interaction frequency 
influences the social experience-based risk assessment. (Chapter 6). 
3) Proposing and assessing the feasibility of a methodology for documenting the personal 
experience-based assessment of risk (Chapter 7). 
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C The psychology of person constructs18 
Personal concepts – General constraints: 
? Dichotomy corollary – A person’s construction system is composed of a finite 
number of dichotomous constructs. 
? Choice corollary – A person chooses for himself that alternative in a dichotomized 
construct though which he anticipates the greater possibility for extension and 
definition of his system. 
? Range corollary – A construct is convenient for the anticipation of a finite range of 
events only. 
Personal concepts – Interaction evaluation mechanism: 
? Construction corollary – A person anticipates events by construing their 
replications. 
Post-evaluation benchmark reformation: 
? Experience corollary – A person’s construction system varies as he successively 
construes the replications of events. 
? Modulation corollary – the variation in a person’s construction system is limited 
by the permeability of the constructs within whose range of convenience the 
variants lie. 
? Organization corollary – Each person characteristically evolves, for his 
convenience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing ordinal 
relationships between constructs. 
? Fragmentation corollary – A person may successively employ a variety of 
construction subsystems which are inferentially incompatible with each other. 
Societal concepts: 
? Individuality corollary – Persons differ from each other in their construction of 
events.  
? Commonality corollary – To the extent that one person employs a construction of 
experience which is similar to that employed by another, his psychological 
processes are similar to those of the other person. 
? Sociality corollary – To the extent that one person construes the construction 
processes of another, he may play a role in a social process involving the other 
person. (Kelly G. A., 1963, pp. 103-104) 
                                                          
18 Note, the corollaries have been reordered and separated into the subject titles to improve clarity. 
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additional work by employing a non-standard fabrication procedure against the advice 
of Parsons Corporation. 
o Collaborated with a tight knit team to provide real-team fabrication review and onsite 
support for the construction of the 1056m suspension bridge. 
Master of Science in Civil Engineering, GPA: 3.63/4.0, January 2001-June 2002 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, United States of America 
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• Developed a state-of-the-art conceptual design of an elevated fiber reinforced composite light 
railway for Bombardier Transportation which can be completely prefabricated and assembled 
onsite – significantly reducing costly onsite construction. 
• Honors: Lehigh University Presidential Scholar (one year tuition funding), Magna cum laude 
Structural Engineering Intern, Bridge and Tunnel Division, June 2001-August 2001 
Parsons Corporation, New York, New York, United States of America 
Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering, GPA: 3.71/4.0, Department Rank: 2/39, September 1997-June 2001 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, United States of America 
• Honors: Magna cum laude, Dean’s List All Four Years 
PUBLICATIONS   
Birdsall, JD & Hajdin, R. Submitted. Vulnerability Assessment of Individual Infrastructure Objects Subjected to  
Natural Hazards. 10th International Bridge and Structure Management Conference. Buffalo, 20-22 
October, 2008. 
Birdsall, JD, Hajdin, R, Erath, A & Axhausen, K. 2007. Assessing infrastructure vulnerability to sudden events.  
INFRADAY 2007: 6th Conference on applied infrastructure research. Berlin, 5-6 October. 
Birdsall, JD & Brühwiler, E. 2007. Methods for documenting the personally constructed reality of risk.  
International Symposium Proceedings: Safety and reliability for managing risk. Stavanger, Norway, 25-
27 June. 
Birdsall, JD & Brühwiler, E. 2006. Changing perceptions: Managing civil infrastructure in a post-intentional  
action environment. In Carlose Guedes Soares & Enrico Zio (editors), International Symposium 
Proceedings: Safety and reliability for managing risk, Estoril, 18-22 September 2006, London: Taylor & 
Francis. 
Birdsall, JD. 2006. Affect-based approach: Quantifying user costs related to infrastructure. In Thomas Vogel,  
Nebojša Mojsilovi, Peter Marti (editors), 6th International PhD Symposium in Civil Engineering, Zürich, 
23-26 August 2006, SP-015, Zürich: IBK Publikation. 
Birdsall, JD & Brühwiler, E. 2006. Harnessing social perception of a bridge’s condition. In Paulo J.S. Cruz, Dan  
M Frangopol and Luis C Neves (editors), Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Bridge 
Maintenance, Safety and Management, Porto, 16-19 July 2006, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Birdsall, JD. 2002. Structural Guideways: Advanced Materials and New Structural Systems. Master’s Thesis,  
Lehigh University, Dr. John L. Wilson & Dr. Ben Yen (advisors). 
PRESENTATIONS   
Assessing infrastructure vulnerability to sudden events. INFRADAY 2007: 6th Conference on applied 
infrastructure research. Berlin, 5-6 October 2007. 
Changing perceptions: Managing civil infrastructure in a post-intentional action environment. International  
Symposium: Safety and reliability for managing risk, Estoril, 18-22 September 2006. 
Affect-based approach: Quantifying user costs related to infrastructure. 6th International PhD Symposium in  
Civil Engineering, Zürich, 23-26 August 2006. 
Defining Life in civil engineering life-cycle analysis. Structures Institute, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de  
Lausanne, 1 December 2005. 
AWARDS  
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne University Scholar, September 2004-December 2008 
Fully funded doctoral program for all four years. 
Lehigh University Presidential Scholar, September 2001-June 2002 
One year tuition funded, awarded for undergraduate scholastic achievement 
Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society, March 2001 
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  Inducted into the liberal arts and sciences honor society Phi Beta Kappa for undergraduate academic  
achievement. 
CE News 2001 Star Student, December 2000 
Ranked as one of the top 15 2001 United States of America civil engineering graduates by CE News a 
leading industry journal  
Chi Epsilon Honor Society, December 2000 
  Inducted into the civil engineering honor society Chi Epsilon for undergraduate academic  
achievement.  
Tau Beta Pi Honor Society, November 2000 
  Inducted into Tau Beta Pi honor society for undergraduate engineering academic achievement. 
National Honor Society, December 1996 
  Inducted into Chatham High School’s chapter of the National Honor Society for my high school  
academic achievement. 
Eagle Scout, September 1994 
  Attained the rank of Eagle Scout – the highest award a scout can achieve in the Boy Scouts of  
America. 
LEADERSHIP  
Swiss Sustainable Development of the Built Environment Advisory Council, March 2007-December 2008 
Active member of an inter-disciplinary team charged with advising the Swiss government semi- 
annually on pro-sustainability policies, research activities, and investments. 
Scots Kirk of Lausanne Congregational Board Member, December 2005-December 2008 
Elected to the congregational board of the Scots Kirk of Lausanne. As a board member I review and  
vote on budgetary and maintenance policies. 
  Habitat for Humanity Alternative Spring Break Faculty Advisor, March 2002 
  Lead 12 students on a week-long Habitat for Humanity trip. 
Lehigh Christian Community Church founding member, January 2000-January 2002 
Helped found an all student organized, contemporary Christian Church which hold weekly praise  
worship services on Lehigh University’s campus. 
  Served as facilities manager and helped meet the church’s facilities needs as it grew from 10 initial  
students to a congregation of over 150 students. 
Chi Epsilon Vice President, December 2000-May 2001 
Elected vice president of Lehigh University’s civil engineering honor society Chi Epsilon 
  Represented the Lehigh chapter at the Chi Epsilon annual conference in Madison, Wisconsin. 
Boy Scout Leadership Roles, September 1990-1997 
Contributed to the growth and development of my fellow scouts by holding numerous leadership  
roles in my local troop. 
  Taught and lead over 45 young men in weekly scouting meetings and monthly weekend outings. 
LANGUAGES  English (native language), French (conversational) 
PROFESSIONAL American Society of Civil Engineers, European Safety and Reliability Association, Tau Beta Pi 
AFFILIATIONS 
INTERESTS: I enjoy running 10k and ½ marathons to keep my body and mind fit. 
